Die Umdrehung der Werte: The Ambivalent Intellectual Relationship between Georg Simmel and Max Scheler

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Abstract

This paper explores the intellectual and the biographical relationship between Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Scheler (1874-1928). This topic has been examined through correspondences, direct and indirect references, as well as investigations in the Munich Archive (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek – BSB). Simmel and Scheler lived in Berlin in the early twentieth century, so they shared the German Jahrhundertwende “Zeitgeist” and many fascinations, anxieties, hopes, and feelings. Scheler was Simmel’s pupil (Berliner Humboldt Universität) in 1895, but they were destined to meet again and again. Simmel attended some of Scheler’s lectures as he searched for his theoretical path. Their roots of reciprocal influence also spanned many indirect interests and they developed personal acquaintance. There are many similarities and affinities in Simmel’s and Scheler’s work, that behind the reciprocal effect of their respective intellectual work hide an undeniable and unavoidable ambivalence. They converge on many topics (the cultural and moral analysis of values, the rediscovery of “emotional” issues in the foundation of social and cultural theory, the historical and anthropological interests, etc.), even though their respective philosophical and sociological findings were quite different. Scheler’s “essentialist” position, in opposition to some Simmelian “functionalism” (i.e. relationalism), does not detract from the mighty importance of Simmel’s unique approach, which brought a breath of novelty to both philosophical and sociological fields through its eclectic and innovative inquiry into modernity and from Scheler’s new phenomenological

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approach. The interaction between Simmel and Scheler was certainly significant for both of them, surely for defining and clarifying their own philosophy of culture as well as their anthropological and sociological achievements.

Keywords: Simmel, Scheler, sociology, anthropology, Lebensphilosophie

1. The Simmel-Scheler Milieu

The first aim of this paper is to sketch the biographical and intellectual relationship between Georg Simmel (1858-1918) and Max Scheler (1874-1928). It explores the mutual influence of two of the most meaningful maître à penser of the twentieth century: no one can deny how deep and wide has been the legacy of their thought within the philosophy of culture as well as any sociological field.

I must admit that from the very beginning this aim appeared as a challenge rather than a real research task. Reconstructing the “mutual action” [Wechselwirkung], to use a central Simmelian phrase, which two intellectuals trigger, is not a simple matter. It is no coincidence that the last work in this regard (one of the few) goes back more than twenty years (Hübner-Funk 1995). This partly depends on the bibliographic and biographical data available, and partly on the “neglected affinities” that they shared. In Schelerian interpretation of Simmel’s thought, some topics addresses an authentic comparison, equipped by systematic quotations, but elsewhere a strong criticism also emerges.

Both Simmel and Scheler did not have a “school” stricto sensu (Lukács 1958 [1918]), although if the impact of their intellectual work on their contemporaries was very significant. They had, however, actually pupils, and this certainly reflects their influence: both of them died prematurely, Simmel (in 1918) after the recent achievement of a stable academic position in Straßbourg, Scheler (in 1928) after the call to the University of Frankfurt (and after a series of intricate events due to his former academic experience in München).

It is possible to gather some traces about the relationship between Simmel and Scheler from direct sources (the texts to which they refer or mention to each other), from
letters (that involve them more or less directly), and through the intellectual profiles of authors who personally met and dealt with both of them. This is, for example, the case of Karl Wolfskehl and Sigfried Kracauer, whose intellectual profile were strongly influenced by the Simmelen-Schelerian double ancestry. Theodor Adorno reported:

[Kracauer] is linked to Georg Simmel and Max Scheler […] He knew both of them well privately. Simmel, of whom he wrote a study, advised him to go over completely to philosophy. Not only did he train his ability with him to interpret specific substantial phenomena in relation to that which – according to that conception – appears mainly here in the way of the general structures […] Simmel’s influence on him was really more at the level of a gesture of thought then of an elective affinity to an irrationalist philosophy of life (Adorno 1974, 391-392).

Max Scheler and Georg Simmel met for the first time in Berlin in the spring of 1895. At that time, Simmel was a Privatdozent at Alexander von Humboldt Universitāt: he mostly lectured philosophy (moral Philosophy) and sociology. Max Scheler, who was 21 and came from the University of Munich (as a student of medicine and biology), enrolled in Berlin for one year only as a student of philosophy, psychology, medicine, and sociology. The Berlin experience was short but crucial in the path of Scheler’s definitive “conversion” to the philosophical studies. Scheler completed in fact his studies (in philosophy under Eucken’s guidance) at the University of Jena in 1897.

During Scheler’s first period in Berlin, Simmel lectured on various subjects, including Sociologie [mit Berücksichtigung der Geschichte der Familie] and Neueste philosophische Theorien [Theorien der letzten dreißig Jahre], and for a wider audience (269 people) entitled Ueber den Pessimismus [insbesondere den Schopenhauerschen]. In the summer semester of 1895 Simmel began lecturing on Kantian philosophy (Die Philosophie Kant’s) and social psychology (Social Psychologie mit Berücksichtigung des Sozialismus). During the winter semester of 1895/96, the period in which Scheler attended Simmel’s classes (Henckmann 1998, 17), the Berlin sociologist lectured on the Geschichte der neueren Philosophie [von Descartes bis zur Gegenwart], Sociologie, and on the Ethik [mit Berücksichtigung der Probleme des modernen
Lebens] (Köhnke 1996, 198). During these years Simmel strongly aspired to the ethics chair at Humboldt University, a position that was previously held by Georg von Gizycki († 1895). The inner academic dynamics favored the candidate Max Dessoir, thanks to Dilthey’s strong ancestry (Köhnke 1996, 361).

At the time, the great “light” of philosophy in Berlin was indeed Wilhelm Dilthey, and Scheler attended some of his lessons. It is noteworthy that in the fin de siècle metropolis of Berlin Simmel and Scheler were destined to encounter each other again, and in more meaningful ways and occasions, namely within those intellectual salons that came to life around the figure of the poet Stefan George. Simmel’s and Scheler’s common friendship with Ernst (and Friedrich) Gundolf and Karl Wolfskehl, whom Scheler met on such occasions, decisively revealed Scheler’s aesthetic tendencies. George’s “heroic” poetics fits very well with the great influence that Nietzsche’s philosophy had on both Simmel and Scheler during the last decade of the nineteenth century. From Nietzsche’s radically skeptical and tragic conception on the fate of the Western culture (more particularly, the effects of the rationalistic modernization and the progressive conflict with the “mediocrity” of Western mass society, as well as the speculations on the ressentiment theme), both Simmel and Scheler forcefully responded, embracing Lebensphilosophie as a possible antidote to the increasing Kulturpessimismus of the early twentieth century (Belardinelli 1992; Lichtblau 1996). Gundolf and Simmel are cited not coincidentally together by Scheler in an explanatory passage of the essay Vorbilder und Führer (1911), particularly in the chapter Der Genius in der Sphäre der (Welt)-Erkenntnis,

The task of phenomenology with regard to poetry is the uncovering of the phenomenological structure of the poetic world (such as Gundolf, Simmel.) Poetry and philosophy are united by the structure of worldview (Scheler 2000, 329)².

Within the frame of the Schelerian aesthetic theory, the poet-figure was considered as the artist of the “inner world” [der Künstler der Innenwelt] and Scheler referred to Simmel’s Goethe to explain this concept:
True poetry teaches us - far beyond the content of poetry - to experience it in all its forms, to grasp the most immediate of our emotional activity - to grasp the most immediate of our spiritual activities - the soul as it grows, the soul as it experiences (Scheler 2000, 336)\textsuperscript{10}.

Georg Simmel’s son Hans also reported in detail some anecdotes on the \textit{George-Kreis}. He lists many followers of Jewish origins, including: “[...] Karl Wolfskehl, Freidrich and his brother Ernst, Arthur Salz, Ernst Morwitz, my father [Georg Simmel], and others like Max Weber, Reinhold Lepsius, Paul Verlaine, Bohringer [...] who frequented the salons of the \textit{George-Kreis} in Berlin in the years 1903-1904” (Simmel* 2008, 58). It is well-known that Georg Simmel focused on George’s aesthetical portrait in the essay \textit{Stefan George. Eine kunstphilosophische Studie} (1901)\textsuperscript{11} and then he dedicated the second (1905) and the third (1907) edition of the volume \textit{Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie} to his friend-poet (Simmel 2008, 316-317).


A privileged point of view for the reconstruction of the biographical and intellectual relations between Simmel and Scheler can certainly be the correspondences. Much of this material has been lost (Simmel 2008: 1026 [\textit{Editorischer Bericht}]), but what has been collected in the recent decades, thanks to the valuable philological and bibliographical work by Otthein Rammtedt within the \textit{Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe}, has provided scholars an indispensable means for their research.

It is well-known that Scheler lectured in Jena until 1906, when he moved to the predominantly Roman Catholic University of Munich (more precisely, he lectured since December 21, 1906 as \textit{Privatdozent}, after his \textit{Umhabilitation}). In 1910, after he was publicly accused of adultery by a Munich newspaper, Scheler sued for libel but lost, and the University of Munich canceled his teaching contract. He moved to Göttingen, where he lectured in coffeehouses and other private venues. From 1910 to 1919, he would have to earn a living as a private scholar, lecturer and freelance writer. Because Scheler was forbidden to teach in German Universities, his lectures would
often have to be held in hotel rooms rented by his close friend Dietrich von Hildebrand. In this period Scheler frequently moved from Göttingen to Berlin, and vice versa.

In a letter written on February 6, 1909 Simmel wrote to Karl Wolfskehl\(^2\) referring to Scheler’s scarce bibliographic achievements and the “material difficulties” he was experiencing at the time (Simmel 2008, 684). Indeed, in those years Scheler - beyond some reviews and the Habilitationsschrift “Die transzendentale und die psychologische Methode”, written under the aegis of Rudolf Eucken in 1899 and published in 1900 - was far removed from the scientific-academic point of view (Scheler 1971, 420ff.). In this letter, Simmel implicitly referred to the scandal that impeded Scheler the venia legendi at the University of Munich (“der Fall Furtwängler”), and also talked about a sum of money that he would have collected for his benefit. We have a real and more detailed consistency of this sum in a successive letter (March 8, 1909) that Simmel addressed again to Wolfskehl, which stated that Simmel’s “personal contribution” to Scheler amounted to 1500 marks (Simmel 2008, 691-692)\(^3\). In a letter to Margarete von Bendemann (March 22, 1909), Scheler was mentioned as was Ernst Bloch (Simmel 2008, 693), who, beyond commonly attending Simmel’s lessons in Berlin, had previously shared some academic years with Scheler in Munich (between 1905 and 1906\(^4\)).

A new letter to Wolfskehl on April 13, 1909 referenced an unequivocal request from Simmel, who sought him as an intermediary for Scheler, in regard to the support [Hilfsaktion] in his favor, since “[...Scheler’s] difficulties – not exclusively economic – had exacerbated” (Simmel 2008, 695). Henckmann wrote about this Scheler’s difficult period:

Scheler reichte 1907 eine Scheidungsklage ein, zog sie aber kurz darauf wieder zurück. 1908 gab er die häusliche Gemeinschaft mit Amélie endgültig auf. Als diese erfuhr, daß er sich wenige Wochen nach der Trennung auf ein Verhältnis mit einer jüngeren Frau eingelassen hatte, für die er außerdem großzügig Geld ausgegeben haben soll, während er ihr gegenüber vorgab, die Alimente für seinen 1905 geborenen Sohn Wolfgang nicht oder nicht pünktlich zahlen zu können, verwandelte sich ihr verletzter Stolz in einen ungehemmten Vernichtungswillen (Henckmann 1998, 21-22).
In these years Simmel attempted, thanks to key figures of Margarete Susman and Gerturd Kantorowitz, to introduce Henri Bergson’s philosophy within the George-Kreis in Berlin (Zanfi 2013, 86ff.; Fitzi 2002). Bergson’s philosophy would have played a strong influence on Scheler, who really appreciated the translation into the German language as a valuable contribution for the scientific community.

A new letter addressed to Wolfskehl (December 6, 1909) reported another one episode related to the Simmel-Scheler biographical relationship (Simmel 2008: 737): the Berliner sociologist talked about a “very unpleasant experience” [eigentümliches negatives Erlebnis] referring to Scheler. This letter referred of a together planned voyage in Italy for the autumn 1909. Scheler did not reply to some insistent letters. Simmel then asked Wolfskehl for further news about Scheler, and admonished him for his rudeness and lack of respect [Unhöflichkeit und Rücksichtslosigkeit].

In February, 19 of 1911, Simmel addressed a letter to Edmund Husserl: after mentioning his two recent volumes Hauptprobleme der Philosophie (a copy of which was sent with the letter) and Philosophische Kultur (in forthcoming press), Simmel asked Husserl for news about Scheler. He precisely asked for “his modus vivendi and his plans” (Simmel 2008, 941). As known, the “fatal” encounter between Scheler and Husserl (during an editorial meeting of the “Kant-Studien” review) dates back to January 1902: this was surely fatal for Scheler, since he had finally found a philosophical solution within the debate on the Methodenstreit between neo-Kantians and psychologists (Amori 2010, 32ff.). The Husserlian phenomenology must have seemed to Scheler’s eyes a kind of “lapis philosophorum”, offering a new perspective of studies (he always refers to phenomenology as a new fundamental “approach”) and research in the epistemological field. The influence of Phenomenology in Scheler’s work is very complex, as Mancuso recently underlined (Mancuso 2007). Scheler found in Husserl a new intellectual guide, as well as Husserl considered him as one of the most promising of his epigones. After the episodes related to the loss of the venia legendi at the University of Munich in 1910, Scheler privately lectured in the

In regard to Simmel’s voyage to Göttingen, planned in April of 1913, a new letter to Husserl (March 2, 1913) mentioned Scheler. Simmel particularly mentioned an interesting series of seminars that he would attend (Simmel 2008a, 169; Mader 1980, 42ff.).

Scheler had moved back to Berlin in 1912 and, as referenced by the testimony of Michael Landmann, Arthur Stein and Simmel, who attended his courses, Simmel had a powerful reaction, especially in relation to Scheler’s talk titled Aufsatz über die Lebensphilosophie (Landmann 1976, 272). We find confirmation of Simmel’s attendance at Scheler’s lectures in some Hermann Schmalenbach’s remembrances of Simmel (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 213).

Scheler addressed a letter to Husserl from Berlin on March 12, 1913. Simmel (beside the name of Renach) was mentioned in this letter that contained some topics of a conference in Berlin held at the Kantgesellschaft. Husserl was invited to speak (Husserl 1994a, 216-217). He could not participate due to the concomitance of the publication of the volume Ideen I. In this letter Scheler referred of the circulation and proliferation of phenomenological thought, and he mentioned Nicolai Hartmann (and the Marburger Schule), Frischeisen-Köhler (the “Dilthey-Schule”), and some scientific reviews (“Logos”). He then wrote: “Von Simmel hoffe ich sehr, daß er in einer allgemeinen Zeitschrift sich zu der Sache äussert. Er erhielt ja auch meine hiesigen Vorträge einen besseren Begriff von der Sache” (Husserl 1994a, 217).

In Strasbourg Simmel’s new city of residence, he finally became a Professor Ordinarius. He then wrote a postcard to Scheler (September 3, 1915), asking him to meet in nearby in Heidelberg (Simmel 2008a, 556). Simmel informed Freidrich Gundolf in a successive letter (September 5, 1915) of the same intentions. A new request for their meeting was sent to Scheler on September 18, 1915, in which Simmel implicitly referred to his forthcoming intellectual commitments (Simmel 2008a, 558). These commitments included his participation in the Wiener Urania program “Kriegsvorträge in Wien”, a conference on the
second year of the First World War: Paul Deussen, Hugo von Hoffmannsthal, Ernst Troeltsch, and Simmel were some of the most noted invited speakers.

In a new letter dated October 6, 1915, Simmel congratulated Scheler for the publication of the book *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze*\(^{19}\) and for good review on it that appeared on the “Frankfurter Zeitung” by Max Böhm (Simmel 2008a, 562)\(^{20}\). In Scheler’s *Zur Idee des Menschen* (1913) Simmel was mentioned in relation to the concept of “person” that emerges from the pages of the Simmelian essay *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes* (1911), and later collected in the volume *Philosophische Kultur* (Simmel 1996: 349-366), and then in relation to the concept of God – Scheler directly mentioned Simmel’s words (Simmel 1996: 354). In *Abhandlungen und Aufsätze* (1915), Simmel’s name appeared several times: it was mentioned in *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moral* (Scheler 1915, Bd I, 64 et seq.), and then again in references to Simmel’s *Philosophie des Geldes* in the Schelerian essay *Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis* (Scheler 1915, Bd. 2, 129); and finally a reference to Simmel in the essay *Zum Sinn der Frauenbewegung* (Scheler 1915, Bd. 2, 278).

In the letter to Husserl, written on March 8, 1916, Scheler referred to Simmel, this time about his possible call to Heidelberg on the chair previously occupied by Emil Lask, who died on May 26, 1915:


### 3. Simmel’s influence on Scheler’s work

Simmel’s books were quite apparent in Scheler’s personal library. From an investigation in the Munich Archive (*Bayerische Staatsbibliothek* – BSB), which preserves Scheler’s *Nachlaß*, significant elements emerge in this regard. Simmel’s volumes that were held by Scheler included: *Die Religion
(1906), *Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* (1905), *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* (1910), Henri Bergson (1914), Kant. *Sechszehn Vorlesungen gehalten an der Berliner Universität* (1918), *Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysischer Kapitel* (1918), *Der Konflikt der modernen Kultur* (1918), *Grundfragen der Soziologie. Individuum und Gesellschaft* (1920). In many of these works, Scheler had underlined propositions and added marginal annotations (sometimes highly colorful), which enlighten us how intensively he read Simmel. In the volume *Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel* [BSB München: ANA 315 G 2 1851] there are pencil marks in different parts of the chapter titled “Tod und Unsterblichkeit”. Scheler had dedicated an essay to the “Unsterblichkeit”, which he never published indeed [ANA 315 CA IX 29, A 1-6]. Many underlines can also be found in *Hauptprobleme der Philosophie* [ANA 315 G 2 1378], *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie* [ANA 315 G 2 200], *Philosophische Kultur* [ANA 315 G 2 200] and in *Die Religion* [ANA 315 G 2 45]. In *Die Religion* Scheler often approved of Simmel’s words (with a “gut!” or a “sehr gut!”), as well as in *Philosophische Kultur* (especially in the chapters *Das Relative und das Absolute im Geschlechter-Problem* and *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes*), but notes were also found that showed disapproval with a clear “nein!”.

In the volume *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel* Nikolas Spykman maintained that Georg Simmel had a great impact on many intellectual in the early twentieth century, and he wrote about Scheler and Simmel:

> Simmel had a great influence on the numerous students who passed beneath his touch during his thirty years of teaching. But he made no school in the narrow sense of term [...] Wiese and Scheler in Cologne and the “Kölner Vierteljahrshefte für Soziologie” have definitely accepted Simmel’s views regarding the study of sociology (Gassen and Landmann 1958: 186-187).

> Ludwig Marcuse considered Simmel’s contribution as indispensable to authors such as “Ziegler, Ortega y Gasset, Spranger, Jung, Spengler and Scheler”, with particular reference to Simmel’s reflections on the “Lebensmetaphysik” (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 191). Erich Przywara argued
that three important Jewish thinkers, Simmel, Husserl, and Scheler, were the “initiators” of innovative researches in the twentieth century. He indicated that Simmel had given new philosophical meaning and impulses with his text, influencing the philosophers Romano Guardini and Martin Heidegger. He credited that Husserl as being as a methodological renewer in all fields of knowledge. Furthermore, he indicated that Scheler was an innovator in the field of anthropology, psychology, and ethics (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 224-225; 227). Karl Berger, who lead “kunstwissenschaftliche Studien” in Berlin in 1908-1909 and then moved to Munich, recalled a meaningful anecdote. If someone asked him what is the newest philosophical foundation in ethics, he would replied with a smile: “Ich würde sie Max Scheler als dem an-ethischen Menschen kat’exochn anvertrauen” (Gassen and Landmann 1958, 247).

The depth of Simmel’s influence on Scheler’s studies emerges in his bibliographical productions. The first occurrence of Simmel in Scheler’s works appears in the Habilitationsschrift: “Die transzendentale und psychologische Methode” (1900). In a phase still strongly influenced by Eucken, and due to the philosophical milieu inquiring into epistemological issues, the Habilitationsschrift was inscribed in the so-called “Methodenstreit”. This involved the intellectual forces in the determination of a “place” of philosophy, namely as epistemology, and, more specifically, in order to clarify the inquiry subject and method within the Geisteswissenschaften. The Darwinian theory (and the echo that generated in various fields of culture) certainly was considered by Scheler to be very worthy and interesting. Among the various authors who were influenced by Darwin’s theory, Scheler mentioned Simmel:

Simmel applied his theory to the epistemology and he considered the truth as the characteristic of the ideas that best adapted to the environment, while others announced, with trumpet blasts, a new ethic based on that theory (Scheler 1971, 209)\textsuperscript{21}.

Scheler’s competence and cognition on Simmelian studies were not at all superficial. Scheler knew not only Simmel’s main volumes, which were published prior 1900, i.e. Über sociale Differenzierung (1890), Die Probleme der
Geschichtsphilosophie (1892), and Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (1892-93), but also the so-called “secondary literature” that Simmel produced in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Scheler specifically cited Simmel’s scientific article Über eine Beziehung der Selektionslehre zur Erkenntnistheorie, which was published in the journal ‘Archiv für systematische Philosophie’ (edited by Ludwig Stein and Paul Natorp), Neue Folge, Bd. I, Heft 1 (1895). This article argued for an “evolutionization” of the Kantian a priori (Karlsruhe 2001): in this phase Simmelian thought was still strongly influenced by Spencerian suggestions, which socially and culturally reverberated in the concept of “differentiation”. Notable developments and argumentations on these assertions could be found in the double volume Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft that Simmel had published a short time previously.

Scheler quoted Simmel in a note, referring to an article of 1897, in relation to the analysis of the “principle of causality”. He reported what Simmel considered a solution to the question – whether to consider the “subsumption” of this principle from an aprioristic normativity or whether to bring it back to the dimension of the Kantian judgment of experience:

In the first volume of Kantstudien (1897), pp. 416ff., Simmel has attempted in his essay “On the Difference of Perceptions and Experiences” the sharpness of this either/or by the assumption of a gradual transition between the a priori synthetic Judgment and the judgment of experience. Since apriority and necessity necessarily belong together in Kant, it would also be necessary to establish consistent degrees of apriority, which (at least on the Kantian premises) is not pursuable (Scheler 1971, 249)\textsuperscript{22}.

The question of causality was then tackled by Scheler when the causality principle was analyzed and applied in the Kulturwissenschaften, and particularly in the “historic studies”. This provided significant evidence that Scheler listed Simmel among the neo-Kantians of Baden:

In agreement with Schopenhauer, who alleges that the methodological principles of a science could only be derived from their real work, but in contradiction to it, that the mental fixation of laws is an essential characteristic of scientific knowledge, Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, conclude that history already in its present state of art is a science, and that accordingly there must be
two kinds of science, “sciences of law” and “sciences of events” (Scheler 1971, 304)\textsuperscript{23}.  

In the second edition of *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* (1923), Scheler referred again to Simmel, particularly looking at the essays *Fragment über die Liebe* (posthumous 1922) and *Lebensanschauung* (1918)\textsuperscript{24}. Scheler’s wide critique on sympathy in his book was primarily aimed at the theories of sympathy that he considered inadequate: 1. *Descriptive and genetic Psychology* (Hume, Darwin, Spencer, Lipps, Wundt, etc.), since sympathy cannot be reduced or referred to as psycho-physiological causes of the phenomenon; 2. *Metaphysical Systems*: while recognizing the originality of affective phenomena and the central question of sympathy, many philosophical systems were not exhaustive on the theme of identity and essential difference of “persons”. Among the authors in this field we find both “metaphysicians of life” (Schopenhauer, Bergson and Simmel) and the so-called *Geiststheoretiker* (Hegel, von Hartmann, Driesch, and Becher).  

In this volume, Scheler had with Simmel a real and concrete dispute, since Simmel’s fragment on love was a valuable methodological example of an “emotional” analysis with an underlying sociological and philosophical meaning. Scheler refused to reduce the “love” to the pure function of an interaction, as Simmel supports, and he particularly argues:

Love as such, as a pure function, never errs and is never deceived, so long as man does not deceive himself as to its presence, its genuineness, or concerning its object. Nor does it err or deceive itself even in those cases referred to in Georg Simmel’s profound but very one-sided *Fragmente über die Liebe*, where it seeks existence only for its own sake, as “pure feeling”, and seems merely to make artful use of biological sex-differences and the automatic tensions which result therefrom, in order to engender itself and to irradiate the soul. For here it enters only into an earth-bound relationship, a union, for instance, in which the racial energies are in decline, and for this very reason it is constrained to sterility. For love as such seeks to produce a “nobler race”, and this being impossible here, its very providence will at least hinder and restrain such men from mere reproduction of their kind and from handing on their hereditary taint still further to a distant posterity. But we must not follow Simmel in treating this “negative instance” as a norm; it is only a border-line case of love, to be taken instead as the marginal exception, which does but prove our rule. Simmel supposes that love resembles justice and the arts, which
first sprang entirely from vital needs and motives, and continued to serve these purposes (in an objective sense) for centuries, only for a “reversal” [Umdrehung] to take place in which life and its energies came, in their turn, to subserve these spiritual values for their own sake. So lovemaking also, even to the kiss and the sexual act, is supposed to have originated in the course of evolution for the objective purpose of procreation, but thereafter to have emancipated itself into an independent value which now commands life to its service. But such a notion is too simple and too ingenious to be true as well. The converse theory has also been put forward by believers in a 'rationalization' of the will to propagate, for instance, by H. Grotjahn. But such analogies-Simmel's deeper one, no less than the more superficial ideas of Grotjahn, have no real justification. Against Simmel it must be said that in the last phase of his 'philosophy of life' (approached by way of Bergson), he completely misconceived the primordial nature of spirit, and the objects, meanings and values appropriate to it. Nor, indeed, is it correct to maintain, as Simmel does, that pure art, pure knowledge (i.e. philosophical, rather than positive scientific knowledge), justice, ethical norms of a more general kind and even the disposition of the individual, were ever developed out of “life”, or were originally fostered and cultivated in the service of organic drives and needs. The original confines of the development of the spirit, its limited apprehension of meaning and value, may well have been progressively enlarged, in the course of human evolution, by the effect of organic drives and wants in giving direction to its aspirations; but the activity of the spirit has. Everywhere and at all times followed its own original laws, and its objects of meaning and value have always been sublimely elevated above all that relates to life as such (Scheler 2007, 113-114).

Scheler criticized Simmel and his “romantic” idea of (sexual) love, that substantially hides the false twofold mechanism of “the materialization of the spirit and the spiritualization of the material” [die false Versinnlichung des Geistes und die falsche Vergeistigung des Sinnlichen], and the subjectivism of his Lebensphilosophie. Simmel considered life as the new metaphysical center of any reflection and the very ontological issue in any field of culture. Life generates “forms” and then they rebel against it in some kind of “reversal” [Umdrehung] sui generis: Scheler found this statement by Simmel very incoherent. Scheler’s foundation of the emotional theory was based indeed on the “objectivity” of values and emotions: they orient life and have their own ontological status.

We entirely reject metaphysical biologism, i.e. the conception of ultimate reality, in the manner of Bergson,
Simmel, Lodge and others, as itself an \textit{élan vital} or life-principle, or as the life or soul of the universe. For neither in its knowing, intuition and thinking capacity, nor in its emotional and volitional one, is Spirit, or “noûs”, an outcome or “sublimation” of life. The modes in which cognition operates can nowhere be traced back to the bio-psychical pattern found in processes of the automatic and objectively goal-seeking type; each obeys laws of its own. Nor, again, are cognitive, ethical or aesthetic values subordinate varieties of biological value (Scheler 2007, 74-75).

Scheler also criticized Simmel due to the indistinction between “life” [\textit{Leben}] and “spirit” [\textit{Geist}]. This issue would be further deepened in Scheler’s late work, particularly his masterpiece \textit{Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos} (1928). Simmel’s “original romanticism” explained this indistinction: “Simmel is the complete romantic at this point and is also thinking as such, endowing the spirit with a spurious vitalism, and the truly vital with an equally fictitious spirituality” (Scheler 2007, 118).

Simmel’s erroneous interpretation of love recurred in the unpublished essay \textit{Die Grundformen des Schamgefühls. Lehren von der Herkunft des Schamgefühls} (1913). Scheler tackled there the coquetterie issue, as it emerges in Simmel’s famous homonymous essay within \textit{Philosophische Kultur} (1911):

Simmel brings the coquetry - quite erroneously, as it seems to us - to sexual love, even to the well-known Platonic definition, and he finds in it a variety of surrenders and failures. But coquetry has nothing to do with sex love. It completely lies in the sphere of the \textit{instincts}, and is far less mysterious than Simmel thinks. Above all, Simmel seems to me disregarding that it is not really a genuine home expression of “\textit{something}” (for instance, of surrenders and failures, i.e. a \textit{mental} processes), but only a rhythm of the movement that expresses nothing at all. Particularly, it is not a genuine surrender impulse and only apparent failure - this would at least be closer to the shame. See G. Simmel, ‘Die Koketterie’ in ‘Philosophische Kultur’, Leipzig 1911” (Scheler 2000, 104)\textsuperscript{26}.

The release of \textit{Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die material Werethik} (1913, 1916) represented an important turning point in Scheler’s intellectual activity. The critique of
the Kantian moral paradigm flourished beside the “foundation” [Grundlegung] of ethics on the basis of new presuppositions: “emotional intuitionism” and “material apriorism” (Scheler 2009,14). As Scheler himself clarified in the preface to the second edition of Der Formalismus, the rigorous personalism is strictly related to the doctrine of an “individual and objectively valid good” and of the individual “moral destination” [sittlichen Bestimmung] of each person (Scheler 2009, 15). In the eyes of an Orthodox Kantian, this might seem to be a contradiction in terms (the conceptual coupling of individual/objectivity, individual/legality): rather Scheler treats these concepts in a systematic manner.

In the distinction between “ideal ought” [ideal Sollen] and “value” [Wert], Scheler demonstrated the relationship of dependence and derivation of the former from the second (but never the opposite). The ideal Sollen always has a relationship with the sphere of values, and meaning the obligation as “ought” precisely indicates the ontological status of the moral obligation itself with respect to the value. In this Scheler referred to Simmel’s work Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (1892-93), where he in nuce glimpsed a theoretical formulation (Scheler 2013, 409 [241]).

Simmel furnished important intuitions to Scheler in order to clarify the relationship between individual and moral ought. Simmel’s volume Das individuelle Gesetz. Ein Versuch über das Prinzip der Ethik (1913), quoted by Scheler in his book and defined as a “very instructive essay”, was the starting point for a deepening of the (individual) moral obligation based on experience and on the “material apriorism” (Scheler 2009, 481).

In the essay Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart (1922)27 Scheler asserted:

In a closer association with the two Kantian schools there was also Georg Simmel, who from an initially more positivistic mindset over the Kantian issues finally managed to a “philosophy of life”, the result of which he published in his posthumous “Lebensanschauung. Four metaphysical chapter”. The essay “About Death” is the deepest and most mature of what this peculiar thinker, inspiring far beyond the German borders, wrote. His essay on “The Individual Law”, in which, like Schleiermacher (and in his “Ethics”), he attempted to demonstrate the evidence of “individualized values”, i.e. the
individual moral destiny of man, in addition to “universal moral ones”, has greatly enhanced ethics. His last “philosophy of life”, suggested by Bergson, which remains dark, indefinite, and confused, cannot be admitted with equal applause (Scheler 2005, 291)²⁸.

Scheler’s strong reference to the individual sphere within the “essential” value recognition did not pass through a formalistic, i.e. rationalist, foundation of the Kantian Sollen – the “doctrine of the necessary universality of duty”. It found in Simmel an important intellectual precursor. However, Scheler deviated from the Simmelian theoretical scheme (exposed in the essay Das individuelle Gesetz). He underlined the limits of the individualistic subjectivism, and claimed the dual character of the material theory of Schelerian ethics, which asserted, on the one hand the objective content of the value (the good in itself), on the other hand it maintained the essential value of the person (Scheler 2013, 945 [482]).

Scheler thus clarified a fundamental aspect of the relationship between individuals’ “lived experience” [Erlebnis] and values, which directly concerns some reflections developed by Simmel in relation to his theory of religion. The Schelerian theory is in sharp contrast with the Simmelian theory on this topic. According to Scheler, the value is always the telos and the goal of any “living experience” [Erleben]. The relationship between value and Erleben is always determined by the orientation of the second one toward the first one, and never of a filiation or generation of the value from the Erlebnis (as Simmel, on the contrary, argues). In Simmel’s theory of “religiosity”, the content of religion seems to derive from a particular emotional connotation of humankind. It is derived from “optimism”, from a particular anthropological “feeling” (or from an authentic worldview), whereas religion represents a crystallized and institutionalized formation of it. This Simmelian scheme reverberated in all of his last writings (on the Leben topic), in which the cultural forms are nothing more than temporary “stations” of the subjective mind that created them and needs to follow them to recognize each other²⁹.

In the volume Vom Ewigen im Menschen (1921) Scheler was strongly critical toward Simmel, particularly in the chapter “Der religiöse Akt”, in which he confuted the
sociologist for reducing religious life to a simple kind of “apprehension” of any content. Simmel would have shifted the emphasis on the subjective aspect of religious experience, reducing the idea of God to a simple “related” noun (Scheler 2009, 619 et seq., GW V, 240 et seq.).

The Simmelian distinction between religion and religiosity is well known as well as the extent to which the latter is affected by the lebensphilosophische considerations and reflection in Simmel last works. Religiosity was described as “the whole existence expressed in a particular tonality” or as a “modality of the soul of living and experience the world” (Simmel 1989, 53; 113; 133). Scheler accused Simmel of an identification and misunderstanding of God with the thematic nucleus of his “metaphysics of life” [Erlebnis], the profound force that self-creates and continuously flows. Not accidentally, Scheler mentioned this in these passages on Simmel’s volume Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel (1918), which was certainly the most important manifesto of his Lebensphilosophie. The Simmelian “religious subjectivism”, more generally the immanent vision of religious life, did not stand according to Scheler’s critics.

If on the religious issue Simmel and Scheler seemed to share a sidereal distance, the spiritual and “metaphysical” interpretation of the radical experience of the First World War by the German Empire represented an element of theoretical and aesthetic convergence. The entry into war by Germany was not considered an exclusively political choice, but both interpreted it as an occasion linked to the “German spiritual destiny”. The experience of war was seen as a decisive turning point in relation to the irreversible crisis30 that was taking place primarily from a cultural point of view in Europe. It was a fatal watershed for all European people. According to Scheler, Germany should have lead Europe against the pressure of the three “empires” (the “Eastern”, the Russian and the American forces) (Scheler 1982: 153). Scheler’s war writings Der Krieg als Gesamterlebnis (1916) and the luckier Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg (1915, 1917) were very close to the Simmelian writings on war (Watier 1991, Joas and Knöbl 2013, 137). In these years Scheler and Simmel assumed a nationalist
and warlike position, which essentially united them to many German intellectuals who were blinded by some kind of an “interventionist fascination”: for many of them it seemed to be a real Kulturkampf (Bruendel 2003; Hoeres 2004).

Finally, in the 1926 Leib und Seele lectures, Scheler delivered a significant testimony to the importance of Simmel (whom he mentioned besides Eucken) in the identification of an “original category” [Urkategorie], explaining the spirit of the new era:

The deceased deep German thinker Georg Simmel once said (similar to Rudolf Eucken in his basic concepts of the present) that every age has its original worldview category from which it is imbued, as the starry sky and its mechanics in the 18th century (H. von Stein). And this original category is undoubtedly today: “Life” (Scheler 1997, 135).

Not so far from these thoughts, particularly in Versuche einer Philosophie des Lebens of 1913, Scheler had adopted Dilthey, Nietzsche and Bergson as theoretical models for the presentation of the Lebensphilosophie as the new interpretive paradigm of the world, or “[...] a philosophy that springs from the fullness of life, or better, from the fullness of the experience of life” (Scheler 1997a, 82).

In conclusion: due to the “ambivalent” relationship between Simmel and Scheler, the balance of an interaction [Wechselwirkung] between the two of them remains open and uncertain. From the direct and indirect biographical testimonies, we can infer that it is undeniable that they shared and exchanged many suggestions and reflections within different phases of their life. Equally undeniable is the mutual intellectual esteem that reverberated in their works and in the intellectual process they undertook, spreading to different speculative outcomes. This interaction was anyway fruitful for both of them: Scheler’s “essentialist” position, sometimes in opposition to some Simmelian “functionalism”, does not detract from the mighty importance of Simmel’s unique approach, which brought a breath of novelty to both philosophical and sociological fields through its eclectic and innovative inquiry into modernity issues. Simmel’s philosophy of culture, his relational approach, and also his lebensphilosophisch “intuitions” certainly set a precedent and represented “doctrine”
for his pupils (*lato sensu* and *stricto sensu*), and this last assertion we might state would also work with Max Scheler.

**NOTES**

1 Gunderson recently tackled a particular issue in Simmel and Scheler (the problem of technology and the “value-fused analysis of technology-values relations”), even if he did not explore the genealogy of their respective mutual intellectual exchange (Gunderson 2017). He considers the modern valuation of technology in Simmel and Scheler, i.e., technology is (as an end) considered irrational because it is a reversal of the means-ends relationship and values the general development of technology instead of the potential benefits of particular technical developments.

2 I use this locution, which is an essay title describing the “fluctuating” and ambivalent relationship between the sociologists Simmel and Weber (Faught 1985).

3 On this topic Sibylle Hübner-Funk examines in the *incipit* of her contribution on Scheler and Simmel (Hübner-Funk 1995). Hübner-Funk’s study certainly opens the path to a series of questions about the relationship between Simmel and Scheler: it reduces to a simply a report of some conceptual affinities, and it is too focused on the common Simmel-Scheler Jewish origins. This perspective risks being reductive with respect to a reciprocal influence that goes far beyond the purely religious subjects.

4 Martin Jay refers what already Adorno mentioned above: “Encouraged by the eminent philosophers Georg Simmel and Max Scheler, with whom he was personally acquainted, Kracauer turned into philosophical and sociological analysis as a new career” (Jay 1985: 155). In this regard, see also Inka Mülder’s studies on the young Kracauer (Mülder 1985: 8).

5 Henckmann remarks on this meaningful evidence, referring to the academic experience of these years: “Die Frage nach Zusammenhang und Verhältnis der theoretischen und praktischen Kultur war ihm fast gleichzeitig durch den Gang seiner Studien sowie eindringlicher persönlicher Lebenserfahrungen gestellt worden” (Henckmann 1998a: 18).

6 Henckmann argues elsewhere that Scheler during the winter semester 1895/1896 would have only followed a lecture on the history of philosophy (Dilthey), and one on the social psychology (Simmel) (see Henckmann 1998a: 18).


8 Simmel clarifies in *Schopenhauer und Nietzsche* (1907) that the fundamental difference between the two philosophers lies in Nietzsche’s faith in “eternity”, the very remedy for pessimism, whereas Schopenhauer,
who viewed the very essence of the world (the will to live), defended with his “best forces” (Simmel 1995a: 188).

9 Henceforward Scheler’s English translations from the German are mine [Ruggieri], where they’re not specified for English editions. The original text as follows: “Aufgabe der Phänomenologie hinsichtlich der Dichtung ist die Aufdeckung der phänomenologischen Struktur der dichterischen Welt. (So z.B. Gundolf, Simmel.) Dichtung und Philosophie sind durch die Struktur des Weltanschauens geeint”

10 “Die wahre Dichtung lehrt uns - weit hinaus über den Gehalt der Dichtung -, überhaupt formvoll zu erleben, das Unmittelbare des Weltanschauens die Seele als werdende, als erlebende”


12 Karl Wolfskehl (1869-1948) was a poet, dramatist, essayist, and translator. He studied German literature in Giessen, Leipzig, and Berlin. In 1893 he obtained a doctorate at the University of Giessen and began following the poet Stefan George. From 1898 he lived in Munich, where he probably came into permanent contact with Max Scheler. This became a “landmark” of the bohemians in Munich. In 1933, due to his Jewish origins, he was forced into exile in Switzerland, then in Italy and finally in New Zealand.

13 In those days, more precisely on March 7, 1909, the DGS (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie) was formally established, including Tönnies, Vierkhandt, Beck, Herkner and Simmel himself, but he left after a few years.

14 In a letter sent to Husserl (March 5, 1906), Scheler wrote: “Ich werde voräug in Berlin ruhig weiterarbeiten und den Gang meiner Anlegenheit in München abwarten: Potsdamerstr. 27/b” (Husserl 1994a: 213).

15 Zanfi reports in a note a passage from Simmel’s son, Hans, who writes: “The difficult translation of L’évolution créatrice was conducted by Gertrud Kantorowicz, with the collaboration and supervision of my father - and mine for some purely scientific steps” Max Scheler gave a positive judgment on the translation of L’évolution créatrice in his course on Bergson in Cologne in the winter semester of 1919/1920: ‘the main metaphysical work of Bergson, L’évolution créatrice of 1907, was translated - really well - by the young lady Kantorowicz with the collaboration and supervision of Georg Simmel, with the title Die Schöpferische Entwicklung Jena 1910 ’, [Bayerische Staatsbibliothek] BSB Ana 315, B, I, 99, f. 1” (Zanfi 2013: 85).


In regard to an editorial note of Simmel’s letters, Michael Landmann indirectly testinomies Simmel’s attendance to Scheler’s private lectures in Berlin during these years. Karl-Theodor Bluth (1892-1964) would have confirmed it with interesting details: “Max Scheler hielt 1912 Vorlesungen in Berliner Privatwohnungen; er las seine Ethik. Georg Simmel und einige seiner Freunde und Frauen nahmen an diese Vorlesungen teil” (Simmel 2008a: 170).


“Simmel wandte die Theorie auf die Erkenntnistheorie an und sah in der Wahrheit das Merkmal der an die Umgebung bestangepaßten Vorstellungen, während wieder andere mit Trompetenstößen eine neue, auf jene Theorie aufgebaute Ethik verkündeten”.

“Simmel hat im ersten Bd. der Kantstudien (1897), S. 416ff., in seinem Aufsatze ‘Über den Unterschied der Wahrnehmungs- und der Erfahrungsurteile’ den Versuch gemacht, die Schärfe dieses Entweder- Oder durch die Annahme eines graduellen Übergangs zwischen dem synthetischen Urteil a priori und dem Erfahrungsurteil zu brechen. Da jedoch Apriorität und Notwendigkeit bei Kant notwendig zusammengehören, so müßten auch konsequent Grade der Apriorität statuiert werden, was (auf kantischer Grundlage wenigstens) nicht durchführbar ist”.

“Im Einverständniss mit Schopenhauer, daß die methodologischen Prinzipien einer Wissenschaft nur aus deren wirklicher Arbeit gewonnen werden könnten, darin dagegen im Widerspruche mit ihm, daß die gedankliche Fixierung von Gesetzen ein wesentliches Merkmal wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis sei, folgern Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, daß die Geschichte schon in ihrem derzeitigen Bestande eine Wissenschaft sei und daß es demgemäß zwei Arten von Wissenschaft, ‘Gesetzes- und Ereigniswissenschaften’, geben müsse”.

Scheler also refers to Simmel’s Lebensanschauung in the unpublished essay “Unsterblichkeit” [BSB Archiv: ANA315 CA IX 29: A 1-6]. He particularly addresses Simmel’s metaphysics (in addiction to Bergson and Driesch) in order to explain a theory on the existence of the so-called “soul” [Seele]. Along the same lines, Scheler mentions Peter Wust, probably referring to the volume Die Auferstehung der Metaphysik (1920) (Wust 1963). In Simmel’s book Lebensanschauung, held in Scheler’s library, there are indeed underlines only in the chapter “Tod und Unsterblichkeit” [BSB Archiv: ANA 315 2 1851].

According to Scheler, Simmel should be put beside Schopenhauer and Freud due to their “functionalisation” of love, that is, they assign a secondary and derived function to love with respect to other primary instincts or forces (will to live, “Es”, life): “Es ist der große Irrtum der


29 In Der Begriff und der Tragödie der Kultur Simmel asserts: “Es ist der Begriff aller Kultur, dass der Geist ein selbständig Objektives schaffe, durch das hin die Entwicklung des Subjektes, von sich selbst zu sich selbst ihren Weg nehme; aber eben damit ist jenes integrierende, kulturbedingende Element zu einer Eigenentwicklung prädeterminiert, die noch immer Kräfte der Subjekte verbraucht, noch immer Subjekte in ihre Bahn reißt, ohne doch diese damit zu der Höhe ihrer selbst zu führen: die Entwicklung der Subjekte kann jetzt nicht mehr den Weg gehen, den die der Objekte nimmt; diesem letzteren dennoch folgend, verläuft sie sich in einer Sackgasse oder in einer Entleertheit von innerstem und eigenem Leben” (Simmel 2001: 219).
In regard of this aspect, Lichtblau considers the very tight relation between the Wilhelmine crisis among the intellectuals and the rising of the sociology autonomous science among the humanities (Lichtblau 1996).


REFERENCES


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