Ereignis and Da-Sein in the Beiträge zur Philosophie

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Abstract

This contribution seeks to clarify the status of Ereignis and Dasein in the Beiträge zur Philosophie and to question, in particular, the relationship between these two concepts. The angle that will be preferred here is that of the discussion with transcendentalism (starting with Kant). The author defends the thesis that there is an alteration in the meaning of “Dasein” between Sein und Zeit and the Beiträge zur Philosophie, having repercussions on the relationship between “Seyn” and “Da-sein”. At the very heart of this new meaning of Da-sein in the Beiträge stands the conception of an “outstanding standing-within” (ausstehendes Innestehen) that must be analyzed in detail.

Keywords: Being, Dasein, Ereignis, existence, grounding, transcendence, Heidegger, phenomenology

It is time to demystify the Beiträge zur Philosophie. Granted, it is a difficult text, but given the nearly inaccessible nature of some monumental works of the philosophical tradition, its difficulty is hardly a good reason for neglecting it. What unsettles the reader familiar with “early” Heidegger, and with phenomenology in general, is not only his style, but also the “attitude” (in the sense of the phenomenological “Einstellung”) that he advocates. Although thinking “Ereignis” was supposedly restricted to the “Wenige” – that is, to a limited number of thinking beings – now it opens on the “Zukünftige” (those [who are] to come) and begins “another beginning.” This suggests that this thinking escapes what has until now been its familiar framework, and must henceforth “suspend” every inclination to (wish to) remain within that framework. Indeed,
there is nothing stranger to someone committed to a descriptive mode of philosophical analysis – which requires that the experience described in it can be re-activated) – than this Nietzschean lived experience of a lone thinker, declared loud and clear. Of course, this start to an “other beginning” does not appear from nowhere. We can – and must – situate ourselves in relation to the “first beginning” of metaphysics: doesn’t Heidegger himself insist on the need for the philosopher to continually be in an “Auseinandersetzung” with respect to the Western philosophical tradition? Still, we must truly inhabit the Beiträge zur Philosophie in order to have the means to listen to what Heidegger says and to be attentive to the consequences (and to the means used) of what he asserts right from the start. The new style of thinking no longer consists in treating of something, of speaking about an object, but in bringing about the identity of Denken and Sprachen, of thinking and its expression or its being spoken. In other words, the fact of asking the Grundfrage (the fundamental question) now – the question of being, properly speaking (or of the truth of Seyn), more precisely, the question of knowing how Seyn unfolds in its essence (Heidegger 1989, GA 65, 387) – and not merely the Leitfrage (the guiding question), or that of the Being of the being (or of the Seyn of the truth) – requires a style which presents the content in a suitable form. And the important thing is to see that this forming no longer has anything to do with a “translation” or a “transposition” of a content of thought into an audible or readable form. The thinking of the other beginning is articulated and unfolds via “proto-conceptual” networks (or, to use F. Dastur’s formulation, via “directions of senses”); it is anchored in a relatively small number of basic roots (for example, “halten,” “stehen,” etc.) and fragmented or fractured (“zerklüften”) by prefixes (such as er-, ver-, in-, aus-, etc.). “Zerklüften” replaces “modality” of the old ontology in the thinking of the other beginning. This move certainly does not mean that Heidegger in the Beiträge should be thought to be playing with words or with language. Rather, this attests to the “Sprechen der Sprache” (in the way in which the “Sprache spricht”) in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. This state of affairs should guide and govern every translation of the text. A non-

German-speaking reader would understand nothing of the thought expressed in this book if the translation fails to carefully attend to the subtle interrelations found in these networks that stem from the Sprache itself (which is not universal, but which is embodied in a specific language, in this case, in German).

The key that lets us enter into this thinking set out in six fugues is the notion of Ereignis. (This term is best left untranslated.) Ereignis does not mean the fact that a mystical and ineffable “being” now shows itself to a certain select few. It is most certainly Seyn, but not in the sense of a determinate being (or an indeterminate one, for that matter). Rather, Ereignis is Seyn as the principle of “Wesung,” the unfolding of its being, which is nothing other than the principle of the phenomenalization of Seyn. This explains why Heidegger at times stresses the fact that Ereignis is properly Seyn, while at other times he sees in Da-sein the carrying out of Seyn’s appropriation. More precisely, the author of the Beiträge simultaneously means five things by this:

1) Ereignis properly speaking has no content. In this regard, Heidegger specifies: (GA 65, 242) “Of what,” then, is Ereignis the Ereignis?

2) This question seems wrongly formulated, if only with respect to its quantitative determination. Whereas the Seingeschichte certainly concerns/has “some” “rare” events (cf. GA 65, 227 sq.), there it is in fact a matter of “blows” (Stöße) of “ap-propriation (Er-eignung)” itself (GA 65, 463). The latter refers to Er-eignis in its uniqueness (GA 65, 471). As Heidegger will write in Identity and Difference, Ereignis in so far as it corresponds to Seyn (GA 65, 470), is a “singulare tantum.” (Heidegger 1957, 250)

3) Further, Ereignis concerns something that is never yet realized but which is in the process of “coming to pass,” of “taking place.” The temporal dimension of Ereignis is thereby revealed. On the one hand, Ereignis signifies that which “ereignet” (the “sich” is here omitted, a point we will soon clarify), that is, that which “takes place” in an “Augenblicksstätte,” a “place of kairos,” which resonates with the “exaiphnes” (instantaneous point of reversal) in Plato’s Parmenides. On the other hand, what we glimpse here is a
relation to a particular kind of eternity, one that annihilates the “never”-ness of Ereignis’ not-yet-being-realized (which of certainly echoes the fact that we have perhaps never experienced the divinity). Ereignis flickers between the infinitesimal measurement of the instant and the non-finitude of eternity (which is not the infinity of the Absolute—that is, not the “vast, empty eternity”—but precisely the transcendence of the last God (that is, what Heidegger calls “the shortest path”) (GA 65, 406).

Moreover, and this is central: Ereignis expresses the phenomenon of an appropriation (er-eignen = sich zuweisen (to attribute to itself) (GA 65, 7)). Appropriation of what? Appropriation of the fact that, devoid of content, unique and unprecedented, therefore, Seyn flickers (aufleuchtet) in its “Da” (which also justifies the translation by “co-propriation” suggested by J.-M. Vaysse); of the fact that it is not only Being which confers upon the being its “sense” and its “foundation,” but, further, that the being bears Being and accounts for it (for Heidegger, even onto-theo-logy has never managed to think the being in its true sense of Being); of the fact that transcendence phenomenalizes itself, of the fact that the Absolute finitizes itself. (We knowingly here employ a metaphysical vocabulary that Heidegger rejects.) We stress that Ereignis names Dasein’s appropriation of this state of affairs, an appropriation that no longer only concerns its understanding (as in Being and Time), and even less is any sort of “representation” whatsoever, but is the way of holding-on oneself (keeping?) within essence (GA 65, 369) and the manner in which Dasein makes Seyn flicker in the Da. In other words, it is the way that Dasein concretely “founds the truth” of Seyn (a point to which we will return).

One final point concerns the relation between “Ereignis” and “Er-scheinung;” Ereignis is a phenomenon, an “Urphänomen” (granted, in a very different sense than the Goethean one, which holds that the plurality of Urphänomene can be intuited in a transparent manner). This follows entirely logically if we recall that Being and Time sought to think Being as a “phenomenological concept of the phenomenon”—nothing surprising, then, that Seyn as Ereignis should echo a thought of the phenomenon. We thus can understand on this basis why Heidegger (later) brings together “Ereignis” and “Eräuignis”—not
(contrary to Goethe) so as to revive some role for “vision” or for “intuition”, but precisely to sound a \textit{phenomenological} echo in the thinking of this co-propiation of \textit{Seyn} and \textit{Da-sein}.

Moreover, by using this notion of “appropriation,” Heidegger seeks to think \textit{Seyn} in a way that is no longer indebted to the framework of the philosophy of “representation (\textit{Vorstellung}).” In particular, he seeks to avoid the paradigm of reflection, in which every reflection implies a turning back \textit{upon} that which is reflected, whereas here, we stress the point is “neither to describe nor to explain, neither to promulgate, nor to teach. Here the speaking is not something over and against what is to be said but it is this latter itself as the essential occurrence of beyng.” (Heidegger 2012, 6; GA 65, 4) This appropriation is therefore essentially \textit{non-reflexive}, which is expressed by the suppression of the “\textit{sich} (self-)” in every characterization of appropriation. We find evidence of this, for example, on the very first page of the \textit{Beiträge}, where Heidegger writes that it is a matter of fundamentally “being transmitted (or ‘trans-propiated’) to \textit{Er-eignis} (dem \textit{Er-eignis übereignet werden}).” This quote confirms the claim: “\textit{Da-sein} means appropriation in the event, the latter taken as the essence of beyng.” (Heidegger 2012, 231; GA 65, 293) The same point is also expressed in the passages that follow, where Heidegger uses the formulation “\textit{ist ereignet},” which allows him to avoid any suggestion of a \textit{Sichheit} (not to be confused with \textit{Selbstheit}): “The ‘there’ is appropriated by beyng itself. The human being, as steward of the truth of beyng, is subsequently appropriated and, as belonging to \textit{Da-sein}, is appropriated in a preeminent and unique way. (Heidegger 2012, 236; GA 65, 299)

\textit{Was heißt Denken?} recalls this “\textit{Verwindung}” of the paradigm of reflective consciousness. As we have shown elsewhere (see Schnell 2013, chapter 5), in the second part of this 1951-1952 lecture series, Heidegger assigns to “what most calls for thinking” (\textit{das Bedenklichste}) the place that, in classical German philosophy was occupied by self-consciousness. In the post-Kantian philosophy that raised reflection to a supreme power, every consciousness of an object had been brought back, as we know, to self-consciousness, every relation of subject and object had as a premise a structure in which an object over
against a subject was identified with that subject—which thereby even founded self-consciousness. However, the Heideggerian concept of “what most calls for thinking” supplants this structure of self-consciousness to the extent that the object of what “most” calls for thinking is not identified with the one who thinks (the subject, consciousness, etc.), but with itself as that which is to be thought: “That which most calls for thinking [’Bedenklichstes’] calls us to think nothing other than itself.” Instead of identifying the “subject” with the “subject,” it is, so to speak, “the object” that is identified with “the object.” There is no clearer expression of the fact that Heidegger here turns away from the philosophy of subjectivity than his putting the identity of what most call for thinking in the place of the identity of (self-)consciousness. Thus, this “asubjective” identification takes up again his pre-War thinking on Ereignis.

The sole aim of the Beiträge zur Philosophie is to set out a transition (Über-gang). A transition that is as much—and we would even say, is above all – an owning-over-to (Über-eignung). (which none rightly translate by “trans propriation”). In the latter, Seyn and Da-sein appear in their mutual “solicitation.” Seyn “needs” (braucht) Da-sein so that there might be, in its essential character which is to self-obscure, a possible opening for it (otherwise nothing could be said or understood of it); and Da-sein “belongs” to Seyn (and “belonging” and “appropriation” are synonymous), since for Da-sein to have a “Da” that expresses the truth of Seyn, Da-sein must be and such a being plainly echoes or resonates with Seyn.

However, this “transition” is in fact a “dispute,” a “fight.” A fight between whom? Between what? Ordinarily, we say that it is between metaphysics and a thought that exits this metaphysics, and by exiting seeks to reveal it in its own being. This is correct in a way, it seems to us, but only if we see that such an “exit” implies a surpassing, a trans-ition, a movement, understood in its resolutely active, operative dimension, of “transcendence.” And this transcendence (Transzendieren) refers to the most robust result of the history of metaphysics: transcendentalism. The fight is thus not between metaphysics and the post-Being and Time Heidegger, but between non-reflective metaphysics and reflexive metaphysics, between the
thinking that aims to “verwinden” the transcendental and transcendentalism itself (thus to “surpass” it, not in order to destroy, but rather to grasp its origin which is still operates and acts¹). In *The Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger writes something both remarkable and very accurate: in a dispute, the disputants are stripped bare, given in their ownmost being, their “truth.” In their dispute, transcendentalism and the thinking of the other beginning have to appear in their very essence. The obvious difficulty here is that we do not yet know what this thinking of another beginning will yield, and we perhaps also do not know what the essence of transcendentalism is, either. In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, Heidegger intends to shed light on this point.

First, however, what allows us to restrict the object of the *Beiträge* to a dispute with transcendentalism? Heidegger is explicit about this point in the fourth fugue (“Der Sprung”), in particular in § 134 (but also in § 262 (GA 65, 448)): despite differing from the Kantian view (which remains dependent on an understanding of *Dasein* as “subjectivity” and of beings as “representable”), we may bring closer to our contemporaries (that is, the witnesses of the thinking of the other beginning begun from transcendentalism) the relation between Dasein and being by referring to the previous view in spite of all the essential differences (GA 65, 253). Further, Heidegger adds (heading off all possible misunderstanding) that this is not some “circumstantial occasion (Gelegenheit)” but a “fundamentally historically unique position (geschichtlich einzigartige Grundstellung)” (ibid.).

That here what is in question is transition means that (Heidegger writes on the second page the *Beiträge*) we are not yet at the level where it is possible to articulate “the free fugue of the truth of *Seyn*.” This is clearly another indication of the dispute with transcendentalism: the *Beiträge* are supposed to bring us to the clearing of the truth of *Seyn*, but they do not constitute the actual work of this clearing, they are only a “preliminary exercise (Vorübung)” for it.

In his interpretative sketch of the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* in the book, *Adyton*, P. Trawny asserts: “Perhaps the principle term of Heidegger’s thought in not “Sein,” but “in,” “In-
Sein,” thought otherwise, but also already thought as the “In- 
Sein” of Sein und Zeit.” (Trawny 2010, 9) We completely endorse 
this assertion, confirmed by Heidegger himself (he maintains 
that “We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood 
[Inheit] itself” (Heidegger 1962) in § 12 of Sein und Zeit). 
However, we interpret this point differently than does Trawny. 
Trawny seeks to trace the boundaries of the intensity of 
“Innigkeit” so as to circumscribe the inner domain of an “esoteric 
thinking.” In our view, one must instead stress the inseparable 
and interwoven nature of an inside (In) and an outside (Aus), 
which permeates the reinterpretation of Da-sein found in the 
Beiträge zur Philosophie. Indeed, this reinterpretation even 
constitutes the entire project of the Turn (and thus, specifically, 
of the “Übergang” treated from Sein und Zeit to the Beiträge zur 
Philosophie). We would add the crucial point, which, however, 
Heidegger mentions only once, that: the “In” refers as much to 
the “Aus” as to the “Da.” In fact, it is a matter of turning to the 
“unfolding of the Daheit of the Da as the founding of Da-SEIN.” 
(GA 65, 311) Let us develop these key points.

In crucial text already referenced, The Origin of the 
Work of Art, (from 1935/36, thus directly preceding the drafting 
of the Beiträge zur Philosophie), Heidegger returns to the 
meaning of “Dasein” elaborated in Sein und Zeit. About the 
meaning of Dasein’s existence, he writes: “The knowing that is 
a willing, and the willing that is a knowing, is the existing 
human being’s allowing himself ecstatic entrance⁵ (ekstatisches 
Sicheinlassen) into the unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) of 
beings. The resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) which is thought in 
Sein und Zeit is not the decisive action of a subject, but rather 
the Dasein’s opening up (Eröffnung) from out of its captivity by 
beings into the openness of Being. In his existence, however, 
man does not move from something inward to something outer. 
Rather, the essence of existence is the out-standing standing- 
within (ausstehendes Innestehen) the essential mutual 
exteriority (im wesenhaften Auseinander) belonging to the 
clearing of beings.” (Heidegger 1977, GA 5, 55)

First, then, a word about this reference to Sein und 
Zeit! One of the fundamental interpretative lenses applicable 
to the Beiträge zur Philosophie is Heidegger’s attempt there to
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focus his reflections on the relation between "Dasein" ("Da-sein") and "Sein" and ("Seyn"). This deepened reflection leads to a novel understanding of Dasein, which undergirds all the "fugues" of the work. In addition, in the passage just cited in which this new sense of Dasein is explicitly formulated and expressed, Heidegger seems to say that the new meaning of Dasein in question has already been thought in Sein und Zeit. This would seem to invalidate the thesis that this new meaning was a crucial motive for the "Kehre," since, at least on this point, there then could not be any continuity between Sein und Zeit and the Beiträge. Thus, only one of two things is possible: either Heidegger too one-sidedly stressed a continuity where instead there is a break; or there is not such a radical break between the sense of "Dasein" in Sein und Zeit and that of "Da-sein" in the Beiträge zur Philosophie. We endorse the first of these alternatives.

This interpretation of the Beiträge can perhaps be reformulated in this way: the re-working of the meaning of Dasein and the reconsideration of the meaning of Being are reciprocal conditions for each other. On the one hand, a clarification of the meaning of Being as Being leads to the exposure of a new ontological characterization of Dasein (Da-sein). On the other hand, it is this deepening of the meaning of Dasein leads to a sharper understanding of Sein (Seyn).

So, what justifies the claim that there is such a fundamental transformation in Heidegger's thought such that it is legitimate to situate the "Kehre" exactly in that transformation? More precisely, what justifies this claim both in the face of the relatively short period of time at issue (between the end of the 1920s and the mid-1930s), and given Heidegger's own numerous characterizations of his corpus, which contradict it? One possible—not at all original – answer is to say that there is a difference between what Heidegger set out to do in Sein und Zeit and what the published work truly allows us to establish with certainty. We take this general position as our starting point.

On the very first page of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger declares: "Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely."
Heidegger 1962, 19) In § 2, he adds: “If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein), with regard to its Being.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 7; Heidegger 1962, 27) Ontology, properly speaking, is preceded by a fundamental ontology, which is the existential analytic of Dasein. This priority logically implies a difference between the being of a particular (but remarkable) being—that of Dasein—and Being as Being—Sein. This is exactly what Sein und Zeit posits from the outset, as is of course well known. Let us now turn to the fundamental characterization of Dasein from the opening of this same work.

In § 9, Heidegger outlines the fundamental aim of the ontological interpretation of Dasein. This means that “the problematic of its Being [namely, the Being of Dasein] must be developed from the existentiality of its existence.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 43; Heidegger 1962, 69) But what does this “existentiality” mean? “Dasein” is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself understandingly (verstehend) towards that Being [which is its own!]. In saying this, we are calling attention to the formal concept of existence.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 52 ff.; Heidegger 1962, 78) Heidegger will then “deformalize” this formal concept of existence through the analysis of the fundamental ontological structure of Dasein in terms of “being-in-the-world” (In-der-Welt-Sein).” The decisive point here concerns the very thing in this structure, that puts Dasein and the world “into relation,” namely, “Being-in (In-Sein).” On this matter, Heidegger stresses the point that: “We must set forth the ontological Constitution of inhood [Inheit] itself.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 53; Heidegger 1962, 78) The entire project not only of Sein und Zeit, but of the Beiträge is condensed in this remark (rarely emphasized in the general scholarship): that is, to reveal the fundamental philosophical meaning of this realm, this “immanent sphere” of the Open, which allows human Dasein to understand that alongside which it is when it, in its Being, it relates itself to beings.

Our thesis is that the concrete development of the meaning of Inheit reveals a change in perspective between Sein und Zeit and Beiträge zur Philosophie. Despite Heidegger’s repeated emphasis on the resolutely “ecstatic” character of
Dasein, it nonetheless appears, in Sein und Zeit, that Dasein’s departure from the self takes place either towards the world or toward its ownmost solitude; however, to the extent that the world is a “something constitutive for Dasein.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 52; Heidegger 1962, 77) In every case; Dasein in its ecstatic character is and remains “with” itself (a point to which all the fundamental analyses of the book attest: anxiety, the anticipation of death, Gewissen, temporality, etc.). This ultimately confirms what Heidegger proclaimed as early as § 4, where he writes that “[...] the question of Being [...] [that is, of Being as Being] is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself—the pre-ontological understanding of Being.” (Heidegger 1977, SuZ, 15; Heidegger 1962, 35) In fact, we hold that what is being expressed here is more than a simple “ontological” characterization of Dasein (consisting in Dasein’s asking itself the question of the meaning of Being in an essential way): this radicalization implies that occupying fundamental ontology can, in the final analysis, lead to nothing other than an identification of Sein as Sein, on the one hand, and of Sein with Dasein, on the other.6 Such that the reciprocal conditioning pointed out above gives rise, in this treatise, to a return that is equally reciprocal between a Dasein characterized by a radical Inheit and a Sein that is reduced to the Being of Dasein.

Thus, the elucidation of the ontological constitution of “Inheit” is carried out in the Beiträge zur Philosophie no longer in terms of the “In-der-Welt-sein (being-in-the-world)” of Dasein, but of the “Inständigkeit (standing in)” of Dasein.

The best illustration of this process is precisely the characterization of Da-sein in the Kunstwerkaufsatz – a characterization that must be completed with an essential point supplied by Heidegger in the summer 1935 course, Einführung in die Metaphysik. The relation between Da-sein and Seyn is in fact expressed in terms of “Ausstehendes Innестehen” and “In-sich-aus-sich-Hinausstehen”. The former characterizes Da-sein and the latter characterizes physis insofar as physis determines Being itself, a double characterization that is developed and explicited in the Beiträge zur Philosophie.
Da-sein is given several characterizations in the Beiträge zur Philosophie.

(1) The Beiträge zur Philosophie ask anew the question of modality (and does so, as we have seen, in terms of “fracturing (Zerküftung)”), notably, that of the status of possibility. Sein und Zeit sets out the notion of “possibility,” in particular, of “supreme possibility,” from a standpoint that restricted it to the supreme possibility of Dasein. This possibility was considered to be that which grants an existential concretization to the fact that Dasein holds itself within possibility as possibility (that is, the anticipation of death, its death). The Beiträge zur Philosophie explicitly revisit the question of the “supreme possibility”: Heidegger specifies in § 169 that “Da-sein is the grounding of the truth of this simplest fissure.” (Heidegger 2012, 232; GA 65, 294)

However, this does not thus mean that possibility is now one-sidedly aligned with Seyn as “Verweigerung” (refusal) and “Sichverbergen” (self-concealment). Indeed, as § 176 makes clear, it is the supreme possibility of DA-SEIN that of “grounding and the preserving of truth itself.” (Heidegger 2012, 237; GA 65, 301) Thus, a prime feature of the “oscillation (Schwingung)” between Seyn and Da-sein concerns the question of modality.

(2) How should we better understand the idea that Da-sein is the “founder (Gründer)” of the truth, that the “truth ‘is’ as Da-gründung (founding of the Da) and Da-sein?” (GA 65, 329) Heidegger’s fundamental aim consists in using a transcendentalism that certainly “does violence” to its traditional interpretations (notably, to Kant’s transcendentalism), but that nonetheless preserves the relation between “Da-sein” and “Seyn”, between “thinking” and “Being” (Fichte), a relation that was first set out by the transcendental or by transcendentalism (and for which, incidentally, transcendental imagination is decisive). (GA 65, 134) Heidegger rigorously thinks through this “relation,” (a term which is in fact inappropriate) as a co-belonging or a mutual solicitation. Here, we must set aside any idea of a pair of terms about which we would then ask what first makes their “meeting” or their “encounter” possible. Their “relation” is “the mutual oscillation
of needing and belonging (Gegenschwung des Brauchens und Zugehörens).” (Heidegger 2012, 198; GA 65, 251) Seyn needs Da-sein in order to unfold in its essence. And Da-sein necessarily belongs to Seyn since it is only in this way that it can itself be. Moreover, to the extent that “the originary founding of the foundation” is the way in which the truth of Seyn unfolds in its essence (GA 65, 307). In other words, that “Da-sein is founder of the truth” means that Da-sein certainly does not create Seyn but that lacking Da-sein, Seyn could never be there. The “there” is the way in which Seyn manifests itself in its truth. To grasp the status of this, reference to Kant (and to Bergson) may be helpful. In the first Critique, Kant write that the “phenomenon” as “representation” is no the thing in its essence, but nor is it a simple figure imagined by the mind. The phenomenon is the most certainly object—but insofar as it “appears” to us. Via the phenomenon, Kant sought to think through the way in which things are—a sort of third term (in the manner of the Bergsonian image) “between” or “beyond” simple mental representations and things in themselves. Heidegger, however, aims to think through fundamentally the notion of the phenomenon—outside the framework of a philosophy of representation, of course. The Ereignis (in the double sense of the event and of appropriation) of the comprehension (that is, of the “light” as decisive “Begreifen”) of the status of the phenomenon is condensed in the There (claiming or, rather, constituting the very essence of Da-sein insofar as it thus lets Seyn be in its fundamental truth).

(3) Let us now explore the Heidegger’s identification of “Da-sein” and “Dagründer (founder of the There)”. (GA 65, 409) “Founding (Gründung)” has three senses:
(a) The “originary founding of the foundation” refers to the ways in which the foundation (Grund) properly “is,” unfolds in its essence; thus, it concerns the being of the foundation (in the intransitive sense) (the sense relative to Seyn). The second and third senses concern the founding (Gründung) in terms of “arché-foundation” (Er-gründung). In Er-gründung, the foundation is attained and assumed, that is, appropriated (what is expressed here is a plain link between Er-gründung and Er-eignis (the sense relative to Da-sein).
(b) The fact that the foundation is the foundation of something constitutes the first sense of Er-gründung.

(c) The fact that something is related to the foundation as its foundation (thus the fact of founding, building (= bauen) (cf. above) upon it) circumscribes the second sense. When Heidegger claims that “it is the grounding, basic disposition because it disposes the fathoming of the ground of Da-sein, i.e., of the event, and thereby disposes the grounding of Da-sein (Heidegger 2012, 28; GA 65, 34), he identifies “founding” and “arché-founding of the foundation” as well as “Ereignis” (= Seyn) and “foundation of Da-sein” (as he specifies in GA 65, 311, and as we have seen, the foundation of Da-sein corresponds to the unfolding of the “Daheit” of the “There.”) Da-sein as “founder of the truth” and Ereignis as the “foundation of the truth of Seyn” refer to one another. On this basis, Heidegger can define Da-sein as follows: “Da-sein is the occurrence of the sundering (Erkläftung) of the axis for the turning of the event. Sundering, first and foremost sundering, is appropriating…” (Heidegger 2012, 246; GA 65, 311) Erkläftung is more precisely the crossing-over, by means of a leap, of a gap that opens up from the “exaiphnes” in the Kehre, and which fundamentally describes the oscillation between Seyn and Da-sein.

(d) One final important point about the Gründung and the Dagründung concerns the relation between Ergründen and Erbauen (see GA 65, 39): building means, on the methodological level, the modality of “construction” in the thought of the other beginning (the term “construction” no longer being apt, here, since it was already employed in the thinking of the first beginning, in the critique of the simply descriptive project/pursuit/course/undertaking)

However, the Kehre is not only a re-centering of the relation between Da-sein and Seyn, it also has consequences for the way in which Seyn “bears” the being. Here, two passages are particularly decisive; true, they are not drawn from the Beiträge zur Philosophie, but they bear on and shed light on them.

We must first clarify a point on the status of metaphysics. If metaphysics certainly designates the fundamental figure of the thought of the first beginning, the thought of the other beginning does not mean a pure and
simple abandonment of metaphysics, but its “Verwindung.” This first of all, and more than ever, elucidates the *phenomenalization of the being*. We read in *Besinnung*: Metaphysics is thought not as a doctrine, nor as a discipline, nor as a form of knowledge, but as Metaphysics is not thought of as a doctrine, nor a discipline, nor a form of knowledge, but as the “composition of the being in the whole itself with a view to the being as such, that is, to as that which is composed by being-ness and by the unquestioned truth of Seyn.” (GA 66, 382)

Hence, the novelty of the thought of *physis* in relation to the *Daseinsanalytik* of *Sein und Zeit*—and here reference to l’*Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935) is obligatory—consists in the fact that the world as “land of all lands” (which might bring to mind the later expression of the world as “domain of all domains”) thenceforth takes upon and within itself the manifestation of the being (in “exchange” with *Dasein*), and that, therefore, the being is no longer the sole deed of *Dasein*.

*Physis* expresses the *Aufgehen* (= dehiscence), which is not a neutral process, but that which opens and grows *of and by itself*. “Physis is the Being itself thanks to which the being is and remains observable.” (GA 40, 17)—that is, Being not as Being, but the Being of the being as such, the meaning of which is not solely revealed in *Dasein’s* project, but precisely due to the fact that this way of self-phenomenalizing flickers with *Da-sein*.

In the *Beiträge zur Philosophie* itself, Heidegger first specifies how one should understand the connection between the status of *physis* in the first beginning and the other beginning. For him, *physis* as the “present dehiscence (*an-wesendes Aufgehen*) was initially thought by the Greeks, anchoring the truth as *aletheia* in this Being of the being. In the thought of the truth of Seyn, it is not a matter of a simple “return” to a thinking that aims to remove itself from “Machenschaft (plot, machination or fabrication).”10 It is rather a “de-tour (*Um-weg*)”:

The detour, however, must not be understood in the sense that an immediate or shorter path to being had been missed. Indeed, it is this detour which first leads into the plight of the refusal and int to he necessity of bringing for decision that which (*φύσις*, *ἀλήθεια*) in the beginning was only the intimation of a bestowal and did not allow itself to be grasped and preserved. (Heidegger 2012, 343; GA 65, 434)
Heidegger's view is unmistakable here. Let us first recall the meaning of the “de-cision (Ent-scheidung).” De-cision does not in any way mean to make a “choice,” but rather indicates the opening of a “space” (on this point, Heidegger speaks of an Auseinandertreten (meaning the fact of straying) that separates and in this separation sets in motion: (1) the ap-propriation (Er-eignung) of the opening as clearing of that which conceals itself and of the undecided; (2) the belonging of man to Seyn (man is the founder (Gründer) of the truth of Seyn, as we know); (3) the attribution of Seyn to the time of the last God. (GA 65, 88) De-cision is one (in the manner of Ereignis): it concerns the question of knowing whether Seyn definitively reveals itself or whether instead this withdrawal as refusal becomes the primary truth and the other beginning of history. (GA 65, 91) Moreover, physis now stems from the “de-cision” and no longer from a gift given in an ephemeral way.

What “grounds” (begründet, that is, justifies and legitimates) this experience of physis as the first beginning? Appealing to the “longevity of the tradition” does not satisfy Heidegger. According to him, the “foundation” is hidden. And the task of thinking the other beginning is to reveal this foundation, to expose it in a way that elucidates the Being of the being as physis. (GA 65, 195)

The Beiträge zur Philosophie describe physis more particularly in three ways (thus recalling the “In-sich-aus-sich-Hinausstehen (holding-itself-outside-and-within-itself):” if, first, the Greeks thus also already thought physis as “present dehiscence” (GA 65, 425), and second, if they considered that this dehiscence is not the deed/fact of the “human,” of the “subject,” etc., but is produced “of itself (von selbst)” (GA 65, 191), then the thinking of another beginning adds, third, that this requires a “foundation on the basis of Seyn (Gründung aus dem Seyn).” (GA 65, 184) A fundamental consequence follows from this, affecting the meaning of aletheia. As it turns out, this term now only suits the being, not Seyn: Άληθευα everywhere remains the unconcealedness of beings, never that of beying; it is never the latter because άληθευα itself in this inaugural interpretation constitutes beingness (φύσις, e-mergence [Auf-gang]) ἴδεα, visibility. (Heidegger 2012, 262; GA 65, 332) Why? …[b]ecause
in ἀλήθεια the occurrence of unconcealment and concealment is precisely not experienced and not grasped as the ground, for the questioning is indeed still determined on the basis of φύσις, being as beings (Heidegger 2012, 277; GA 65, 351). About the connection between Da-sein and physis in the thinking of the other beginning, Heidegger concludes: Da-sein is properly the self-grounding ground of the ἀλήθεια of φύσις, the essential occurrence of that openness which first opens up the self-concealing (the essence of beyng) and which is thus the truth of beyng itself (Heidegger 2012, 234; GA 65, 296).

NOTES
1 “Ereignis” means both “event” (with the double meaning of that which emerges in an unexpected way from the outside, and that which is happening) and “appropriation.”
2 “To take place” actually translates the colloquial expression “sich ereignen.”
3 Cf. also what Heidegger writes about Ereignis as «Zueignung» (Heidegger, GA 65, 317 and 320 ff).
4 On this point, we refer to the difference between Beginn (inception) and Anfang (beginning). The former means the starting off of something new that leaves behind what precedes it, whereas the second means that what begins unfolds a process in which the origin continues to act until the end.
5 We render Sicheinlassen as “leaves-itself-in” (se-laisser-à), modeling it upon “Insein,” translated in French by “être-à” (being-in), taking into account that “ein.” here has the precise sense of “in.” [TN] The French original is: “un se-laisser-àextatique (ekstatisches Sicheinlassen).”
6 On this point, a specification as troubling as it is instructive—appearing as both a self-interpretation and a critique of one possible reading of Sein und Zeit-may be found in § 259, entitled “Die Philosophie.” (GA 65, 433).
7 The first sense of founding thus determines the second and third senses.
8 On this point, see the important § 140. (GA 65, 261).
9 In Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Heidegger had in fact already stressed the need to complete, on the methodological level, the phenomenological reduction with a phenomenological construction (projecting the being with respect to its Being and the structures of this Being). (GA 24, 29 ff.)
10 For precise specification of the fundamental difference between physis and Machenschaft as “Un-wesen der Physis,” cf. GA 65, 126-127, 133, 135.
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