False Memories and Reproductive Imagination:
Ricoeur’s Phenomenology of Memory

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Abstract

In cognitive psychology, a false memory refers to a fabricated or distorted recollection of an event that did not actually happen. Both ‘memory-distortion’ and ‘false memory creation’ refer to the processes of recollection in which the recollected events are not actually happened. This paper has three aims: (1) to examine Ricoeur’s analysis of memory and imagination; (2) to explain and reinforce the constructive role of memory; (3) to show in what manner the first two aims lead to the conclusion that the phenomena of ‘distorted or false memory creation’ are reproductive because the nature of recollection is constructive in the sense of representation of past. In this regard, Ricoeur’s trajectory not only displaces the essential structure of memory and imagination behind the curtain of their distinction and connection, but also contributes to the debates in cognitive psychology.

Keywords: Ricoeur, phenomenology, memory, imagination, schematism false memory creation.

Introduction

E. F. Loftus, in “Creating False Memories”, argues that “false memories are constructed by combining actual memories with the content of suggestions received from others” (1997, 77). False memory creation is equivalent to memory distortion in the sense that the content of suggestions received from others could distort the original memory and lead to false or distorted memory. British psychologists F. Bartlett shares the same thesis that false memory is constructed. This paper aims at arguing that, through Ricoeur’s analysis of imagination and memory, we could find that imagination must be involved in the
process of recollection. It is the very meaning of the constructive role of memory. However, the imagination involved is not productive imagination, but reproductive imagination. Although false memory creation and memory-distortion consists of content that did not happen, false memory creation and memory distortion, is a kind of remembering, are also created by reproductive imagination. To make sense of this argument, it is necessary to understand how reproductive imagination creates false or precisely how imagination works together in memory. Through Ricoeur’s insight, I will argue that memory is apprehended in accordance with its aim of faithfully representing the past. It is in term of representation what is remembered is given as an image of what previously was seen, heard, experienced, learned and acquired. Recognition makes memory ‘visible’ and understandable. It brings up ‘memory-image’ from ‘pure memory’ through emplotment. Recollection necessarily involves imagination but the imagination involved can never be productive. All these explicate how the constructive role of memory is.

Before moving on to the debate, some important concepts are necessarily clarified. The term of ‘false memory creation’ is reserved for cases in which a subject has a false belief about the past that is experienced as memory. In these cases, the subject believes that he is directly remembering what has been in the past (Lampinen, Neuschatz and Payne 1997, 181-2). To clarify the term, we could draw a distinction between ‘false memory creation’ and ‘false memory’. The latter refers to the incorrect belief about a past event, but the former refers to the process and experience of creating ‘not-memory’ as ‘memory’. This distinction can be found in Husserl and Ricoeur’s phenomenology. In Husserl’s noetic-noematic distinction, remembering can be distinguished into the act of remembering and the remembered. In Ricoeur’s distinction, they are “memory as intention” (la mémoire) and “memories as the thing intended” (le souvenir) (Ricoeur 2004, 22).

Further, we may draw a distinction between ‘false memory creation’ and ‘lying’. The person is unaware that the information is false, on the one hand; and he or she experiences the false information as memory, on the other hand.
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(Moscovitch, 1989; 1995). For the person who creates false memory, they do not intentionally deceive someone and false memory or distorted memory can also seem to be coherent and consistent. However, lying does not involve memory disturbance as the person intentionally changes the information in order to deceive someone. Let’s consider a pathological case introduced by psychologist Schacter. He finds that in certain cases of frontal lobe damage, failures of source memory are accompanied by extensive and even bizarre confabulations - false recollections of event that did not occur and could not have occurred. For example, a sixty years old man got married with his wife for over thirty years; and they had four children aged from twenty-two to thirty-two. However, the man insisted that he and his wife had been married for four months only and their children were born within these four months. In fact, he could correctly tell the number of children they had and also their age. When he was asked how it was possible for them to have four big children in this four months’ time, he had a ready response: “they’re adopted” (Schacter, 1996, 119-120). In the patient’s view, his “memories” is very vivid and precise, and he has no intentional to tell lie. Therefore, Moscovitch argues that “what distinguishes confabulation from lying is that typically there is no intent to deceive and the patient is unaware of the falsehoods. It is an ‘honest lying’” (Moscovitch, 1995, 226).

There are three sections in the paper. In section one, the Gestalt psychological account are explained. In section two, Ricoeur’s eidetic analyses of memory and imagination are elaborated, and the constructive role of memory is explained. In section three, I argue that the phenomena of distorted and false memory are created by reproductive imagination through the very distinction between productive and reproductive imagination.

1. The constructive role of memory: from the perspective of Gestalt psychology

British psychologist F. Bartlett finds that people rarely recall all of the events in the story accurately. They may fit
their expectations or imaginations of what should have happened although these are not part of the original story (Bartlett, 1932). Schacter points out that according to Bartlett’s view, “memories are imaginative reconstructions of past events that are heavily influenced by the rememberer’s pre-existing knowledge structures or schemas” (Schacter, 1995, 9). U. G. Neisser further develops Bartlett’s insight. He explains how recollection has the constructive role. Past events are reconstructed by pre-existing knowledge and schemas, through which fragment of episodic memories are gathered together. He draws an analogical argument for his claim. His argument is that the reconstruction of a dinosaur from fragmentary fossil remains is similar to the reconstruction of a unity of memory from fragmentary memories remain. And a palaeontologist is similar to a rememberer. The similarities of remembering and the work of palaeontology are that both are acts of reconstruction; what are reconstructed in both cases are fragmentary instead of a complete work and the final products are absent in the very beginning (Neisser, 1967). He concludes that all memories are necessarily reconstructed through imagination. And the process of imagination often consists of knowledge that is not part of a specific event. Thus, the fundamental nature of memory is constructive. This nature leads memory to the other nature of memory, namely distortive and inaccurate. Recent research argues that the formations of memory-distortion and false memory creation are created by imagination through the adoption of the conclusion deduced from Bartlett and Neisser. Johnson and Suengas argue that if recollection of ‘external events’ and imagination are confused in certain conditions, thereby producing distorted memories. Conducting some experiment on students, they find “people embellish imagined events more than perceived events when recalling orally. If so, this would tend to make memories for perceived and imagined events appear more similar.” (Johnson & Suengas 1989, 108) In their account, they make use of Bartlett’s doctrine of schemas to illustrate the constructive nature of memory. If we recollect the past events, but the schemas confuse the imagined events and the perceived events, then distorted memories or false memory would be created.
Take an example in their experiments, some young children are influenced by misleading suggestions to remember events that have never happened. Then they are asked to tell the story of the past events. Finally, they are not convinced by debriefing that the memories are incorrect. They believe what they remember are real. According to Gestalt account, those young children create false memory and their memories are distorted because their schemas are affected by others. Although Gestalt account addresses the constructive nature of memory with the doctrine of schemas, there is no precise and clear illustration on schemas. Since the doctrine of schemas is not illuminated, how schemas can contribute to the constructive role of memory is not clarified.

Gestalt’s accounts of memory-distortion and false memory creation claims that memory has the constructive role. The constructive role of memory is the condition of possibility for memory-distortion and false memory creation. Gestalt’s account emphasizes the schemas. However, how can the doctrines of ‘schemas’ explain the constructive role of memory is? If the explanation is neglected, then Gestalt seems to simply explain away how constructive memory is. Therefore, it is difficult to understand how imagination constructs memory and whether false memory or distorted memory are created by reproductive.

2. Ricoeur’s analysis of memory and imagination

2.1 The connection between memory and imagination

Ricoeur draws several resources from Husserl. First, he follows that memory can be divided into primary memory (retention) and secondary memory (recollection or remembering). On the one hand, primary memory is opposite to secondary memory. “Retention still hangs onto the perception of the moment” (Ricoeur 2004, 35). Perception is a mode of presentation (Gegenwärtigung) that the things perceived are directly present. Retention is the continuous modification of the perception of the moment. On the other hand, secondary memory “is no longer presentation at all; it is presentification or re-presentation. Second, he follows that both imagination and secondary memory
are presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) which is opposite to presentation which refers to perception. Both of them share in intuitivity but differ from perception by the non-presentation of their object” (Ricoeur 1991b, 119).

Ricoeur develops Husserl’s analysis of presentification. In Husserl’s understanding, Vergegenwärtigung does not signify the giving again of an original in the manner of a copy. The object presentificated is ‘reproduced’ as itself irreal or not actual. Although Husserl, in HUA X under the heading of “reproductive modification”, discusses the notion of reproduction, his main aim is to draw the distinction between Gegenwärtigung and Vergegenwärtigung instead of introducing a detail analysis of reproduction. Ricoeur argues “reproduction is classified among the mode of imagination” (Ricoeur 2004, 35). Ricoeur replenishes the notion of reproduction that there are two ‘ways’ of reproduction, namely the way of metaphor and the way of recognition. He introduces that reproduction can be distinguished into “on the level of style, the way of metaphor; on the level of vision, the way of recognition (reconnaissance). In return, metaphor and recognition make explicit the relation upon which the impression regained is itself constructed, the relation between life and literature” (Ricoeur 1991e, 380). Both ways of reproductions are construction of impression. J. Henriksen, in Desire, Gift, and Recognition: Christology and Postmodern Philosophy, brings an important remark about Ricoeur’s doctrine of recognition. Varieties of temporalization accompany varieties of change, and these varieties of change and temporalization constitute the occasion for identification and recognition. This indicates that recognition closely relates to the very condition of history, namely temporality. The flexibility of recognition is based on possibility of change in time (56). Recognition itself is based on temporality, that is, the flow of time. Precisely, “the concrete act by which we grasp the past in present is recognition.” (Ricoeur 2004, 433) That’s why Ricoeur claims that “the moment of recollection is then the moment of recognition (Ricoeur 2004, 41).

But what do we recognize in the moment of recollection? Ricoeur draws resources from Bergson’s Matter and Memory. In Bergson’s view, there is a kind of memory called “intermediary
or mixed memory” (Ricoeur 2004, 54). It is also called memory-image, half-way between ‘pure memory’ and memory re-established in perception, half-way between fiction and hallucination. What is pure memory? What is memory-image? What is the difference between the two? Pure memory refers to retention which is the sedimentation of the past experience. Ricoeur defines that a pure memory that has not yet been put into image does exist (Ricoeur 2004, 51) and not yet visible. Memory-image is the representational form of pure memory. To recollect the past experience, the pure memory ‘transforms’ into memory-image. For example, when we pass through the library, the things passed by become our pure memory which is the sedimentation. If we want to thematizes or recollect what we experienced in the past, then we have to transform the sedimentation the memory-image of what we experienced in the past. It carries memory back so to speak into a region of presence similar to that of perception. But memory-image, in this sense, is not like a picture or a painting, but something ‘placing-before-the-eyes’. In Bergson’s view, the first record, in the form of memory-images “neglects no detail”. “It [the first record] is equally constitutive of the reflective phase, or as we have called it, the declarative phase of remembering” (Ricoeur 2004, 42). Ricoeur does not completely agree with Bergson’s view as forgetfulness is one of the constitutive components of memory. Memory-image does not record all details. In a contrary, he suggests memory-image is as a mixed form of imagination and recognition in the feeling that you have previously experienced exactly the same thing as you are experiencing now. He claims that,

“…at the stage where recognition blossoms in the feeling of déjà-vu—corresponded to an intermediary form of imagination, half-way between fiction and hallucination, namely, the ‘image’ component of the memory-image (Ricoeur 2004, 54).

As the function of imagination that makes visible, the ‘image’ component of the memory-image is then ‘placing before the eyes’. It is important to note that the function of the imagination consists in ‘placing (something) before the eyes,’ a function that can be termed ostensive: this is an imagination that shows, gives to seen, makes visible”. What Ricoeur wants
to argue is that “memory, reduced to recall, thus operates in the wake of imagination” (Ricoeur 2004, 5). The operation of recollection needs the cooperation of imagination. The operation of recollection is that “the return of a memory can only take place in the mode of becoming-an-image” (Ricoeur 2004, 7). Although recollection involves imagination, the image, pure and simple, will not be referred to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past that I sought it. To imagine is not to remember as imagination does not tend to refer to the past (Ricoeur 2004, 52). To fully understand how memory involves imagination, two questions have to be explored: (1) how does imagination ‘bring up’ memory-image from pure memory? (2) How does imagination make memory understandable through narrating it?

2.2 Emplotment, Schematism and memory-image

Emplotment is the schema to ‘bring up’ memory-image from pure memory. Ricoeur notes that “this emplotment is its intelligible schema [épure]. It imitates in that it is intelligible” (Ricoeur 1991c, 143). It is clear that emplotment is the intelligible schema of a replica of action. Memory is intelligible or understandable if and only if emplotment configures the past event. Emplotment configures the past event with plot, through which expressions like ‘then’, ‘earlier’, ‘later’ are the relations suggested to the phases of the past event.

What is plot? “The plot is the literary form of this coordination” (Ricoeur 2004, 243). Ricoeur explains that “what it itself brings is what I have called a synthesis of the heterogeneous, in order to speak of the coordination between multiple events, or between causes, intentions, and also accidents within a single meaningful unity” (Ricoeur 2004, 243). How could the plot be the literary form of the coordination between multiple events? Ricoeur draws resources from Aristotle that “plot functions as the narrative matrix. This emphasis on narrative as plot has three advantages”: first, it provides us with a structure which could be common to both historical and fictional narratives. Second, plot may be seen as pertaining to the sense of narrative as distinct from its reference. Third, a plot is a way of connecting event and story. A story is made out of
events, to the extent that plot makes events into a story (Ricoeur 1991a, 105-6).

The third advantage would be the most significant in Ricoeur’s analysis. He elaborates that “what Aristotle calls plot is not a static structure but an operation, an integrating process” which is “a totality which can be said to be at once concordant and discordant” (Ricoeur 1991f, 21). This integrative function of the narrative form results from the distance it takes in regard to mere chronological succession in terms of before and after, of the type *veni, vidi, vici*. As a meaningful unity, the plot is capable of articulating structures and events within one and the same configuration (Ricoeur 2004, 246).

This configuration is governed by a schematization. To explain the connection, he draws resources from Kant's doctrine of schematism. It is debatable that how we can faithfully understand Kant’s schematism. But Ricoeur does not completely follow Kant’s doctrine. Therefore, it is mistaken if we simply treat Ricoeur’s as the same as Kant’s. To bear a point in mind, Ricoeur’s doctrine may not commit the same obstacles in Kant’s philosophy. Ricoeur says in “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality”:

> “Kant has opened in the theory of schematism when he defined the schema as a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept...But if one starts with the schema-image, one could understand that it is in producing some images that the predicative assimilation is schematized” (Ricoeur 1991b, 126).

Ricoeur agrees that schema is not image, but a procedure of imagination in providing the schema-image for a concept. What does it mean? We may use Kant’s elaboration to understand the theory of schematism works as a universal procedure of imagination in providing an image for a concept. He argues that no image of particular triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it as it would not attain the generality of the concept, which consists of all triangles like right angle or isosceles triangle. The schema of triangle signifies a *rule of the synthesis* of the imagination with which my imagination can specify the shape of a triangle in general, without being restricted to any particular shape that experience offers me (Kant 2007, A141). In Kant’s view, categories are “pure concept
of the understanding” and “internalized”. Schematism is “the procedure of understanding” (Verfahren des Verstandes) through which the categories or the pure concepts of human understanding find their way to concrete application: “application [...] to appearance (Anwendung [...] auf Erscheinungen).” (Kant 2007, A138-141/B177-181) It means that the procedure of schematism applies the categories, which are “pure” to appearances, which are “sensible”. The procedure demonstrates how the universal, intellectual categories relate to particular, sensible manifold. It makes something as appearance. In Ricoeur’s view, the significance of schematism is producing images as Kant’s schematism as “the method for producing images” (Ricoeur 2004, 253). He explains

“Imagining is first and foremost restricting semantic fields...In this we find what is essential to the Kantian theory of schematism. Schematism, Kant said, is a method of giving an image to a concept. And again, schematism is a rule of producing images...Like the Kantian schema, it gives an image to an emerging meaning. Before it is a faded perception, the image is an emerging meaning” (Ricoeur 1994, 122).

Schematism, in Ricoeur’s view, has two functions. First, it is a rule of producing images. Second, it is a method of giving an image. To give an image that the predicative assimilation is schematized to a concept, schematism reformulates pure concepts of understanding in terms of time. For example, the category “substance” is schematized under the rule of “the permanence of the real in time” and “causality” is schematized under the rule of “the necessary succession of cause and effect in time” (Kant 2007, A143/B183). With this schematic procedure, the given manifolds of inner sense in the realm of sensibility can be synthesized with the pure concepts of understanding (schema-image) and rendered understandable. Thus, the schema-images are the form for recognizing a unity or understanding the meaning of sensible manifold. Without schema-image and schematism, the unity is impossible and the meaning of it cannot be understandable. Therefore, schematism offers the schema-images for the unity of meaning and its understanding. Following this interpretation, memory-image is “created”
through schematism. He draws resources from Bergson’s second chapter of *Matter and Memory* and interprets,

“He says that pure memory is virtual and has to be brought back into the field of consciousness as an image...We are dealing with memory-images where imagination serves as a kind of mise-en-scène of the past” (Kearney & Cooley 1999, 15-6).

The existence of a pure memory is a virtual state of the representation of the past, prior to its becoming an image in the mixed form of memory image. At that time, the “pure” memory is retained without declared recognition. Following the phases of configuration governed by schematism, categories of plot like ‘the beginning’, ‘the middle’ and ‘the end’ are applied to a pure memory. Then a pure memory moves out of its virtual state and passes into its actual state; at that time, all that retained out attention is the memory’s becoming-an-image, namely memory-image. It applies a kind of *mise-en-scène* to the pure memory. It demonstrates how ‘pure memory’ is brought back into the field consciousness as memory-image. Through the procedure, memory is made ‘visible’ again through memory-images. Thus, the evocation of a structure of domination can be incorporated into the narrative of an event. The structure as a phenomenon of the long time span through the narrative becomes the condition of possibility of the event (Ricoeur 2004, 246). Ricoeur further elaborates,

“All narratives combine in various proportions, two dimensions – one chronological and the other non-chronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension. This dimension characterizes the story as made out of events. The second is the configurational dimension, according to which the plot construes significant whole outs of scattered events...this to be the act of the plot, as eliciting a pattern from a succession...To tell and to follow a story is already to reflect upon events in order to encompass them in successive wholes” (Ricoeur 1991a, 106).

There are two dimensions of narratives. The first is the episodic dimension which characterizes the story as made out of events; the second is the configurational dimension which construes a successive whole out of scattered events according to the plot. Then how the act of configuration elicits a story as successive wholes? On the one hand, Ricoeur argues that thanks to episodic dimension, the art of telling uses expressions like
‘then’, ‘earlier’, ‘later’... to suggest a relation of exteriority between phases of the action. On the other hand, thanks to the configuration dimension, the plot may be translated into one ‘thought’ or ‘theme’ (*dianoia*). Configuration operation is an emplotment. Configuration allows us to read the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end. In that way, a plot establishes human action not only within time, but within memory. He then concludes that “memory, accordingly, repeats the course of events according to an order which is the counterpart of time as stretching-along between a beginning and an end” (Ricoeur 1991a, 111). Through the emplotment, it makes the various events or incidents into a story. The plot is mediation between the events and the told story. It organizes the events into an intelligible whole. The events are qualified as an event with a theme by its contribution to the progression of the plot. As Kearney says, “narrative provides us with figural reconstruction of the past that enables us to see and hear things long since gone” (Kearney 2008, 77).

But the relation suggested by the plot is exterior. It is not intrinsic properties of the past event. Telling stories and writing history consists of the relation of exteriority between the phases of the past event instead of a mere copy of the past events. Take an example, if a witness is asked to recollect the memory about the murder case in MRT in 21/5/2014. The witness would firstly select the fragmentary episodes and then producing memory-image through emplotment. He may orally express the phases of the past event he articulated: a man ran into MRT, and then use a weapon to kill the innocent. Ricoeur points out that “by telling stories and writing history we provide ‘shape’ to what remains chaotic, obscure, and mute” (Ricoeur 1991a, 115). One of the functions of imagination is to put memories before our eyes (Kearney & Dooley 1999, 15). He clearly explicates that the reality of history of made ‘visible’ again through images; and this makes memory a reproduction, a sort of second production (Kearney & Cooley 1999, 15-6). Thus, the constructive role of memory is explained and reinforced.
3. ‘Memory-distortion’ or ‘false memory’ and reproductive or productive imagination

If retention is our ontological structure, the past events should be retained. If the past events are retained, then we should remember everything well in order. How could false memory creation be possible? It is important to understand that forgetting is our ontological structure as well. In Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur thematizes the essential structure of forgetting. Ricoeur argues that forgetting serve as both “reserve” and “deletion” (Ricoeur 2004, 553). Without forgetting, recollection is impossible. The forgetting which conditions remembering is related to the past as having been. Forgetting has a positive meaning insofar as having been prevails over being no longer in the meaning attached to the idea of the past. Having been makes forgetting the immemorial resource offered to the work of remembering (Ricoeur 2004, 443). Therefore, this ontological structure provides the condition of possibility for recollection or remembering as well as false memory creation.

Are the phenomena of ‘memory-distortion’ and ‘false memory creation’ created by reproductive imagination or productive imagination? To answer the question above, it is necessary to understand Ricoeur’s distinction between productive and reproductive imagination.

3.1 The distinction between productive and reproductive imagination

Ricoeur argues “the denial of the primacy of the original opens rather new ways of referring to reality for the image because fiction do not refer in a ‘reproductive’ way to reality as already given, they may refer in a ‘productive’ way to reality as intimated by the fiction” (Ricoeur 1991b, 121). G. Taylor clearly points out that the model of original and copy exemplifies reproductive imagination as the image as copy is at best derivative from the original or reality. But productive imagination is not duplicative of or not determined by an original as it expands our sense of reality and produces a new reality (Taylor 2006, 95-97). In reproductive imagination, the
primacy of the original is still emphasized but the primacy of
the original is denied in productive imagination.

How is the primacy of the original denied? That fiction
changes reality, in the sense that it both ‘invents’ and
‘discovers’ it. “It is that new realities become open to us and old
worlds are made new” (Ricoeur 1991b, 135). Ricoeur further
describes that “what is articulated in this way is what I call
second-order reference and which in reality is the primordial
reference” (Ricoeur 1994, 124). The construction of second-order
reference is called ‘reference effect’ or ‘meaning effects’. “This
new reference effect is nothing other than the power of fiction to
redescribe reality” as it opens up and unfold new dimensions of
reality, suspending our belief in an earlier description (Ricoeur
1994, 124). That is why Ricoeur concludes the productive
imagination is “a free play of possibilities in a state of
uninvolvement with respect to the world of perception or action.
It is in this state of uninvolvement that we try out new ideas,
new ways of being in the world” (Ricoeur 1994, 123).7

3.2 Memory-image, memory-distortion and false memory
creation

If we follow Ricoeur’s analyses, the procedure of
imagination descending from ‘pure memory’ to memory-image,
memory-image is possible because of the procedure of
schematism and emplotment in which categories of plot (the
beginning, the middle, the end…) are applied to selected
fragmentary episodes. This voiding was nascent in ‘placing
before the eyes’ considered as ‘putting into images,’ the putting-on
stage constitutive of the memory-image (Ricoeur 2004, 53). It
is in term of representation what is remembered is given as an
image of what previously was seen, heard, experienced, learned
and acquired. Therefore, the constructive role of memory is
explained and confirmed. Ricoeur concludes that “history
makes use of fiction and fiction of history as each refigure time”
(Ricoeur 1991d, 353).

As recollection, by nature, has the constructive
character, it is possible to dramatize the thematic of the
imagination in the same way by organizing it in relation to the
two poles of fiction and hallucination. He further indicates that
“by moving to the pole of hallucination, we uncover the pitfall of the imaginary for memory” (Ricoeur 2004, 53). More importantly, Ricoeur states that “a phenomenology of memory cannot fail to recognize what we have just called the pitfall of the imaginary constitutes a sort of weakness, a discredit, a loss of reliability for memory” (Ricoeur 2004, 54). He discovers the close connection between secondary memory and imagination that the pitfall of the imaginary constitutes a sort of weakness, a discredit, a loss of reliability for secondary memory. The phenomena of memory-distortion and false memory creation are always possible as the interplay between presentification by which memory-image is possible and makes memory “visible” and “understandable”. There is no guarantee that the image is actually the representation of the past. Imagination could also move in the direction of mere fiction. As Ricoeur claims, “the imagination, freed from its service to the past, has taken the place of memory. The past, the absent with respect to the history that recounts it, constitutes the other limit of this ambitious mnemotechnics, along with forgetfulness.” (Ricoeur 2004, 66-67).

3.3 Distorted memory and false memory are created by reproductive imagination

As mentioned in part one, Bartlett offers an account of memory-distortion and false memory creation. He and his followers address the constructive nature of memory with the doctrine of schemas. Past events are reconstructed by pre-existing knowledge and schemas, through which fragment of episodic memories are gathered together. However, how schemas reconstruct past event and makes memory “visible” is unthematized. Therefore, they can hardly explain away the constructive role of memory and answer whether the phenomena of memory-distortion and false memory creation are created by reproductive imagination.

Memory-image is not only recognized as an image already lived, but also an image of the past in which is configured with emplotment. In this sense, there are two ways of memorial illusion. First, if the fragmentary episodes are similar. A false fragmentary past event is ‘implanted’ into
similar fragmentary past events and recognized under a theme. For example, I could remember the deadline of this conference is 25 May, but in fact I mixed up the deadline of final paper in one of my course. The selection and gathering may lead to mistake. Second, the order of the fragmentary past events may be mistaken. For example, I could remember during dinner, I had a toast, then sushi, then apple...But I was mistaken that I had apple before, toast and sushi. In this sense, it seems that the procedure imagination involved in false memory or distorted memory produces a new reality in which the false memory or distorted memory is present as the past.

However, it is important to bear in mind that memory could never deny the primacy of the original like what productive imagination does. In all kinds of recollection, it marks the temporal position as the memory-image is “dated”. If a memory is an image in this sense, it contains a positional dimension that, from this point of view, brings it closer to the original. Fictional entities “does not depict but itself off from the real, memories posit past things; whereas the depicted still has one foot in presentation as indirect presentation, fiction and the pretend are situated radically outside of presentation” (Ricoeur 2004, 48).

There are two ways to understand the differences. First, recollection has temporal character or temporal mark, imagination does not have it. Ricoeur points out that,

“The difference between imagination and recollection depends on the answer to this question. It is then the positional dimension of recollection that makes the difference: “Recollection, on the other hand, posits what is reproduced and in this positing gives it a position in relation to the actually present now and to the sphere of the original temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs” (Ricoeur 2004, 36)

In recollection, it posits what is reproduced. What does recollection posit towards what is reproduced? Recollection marks the temporal mark to what is reproduced. The temporal is the ‘pastness’ of the past. Ricoeur, in “Narrated Time”, distinguishes “the ‘pastness’ of the past in the two ways of ne plus (no longer) and of encore (still)” (Ricoeur 1991d, 347). Ways of ne plus (no longer) is in relation to the actually present now.
It is not simultaneous with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is. Ways of encore (still) is in relation to the original temporal field to which the recollection itself belongs. The encore constitutes the ultimate referent intended across the ne plus. The pastness is absent in the actually present now but is reproduced in way of ‘having once been actually experienced’. However, in imagination, the presence of what is imagined is ‘as-if’ without any temporal mark. An imaginary event does not occupy a fixed and determinate temporal position. For example, when I imagine that I play soccer with a famous soccer player, Messi. The imaginary scene cannot be placed in any direct temporal relation. Therefore, Ricoeur emphasizes that recollection, “then, is far from a Bergsonian vision of a duration free of all extension; instead, it confirms the dimensional character of time” (Ricoeur 1991e, 380). Also, “the latter [fantasy] lacks the present ‘as it were’ of the reproduced past” (Ricoeur 2004, 47).

Second, the reference of the intentionality of memory differs from that of the intentionality of imagination. Ricoeur points out that,

“The eidetic difference between two aims, two intentionalities: the first, that of imagination, directed towards the fantastic, the fictional, the unreal, the possible, the utopian, and the other, that of memory, directed towards priority reality, priority constituting the temporal mark par excellence of the ‘thing remembered,’ of the ‘remembered’ as such” (Ricoeur 2004, 6).

Through eidetic analysis, the objects imagined and those recollected are explicated. What is imagined is in the field of unreal but what is recollected or memorized is in the field of absent but real. The intentionality of imagination is towards the fantastic, the fictional, the unreal, the possible, the utopian. And the intentionality of memory is towards priority reality although what is recollected is absent in relation the actually present now. ‘He stresses that “memories belong to the ‘world of experience’ in contrast to the ‘worlds of fantasy’, of irreality. The former is a common world, the latter are totally ‘free’, their horizon completely ‘undetermined.’ In principle, then, they cannot be confused or mistaken one for the other, whatever may be said regarding the complexing relations between
Fiktum and possibility, even their irreducibility to one another” (Ricoeur 2004, 49). Memory and imagination direct towards different world. Their references cannot be mistaken as they belong to different world. Ricoeur concludes that “imagination and memory have as a common trait the presence of the absent and as a different trait, on the one hand, the bracketing of any positing of reality and the vision of something unreal and, on the other, the positing of an earlier reality” (Ricoeur 2004, 44). Imagination has the positing of the vision of something unreal, but memory has the positing of an earlier reality. These mark the second difference between memory and imagination.

For those who create false memory or distorted memory, they consistently regard the memory as the original past event. Although the constructive role of memory leads to false memory creation as imagination involved creates a false and reproduced unity, they have no intention to create a new reality like what fiction does. Therefore, it is clear that memory, by nature, can be reproductive but never be productive in the sense that recollection as reproduction “assumes that the primary memory of a temporal object such as melody has ‘disappeared’ and that it comes back” (Ricoeur 2004, 35).

Conclusion

Several psychologists like Loftut and Bartlett argue for the constructive role of memory. And this nature of memory leads to memory-distortion and false memory creation. However, how it is possible is unthematized. Through the examination of Ricoeur’s analysis memory and imagination, the connection between memory and imagination is then clarified. Schematism is the condition of possibility for memory-image. Through the procedure of Schematism, memory is then visible as memory-image. Categories, are not object of original perception, are applied to the fragmentary past event. Therefore, the constructive role of memory is confirmed. More important, the procedure of imagination descending from ‘pure memory’ to memory-image, it is possible to dramatize the thematic of the imagination in the same way by organizing it in relation to the two poles of fiction and hallucination. As the possibility of the pitfall of the imaginary for memory, false
memory would be created or memory would be distorted. Although false memory creation and memory-distortion ‘re-describes’ the reality with a new order, the primacy of original is not denied. In this sense, we find that the phenomena of memory-distortion and false memory creation are created by reproduction as the nature of memory could never be productive.

NOTES

1 Ricoeur disagrees with Bergson who argues that forgetting is in reality a complete logic of deletion as it does not mean that the forgotten event has not existed or disappear (Ricoeur 2004, 198). Ricoeur argues that forgetting serve as both “reserve” and “deletion” (Ricoeur 2004, 553). Forgetting is the ontological structure of a rememberer as it is the condition of possibility for remembrance. Only God does not forget as He knows everything. Human remembers the past event because the past event ‘disappears’ at the present moment. We forget the past event in order to live through it. For detail illustration, see Dessingué (2011, 168-178).

2 Ricoeur addresses that this schematism is constituted within a history, a history that has all the characteristics of a tradition (Ricoeur 1991, 147). It is true that traditionality illumines the function of the narrative models or paradigms. In this paper, the phenomenon of traditionality cannot be clarified. But we should bear a point in mind that tradition is not the constraints of productive imagination. Productive imagination is transcategorical that it must transform existing categories and draw from existing reality. Therefore, productive imagination does not free from everything. It may be somehow within the boundary of tradition.

3 Some philosophers argue that Kant’s introduction of schematism is unnecessary. For example, G. Warnock argues that schematism aims at replying ‘a pseudo-problem’ (Warnock 1949, 77-82). H. Prichard shares the similar view (Prichard 1909, 249). However, some philosophers like E. Allison argues for the necessity of schematism as schematism is a procedure explaining how the faculty of understanding and the faculty of sensibility work together. Precisely, how the pure concept apply to sensible intuition (Allison 1983, 175-182). M. Heidegger, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, also share the same view that schematism does have its importance as “all conceptual representing is a schematism” (71). This paper does not aim at discussing the debate, so the detail confrontation is not explained.

4 For further details, Vanhoozer 1991, 34-54; Piercy 2011; Bourgeois 2008, 163-182.

5 It is interesting enough that Kant does not talk about categories other than science. He introduces twelve categories only. Heidegger, in Kant and
the Problem of Metaphysics, critically examines Kant’s doctrine of schematism and further develops his own schematism of life.

6 In “Mimesis and Representation”, Ricoeur analyses three levels of mimesis. Mimesis brings about an argumentation of meaning in the field of action (Ricoeur 1991c, 138). For further elaboration, please refer to Time and Narrative.

7 Although the distinction between the two imaginations is clarified, we should not overestimate the distinction as the new referent in productive imagination is not created out of nothing. As G. Taylor explained, “the productive imagination is ‘not something irrational,’” he says; “it must be categorical in order to be transcategorical. To be effective, the productive imagination must transform existing categories; it cannot exist totally outside and separate from them...must have elements of reproductive imagination, must draw from existing reality sufficiently so that its productive distance is not too great” (Taylor 2006, 97-8). It means that productive imagination have elements of reproductive imagination and cannot exist totally outside and separate from them.

8 In Hua XI, Husserl illustrates his understanding of the two ways of memorial illusion and his solutions (192). His illustration mainly focuses on fulfilment, but does not explain the connection between memory and imagination.

REFERENCES


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