

The Concept of the World: From the Husserlian Epistemological Horizon to the Heideggerian Hermeneutical Possibility

Gheorghe Cecan
“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi

Abstract

The phenomenological approach to the lifeworld aims to reveal the structure of world without support on metaphysical speculation or epistemological assumptions, exclusively on the basis of subjective experience and intuition, instances which mark the formal coordinates of the ontological structure of what it means to live in a context. For this reason, the description and explanation of the meaning of the lifeworld presupposes revealing the daily structures of the world of life, the interconnections of the self with others and with the environment not in the sense of a causal system, but more in a sense of a system of possibility of what Martin Heidegger called *hermeneutics of the facticity*. In this context, the following paper is dedicated to a treatment of the of some of the frequently debated issues in the literature on Husserl and Heidegger by providing phenomenological analyses of world and subjectivity as the respective philosophers viewed this particular relation.

Keywords: Intentionality, *being-in-the-world*, horizon, referential whole, being-at-hand, epoché

1. Introduction

“To the things themselves!” Thus can be summarized the conceptual vector of the movement of phenomenology inaugurated by Husserl and later branched by Heidegger, but even under this general battle cry it has been and remains unclear to what extent “phenomenology” actually means the same thing to Husserl and Heidegger. Opinions range from the view that “Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology are radically different, and have virtually nothing to do with each other,” (Schacht 1972, 294) to the contention that “the whole of *Sein and Zeit* springs from an indication given by Husserl and

amounts to nothing more than a detailed elaboration of a particular Husserlian theme.” (Merleau-Ponty 2005, VII)

In this context, it is necessary to acquire a more systematic grasp on this matter of defining the lines and the limits of what is called phenomenology. At least it is clear that Husserl and Heidegger agreed on one or two negative points concerning phenomenology. Neither suggests that agreement on the phenomenological slogan ensures any common theme. What are the “things themselves” that we should go back to? The answer with necessity does not follow from the maxim itself. Secondly, Husserl and Heidegger are equally worried about the method of phenomenology. They are both concerned with the way other phenomenologists construe all kinds of theories and ideas and easily pass them off as “essential insights”. For both Husserl and Heidegger, phenomenology is “hard work”. Despite their negative and formal agreements, however, there are good reasons to believe that “phenomenological work” has very different meanings for Husserl and Heidegger. After all, Husserl conceives of his phenomenology as a “transcendental,” even “epistemological” project, while Heidegger's phenomenology must understand itself as “ontology.” On the one hand, the “things themselves” are consciousness” and the question of how it “reaches” transcendent things, and, on the other hand, the being of entities is the phenomenon *par excellence*. In the final analysis, it seems, there is no single phenomenology, but rather a series of different phenomenologies. But can Husserlian constitutive phenomenology be identified with epistemology really without further extensions? And is it so obvious that Heidegger's “ontological” phenomenology is opposed to transcendental philosophy? In the present study, I will try to answer these questions by arguing that there are important similarities between the two accounts when it comes to how they characterize the world and subjectivity. However, as we shall see, there are significant differences in the interpretation of intra-mundane entities.

In the following lines, I intend to carry out my intentions by taking up two charges that are often leveled against Husserl—the charge that he has no conception of the world

except as a totality of entities, and the charge that Husserlian transcendental subjectivity is “worldless”. I argue that Husserl's notion of a world horizon is in many ways similar to Heidegger's conception of the world as a referential network, and that the former indeed seems to have the advantage of being less tied to a specific way of being intra-mundane. I also bring up the issue of subjectivity. One of the “guiding clues” for this study is the charge of worldlessness, but Husserl's charge that Heidegger's phenomenology is a type of “anthropology” is also considered. I argue, among other things, that Husserl's phenomenology of the embodied transcendental subject exhibits features very similar to those expounded by *Dasein*: both are “in” the world, rather than simply “related” to it, but are “in” the world precisely as subjects, not as objects. Thus, just as the transcendental subject cannot be said to be worldless, it is equally wrong to claim that Heidegger's phenomenology of *Dasein* is a type of anthropology. Both Husserl and Heidegger analyze the structures of the transcendental subject, and both offer a radically new interpretation of it.

2. Object-intentionality and the world

Many discussions in the literature about Husserl and Heidegger revolve around the concept of the *world*. It would not be entirely wrong to say that a significant part of this discussion was triggered by a famous passage from *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger accuses traditional philosophy of assuming too little instead of too much, when it characterizes subjectivity. This passage, which concerns us, unfolds as follows: “If, in the ontology of *Dasein*, we ‘take our departure’ from a worldless “T” in order to provide this “T” with an Object and an ontologically baseless relation to that Object, then we have ‘presupposed’ not too much, but too little.” (Heidegger 1962, 316) How does Husserl react to this when he reads *Being and Time*? Having already read more than three hundred pages of the book, which, as Gadamer suggests (Gadamer 2013, 261), must have appeared ambiguous, sometimes articulating a transcendental phenomenology, sometimes criticizing the same transcendental stance, Husserl is suspicious that the accusation is above all directed at his phenomenological corpus.

In the margin of his copy of *Being and Time*, Husserl notes: "Objection, wordless I" (Husserl 1997, 377).

Although Heidegger's criticism against Husserl is concealed throughout the pages of the Heideggerian *magnum opus* – often disguised as a critique of Descartes – in this case of the concept of the world, the critique is so subtly disguised that there is no doubt that a critique of Husserl's methodology is in fact one of Heidegger's main goals. But is the criticism in question justified criticism? Despite Husserl's preoccupation with the notion of intentionality, many commentators are willing to give legitimacy to Heidegger's accusation. It would not be enough to answer that these commentators simply do not respect the inherent central subject of the Husserlian corpus namely the intentionality, or that they misinterpret the *epoché* as implying the exclusion of the world from the phenomenological thematization of a "pure" ego. In this context, it is necessary to approach the question carefully and from two different perspectives. First, we must examine the phenomenological notion of "world" – not only Husserl's notion, but also the notion that Heidegger might consider when he claims that the Husserlian ego is one without a world. Is there any common ground to be found here, or is what Heidegger labels the "world" actually absent from the Husserlian phenomenology, or at least not something that essentially belongs to transcendental subjectivity as Husserl understood it? This last remark suggests a distinct set of questions which we need to address exhaustively. What is the notion of *Dasein* that we find in Heidegger's work, and is the *being-in-the-world* (*In-der-Welt-sein*) the concept that adequately describes the being of *Dasein* compared to the being of Husserl's transcendental subjectivity? These questions are considerable and are provided with only preliminary answers in the present study. But if we want to be able to locate with a certain accuracy the differences that separate Heidegger's questions about being from Husserl's view on the subject, we must understand to some extent what conceptions of the world, worldly beings, and subject are developed in these phenomenologies. For Husserl, the suspension is justified because he never gives up his "sympathy" for the descriptions of beings within the natural

attitude. This is also true for Heidegger, because he articulates the description of mundane *Dasein* from a point of view that is already phenomenological. To the extent that individual worldly beings are conceived, we already have sufficient indications to deduce: Husserlian and Heideggerian accounts are – at least at the “descriptive” level – almost identical. In this context, it cannot be the case that the Husserlian *epoché* and reduction imply that we should ignore the world in favor of a sphere of the “subjective” being. On the contrary, the method of reduction requires us to preserve the world, because it must function as a transcendental clue to a return to subjectivity. Also, if what is meant by the accusation of “lack of the world” is specifically that the reduction, although it needs a mundane “guiding clue”, implies a “retreat” back to a subjective sphere, never to return in the world, the accusation can be rejected immediately, especially given the thread of the Husserlian method. The regression to subjectivity does not imply an abandonment of the world; the reduction does nothing but articulate the *being-there-for-us* of the world and can only do so by “leaving” the theme of the world. However, the fact that the world does not disappear from the focus of the Husserlian phenomenology with the realization of the transcendental reduction does not mean that subjectivity through such a reduction cannot be “deprived of the world” in a certain specific sense, more precisely in a sense in which the question of constitution implies primacy of one pole over the other.

Certainly, Heidegger would never think that the Husserlian phenomenology has no interest in the world; rather, he must have reason to assume that, despite Husserl's insistence on the importance of the world and the mundane as transcendental clues, the transcendental subjectivity that Husserl discovers must nevertheless be categorized as “worldless” in a sense in which the world is excluded from the constitution of the subject. But Husserl ostentatiously emphasizes that - as it is intentionally directed - transcendental subjectivity has in itself a relation to objects. It is essentially object-oriented, and if we were to remove intentionality from the transcendental subject, this instance can no longer be called transcendental subjectivity, because it could no longer be the

“place of manifestation” of something. And having no experience, it would, in fact, cease to be subjectivity in any concrete sense. Despite all these aspects, a commentator like Pierre Keller claims that Husserl opts for a theory of intentionality based on acts of consciousness that do not need any object (Keller 1999, 17) and that this is the crucial difference between Husserl and Heidegger. Certainly, insofar as what is meant is that acts of imagination, memory, or even perception might have intentional objects that turn out, in fact, not to exist in reality (one may, once again, think of the puddles seen on the road ahead on a hot day), then Husserl's theory of intentionality does have a great deal to say about precisely these sorts of acts¹. But the question arises: what types of acts should Husserl analyze instead? Furthermore, why is it a problem to study acts whose objects need not exist? It seems that the commentator's apparent worries — that phenomenology should concentrate on acts whose objects necessarily exist — surely cannot be Heidegger's.

However, as we read in the commentary, it turns out Keller's main contention is that Husserl assumes that intentionality can be understood by abstraction from the existence of objects to which consciousness is directed in intentionality. It is precisely this view and the internalist interpretation of intentionality in Husserl that Heidegger rejects, according to Pierre Keller. It is important to note that the problem in question does not respect the Husserlian vector, as in *Logical Investigations* the central question is not whether the objects of intentional experiments should matter „like nothing” for phenomenology or whether the exclusive “noetic” accent that Husserl articulates as characteristic should be completed with a “noematic” focus. Therefore, an accusation such as: Husserl's transcendental phenomenology ignores objects, in order to focus on the subjective acts themselves, can be easily rejected. But that is not Keller's argument. Rather, the existence of objects is supposed to be ignored by Husserl, and this leads him to an unacceptable „internalism”, according to Heidegger. But how should Husserl consider the existence of intentional objects? Certainly, Husserl would be quick to point out that the noematic correlations discovered by

phenomenology – intentional objects only as intentional – would be, for example, for (normal) acts of perception “real”, “existing”. When I touch the keyboard in front of me, there is no doubt that the perceived keyboard is perceived as existing, and therefore it would simply be bad phenomenology if Husserl had abstracted the “existence of the object’ in this sense. I suspect that what Pierre Keller has in mind is a much stronger notion of “existence”: not existence as something that belongs to a description of certain noematic correlations, but existence there, in reality, in the real world. In other words, the main difficulty in Husserl's theory of intentionality would then be its failure to take into account this problematic fact: whether or not intentional objects really exist, and this is a significant difficulty, because the real existence of objects possible plays a major role in the “intentional” reporting of consciousness. Husserl positions himself in an unacceptable “internalist” view because he does not even consider the role of intentional objects, which exist in his account of our experience of these objects. This reading seems to be confirmed by Keller's definition of internalism. An internalist is one who believes that “it is possible to understand at least some contents of the mind in the narrow terms provided by introspection and first-person awareness that does not appeal to any knowledge of other persons or objects outside of the person in question. It is thus possible to investigate such contents of consciousness in a manner that is methodologically solipsistic.” (Keller 1999, 111)

It seems that the difficulty of Husserl's thesis of intentionality lies in the fact that it undertakes to delimit our consciousness of the world and worldliness without appealing to any knowledge of that world and of the worldly entities concerned. But our experiences of the world and worldly beings cannot be explained by reference to the existence of that world and those beings. This is because we have access to the “existence of objects” only through our experience in which they turn out to exist, which means that the naturalist critic must “live” uncritically and in the explanation of experience he must invoke the same type of experience that we intend to explain. The naturalistic vision starts from the wrong end, assuming as unproblematic the very experience that it problematizes.

Husserl, therefore, cannot be criticized consistently for understanding intentionality in abstraction from the existence of the intentional objects – because if Husserl does not “abstract” in his account of intentionality from the existence (in the sense discussed) of the intended objects, if he does not refrain from appealing in the natural way to our knowledge of them, he cannot succeed in making intelligible our intentional awareness of those objects at all. I don't think that Heidegger's accusation of “lack of world” overlaps with Pierre Keller's criticism of Husserl. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (Heidegger 1988), for example, Heidegger rejects emphatically the “natural” account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a relation between two entities, a relation that subsists only insofar as the entities (object and subject) exist. In opposition to such an account, Heidegger insists that the “subject” itself is intentionally related). This is hardly compatible with the position that a satisfactory explanation of intentionality should take into account our existence or (non-phenomenological) knowledge of intentional objects. As it should already be clear to some extent, the present study argues that Heidegger (at least Heidegger from the period of *Being and Time*) is a transcendental phenomenologist, who asks questions of constitution and not a realist, as Keller points out. Experiences always have their intentional objects (although they do not have to exist). There is no intention without an intentional object, insofar as transcendental subjectivity is essentially characterized by intentionality, it would be analytically false to call it “objectless” as Heidegger points out. In this context, Heidegger can describe Husserl's transcendental subjectivity as “worldless” because there is no other concept of world in Husserl's work than that of a totality of spatio-temporal events regulated by laws or other than that of a mass of all beings real (and ideal). The only concept of the world in Husserl's thesis would seem to belong to a totality of beings or events. This conception of the world is one that Heidegger briefly mentions in *Being and Time* and labels it “world” (in quotation marks) in contrast to his own conception of the world (without quotation marks) as the one in which *Dasein* “lives”. Thus, Husserl's transcendental subjectivity is

not “without world”, in the sense in which it would not be intentionally bound to beings — but it is “without world”, in the sense in which it is devoid of a connection to the world in the specific sense Heidegger purports. In other words, even though on Husserl’s account transcendental consciousness is temporal, embodied, personal, and socio-historically embedded, and even though Husserl provides the outlines of an elaborate phenomenological ontology of a spatio-temporal socio-historical world, Heidegger objects in his early work that Husserl never sufficiently addressed the question of the being of this consciousness or the being of the world, as Hanne Jacobs points out in “Transcendental subjectivity and the human being” (Jacobs 2014, 87-105).

Now, before we discuss whether this in fact must be a problem for Husserl – it might be, after all, that Heidegger’s concept of world is phenomenologically unsound or inferior to Husserl’s conception – let us take a closer look at the claims just cited. Is Husserl’s sole concept of world really that of a totality of either spatio-temporal events or of real and ideal entities? Do we find in Husserl no other notion of world than that of a totality of beings and events?

3. The world as horizon

It is certainly true that Husserl, as Ludwig Landgrebe points out (Landgrebe 1967, 57-58), tends to initiate his analyses of the world’s constitution by focusing on the given individual entity. But, from the beginning, Husserl seems to realize that the individual entity is never given in complete isolation, as if perceiving this computer screen could mean seeing it as the whole and only thing that exists. Rather, the computer screen is seen as a simple part of a world that extends beyond it. For example, although my focus is on the computer screen, there is actually more in my field of vision: the table on which the computer screen sits, the curtains behind it, the glass, and beyond that, the trees. These things are part of the non-thematic background object [*gegenständlicher Hintergrund*] against which the screen of the thematically perceived computer is displayed. But reality, as it is given to me in my current perception of the screen, is not exhausted in this

relationship between thematic and non-thematic. It extends beyond my current visual framework. I can let my gaze go to the door behind me, and behind that door I know that there is a familiar corridor, and although none of this, under normal circumstances, is not explicitly in my consciousness, nor is co-thematized. However, these instances “matter” for the constitution in question. According to Husserl, the perceived does not matter, so to speak, for itself, but instead counts as an extract from a wider environment of objects. This computer screen and this curtain are perceived as belonging to a world that extends even beyond what I will be able to see in my entire experience.

The key terms with which Husserl tries to conceptualize the present being of this reality – never as a whole perceived in fact, yet somehow always involved in what is actually perceived – is elaborated in *Ideas* as follows: “But not even with the domain of this intuitionally clear or obscure, distinct or indistinct, *co-present* – which makes up a constant halo around the field of actual perception – is the world exhausted which is 'on hand' for me in the manner peculiar to consciousness. What is now perceived and what is more or less clearly co-present and determinate (or at least somewhat determinate), are penetrated and surrounded by *obscurely intended horizon of indeterminate actuality*.” (Husserl, 2000, 57)

Whatever it may not be concerned with, the subject finds himself at every moment surrounded by a horizon of indeterminate reality. Even when I am caught writing a text or arranging my books, an endless reality is, in a non-thematic way, at play. An easy way to understand Husserl's perspective would be the following: The perceived object, such as the computer screen, is seen as an object in a more or less intuitive “object-field” [*Dingfeld*], e.g. this office with its various objects. But what “matters” to me, what “exists” to me, is not exhausted in this field. Rather, the field of things presents itself as a simple “section” of the world: “as the momentary field of perception, [it] always has the character for us of a *sector of the world*, of the universe of things for possible perceptions.” (Husserl 1970, 162) The world, according to the quote, is thus the universe of perceptible things – certainly, this is precisely

the concept of “world” (in quotation marks) from which the Heidegger scholars criticize Husserl as reducing the whole phenomenon of the world to perceptibility. The horizon of the world, it seems, functions for Husserl as a universal “container” for perceptible objects, or even the totality of such objects. The latter notion of world seems implicit, for example, in Husserl's characterization of the world as the horizon of things (*Horizont von Dingen*) or of reality rather than the horizon of things, and in the description of the world as the “universal unity” of things (*die Alleinheit von Dingen*). From a Heideggerian point of view, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann offers a justified conclusion to this subject: “Insofar as consciousness is already intentionally alongside the entities, the critique of a 'world' less subject that may be directed at Hartmann's subject of knowledge cannot be directed at Husserl. But if by world, we do not mean the totality of real (and ideal) entities, given horizontally, but rather the disclosedness of a world (clearing, openness) as that which ontologically makes it possible for entities to be encountered as inner-worldly (and thus also [makes possible] the givenness of objects for consciousness), then the intentional consciousness of Husserl – both the objectified and the transcendental-constituting consciousness – must also be characterized as *worldless*. It is worldless because it is only intentionally related to life-worldly objects, and to the universal horizon of the life-world that embraces all possible objects – i.e., it is only related to *inner-worldly* [entities].” (Herrmann 2004, 65)

In other words, it seems the introduction of the notion of *horizon* only brings more clearly to light the essential limitations of Husserl's description of the phenomenon of world, as seen from Heidegger's point of view. By no means does the world as a whole allow Husserl to redirect his thesis beyond individual things and their manifestation to articulate a subjectivity that tends to a world that is *not composed of such things* – a world that allows things to manifest themselves in the first place. Although Husserl insists that we do not perceive things in complete isolation; although he realizes that each individual object is necessarily perceived in a framework that involves other objects and, ultimately, the entire universe of

objects, his concept of the world still remains essentially a collection or a totality of objects. These limitations are included in Heidegger's argument. But this argument, in my opinion, overlooks the most important features of the notion of horizon developed by Husserl in his concrete analyses of perceptual intentionality. As I try to show in the following part of this study, the idea of the horizon is in fact, if understood correctly, an alternative to the conception of the world as a whole, rather than another version of it. It should be noted, however, that the following account highlights only a few facets of Husserl's conception.

It is important to determine as a premise that, according to Husserl, we never perceive an object completely isolated from other objects. When I perceive a tree, I see it as a tree in a garden, surrounded by other trees and so on. But the perceptual horizon on this current act of perception is not exhausted by these "objects-surroundings". For the perceived tree itself, regardless of its surroundings, there is a perceptual horizon: the tree presents itself as one that I could see from different angles, thus bringing different sides (such as the "invisible" back of the trunk) into view. and also as one that I can inspect more closely in terms of the part actually perceived. These multiple aspects of the tree are co-intentional, according to Husserl, in my current perception of the tree – a perception that, strictly speaking, has only one such aspect: "The object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is. It is only given 'from the front' only 'perspectivally foreshortened and projected' etc. While many of its properties are illustrated in the core content of the perception, at least in the manner which the last expressions indicate, many others are not present in the perception in such illustrated form: to be sure, the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior etc, are co-intended [*mitgemeint*] in more or less definite fashion [...], but they are not themselves part of the intuitive, i.e., of the [strictly] perceptual or imaginative content, of the perception." (Husserl 2001, 220)

The sides or additional aspects belong to the perceived tree exactly as intended in the perception in question (that is to say in the noematic correlate). According to *the perception itself*,

the tree has “more to offer”. If we were to successfully isolate a “core” of the complete perceptual presentation and throw away the intended “surplus”, the result would be a disintegration of the concrete perception. In other words, the intentional surplus must itself be considered a perceptual intentional surplus, rather than a certain non-perceptual intentionality, for example, an imaginative intentional complex, always accompanying a perception. What I perceive when I perceive a tree is not an aspect of a tree nor (in most cases) a part of it, but precisely the tree itself, the “whole” tree – and this means that, perceptually, it intends many things that are not themselves, strictly speaking, manifest. The concrete perceptual manifestation includes both the “authentic” and the “inauthentic”. Speaking from a noematic point of view, we can say that the perceived object belongs to a horizon of co-parts and intended aspects. Thus, the paradigm of an intuitive “presenting” act, the paradigm of a “fulfilling” act, turns out to be “a complex of full and empty intentions”. But does perception need to have this “horizontal structure”? In *Ideas*, Husserl argues that God himself should perceive material things in this way, if he were to perceive them as they are. It is not because we are “finite” creatures that we can perceive worldly entities only in perceptions that have a horizontal structure. Rather, the beings themselves demand this type of perception: it is up to their essence to manifest in this way. According to Husserl, a perception that does not have a horizontal structure would simply not be a perception of something like a tree – it would not be a perception of a transcendent object, an object that is not contained or exhausted by my experience of it. A tree perceived as complete or “adequate” would not be a tree at all. It would be something inseparable from my instant experience. In *Logical Investigations*, Husserl already offers an explanation: “If perception were always the actual, genuine self-presentations of objects that they pretend to be, there could be only one single perception for each object, since its peculiar essence would be exhausted in this self-presentation.” (Husserl 2001, 220)

We have to imagine that everything that is intended in my current perception of the tree is *given* in that perception,

that all the “intentional terminals” that make up the noema of the tree are manifested in the strict sense. Now, if I moved my upper body just a few inches on both sides, then – given that everything that was intended was already given in the previous perception, that all aspects of the tree were fully manifest – we should say that my perception can no longer be a perception of the same unaltered object. It could not be the same unchanged tree that I perceived, because the movement of my upper body by a few centimeters makes me see new aspects. If these new aspects are new aspects of the same tree, then we should say that not all aspects were given at the beginning, which, by hypothesis, must confirm the Husserlian perspective. But why is it important to be able to have several perceptions, different in the perceived content, of the same object? In fact, we can and would have been wrong to claim that a perception of something like a tree can ever give all aspects of its object simultaneously – but why does Husserl think it is a matter of principle that the perception of a thing is “inadequate” in this way? If all aspects of the perceived object are fully manifest and, therefore, if the perceived object changes whenever the “perceptual content” changes, then the perceived object will change with experience. Each qualitatively different perceptual experience would mean a qualitatively different perceived object. The state in question involves asking the question: how could experiences be experiences of something? Is it not justified in principle rather for experience and object to not be separated? Experience seems to completely absorb the object, so that perception cannot be differentiated from perceptual experience. This is, in fact, what Husserl concludes is: If we think of the ideal aspect that is extracted from the nexus of fulfillment and is extended in time, then we would have a completely concrete appearance as an absolute donation of a thing. What kind of donation would this be? It would not be an inappropriate donation. It would not contain anything indeterminate: it would be a completely appropriate and completely decisive aspect. There would also be a difference between the aspect which appears and the transcendence determined by it.

This means, in general, that no concrete perceptual object - even viewed (artificially) in isolation - can manifest

without a horizon of intuitive “absence”. A tree could not manifest as such for me in an act of perception, if that perception does not intend both intuitively given aspects and intuitively non-given aspects. Thus, the perception of the object is not such a simple matter, according to Husserl. It eliminates the possibility of a pure and simple donation; rather, donation according to a horizon is *the essence of being in the world*. Therefore, even in the absence of the co-intentional horizon, what is donated is not a “whole” thing, but rather only a part or an aspect of a thing, because obviously a “part” is necessarily a side of an object, and refers to other sides, so it can only be given as a side when the horizontal intention of other sides or aspects is at stake. It is important to remember that the intended horizon must be there from the beginning, implicitly right from the first “sight” I threw at the object. If I want to take an exact look at this object, it is necessary that the multiple aspects given improperly be co-intended simultaneously. It cannot be my subsequent intention to lead to the discovery of “additional” aspects of the object, because if I had not anticipated from the beginning only the strictly given, there would be nothing more to explore. Obviously, all these have important implications not only for the Husserlian conception of the world, but also for its notion of subjectivity. In Husserl's terms, every perceived worldly being requires an “inner horizon” (*Innenhorizont*), a horizon of aspects that are *not-yet-manifest* and *are-not-longer-manifest* aspects of the same being - and as we have seen, without such of an “inner horizon”, we would not perceive any mundane entity at all. We can thus label the object-surroundings in which such a perceived object is always perceived, the “outer horizon” (*Außenhorizont*). The world itself would include both the inner and the outer horizon, plus the corresponding manifestation, thus being a universal horizon in which *what appears appears as such*.

This discussion about object and perception therefore indicates something essential about the concept of world as horizon. The world is not a totality of entities, but as horizon is rather the very structure that allows entities to appear. If the world is the universal horizon, then it cannot be a totality of

entities, because entities cannot manifest or constitute in any way, so to speak, “horizon-free”. If entities are simply and completely given, given without horizons of non-giveness, then it would make sense to say that the (rest of) the world, as a world horizon, is the totality of those entities that are not currently given. But as a matter of principle, there can be no such horizonless giving of any worldly entity, according to Husserl. Even when we abstract from all surroundings and have the entity perceived individually as given in total isolation, we are necessarily drawn back to perceptual horizons. Therefore, if we take seriously the notion of a world-horizon and are careful not to overlook its implications, we can appreciate why Husserl notes that the world is something in *things-in-themselves* rather than a collection of things (Husserl 1970, 296). The world, as (“inner”) horizon is certainly part of what constitutes manifest things as they are manifest, and if individual things already involve the world in this sense, they need it, as it were, in order to constitute themselves, then it makes no sense to say of the world that it is a collection or a totality of things. If we mean by horizon the worldliness of entities, this would seem to suggest that entities are what make the world possible, or at most that world and individual entities are interdependent. But our earlier discussion of perceptual intentionality shows that the horizon is the condition of entities' possibilities and not the other way around. Certainly, there can be no present horizon except as a horizon that allows entities to appear, and in this sense the horizon of the world needs entities. But this does not mean that entities make the horizon possible, it only means that an intentional horizon cannot be any other way than a horizon that has lets entities appear. Since no entity can be given otherwise than in and through co-intentional horizons, the idea of the world as a totality implies that also the world can only be given in and through co-intentional horizons. Intentional horizons, such as the multitude co-intended in the present perception and co-responsible for my perceiving this or that thing, would then be something that makes the world possible, rather than themselves constituting the world. The world could not be the perceptual horizon itself, but only a collection of entities that

appear in and through the perceptual horizon. Therefore, the concept of the world as a horizon is not only non-identical with the concept of the world as a totality; is actually incompatible with it. The two would only be compatible if there could be given “horizonless” entities.

In short, the world is not a horizon of things, but a horizon of possible experience; “an infinite horizon of possible experience” (Husserl 1959, 148) or, more precisely, the universe of actual as well as possible experience, and that makes all the difference. As the horizon of possible experience, the world has a mode of being (*Seinsweise*) completely different from the mode of being of the individual thing. A horizon of possible experience that in and through which, as we have seen, any individual entity can manifest, is not itself a “container” of such entities, nor is it the totality of them. As a universal horizon, the world is a structure that allows individual entities to manifest. If we return to our discussion of “wordlessness,” it becomes clear that the charge is not legitimate if it is based on the assumption that Husserl has no other concept of the world than that of a totality of entities. If *being-in-the-world* means “transcending to the World as the possibility of encountering objects,” then Husserlian transcendental subjectivity certainly *is* in-the-world. It intentionally transcends the universal horizon of the world, thereby allowing entities to appear. Without “transcendence” in the form of horizontal intentionality, it is clear that there can be no transcendence at all.

Although the discussion in the present section seems to suggest it, Husserl does not mean that the world is nothing but a world of possible perceptual experiences. In addition to existing as a world of perception, he points out, the world is there “with the same immediacy as a world of valued objects, a world of goods, a practical world” (Husserl 1983, 63). In fact, the horizon of the world is primarily determined (*vor allem*) by our everyday practices, says Husserl, and if he sometimes limits himself to talking about it as if it were only a horizon of possible perception, this is purely because the world as practical world is necessarily grounded in the world as world of perception. Every practical activity presupposes an underlying “layer” of perception, according to Husserl. I cannot drive nails

into a wall unless I can see the nails and feel the hammer in my hand, and the world cannot be the universal horizon for practical activity unless it is the horizon for perceptual experience. The latter founds the former. But we note that this does not necessarily mean that I live primarily in acts of perception, nor does it imply that the concrete world matters to me primarily as a world of perception. Would Heidegger be convinced, or would he still maintain that the true phenomenon of the world remains unseen by Husserl? To clarify this question, we need to make a brief sketch of Heidegger's concept of the world.

4. The world as a referential whole

When we treat the phenomenon of the world, as it is developed in *Being and Time* and in other writings of Heidegger from the late twenties, it may be advisable to determine as a starting point of hermeneutics *the individual, the given being*. In this context, according to Heidegger, the being that *Dasein* immediately encounters is not a material object which is simply “there”, which “appears”; it is not even an object with certain cultural layers, but rather something essentially different. The entity with which *Dasein* is immediately concerned is what Heidegger calls *Zeug* or a „tool”. In what seems to be a clear contrast to Husserl, Heidegger insists that the “tool” has a way of being different from that of a “material thing”. A tool is “something-with-which-to”...; this *Um-zu* makes up the very being of the utensil. Understanding *Um-zu*, understanding the *Zuhandenheit* (*quality-of-being-at-hand*²), is what allows me to encounter for example, a hammer like a hammer, allows me to encounter it in an interaction of the type: *to use*. The hammer is a “something-with-which-to” drive a nail in wooden planks. That is, in the “something-with-which-to” structure that constitutes the hammer there is a reference to something. The same is true for all “utensils”: wooden planks are *something with which* the individual – provided additional utensils, such as hammers and nails are available – can build something, for example, a house. What is a house? A house is something you can live in – a “living utensil” (*Wohnzeug*), as Heidegger puts it. A utensil or a tool necessarily refers to other utensils that

necessarily refers to others, i.e., strictly speaking, there cannot be a single, isolated utensil. A utensil can be what it is as a utensil only in *a utensil complex* or *Zeugganzes*. This whole, complex comes “ahead” and makes the tool possible as an individual, in the sense that the tool can be a particular tool only if it is already placed in an assembly of such a complex of tools. A hammer cannot be like a hammer in the absence of other utensils, such as nails and boards. If a tribe of Amazonian Indians, completely unfamiliar with hammers and nails, coincided with a hammer by chance, they probably would not be able to „discover” it specifically as a hammer. This does not mean, however, that they would perceive the hammer as a simple occasional simple-present thing – they would probably see the hammer as a tool to be understood by them and would continue to investigate that “something-with-which-to” by placing it in already familiar utensil complex. The hammer would not be perceived in any way as what it is - as a tool - but embedded in a complex of utensils. It is probably tempting to conclude that what Heidegger wants to label as a world is precisely this utensil complex, considered a whole or a whole of such an accumulation of utensils. Some might even argue that Heidegger himself sometimes approaches such an interpretation, for example, when he remarks that, with the whole (*Ganzes*) of the utensil complex, the world announces itself (Heidegger 1962, 105). However, a utensil complex involves utensil interconnection (*Zeugzusammenhang*) and thus is ultimately something different from an accumulation of utensils, if the latter is understood as a “sum”, totality or collection of beings. And, as we already know, Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that the world must not be identified with the sum of all existing beings (Heidegger 1988, 165). When Heidegger's specific use of the notion of world is introduced into *Being and Time*, as opposed to “world” (in quotation marks) as the “total sum” of beings, he defines it as that in which *Dasein* “lives”.

However, in this context, the term “living” (“*lebt*”) is contested by Heidegger, for him it is a concept that does not exhaustively determine the ontology of *Dasein*. *Dasein* does not “live” but rather exists, since “*Dasein* must never be determined ontologically in such a way that it is seen as life – (ontologically

indeterminate) and as something above.” (Heidegger 1962, 75) Then why suspend the term of life and “living”? Our imminent intuition is that Heidegger understands by “living” not the way animals or humans exist but rather something similar to what Husserl indicates when he speaks of the acts in which we “live”. Husserl acknowledges that we do not normally “live” in selfless acts of perception, which means that these acts do not represent our active involvement. Normally, we “live” in various practical acts; we are disinterested in the visual appearance of the hammer tool, as we are preoccupied with planking the board and so on. When Husserl speaks here of “living” he is speaking of those actions in which we are truly engaged. In this sense, following other demands, we can argue that Heidegger uses the term in question in the style of Husserl, but with the minor specification that Heidegger does not designate anything “noetic” in the world, but rather the “noematic” side of everyday involvement, if we use a Husserlian idiom here.

It is necessary to reformulate the question, then. What is *Dasein* aimed at when it is “interested”, what is the “object” of its involvement? It is certainly not the individual tool. When I'm busy assembling a new library together, I don't constantly focus on the hand screwdriver; in fact, I could be so caught up in the project that I completely forget that the screwdriver is present. Heidegger would similarly claim that I am not concerned with the screwdriver or the shelf, although it would be wrong to claim that I am not in any way attentive to the shelf and the screw. I am attentive and interested in the functioning of the ensemble, so in the determination of the simple presence of things, utensils. What concerns me is the assembly of the library base, for example, and in this activity it would be wrong to say that I am, first of all, actively directed towards private entities and that I am attentive to a series of such entities, beings. We should say, therefore, that the idea of the library in its definite state is what concerns me as I assemble the library base. In this spirit, Heidegger seems to articulate his theory at some point in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962, 98-99), but such a vision proves to be difficult to categorize as phenomenological. First of all, it would be quite difficult to be properly involved in a practical activity if

someone were constantly focused on what was to be built (*das Herzustellende*). And secondly, this suggestion seems to be too closely related to the process of making or producing something. In fact, counterarguments can be made, such as the use of the bicycle to get from point A to point B. The latter example could suspend the suggestion that we are engaged purely in an process of making or producing because the use of the bicycle is intended precisely to “produce” my being at B, at a certain moment. But it simply seems wrong to say that the next position in B is in what I am “living”. It seems more correct to point out that I “live” in all those references involved in my process that involves getting to the point. What I “live” when I ride a bike or assemble the base of my new library is the referential structure itself, the references themselves and not the beings, Heidegger would eventually argue when he states: “When I am completely engrossed in dealing with something and make use of some equipment in this activity, I am just not directed toward the equipment as such, say, toward the tool. And I am just as little directed toward the work itself. Instead, in my occupation I move in the functionality relations as such. In understanding them I dwell with the equipmental contexture that is handy. I stand neither with the one nor with the other but move in the in-order-to.” (Heidegger 1988, 293) *Dasein* “lives” in a system of references, rather than in a collection of beings, according to Heidegger.

As stated above, each individual utensil is in its being something that carries or is a reference to other utensils. Screwdriver refers to the screw and so on. But this is not all. The defining characteristic of the screwdriver as a tool is not, in fact, a direct reference to other beings, but its *usefulness*. This is involved in Heidegger's use of the concept of *Um-zu* to describe his being, because *Um-zu* literally means “in order to”. The reference to other tools, the reference to the screwdriver to the screw, is a reference to the screw only in and through the utility of the screwdriver to insert a screw into a materiality. Thus, it could be said that the being of the instrument is the “functional purpose” (*Bewandtnis*) and that the references in which *Dasein* “lives” are functional references and, in addition, that they make up a whole or a “totality of functional purposes”

(*Bewandtnisganzheit*). Obviously, this link of functional purposes must eventually reach a finiteness of references, or to become, rather, *the telos* of the whole system of references. This *telos* – the last instance of the “for the sake of” (*Umwillen*) - which the whole structure “in order to” presupposes – can be nothing but the being of the human being. Although not a focal point for the investigation, Heidegger seems to avoid what might be seen as the real question involved in pointing out the world as the one in which *Dasein* “lives”, as he never positively states that *Dasein* in his every-day state is mainly thematically aware. The exegetical tradition recommends the use of concepts such as “attention” and “interest” in trying to capture what Heidegger might mean by “living” *Dasein*, but, of course, attention does not coincide with the instance in which I might pay attention to something I do not show or have any interest in, for example, because other interests dictate that I do so. In other words, “attention” may more appropriately capture what Heidegger (following Husserl) would label as the determination of the concept of “living”. The question of interest should be put aside, on the other hand, there is also the hermeneutic possibility of interrogating Heidegger regarding the question of concentration, *Dasein*'s attention to his own facticity. He uses terms such as “focus” and “theme” only when he aims to critically emphasize what *Dasein* cannot be strictly aware of (for example, this tool or another, the work in question). Consistently, Heidegger prefers terminology that deals with what *Dasein* “moves” or “finds” and is then identified with the network of references as such.

What Heidegger indicates is that the terms “targeting”, “theme” and “focus” are not adequate to capture what happens in everyday involvement (*Umgang*). Assembling a library is a “practical” activity and, involved in this way with its surroundings, *Dasein* does not have a clearly discernible theme. What happens is the simple fact that *Dasein* “lives” or moves in “utility” relationships, so it is not thematically aware of the various beings-utensils as such, nor is it thematically directed towards what needs to be built (the library) and nor does it reflectively thematize its own activity as such. In fact, we can eliminate the discourse in which it is announced that the

referential network is thematic as such: “And insofar as it is encountered in use, this means that, in relation to sight, its genuine reality appears in looking away from it as a mere thing on hand.” (Heidegger 2009, 191) Therefore, Heidegger argues that an approach to everyday practical life in terms of thematic awareness is wrong. Our usual involvement in interacting with the world, although by no means devoid of circumspect vision, is as such non-thematic. The thematic awareness is articulated when *Dasein* is involved in theoretical observation – in itself a kind of involvement, although by no means a simplistic one – an instance not necessarily characteristic of the type of involvement attributable to everyday *Dasein*. So what *Dasein* “lives” in is not for Heidegger the equivalent of what *Dasein* knows thematically. However, the best way to approach the way Heidegger articulates “living”, “moving”, or “dwelling in” is by appealing to Husserl's theory of the acts in which we “live” - it is important to note that Husserl, in turn, articulates the terminology of his discourse in order to avoid invoking the pejorative idea of “theme” or (theoretical) “focus”. According to Heidegger, it is justified to argue that the everyday involved *Dasein* is not necessarily “thematic” aware of something in general - neither of individual tools, nor what needs to be built, nor of the reference network – but moves or is in the network of references and not in individual utensils or something close to it.

However, Heidegger does not claim that references in which *Dasein* “lives”, “moves” or “dwells” can in no way become „thematic” in an everyday context, but only that they are almost never thematic as objects of a purely theoretical and neutral investigation. Although Heidegger consistently insists that tools, operations, and even the reference network remain discreet in the natural context of use, he considers a number of ways in which the reference network can still be highlighted on a daily basis using the *Umgang*. These include examples of disorders - such as when a tool is missing or defective - involving use. What happens, Heidegger asks, if, for example, an instrument malfunctions? Since the most appropriate way to encounter an instrument as an instrument is by resorting to interacting with it, and since this interaction is determined by updating as impossible due to the malfunction of the tool, the

tool is now presented to its potential user in a certain “unhandiness” (*Unzuhandenheit*). It could be argued that the defective utensil announces itself in a certain *presence-at-hand*, as just another occurring being, because it is there unsuitable for anything, in a propensity for disinterest. And yet Heidegger argues that “This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere.” (Heidegger 1962, 103)

Although it literally loses its handiness or rather because of the way it loses it, the tool accentuates its “presence-at-hand” quality in a deficiency. When I find that the necessary tool is defective, the “in order to” is highlighted in a problematic way. Now I am suddenly aware that I need this tool to do what I needed for that project and so on. As the reference is disturbed, the reference itself becomes explicit (*ausdrücklich*). In this context, not only the malfunctioning individual utensil, so to speak in its isolated *Um-zu*, is highlighted, because “When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the “in-order-to” to a “towards-this” has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them [*Sichstellen unter sie*]. But when an assignment has been disturbed – when something is unusable for some purpose-then the assignment becomes explicit.” (Heidegger 1962, 105)

Not only the keyboard in its „in order to” or related to “with which to” is accentuated when the keyboard does not work, but also the whole network of references, references, also: I needed the functional keyboard to write that text, which, in turn, had to be completed by that date in order to be sent to that conference, and so on. Another way in which the reference network can be accentuated for everyday *Dasein* involves meeting the *sign*. A *sign*, such as an indicator on a car - to use Heidegger's example - is itself characterized by a “in order to”, it is itself a tool. Unlike most other utensils, the indicator has the task of being noticed. Of course, this is not about other road users noticing the indicator as a car-like tool, such as a radio antenna. Rather, the indicator has the specific function of providing other road users with guidance in the environment,

says Heidegger. What accentuates the indicator is, for example, that this car will turn right at the next intersection and therefore also highlights subsequent references to my need to make sure the driver saw me so I can continue to ride my bike safely. In other words, the indicator is a special tool in that it does not highlight its own status as a tool and no being, instead, highlights a network of references. Heidegger concludes: “Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something.” (Heidegger 1962, 111)

The encounter of a malfunctioning utensil or sign is unique in that both involve an emphasis on the reference network “in which the *Dasein* lives” or through which the *Dasein* lives. This *referential whole*, following the initial formal definition of Heidegger's articulated world is the *world*, so it is natural to subscribe when Heidegger concludes that both the defective utensil and the sign have the function of making explicit the daily *Dasein* in its facticity. In order to discover the utensil as a utensil, *Dasein* should first understand the reference that constitutes the being of the utensil, of course, it is a reference to something and that something (usually) itself has a way of being defined by its *reference to*. In other words, a whole network of references must be understood in order for *Dasein* to have the possibility to interact with the individual being: “The world itself is not an entity *within-the-world*; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as entities which have been discovered.” (Heidegger 1962, 102)

Therefore, the world is a *referential whole* that, as such, allows individual beings to present themselves. Without an understood world, there can be no encountered entities, or *The world* is not something that comes after, but what is before, in the strict sense of this expression “That which is before” means that which is revealed and understood from the very beginning in every *Dasein* that exists, namely before any notification of one being or another; “That which is before” is that which is before us as something that is already always and before revealed.

5. The phenomenon of world

Some argue that one of the most efficient ways to approach the problem of possible affinities between Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology is through the concept of the world (Holmes 1985, 371-387). Given the debate in the literature – especially criticism of Husserl's conception of the world –surrounding the very concept of the world, this suggestion may seem unconvincing at first. However, as I hope to show in this section, there are certain structural similarities between the two accounts as they have been presented in this study. First, Husserl's developed conception of the world as a horizon is ultimately unearthed as incompatible with the notion of the world as a totality of entities. As a horizon, the world is precisely a structure without which entities could not present themselves, a precondition for the manifestation of entities, rather than something itself consisting of such entities. The Heideggerian concept of the world as a whole of references exhibits the same features. It is not itself to be conceived as a totality of entities, whether with the being of “occurrent” things or equipment. Rather, the world is the referential structure that allows such entities to be met. If the world is an entity or a collection of entities, it should probably itself be placed in a referential whole, that is, a world, to be encountered; or, using the Husserlian model, it should be given horizontally, that is, in a world. Husserl and Heidegger thus seem to agree on a perfectly tangible, if only negative, point - viz. that the world cannot be described phenomenologically as a totality of entities – and on a positive, if less palpable, point—namely, that the world should somehow be conceived as a structure that allows entities to emerge. Second, according to both authors, the world is experientially “present” in roughly the same way. Husserl, as we have seen, emphasizes that the world is something I am conscious of in a “dim” manner (Husserl 1983, 57). Although it can be thematized (by phenomenology), the world is not a theme for the naturally granted subject. It is there in a non-thematic, “background” way, making possible our thematic awareness of what we are thematically aware of. However, the same could be said of Heidegger's notion of the world. The

world is something that does not announce itself, at least normally, and, present in this “background” manner, makes possible our unproblematic interaction with individual (inconspicuous) entities. Third, despite the fact that the two notions of world seem, from a Husserlian perspective, to refer to two different “levels” of concrete life (namely, the concrete practical-understanding level we live on and the foundational level of perceptions “in the function of serving”), if probed a little deeper, other structural similarities are also discovered. These will be revealed if we pay attention to how both worldviews are developed. In both cases, the initial focus is on the individual entity rather than any collection or configuration of such entities. Even with this initially limited focus, Husserl and Heidegger are both driven to understand that the individual entity is not given as a simple matter, but rather, according to both accounts, it gives itself only, as it were, by dragging something more with it. How does this happen? In Heidegger's view, the individual instrument can present itself as such only insofar as it is understood in its being, that is, in its reference to... A referential structure must be understood if there is to be any encountered entity. For Husserl, the situation appears significantly different; after all, not a word has been said about references in our presentation of Husserl. But what, for instance, is a perceptual “inner horizon”? The horizon of “improperly” manifest that the “properly” manifest is embedded in is not unrelated to the authentically manifest. How could it be, if the properly manifest aspect is to be *an* aspect of the same as the continuum of improperly manifest aspects are aspects of? The properly given aspect cannot be self-sufficient, as it were, but must - as a dependent moment - refer to other aspects, if it is to be an *aspect of...* (Husserl 1983, 306). We might say, accordingly, that is in its reference to a continuum of other aspects that the authentically manifest aspect becomes an aspect of a thing. Clearly, then, nothing in principle prevents us from interpreting the Husserlian conception of world as itself a “referential structure,” along the lines of Heidegger's concept of world³. What is more, this reading seems to be partially confirmed by certain passages written by Husserl himself.

In *Cartesian Meditations*, for instance, he uses the term “reference” (*Verweisung*) to describe the phenomenon of horizontal intentionality (Husserl 1973, 82-97), and in an early lecture course he formulates the relation between proper and improper manifestation thus: “Actual appearance ‘refers’ to such and such possible appearance, and actual perception in a harmonious perceptual nexus refers to these or those possible perceptions that are in accord with the elapsing perceptual nexus.” (Husserl 1988, 216) In conclusion, perhaps, after all, it can be said that Husserl is of agreement with Heidegger's characterization of the world as a whole of references. However, Heidegger's conception of the world in *Being and Time* is not, as we have seen, a purely formal idea of a referential whole, but that of a very specific referential system—namely a reference system of “for” and “for the sake of”. I have already mentioned that Heidegger's analysis of the phenomenon of the world seems, at least in the magnum opus, a little too closely related to the specific situation of the craftsman in her workshop – it is, more than anything else, a “world of work” (*Werkwelt*). But it seems that a similar point could be made about Husserl. The world-horizon, for Husserl, is primarily a horizon of possible experience, even as he points out that in its full concretization, it is much more than that. However, while this is a large claim that cannot be properly substantiated in the present study, it seems to me that the world-horizon notion has greater descriptive potential than the world-as-referential-network conception; it seems, for example, that the “horizon” can capture not only perceptual phenomena but also “practical” phenomena. One can make the movement of a *Dasein* in its referential network intelligible in terms of “practical horizons” or horizons of “practical possibilities”, at just as the continuous co-presence of the imperceptible wall of the desk behind me can be made intelligible in terms of ‘perceptual horizons’. The “practical horizon” is precisely that in which we “live” mainly, according to Husserl. This becomes evident when we look at an unpublished manuscript. In “Ms. A VI 14 a” from the beginning of the thirties, Husserl repeats his contention that, no matter what we are caught up with, “the whole world is always in this connection the implicit background, the constant universal

horizon”⁴. He continues: “In addition, a 'practical horizon,' a horizon of that which I can do in my horizonally given situation, belongs to every activity, every praxis”⁵. The individual references are ordered somehow in relation to the practical “goal” of the activity, something Husserl (like Heidegger) does not describe as thematically in focus, but rather as placed in the horizon: “in the praxis I am directed towards a goal as the end of a praxis-path, and it [the goal] lies in the horizon as the practical *towards-which*”⁶. Furthermore, we have – once again, in case this point has not been emphasized enough in the present chapter – Husserl's unambiguous assurance that this practical horizon has a very special status within the world-horizon: What is called a 'practical horizon' here thus has a distinctiveness, in terms of 'liveliness,' within the universal horizon world⁷. The “practical horizon” is precisely the one in which we mainly “live,” according to Husserl. Moreover, let us note in passing that Heidegger himself uses the concept of horizon when trying to explain the relationship between the “relevance” of the individual equipment and the “referential whole” that constitutes the world. In *Being and Time*, he writes: “Relationships of involvement [or of 'relevance': *Bewandtnisbezüge* intelligible only within the horizon of a world that has been disclosed. Their horizontal character, moreover, is what first makes possible the specific horizon of the 'whither' of belonging-somewhere regionally.” (Heidegger 1962, 368) Now the crucial point is that even the phenomenon of nature - precisely one of the phenomena that does not fit well in the early Heidegger's account - as something discovered in states of mind, can apparently be covered through this Husserlian notion. Actually, Husserl himself develops, if not a full-fledged theory, then at least outlines for a theory of disposition along these very lines. *Mood*, according to Husserl, is something that relates, in a kind of background, to the horizon more than to any particular object. In this way, it “colors,” as Husserl explicitly says, not only whatever we happen to look at, but essentially the whole world. Is it not very plausible to explain all this in terms of horizons? Or, to put it more cautiously, is there any reason to think that Husserl's notion of the world horizon should not be able to capture this?

The *world-as-world-horizon* conception is so giving in terms of phenomenological connotations, but at the same time it is strangely “neutral” to ontological issues in Heidegger’s sense of the word, that there is no reason why it should not be able to capture practical aspects and “related to the state of mind”; world dimensions as well as “theoretical” dimensions. The horizon of the world, one might say, is a non-committal ontological concept of the world, that is, one that does not prejudge the being of intra-worldly entities. It does not oppose the specific notion of a set of references and, at the same time, is not essentially tied to the idea of *readiness-at-hand*, nor is it committed to an ontology of *presence-at-hand*. In this way, characterizing the world as a horizon seems to be the most fruitful phenomenological approach to the world. The *world-as-world-horizon* conception seems at once to capture the practical, referential connection that Heidegger emphasizes (rightly so, I think) and to capture some of what seems to escape Heidegger’s somewhat ontologically narrow account early.

NOTES

¹ Interestingly, however, the cartesian Husserl would say exactly that the phenomenology or theory of his intentionality is not itself based on acts that do not need an existing object, although he describes such acts in detail. Although *I perceive*, for example, it is absolutely indubitable that the act of perceiving exists and, therefore, the phenomenological act directed towards the act of perceiving is precisely that act for which an object cannot be non-existent. But clearly, Keller discusses the types of acts “treated” in Husserl’s theory of intentionality, rather than those in which phenomenologization itself takes place.

² It would take me too far afield to elaborate on the intricacies of Heidegger’s own account of the relation between what he calls entities that are ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) and those that are present-to-hand (*vorhanden*). McManus provides a book-length treatment of the issue in *Heidegger and the Measure of Truth*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.

³ It might be objected that this is stretching Husserl’s conception of the world too far in the direction of Heidegger. But my point is simply that the Husserlian conception of world as horizon seems able to encompass that which Heidegger is trying to bring to light under the heading of *Venveistingszusammenhang*: i.e., I am claiming that the conception of world as horizon can be stretched in such a way, not that Husserl actually develops it along those lines;

⁴ “[...] stets ist dabei die garliche Welt der implizite Hintergrund, der standige Universalhorizont.” (Husserl 2006, Ms. A VI 14a, 19a)

⁵ “[...] Dabei gehört wesensmassig zu jedem Tun, zu jeder Praxis ein praktischer Horizont, ein Horizont dessen, was ich in meiner horizontmassig bewussten Situation kann.” (Husserl 2006, Ms. A VI 14a, 24h)

⁶ “[...] praktisch bin ich auf ein Ziel gerichtet als Ende eines praktischen Weges, und das liegt im Horizont als das praktische Woraufhin.” (Husserl 2006, Ms. A VI 14a, 25a)

⁷ Husserl’s concept of world as such can be understood as guaranteeing the intersubjective nature of practical reason, which allows for different individuals validating and questioning practical decisions of others that are not and never will be their own. This is not to say that a view like Heidegger’s could not in a different way account for this kind of validating. Indeed, several commentators have addressed the challenge of how to think of success and failure or better or worse ways of disclosing the world from within Heidegger’s early philosophy. Smith (2007, 1–22.) critically considers several proposals before formulating his own according to which we are to look at the way that *Dasein* is beholden to itself in authenticity and resoluteness. Most recently, McKinney (2016, 111–130) has proposed a competing interpretation arguing that we are beholden to the world itself and that authenticity is to be understood as sustaining our openness to the world. McManus (2015, 195–220.), then again, has elaborated how one, from a Heideggerian perspective, can call into question that the different understandings of Being are like different perspectives that can be better or worse because these different understandings are not rivals in that they are not about the same aspect of the world.

REFERENCES

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2013. *Truth and Method*. Translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc.

Heidegger, Martin. 1962. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. Bodmin, Cornwall: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Heidegger, Martin. 2009. *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*. Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Heidegger, Martin. 1988. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translation and Introduction and Lexicon by Albert Hofstadter. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

- Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm von. 2004. *Subjekt und Dasein*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Holmes, R.H. 1985. "The World according to Husserl and Heidegger." *Man and World* 18: 373-387.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1998. *Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907*, Translated and edited by Richard Rojceicz. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2000. *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the phenomenology of constitution*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2001. *Logical Investigations*. Volume II. Translated by J. N. Findlay. London: Routledge.
- Husserl, Edmund. 1970. *The crisis of european sciences and transcidental phenomenology*. Translated by David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Husserl, Edmund. 2006. [*Hua Materialen VIII*] *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934): Die C-Manuskripte*. Springer: Dordrecht.
- Keller, Piere. 1999. *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Landgrebe, Ludwig. 1967. *Der Weg der Phänomenologie*. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn.
- McKinney, Tucker. 2016. "Objectivity and Reflection in Heidegger's Theory of Intentionality." *Journal for the American Philosophical Association* 2(1): 111–30.
- McManus, Denis. 2015, "Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World." *European Journal of Philosophy* 23(2): 195–220.
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2005. *Phenomenology of Perception*, Translated by Colin Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Publishers.
- Jacobs, Hanne. 2014. "Transcendental subjectivity and the human being." In *Phenomenology and the Transcendental*,

edited by M. Hartimo, S. Heinämaa, and T. Miettinen, 87–105.
London: Routledge.

Smith, W. H. 2007. “Why Tugendhat’s Critique of Heidegger’s
Concept of Truth Remains a Critical Problem.” *Inquiry* 50(2):
156–70.

Schacht, Richard. 1972. „Husserlian and Heideggerian
phenomenology.” *Philos Stud* 23: 293–314.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00393738>

Gheorghe Cecan studies philosophy and architecture in Iasi, Romania. His
research interests are phenomenology, hermeneutics and deconstructivism.

Address:

Gheorghe Cecan
Department of Philosophy
“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi
Bd. Carol I no. 11, 700506
Iasi, Romania
E-mail: gelucecanart@gmail.com