Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl: On Two Types of Transcendental Idealism

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Abstract

The idea that subjectivity makes up the foundation or source of all objectivity applies to all transcendental idealists. Nevertheless, Husserl conceives of this relationship between subjectivity and objectivity in a radically different fashion than Kant. Husserl's conception leads to a primacy of the noetic dimension of sense (Sinn) at the expense of the noematic dimension. In order to render this explicit, not only a closer look at Kant's transcendental deduction is illuminating but also taking into account neo-Kantianism. In contrast to Husserl, Kant and the neo-Kantians grant primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema.

Keywords: Husserl, Kant, neo-Kantianism, Rickert, transcendental idealism, subjectivity, noema, noesis

Within phenomenological discourse, it is a widespread conviction that Husserl’s phenomenology is the point of culmination of the Kantian tradition of transcendental philosophy. The phrase ‘subjectivity is the foundation for objectivity’, for good reasons, has turned out to be a correct and common description for the transcendental style of philosophy. That subjectivity makes up the foundation or source of all objectivity, or in other words, that the transcendental logically precedes the empirical, applies to all transcendental idealists. An in-depth analysis, however, shows that Husserl, in an influential way, turns upside down basic foundational relations between subjectivity and objectivity, in particular relations as elaborated on by Kant in the transcendental deduction of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Husserl’s conception of the basic
thesis of transcendental idealism—subjectivity is the foundation for objectivity—leads to a primacy of the noetic dimension of sense (Sinn) at the expense of the noematic dimension. In order to render this explicit, I shall also take into consideration neo-Kantianism, as within this field there has been a fierce debate on the relationship between an objective and a subjective logic. The neo-Kantians take the Kantian route, granting primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema. Finally, it transpires that differences on the level of the idea of subjectivity in general lead to a different conception of concrete subjectivity in Husserl and Kant.

I. Transcendental Foundations and the Noetic

Husserl's position within the tradition of Kantian transcendental philosophy is at issue. In the first decades of the 20th century, phenomenology appeared to be a philosophical approach that according to its self-perception as well as in the eyes of subsequent philosophers managed to turn the concrete subject into a philosophical theme of prime importance. For this reason, Husserl's significance within the tradition of transcendental philosophy is thought to be primarily of a noetic, or to put it in logical terms, of a subjective-logical nature. Hans Wagner's elaborations on Husserl are a fine and influential example of this view (Wagner 1980a; 1980b; 1980c). This assessment, however, needs to be complemented, since doing so would result in a more differentiated view on Husserl's conception of subjectivity and its problems from a transcendental idealist perspective.

According to the deficient view, it is typical of classical transcendental philosophy from Kant to neo-Kantianism that its philosophical approach excludes the topic of 'performance' (Vollzug), or the noetic dimension, from the idea of transcendental foundations. As a consequence, it fails to incorporate the moment of the empirical, or the concreteness of the subject, into the concept of the transcendental subject. The transcendental subject qua entirety of grounds of validity and the concrete subject as an empirical entity remain opposed to each other merely externally instead of the transcendental
subject and the empirical subject being conceptualized in their mutual relatedness. The concrete subject as an empirical subject is handed over to psychology as an empirical discipline. Therefore, classical transcendental philosophy neglects the transcendental status of the acts of the subject, as it is called, its act-life (Aktleben). Husserl, to the contrary, conceives of the pure (transcendental) and empirical (actual, concrete, faktisch) subjectivity, of objective validity and performance, in their logical interrelatedness within the transcendental realm. Hence, Husserl manages to deal philosophically with the accomplishment, that is to say the coming about of the noema, of objectivity in a truly transcendental manner. In a departure from the tradition of transcendental philosophy, Husserl elucidates how the concrete, actual subject is a philosophical object, that is to say an issue of philosophy.

II. Husserl's Subjective Logic and Objective Logic

As indicated, this view does not do justice to the systematics and history of transcendental philosophy as we know it from Kant and neo-Kantianism. First, however, I shall address Husserl's logical position on the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity, before delving into Kant's distinction in the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* between an objective and a subjective deduction, which has been adopted innovatively and influentially by the South-West neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert in his elaborations on 'two routes of the philosophy of knowledge'.

Taking Husserl's conception into closer consideration, it becomes clear that he conceives of pure logic as the science of the essence science as such (mathesis universalis), that is as a formal and universal philosophy of science. This science inquires into the ideal structures that make up the foundation of any science. More precisely, pure logic deals with two different logical objects: with the theory formation of science – concepts, signification (meaning), etc. – as well as with the objects to which theory formation refers. As a formal apophantic logic, logic investigates the general determinations of the essence 'sense as such' (Bedeutung überhaupt), and as a formal ontology, logic investigates the essence 'object as such'
Differing from Kant yet typical of Husserl’s phenomenology is that Husserl conceives of pure or formal logic as an *objective* logic whose *foundations* have to be clarified by a *subjective* logic, that is by a so-called transcendental logic of the subjective acts of knowledge. Hence, a subject-oriented theory of knowledge establishes the foundations of an object-oriented logic. The subjective-logical clarification of objective logic justifies, as Husserl says, its “idealizing presuppositions” (*Hua* XVII, 191). Such a theory of knowledge directed to the subjective (*subjektive Logik*) establishes the foundations for a logic directed to the objective (*objektive Logik*). No surprise, then, that Husserl favors the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*!

Although the thought that a ‘noetic’ or ‘logic directed to the subjective’ functions as the foundation for a pure or objective logic is already prefigured in Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen*, a paradigmatic and precise determination of the relationship between subjective and objective logic can be found in Husserl’s *Formale und transzendentale Logik*. According to this treatise, logic deals with endeavors of reason always in a “double” sense: as a logic directed to the subjective, it deals with the “performing activities” (*leistende Tätigkeiten*)—as a logic directed to the objective, it deals with the “theme,” the ‘what’ of thought and hence with the ‘performed’ “results” (*Hua* XVII, 36-37). For Husserl, “reason in its actuality,” in its “actual performance” of “intentionality” is the “origin” of objective formations (*Hua* XVII, 38). This subjective-logical origin refers to transcendental subjectivity as the “only absolute being.” “Absolute justification of knowledge” is only possible subjectively logically, that is by means of a “universal science of transcendental subjectivity.” (*Hua* XVII, § 103)

In the sketched sense, the noetic or subjective logic obtains a *primacy* regarding the noematic or objective logic. This primacy is what distinguishes phenomenology. Phenomenology finally boils down to, as Husserl formulates it (*Hua* XVII, 280), “self-explication of the subjectivity that considers its transcendental functions,” going back to this “primal logos, from which all other ‘logical’” originates. This philosophical interest in the subjective dimension of knowledge
accompanies Husserl from the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* through to *Formale und transzendente Logik*. His phenomenology is a science of *activities*, as Husserl also puts it, of the subjective ‘origins’. At all times it aims to capture the noeses that make up the foundation of objective endeavors; the determinations and the being of real objects are to be comprehended from the performance of proper acts of thinking—in short, Husserl’s project is that of the subjective foundations of validity.

**III. Kant’s Subjective and Objective Deduction as a Criticism of Husserl**

Concerning the structure of radical foundational relationships, Husserl turns upside down the relationship between subjective and objective logic as we find it in Kant’s philosophy. It is of no surprise, then, that Husserl (as later Heidegger (1951) too) favors the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. He is of the opinion that Kant made a serious mistake by giving up the subjective deduction of the first edition (*Hua* VII, 280ff.). For Husserl, Kant’s transcendental logic truly is in need of a phenomenological clarification of its foundations. Neither Kant nor his neo-Kantian successors, Husserl writes, are able to come up with a “genuine” transcendental philosophy (*Hua* XVII, 272, cf. § 100). Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of subjectivity is supposed to be “completely different” from Kant’s idea of a transcendental logic (*Hua* XVII, 265). This statement of Husserl regarding his relationship to Kant seems correct. He does indeed offer a radically different approach to Kant, perverting the foundational relations characteristic for Kant’s conception of the objectivity of knowledge.

According to what is historically known as Kant’s Copernican turn, and what is called from a philosophical point of view his transcendental turn of the foundational project of philosophy, certainty with regard to the validity of human endeavors can only be reached by the transcendental route. On this route, to use the common (though non-Kantian) term, ‘subjectivity’ turns out to be the principle of ‘objectivity’, of possible relations to objects and hence the ground for validity.
Subjectivity here stands for the entirety of faculties of the subject. It is an entirety of faculties that can neither be naturalized nor culturalized in the sense of a mere multicultural plurality. This philosophy of subjectivity is therefore also not to be confused with a kind of egology: subjectivity as a set of principles of validity is conceived of as a 'general' or 'pure' subjectivity, binding all 'human subjects' as it defines what it means to be human. Transcendental knowledge of human endeavors leads to a set of grounds for validity, which cannot be understood by referring to something outside the structure of these endeavors themselves, i.e. by reference to some kind of a being as in metaphysics or empiricism. It can only be understood by reference to the validity claim and validity structure of human endeavors themselves. With respect to knowledge this means by reference to the cognitive relation itself, that is the relation of intuition and thought. The objective validity of concrete, paradigmatically direct-intentional endeavors of the knowing subject is based upon an entirety of principles of validity. The objective validity of these validity principles is made plausible by showing in an indirect, reflexive procedure that they are the validity conditions of knowledge, of phenomena of theoretical meaning. That such subjectivity is a foundation for objectivity by no means transforms validity into something 'merely' subjective. The punchline of the transcendental turn in philosophy is quite the opposite: subjectivity functions as an objective condition for the possibility of knowledge. It is a condition that founds any objectivity. Hence, objectivity from the start is constrained by the condition of subjectivity.

This implies for the determination of the concept of concrete subjectivity that the concept of the concrete subject has to result from the course of the philosophical validity reflection. In this way, the foundational determination of the concrete subject and its place in the system of philosophy, and with that its initial determinacy, is revealed critically. On the basis of this concept of concrete subjectivity, a starting point is reached for a material doctrine of the determinations of the concrete subject. Hence, a philosophy of concrete subjectivity has its origins in the problem that distinguishes philosophy as
such: the problem of, as Kant would put it, ‘objective validity’, or as Hegel would put it, ‘what truly is’. The concept of the concrete subject results from the concept of philosophy itself.

Although Kant has not developed a philosophy of the concrete subject significant for the foundations of his system of philosophy, he offers a “systematic treatise of the knowledge of man” from a “pragmatic point of view” (AA VII, 119). This pragmatic treatise does not determine the principles of reason in their validity but elaborates on the actualization of reason by humans as free acting beings. Hence, the concrete subject is conceived of as an instance that individuates validity and in this sense is a factor that actualizes (verwirklicht) or performs validity. The same applies to Kant’s considerations in the context of his philosophy of culture and history. In any event, Kant does not deal with the issue of concrete subjectivity beyond its validity qualification.

Nevertheless, dealing with concrete subjectivity philosophically as a validity function is only one important feature. Another one is the undertaking to treat humans as the instance that actualizes validity needs itself to be justified properly, that is to say, it must have its foundations within philosophy as a pure theory of validity. Indeed Kant offers such a foundation. More precisely, he presents it in the heart of his critical project on the foundations of knowledge: in the transcendental deduction. A philosophy that, subsequently, develops a doctrine of concrete subjectivity on this critical basis, surely would no longer be a mere treatise “from a pragmatic point of view.” On the contrary, it would further elaborate the content of the system of philosophy as a system of foundations.

For the topic under discussion, it is, to start with, very interesting that in the course of Kant’s transcendental determination of the foundations of knowledge it turns out that a philosophical justification of knowledge involves two themes that mutually imply each other: the theme of objectivity in the sense of an ‘analysis of the object’ (Gegenstandsanalyse) and the theme of subjectivity in the sense of an ‘analysis of the act’ (Aktanalyse). Hence, Kant’s foundation of objectivity by subjectivity involves an objective-logical and a subjective-logical dimension. It therefore also includes the theme of the subject as
a knowing subject, of the *Aktleben*, of intentionality. Moreover, it does so, as indicated, in the heart of Kant’s critical justification of knowledge: in the ‘transcendental deduction’ of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

That the theme of intentionality has its foundation within transcendental deduction is important in understanding the philosophical relationship between Husserl and Kant. The *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, as a critique of knowledge, functions as Kant’s theory of the ultimate foundations of the system of transcendental philosophy (Krijnen 2015). It discusses, in Kant’s words, (only) the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori. On top of this, within his conception of transcendental justification, and hence, intra-gnoselogically, Kant distinguishes two aspects: a subjective-logical aspect and an objective-logical aspect (Krijnen 2008).

The *objective-logical* aspect of knowledge concerns the synthesis as a relation between pure understanding and pure sensibility. Their cooperation constitutes the *object* of knowledge. It transpires that with respect to its form or objectivity the object of knowledge is constituted by rules, that is to say, governed by rules of thought or the functions of synthesis. The so called ‘subjective’ conditions ground the objectivity of thought, to be more precise, the *objective* character of the object within thought: the objectivity of the object.

In Kant’s conception, this objective-logical issue also contains a *subjective-logical* issue, for Kant addresses the validity-functional accomplishment of the constitution of the object by “powers of cognition” (*Erkenntniskräfte*), and hence, considers “understanding” (*Verstand*) “from a subjective point of view” (*KrV*, A XVI-XVII). The subjective-logical theme of knowledge concerns knowledge as performance (*Vollzug*). It does not concern the objectivity of the object but the *directedness* of thought (thinking) towards the object. The subject proves to be the intentional ground of knowledge. This subjective-logical dimension of knowledge is for Kant only of secondary interest. Accordingly, it plays a significantly stronger role in the first edition of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Here, Kant discusses in-depth different forms of synthesis (*KrV*, A 97ff.). With the “synthesis of apprehension in intuition”, the
“synthesis of reproduction in imagination,” and the “synthesis of recognition in a concept” (KrV, A 105) Kant determines the logical structure of performing knowledge. Performing knowledge makes “all experience as an empirical product of understanding possible” (KrV, A 97-98, my italics). Apparently, the reality (Wirklichkeit) of knowledge (not its determinacy) is achieved through the forms of synthesis qua moments of the structure of performing knowledge.

Kant is not so much interested in determining the structure of knowledge performance but all the more in justifying the objective validity of the concepts which govern this performance as knowledge of objects, and hence govern the knowing subject. As these concepts are the foundation for the objectivity of knowledge, Kant designates the so called objective deduction, which is the deduction which ought to solve this problem (KrV, A XVI, 111, 128), as “essential” for his task—notwithstanding the fact that the subjective side is for Kant of “great importance” (KrV, A XVI-XVII). In the course of the so called subjective deduction, Kant ascends with the mentioned forms of synthesis level by level from the subjective sources to the consciousness of the unity of the synthesis, that is the consciousness of the concept qua knowledge of the object (KrV, A 103). As a consequence, from the subjective deduction Kant finally reaches the objective deduction. This is another way of saying that by considering the intentional dimension of subjectivity in the “powers of cognition”, Kant arrives at the dimension of objectivity. What is significant here for Kant, and relevant for his relationship to Husserl, is that the intentional, subjective activity is not to be performed “at random or arbitrary.” On the contrary, it should be objective (related to an object). Therefore, the performance of the subject requires the object as the instance that stands “against” (dawider) any hegemony of subjective arbitrariness (KrV, A 104, cf. 105).

This leads to results that are important for understanding Husserl’s position concerning subjectivity. Apparently, the issue of subjectivity as the dimension of performing knowledge, of intentionality, is important for Kant though not essential in solving the problem of the objective deduction, that is, to justify the objective validity of the
concepts of pure understanding. This insight also entails that the relationship between the subjective and the objective dimension is by no means a relationship of equivalent moments of the validity structure of knowledge. The subjective, performative dimension of knowledge obtains its objective value and validity only on the basis of the objective transcendental conditions. Without the unity that “makes up the concept of an object” (KrV, A 105), anything but a concept of an object has been produced. According to Kant, the subjective performance of knowledge by the power of ‘understanding’ presupposes objective lawfulness of judgements, whereby pure understanding itself (in the objective sense) functions as the law of synthetic unity. Without doubt, Kant’s consideration takes the subjective sources of knowledge in their ‘transcendental quality’ and ascends from the ‘subjective’ to the ‘objective’ conditions. This consideration, however, presupposes from the start the objective conditions as the point of reference of the subjective performance. That is to say that the concept itself as the factor in which the subjective ascent culminates and in which both preceding forms of synthesis are included, makes this ascent possible. From the subjective point of view, the concept as consciousness of the synthetic unity unites the “manifoldness … in a representation” (KrV, A 103), but seen objectively, without the concept there is no “knowledge of objects” possible (KrV, A 104). As long as the ‘object’ does not stand ‘against’ them, in their mere subjectivity, that is in their mere noematic constitutive performance, subjective functions of knowledge could still be conducted ‘at random or arbitrary’. The consciousness of the concept leads to the concept of the object, the subjective dimension ascent to the objective dimension: to the concept not in its function of uniting but in its function of being the concept of an object that governs the unifying performance.7 ‘Understanding’ in its objective meaning is the grounds of the possibility of the subjective usage of its powers. Seen from the subject matter at issue, Kant’s transcendental deduction of the concepts of pure understanding is ‘in essence’ an objective deduction that co-deduces the moment of subjectivity of knowledge. Although in the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, the importance of the theme of
objectivity becomes more apparent, both editions have the same gist: both concern the objective validity of the pure concepts of understanding, and hence the concept in its objective significance.

This implies that, first, both sides of the deduction belong together in the concept of cognition. Concept and object mutually depend on each other. Secondly, although Kant holds the subjective side of the deduction not to be essential for his purposes, taken as a whole, the subjective side is undoubtedly of essential relevance. This is the case because Kant’s objective deduction not only contains the aspect of a pure logic of determinacy of the object by the apparatus of categories. At the same time, it contains a pointed emphasis on the aspect of apperception. This leads to a noetic co-sense of the determination function of the judgment, resulting from the spontaneity involved in determining the object. Therefore, the theme of (performing) subjectivity is itself part of the objective deduction. The emphasis on the aspect of apperception in laying the foundations of objectivity concerns the competence of determining objects by the ‘I think’ that the cognizing subject claims for itself. For Kant, this claimed competence belongs to the validity structure of cognition. By establishing this competence, from the perspective of a theory of validity, Kant establishes with the principle of synthetic unity of apperception at the same time the concrete subject. By performing judgments, it apperceives itself as competent to determine objects, and hence as a theoretical subject. As such a theoretical subject, the empirical subject is qualified by a relationship to both the manifoldness of intuition and, as Kant formulates it, the ‘I think that must be able to accompany all my representations‘ (KrV, B 131). The manifoldness of intuition and thought come together in a particular concrete subject, and both are subjected to the condition of transcendental unity of self-consciousness as the fundamental and pervasive principle of validity of knowledge. Cognition is determining objects by a thinking subject. To determine the determinacy of this subject, that is the individuating factor of cognition, as performing or actualizing instance of cognition would be the genuine task of a
philosophy of concrete subjectivity. It would pursue, in Kant’s (KrV, A XVI-XVII) parlance, the ‘subjective deduction’.

IV. Rickert’s Two Routes of the Philosophy of Knowledge as a Kantian Criticism of Husserl

The distinction between what is thought and by what it is thought is not only common in Kant’s or Husserl’s philosophy but in neo-Kantianism too. In particular within South-West neo-Kantianism, there has been a fierce debate on the relationship between an objective and a subjective logic. The neo-Kantians take the Kantian route, granting the primacy to the objective or noematic within the correlation between subject and object or noesis and noema. More explicit and elaborated than in Kant, it becomes clear that a primacy of the noetic is only possible on the basis of a petitio principii. In a noetics that is supposed to function as the ultimate foundation, in the parlance of Kant, the ‘objective deduction’ is smudged by the ‘subjective deduction’. Heinrich Rickert’s essay Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transcendentalpsychologie und Transcendentallogik (1909) is an argumentative climax of the debate.8 I use it to address the significant issues for getting a more thorough grip on Husserl and Kant in this respect.

As for Husserl subjective and objective logic are philosophical disciplines, for Rickert too both routes of the theory of knowledge are “transcendental philosophical (Rickert 1909, 174). The theory of the validity of knowledge, in general, the logic, has a twofold character: it consists of an “objective and a subjective sphere” (Rickert 1914, 186). Although the theory of knowledge for Rickert is always concerned with the ‘object of knowledge’, that is to say for Rickert, the measure or criterion for knowledge or the grounds of theoretical validity, this ‘object’ is thematized in two directions.

On the one hand, the grounds of validity are determined with regard to the aspect that knowledge is cognition of an object: the objectivity of cognition is at issue here. This concerns validity as an entirety of principles that guarantee the objectivity of cognitive performances. Knowledge is thematic regarding the foundation of its objectivity, hence, the objective logic, which could be called a validity noematics, determines the
objectivity of the object. On the other hand, knowledge is determined with regard to the aspect that knowledge is cognition of a *subject*: the subjectivity of knowledge is at issue here. This concerns validity in its logical *performance*. Knowledge is thematic regarding the dimension that objectivity is *achieved* by the performing subject, hence, the subjective logic, which could be called a validity noetics, determines the directedness of the subject towards the object. Within the realm of cognition, that ‘*what*’ is thought as an objective configuration has to be distinguished logically from that ‘through which’ it is thought as a subjective configuration. From a validity noematic perspective, the object is conceived “as it would exist for itself, without being an object for an I-subject,” (Rickert 1928, 224, 273; Rickert 1924, 10) and hence determined *without a conceptual reference to the subject*: the relationship to the subject is conceptually detached. By contrast, from a validity noetic perspective, the relationship of the subject *towards* validity is at issue, hence the relationship of the subject to the object is *not* detached (Rickert 1928, 224, 228, 273).

Like Husserl, Rickert too holds that a mere objective logic does not supply a sufficient determination of the validity determinacy of knowledge (Rickert 1909, 217; Rickert 1928, 289). The validity noematic dimension and the validity noetic dimension mutually relate to each other. More in particular, the transcendental deduction of the subjectivity of knowledge shows—as in Kant’s transcendental deduction—that the subject is that factor of cognition that enables it to know itself as a determination. For this reason, the theme of the ‘*object* of cognition’ is intrinsically related to the theme of ‘cognizing the object’. Both themes mutually imply each other *within* the logical sphere.

Yet, validity noetics and validity noematics do not only imply each other. Their relationship is also characterized by an *internal* order. Differing from Husserl and in accordance with Kant, Rickert defends a primacy of validity noematics (Rickert 1928, 292; Rickert 1909, 218 with 220; Rickert 1914, 186; Rickert 1930, 36)—the validity noetic reflection contains the defect of a *petitio principii*. The reason for this is that the validity noetic reflection deals with the *Aktleben* of the
performing subject not as a mere real or natural (for instance psychological) entity but as a phenomenon of sense (Sinnphänomen). This implies that the Aktleben of the subject is conceived of from the start in its significance for the objectivity of cognition. Therefore, validity noetics presupposes objectivity. Without this presupposition of objectivity as the point of reference of the cognitional act, it would not be possible for the validity noetic reflection to distinguish the act as a phenomenon of sense from mere phenomena of reality and to determine the sense of the act. Validity noetics is conducted from the start in relation to objectivity and explicates its concept constantly with relation to objectivity. With the help of this presupposition of objectivity it determines the cognizing act. However, validity noetics as noetics is incapable of justifying this presupposition.

Certainly, the petitio principii of a validity noetic reflection does not consist in applying all kinds of validity noematic factors (for instance principles like identity, difference, etc.), as the same would be the case for any validity noematics. The difference between both disciplines is that only validity noematics is able to justify the presupposition of objectivity. This does not imply that validity noematics is completely independent of subjectivity. It remains impossible to develop a theory of the foundations of objectivity without any reference to subjectivity. The relation to an ‘I-subject’ is a necessary definitional moment of objectivity as such. In its entirety, the object of cognition has to be conceived of in a way that the object can be cognized. It is the object itself that requires the relation to a subject (Rickert 1928, 279ff.). In this respect, Rickert’s parlance of ‘two routes of the theory of knowledge’ gives rise to misunderstanding. Strictly speaking, there is only one route. It starts with validity noematics and then, finally, transitions into validity noetics.

V. Husserl’s Noetication and the Doctrine of Evidence

Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological analysis of intentionality models the foundations of the noematical noetically, that is to say, it leads to subjectivity as the
performing ground of the noema. By contrast, for Kant and Rickert grounding objectivity transcendently is in essence a task of noematics, integrating the noetic dimension. As a consequence, Husserl’s concepts of subjectivity and objectivity are shaped differently than those of Kant and Rickert. Neither Kant nor Rickert identify subjectivity as foundational instance with intentionality, and neither of them conceives of the objectivity that correlates with subjectivity, taken in itself, as *intentio prima et recta*, thinking in direct relation to an object or thinking from naïve evidence. From the perspective of Kant and Rickert, Husserl *noetices the noematic*. Husserl’s phenomenological approach lacks a concept of validity that can do justice to the validity-noematic, objective-logical aspects of the foundations of knowledge.9 Nothing reveals this omission as clearly as Husserl’s solution for the validity-noematic problem of foundations. Husserl offers a validity-noetic option—the doctrine of evidence.

This noetication already has repercussions for the task of a philosophical analysis of acts. Whereas Rickert’s noetics, for instance, is about the validity-functional structure of the act in its significance for objectivity, Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological analysis of intentionality concerns, in contrast, the manifoldness of the particular noeses that establish the noema, and hence the noema as a *mere result of a process of constitution* or the noema as a mere content.10 Moreover, for Husserl, the determinacies of the act make up a new *field of experience*. They are pure yet concrete noeses that can be experienced. Their experience is characterized by apodictic evidence as the ultimate instance of justification. In conformity with the transcendental philosophical standards of Kant, just as for Rickert, the conditions of the possibility of experience themselves are not experienceable but should be comprehended as ‘conditions of the possibility’ (validity principles) of experience. Accordingly, Rickert’s noetics concerns a sphere of grounds of validity for ‘achieving objectivity’; they obtain their validity from this function for objectivity. Hence, it is not about the ontic of an irrelative, absolute being that is ‘pure subjectivity’, as for Husserl.
Husserl’s theorem of evidence finally, that is to say regarding the reduction of the noema to the noeses that constitute it, comes up with noeses in which validity and performance coincide, and hence with the pure ego cogito and its cogitations. They are qualified by so called ‘apodictic evidence’\(^{11}\). Despite several modifications of the theorem of evidence in the course of Husserl’s development, the intuitive, experienceable character of principles remains presupposed, and with that the objectivity of the ‘eidetical’. The essence or eidos, as the given of seeing an essence (Wesensschau), is an ‘object’ too.\(^{12}\) Because the structure of experience or intuition encroaches upon both the realm of essences and the realm of reality, the relation of implication between the foundation or the grounds and what is founded or grounded on it is depraved. The same grounds of validity are assigned to either of them. As a consequence, the true grounds of validity of subjective performances remain unexplained. The noetic-noematic conflation of Aktleben and validity principles contaminates, in Kant’s parlance, the objective with the subjective deduction. Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological reflection on the subject presupposes objectivity as the ultimate foundation for subjective performances, without being able to account for this presupposition in the mode of a strict philosophical reflection.

VI. From \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen} to \textit{Kantische Meditationen}

As said above, Husserl’s noetication has repercussions on what an act-analysis should aim at. Let me conclude with some remarks regarding Husserl’s \textit{Cartesianische Meditationen}. Kant’s conception of transcendental philosophy deals with the problem of validity in the sense of an entirety of principles not of acts and intentions but of objective structures and criteria that form the validity grounds for such acts and intentions too. In this respect, Husserl stands not so much in the validity-theoretical tradition of Kant, Hegel, and neo-Kantianism but in the tradition of the philosophy of consciousness (mind) established by Descartes and successively developed in Empiricism.\(^{13}\) Husserl intends to give this tradition a turn towards a transcendental theory of consciousness. His
transcendental-phenomenological analysis of intentionality characterizes this turn. In the course of its development, Husserl brings to light numerous intentional-theoretical determinations of subjectivity, like its temporality, historicity, monadic and intersubjective determinacy, more in general, the concreteness of pure subjectivity. Yet he is also confronted with fundamental problems affiliated with it. I do not mean here the methodological issue of justifying philosophical knowledge discussed above but a ‘material’ issue: the problem of ‘intersubjectivity’. This is an appropriate example for marking a distinguishing feature of Husserl’s transcendental idealism.

As we have seen, the problem of subjectivity as performing grounds for objectivity is dealt with by Kant in his transcendental deduction of pure concepts of understanding, in particular in the context of his doctrine of apperception. As a consequence, Kant does not identify radical philosophical validity reflection with intentional analysis. In contrast, he brings about an objective logical structure of subjectivity. The neo-Kantians go along with Kant here. Husserl’s route in the Cartesianische Meditationen follows another direction. From the start, in the ‘introduction’ and ‘first meditation’, Husserl celebrates on the one hand Descartes’ intellectual revolution of the ego cogito as the “prototype” (Hua I, § 1) of philosophical reflection, “inaugurating” a turn towards “transcendental subjectivity” (Hua I, 46), while on the other hand immediately taking distance from Descartes too. In the strict sense, Descartes misses the “transcendental turn” (Hua I, § 10) of philosophy. Husserl conceives of the transcendental ego as the “ground of validity” of objectivity (Hua I, 65). The ‘second meditation’ pursues the Cartesian discovery of the transcendental ego and lays open the “field of transcendental experience concerning its universal structures,” an “infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the realm of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience” (Hua I, 66), transcendental experience of a “universal apodictic structure of experience of the I [ego]” (Hua I, 67). The ‘third meditation’ elaborates the general conception of constitution of an intentional object as it resulted from the ‘second meditation’. The ‘fourth meditation’, then, scrutinizes the constitutive
structure of the “transcendental ego itself” (*Hua I*, 99). From this, the central problem of the ‘fifth meditation’ arises: intersubjectivity.

The ego is an ego and as an ego not only an “identical pole of the subjective processes” (*Hua I*, § 31) and a “substrate of habitualities” (*Hua I*, § 32) but in “full concretion” a “monad” (*Hua I*, § 33). Explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically comprises “all constitutive problems as such,” with the consequence that phenomenology as such coincides with this “self-constitution” of the ego (*Hua I*, 102-103, cf. 105-106, § 41). Hence, Husserl’s type of “transcendental idealism” as a “phenomenological self-explication of the ‘ego cogito’” (*Hua I*, § 41) faces the problem of ‘intersubjectivity’ and certainly the problem of intersubjectivity as a constitutive factor for objectivity. Due to Husserl’s phenomenological approach, also “other egos” have to be constituted “in me, as transcendental ego,” constituting, as a subjective-intersubjective result, an “objective world common to all” (*Hua I*, 117, cf. 120). The ‘fifth meditation’ deals with uncovering this sphere of “transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity” (*Hua I*, 121).

For Kant, in contrast, there is no such problem of constituting intersubjectivity. In his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, he conceives of objectivity as being founded in an entirety of principles that determine the objectivity of objects of thought. They range from a noematic-basic level of constitution of the cognitive relation itself to the constitutive forms of intuitions, concepts, and judgments, up to ideas as methodological regulators of concrete object determination. Hence, Kant reveals an entirety of noematic principles as principles of objective thought from its origins to its concreteness. These objective-logical principles make up the foundation of the objective common world, as well as of any objectivity. Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological analysis of intentionality differs from this type of transcendental idealism. Husserl elucidates, in conformity with its subjective-logical, noetic orientation, how the experience of ‘the other’, or its noematic content, intentionally comes about. He aims to obtain insight into the “intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego” (*Hua I*, 122).
The right to use the concept of the other at all philosophically remains *presupposed* for a doctrine dealing with the intentional accomplishment of the experience of the other.

Kant (as well as neo-Kantianism) offers an approach for integrating the dimension of intentionality or performing subjectivity in an encompassing philosophy of validity under the aegis of the noematic. Husserl offers an impressive doctrine of subjectivity. Due to his ego or consciousness-theoretical orientation, however, Husserl corrupts the Kantian approach, notwithstanding the material richness and importance of his analysis of intentionality. Subjectivity and objectivity have to be coordinated properly according to the requirements of reason. Therefore, future Husserlian phenomenology should go for a synthesis—a transformation of the *Cartesianische Meditationen* into *Kantische Meditationen*.

**NOTES**

1 This also applies also to later developments within a Kantian type of transcendental philosophy. See Flach (1994; 1997) and Wagner (1980c).
2 It underestimates Hegel's speculative transformation of Kant's transcendental philosophy too, in particular the contribution of his philosophy of 'subjective spirit' to the philosophy of concrete subjectivity (Hegel 1991, §§ 387-481).
3 See for Husserl's idea of pure logic Bernet, Kern, and Marbach (1996, 41ff.).
4 See for the correlation between (formal) apophantics and (formal) ontology especially *Hua* XVII, §§ 37-46, 25, 27; see also *Hua* XVIII, §§ 67-70 or Husserl 1948, § 1. See Heffernan (1989) for Husserl's concept of logic in *Formale und transzendentale Logik*.
5 Cf. *Hua* VIII, §§ 65-66 with 32 and *Hua* XIX/1, 5ff. The subjective-objective orientation of logic comes to force here throughout (although not yet in the ripe form of the noesis-noema correlation and the 'phenomenological reduction'). Therefore, the noematic focus is colored noetically; objects are what they are only through the "acts of intending (Vermeinen)," hence, for the "phenomenological perspective" there is nothing but a "fabrics of such intentional acts" (*Hua* XIX/1, 48).
6 See, for instance, also the emphatic formulations Husserl applies in the section on “Genuine phenomenological self-explication of the 'ego cogito' as 'transcendental idealism’” of *Cartesianische Meditationen* (*Hua* I, § 41), in particular the statements on a "genuine" theory of knowledge as analysis of intentionality and phenomenology as "transcendental idealism.”
7 Kant writes that the subjective deduction is “as it were an inquiry into the cause of a given effect” and in this sense seems to be merely hypothetical. Kant, however, adds that this is not the case (*KrV*, A XVII). On the one hand,
the reason for this seems rather trivial: the subjective deduction is a transcendental inquiry, not an empirical one; hence, it does not deal with an empirical relationship of conditions. On the other hand, the reason is less trivial: intra-gnoseologically the presupposition of the subjective deduction—the given effect, and hence objectivity as the whereat of the subjective syntheses qua causes—is justified in the course of the objective deduction. Insofar both deductions are 'two sides' of the transcendental deduction, Kant holds a logical primacy of the objective deduction. Therefore, the subjective inquiry strips off its hypothetical character.

8 For Rickert's theory of the 'two ways' see Rickert (1909; 1912; 1928). See on this issue Krijnen (2001a; 2001b).

9 Of course, like it is for Kant or Rickert, for Husserl too the constitution of an object is governed by rules; objects relate to "a structure of rules of the transcendental ego" (Hua I, 90).

10 Husserl, and, despite his critical remarks on Husserl's interpretation of Rickert, Kern (1964) too do not really figure out the relationship between validity noetics and validity noematics in Rickert (see Krijnen 2001b, 352, note 102).

11 From the Logische Untersuchungen (Hua XIX/2, §§ 36ff.) up to the Ideen I (Hua III/1, §§ 136-145) and the Cartesianische Meditonen (Hua I, §§ 5ff.) the theorem of apodictic evidence is central to Husserl. (His attempt to found predicative in pre-predicative evidence is not relevant for the present issue, as the basic relationship of dependence between noema and noesis remains intact.)

12 Cf. Hua III/I, 51 with Hua I, 12, 65ff., 112; Hua III/I, 14, cf. 46; Hua V, 142ff.; Husserl 1948, 421.

13 See on Husserl and classical German idealism recently Krijnen (2014). For a recent presentation of Husserl's critique of Kant, see Pradelle (2015). Pradelle immediately takes Kant to be as a philosopher of consciousness (mind). According to him, Kant's Copernican turn answers the question 'how is a subject ('consciousness') able to know an object (world) that is independent of it?' (cf. Pradelle 2015, 27). This question, however, characterizes not so much Kant as the tradition of rationalists like Descartes and empiricists like Hume. It presupposes that subject and object are originally separated. Kant's philosophy is primarily not a philosophy of consciousness but of validity. As a result, the distinctions between validity noetics and validity noematics, subjective and objective deduction do not play a role for Pradelle. He rather focuses on Husserl's interpretation of Kant in order to highlight the differences between Husserl and Kant.

REFERENCES

Husserl’s works are cited in conformity with Husserliana listed below, abbreviated Hua I-XLI; all translations are mine. References to Kant’s works are done from Gesammelte Schriften in Akademie Ausgabe (AA, original pagination), with Kritik der reinen Vernunft abbreviated KrV; all translations are mine.


Christian Krijnen / Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl


302


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