Axel Honneth and the theory of recognition

Abstract

This article presents a critical reinterpretation of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, arguing that his tripartite model—love, law, social esteem—provides the moral grammar indispensable for diagnosing contemporary social conflicts. By systematically reconstructing Honneth's synthesis of Hegel, Mead, and Winnicott, we demonstrate how struggles against disrespect—rooted in the denial of recognition—are not mere ethical protests, but the main engine of social transformation. This framework uniquely reveals why demands for identity, rights, and dignity (from feminist movements to postcolonial struggles) fundamentally challenge institutionalized patterns of misrecognition, rather than merely material interests. Consequently, we propose that Honneth's theory offers critical theory an essential normative paradigm: it shifts the analysis from economic exploitation to the moral injuries underlying systemic injustice, allowing for a more comprehensive critique of social pathologies. The article thus positions recognition as a vital conceptual tool for understanding and legitimizing emancipatory struggles in pluralistic democracies, where demands for visibility and validation drive progressive change.

Keywords: recognition, Honneth, Mead, Hegel, critical theory