Being and Metaphysics: A Hegelian Critique of Heidegger’s Phenomenological Voluntarism

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Abstract

Hegel and Heidegger are leading figures of modern philosophy, but their interpretation of being, metaphysics, truth, ontology, epistemology, dialectic, alienation and art, among other central questions of philosophy, are radically different. Taking these aspects into account, my paper tries to dismiss Heidegger’s critiques towards Hegel arguing that, from the point of view of 20th century phenomenology, and although using a dissimilar philosophical vocabulary, Hegel was rather a phenomenologist than a metaphysician. Not only that: in many respects, Heidegger’s Dasein toys with metaphysic to an extent that Hegel’s spirit never did.

Keywords: phenomenology, truth, ontology, dialectic, epistemology, art

Introduction

Some scholars identified substantial similarities between G.W.F. Hegel’s thinking and that of Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 2002a; Schmitt 1977, 4-14; Couzens Hoy 1976, 404-407; Kolb 1981, 481-499.). This paper is built on a whole different assumption: Hegel and Heidegger’s philosophies are, beside some secondary convergence points, incompatible. I intend to support this hypothesis by taking into account several major themes that shaped the thinking of both philosophers and compelled them to offer new and sometimes radical solutions to some of the most enduring questions of philosophy ever.

Just as in the case of Hegel, Heidegger’s philosophy offers a remarkable unity and continuity and, regardless of the angle from which is approached, it leads nevertheless to the
tenets, the core assumptions of its thinking, namely the authenticity of the relation between being and being-ness and the many shapes this relation embraces in fields like ontology, epistemology, history or art. Even if Heidegger did not create a proper philosophical system, Hegel being the last of the major Western philosophers that did so, thus willingly placing himself within the filiation of classical philosophy – his works resemble to a certain extent the never finished architecture of a possible system.

The second section of the article tackles the problem of truth and the very different answers offered by both philosophers to it. Since every truth is ontologically dependent, I will explore next the ontologies of both thinkers, aiming to show that Hegel’s stance on this matter is far more reaching than that of Heidegger. Epistemology represents another domain in which Hegel and Heidegger adopt incompatible positions. However, Heidegger’s critiques of Hegel’s concept of knowledge and how is this concept linked to the advancement of modernity are substantial and should not be overlooked. But ontological truths advance epistemically within a far reaching dialectical process, at least for Hegel they do. Heidegger is keen on dismissing dialectic as well, considering it a fraudulent way of embracing dilettantism and avoiding the stakes brought into question. Regarding alienation, both Hegel and Heidegger recognize the issue, but, as expected, they handle it in different ways: if Hegel argues that alienation is to be historically overcome as spirit converts exteriority (nature) into interiority, thus eventually producing a world that anyone can understand and feel at home in, Heidegger considers modern alienation as a process of ontological failure, not success, as Hegel does. This failure can be summed up under a single name: technique. The ontology of modernity is technique, a specific form of epistemology analyzed in the third part of the paper, a being without specific being-nesses and also an alienated being incapable of sublating itself into something superior, because technic is based on standardization and commodification, from which true progress can never arise. While Hegel also recognizes the problem, and refers to it mostly from the prism of mathematics and mechanics, he proposes a different
response to this important challenge of modernity, different from the almost fatalist response provided by Heidegger. Finally, there are some relevant convergence points between what Hegel and Heidegger have to say about art, which is functionally incorporated in both philosophies, but to which Heidegger ascribes a more political role than Hegel does. The conclusions section resumes the fundamental differences between the two philosophies and also the occasional similarities between them and reassesses Heidegger’s powerful critiques of the Hegelian philosophical system, especially the allegation that Hegel basically speaks the same metaphysical language invented by Plato.

However, none of the subjects above can be addressed in the absence of a preliminary discussion about phenomenology. The first part of the paper is therefore centered on a comparison between the metamorphosis endured by phenomenology from its Husserlian inception to its Heideggerian development and, I would say, closure.

1. From Husserl to Heidegger: the metamorphosis of phenomenology

Edmund Husserl conceived phenomenology at the end of the 19th century as a philosophical method of investigating processes of conscience and the objects that, despite their apparent exteriority, are inherent to it. Until then, phenomenology was associated, in the Kantian tradition, with the sphere of the sensible as opposed to the sphere of the intelligible or, as Hegel would put it, with the inconsistent diversity of existence projected (in)voluntarily on the path of self-constituting reason.

Partially following Descartes and Kant, Husserl argued in favor of a reevaluation of all sciences on philosophical grounds and warned, like Heidegger would do so later, against the dangers contained by the expansion of positivism, which is incapable of understanding its transcendent presuppositions and, consequently, its underlining philosophy. Husserl was careful to meticulously differentiate phenomenology from psychology, which was, after all, an empirical, positivist science, and to criticize subjectivism, relativism and solipsism.
as possible outcomes of phenomenology. Even if it can be traced back to a hermeneutical ego, phenomenology does not question the rational truths of the world, undermining the possibility of shared activities and purposes. It just makes visible the web of intentionalities surrounding and constituting them. After all, everyone has access to existence only through its conscience and his most intimate dispositions that entails him or her in certain scientific and axiological directions and not others. Thinking does not exist outside reality and neither do the things we encounter in different circumstances: there is a wholeness here that exact sciences cannot grasp due to the fact that they fail to understand themselves as part of phenomenological processes that manifest themselves according to the pre-cognitive axiological and intuitive dispositions of their protagonists (Husserl 2001; Husserl 1980, 12-13, 39, 46-47, 82-83; Husserl 1983, 39, 102-103; Husserl 2000, 83, 95; Husserl 1997, 96, 494; Husserl 1990, 18-29; Husserl 2006, 47; Husserl 1977). In the words of Husserl, ‘the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing’ (Husserl 1980, 112).

But, although if experienced at an individual level, intentionality is universal (Husserl 1983, 201) because no one and nothing possesses its individuality in itself (Husserl 2000, 313). Husserl’s phenomenology is teleological, and it resembles to a certain extent Kant’s empire of purposes. Phenomenology is also built on logical foundations that allow it to avoid both the dangers of psychological subjectivism and those of empiricism, due to its circumscription within conscience. The method of this new philosophical approach is that of ‘phenomenological reduction’: after the mind is emptied of all of its objects, what remains is pure consciousness, the environment that systematizes all objects of experience and

In the works of Heidegger, phenomenology embraces a whole new meaning. Heidegger is reluctant to the Kantian legacy identifiable in the Husserlian philosophical project that still distinguishes between subject and object, individual and reason, freedom and nature. Since the beginning of modern philosophy with Descartes, these arbitrary delimitations have hindered our understanding of being, along with the possibility of opening new spaces of apprehending and emancipating this being from the chains of inauthenticity it has been forced to wear ever since. In Heidegger’s phenomenology, the ‘self’ is more important than conscience, and it represents a mere reflection of the world that he lives in. In Kantian terms, the self is transcendent to his world, to the Dasein to which it belongs. There are several types of existence for Heidegger: inanimate existence, or existence without being (rocks, for example), existence poor in being (plants and animals) and, finally, existence that questions itself. Only human existence is capable of this kind of interrogation, and this makes it superior to any other form of existence. Dasein is therefore human existence, but not a general, universal one. Each Dasein has its own specificities, its own limits, its own history, its own aspirations. Heidegger is keen to place the Dasein between effective existence, being-ness, and the superior, ontological existence of being. Only accidentally is the Dasein made aware of its being, and only in crucial historical turning points. However, its being continue to influence it unconsciously in the absence of such events, too. Since being-ness cannot be satisfactorily understood starting with itself, on ontic-existential grounds, it follows that being is indispensable in revealing the ontological framework of Dasein, which Heidegger understands, depending on circumstances, both as self and as community (Heidegger 2008; Heidegger 1988a).

It would appear that, by insisting on ontology as the key factor of explaining ontic presences, Heidegger is silently opening the door of metaphysics. But the author of *Being and Time* assures us that this is not the case: for him, contrary to Hegel’s conception, ontology is possible only as phenomenology.
Nothing exists beyond phenomena, although things have a way of hiding themselves, corresponding to the actual decay of the Dasein, its lapse into inauthenticity. However, the decline of every Dasein is inevitable and it must not be approached as a fatality, Heidegger ensures us. The poverty of history, combined with frivolous small talk and banal curiosities, place every Dasein under its real possibilities but, in the same time, compels it in a way of another to actualize them. This actualization is materialized only when the Dasein becomes determined to live up to the challenges of its own existence and confront the nothingness surrounding it in creative and meaningful ways. Overcoming this existential-ontological anguish, the Dasein reinvents itself as being-for-death and renounces its inauthentic present by living up to its historic destiny by seizing the moment, which is something very different than a mere second, being almost a form of metaphysical fulguration – and capitalizing it accordingly (Heidegger 2008; Heidegger 1985). By doing so, the Dasein consciously and voluntarily grasps the truth of its own being.

2. Truth

Husserl had meticulously read Being and Time, and he thoroughly criticize it as nothing more than a philosophical anthropology that cannot be considered proper philosophy, a mystic endeavor of his once esteemed philosophical successor that regretfully parts ways with the critical legacy of Enlightenment (Husserl 1997, 30, 486): ‘A philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into that naivete the overcoming of which has, in our opinion, been the whole meaning of modernity. Once this naivete has finally been unmasked for what it is, once the genuine transcendental problem has been arrived at in its apodictic necessity, there can be no going back’ (Husserl 1997, 499).

However, this amounted to a small problem for Heidegger, once he paved the way for his own philosophical method. And that method is construed around a whole different truth than Husserl’s rationalist, intentional-teleological truth: the truth of being assertively awakening itself from the web of scientific and theoretical sediments that have for far too long
impeded its capacity to see and to understand itself as pure will of becoming (Heidegger 1985). The Dasein is compelled, by being arbitrarily ‘thrown’ into existence, and also due to its ontic decline, to become less transparent to itself. Not only rationalism with it ‘scientification’ of the world contributed to this outcome, but also religion. Christianity, with its original sin, induced a feeling of diffuse guilt which, combined to the anguish produced by the Dasein’s ontological indeterminacy, usually manifesting itself ontically as daily concern – played its part in maintaining the Dasein under its real possibilities, disconnected from its authentic being. Here, Heidegger is very close to Friedrich Nietzsche’s view of morality, who believed that it is enough to stop considering ourselves guilty or evil according to Christian standards in order to become free and therefore good (Nietzsche 1989). For both philosophers, the problem of morality and ethics as well is thereby confined to a simple and most attractive individual choice.

Morality is thus part of the chain that oppresses the Dasein in modern times. Moreover, social conventions are also a burden for the Dasein understood as self, preventing it to achieve its full potential. Everyone is polite and careful in public, but everyone supposedly loathes this attitude in secret and wishes, at least for once, to speak its mind and to renounce this charade of fake amiabilities (Heidegger 2008). To be free, to live and acts in truth seem to mean, for Heidegger, to renounce morality, social conventions and international right, in case of states; only by following this path can an individual or a community live up to the task history has reserved for it (Heidegger 2001, 74; see also Gillespie 1984, 164-176). Although Heidegger emphasizes that the true Dasein must be understood as openness towards the other, he also claims that this form of communion results exclusively from individual resoluteness (Heidegger 1988a). But this Dasein as sum of determined selves does not contradict Heidegger’s premise of renouncing morality and social conventions in order to reverse its own downfall. However, what would happen to the other individuals that choose to stick to morality, ethics and traditional rules of politeness? What place can they occupy in this mystic renewal
of Dasein? Heidegger is silent in this respect, but one can effortless draw the appropriate conclusion.

For Hegel, truth is a whole different matter. Truth is conscience, subject that infuses substance as a division within substance itself, raising it to a new ontological level. In this respect, truth is the whole, without being confined to a handful of assertive individualities that allow their imagination to take over their reason: ‘the living Substance is being which is in truth Subject, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself. This Substance is, as Subject, pure, simple negativity, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; itis the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its antithesis [the immediate simplicity]. Only this self-restoring Sameness, or this reflection in otherness within itself - not an original or immediate unity as such - is the True. It is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual’ (Hegel 1979a, 10; italics in original).

Far from laying outside religion and morality, the truth is immanent to them, although religious truth is given to us only in the form of exteriority (On Christianity... 1961; Hegel 1995). Philosophy steps in to transform the external truth of religion into the internal truth of reason and to historically render man and God compatible as one and the same being (Hegel 1984, 572; Hegel 1988a). Truth is dialectically conveyed as freedom (Hegel 1988a), as reason affirming itself against necessity.

Truth is therefore the good, what it should be, while evil is the distance between what it is and what it should be (Hegel 1978). While Hegelian truth is available, so to speak, for everyone, and it is conditioned by the inclusion of everyone, the Heideggerian truth represents the prerogative of a self-proclaimed elite of spirit that aims to liberate the Dasein from its historical and theoretical chains. But the Dasein can become free not by renouncing knowledge, but by expanding it, thus fulfilling its divine nature (Hegel 1988a). Furthermore, as Hegel’s philosophy of recognition teaches us, no one can be free
against someone, but only together with that particular someone. The tranquility and the judiciousness of the Hegelian truth is superior by far to the sheer aggressiveness and implicit violence that finds its way out of the Heideggerian truth.

In order to fathom the matter, we must turn our attention now to the ontologies that encompass both truths and project them on powerful, yet different paths of becoming.

3. Ontology

Shaking the barriers of the impersonal ‘it’ that hindered its authentic projection as being-ness aspiring to being, the Dasein must now understand its truth in its ontological plenitude. To do so, it needs apprehended with the help of two other major Heideggerian themes, time and history.

As we recall, Heidegger’s ontology rests solely on phenomenological grounds. But the Dasein cannot be explained in a satisfactorily manner starting from itself; after all, the Dasein is nothing more than an unconscious reflection of its own being. In order to properly ask the question regarding being, one of the central endeavors of Heidegger’s philosophy, we should start not from ontic, but from ontological premises. This demarche is not a metaphysical one; in only ensures the Dasein’s possibility to incorporate and allow the manifestation of its being in certain crucial moments, not to really understand it and consciously appropriate it, which is something the Dasein can never achieve due to its ontic determination.

_Ereignis_, the event of revealing the intrinsical of the Dasein, represents a pure and spectacular appearance of being that can be understood without appealing to ontic-existentiel elements that constitute the scaffolding of the Dasein (Heidegger 2002a). These events can only occur as turning points of history, and history is nothing more than a product of the Dasein’s temporality.

Time depends on being, but does not have a being of its own, just like being develops its temporality out of its own existence, but it does not experience time _per se_. For Heidegger, time does not possess a certain objectivity, like it does for Hegel (Hegel 1970); it is just a vague emanation of the temporality of being and its specific being-ness. On its turn, temporality is
born out of the concern that characterizes the Dasein, an ontic reminder of the ontological anguish that circumscribes the contingency of the Dasein, its arbitrary ejection in a world it is permanently constrained to make sense of (Heidegger 2008).

Temporality entails historicity, just as time opens the Dasein to history, to its own history. For Heidegger, history is not to be equated with historiography, a collection of facticities that cover rather than explain the history of being. Being-ness is temporal, but its being is also temporal: existence itself is not ahistorical. However, the real challenge of the Dasein is not to understand the limits of its history, but to authentically reunite itself with that history (Heidegger 1999). This cannot occur through historiography, through books; as previously mentioned, Heidegger is skeptical towards theory and knowledge as appropriate means of development of being, arguing that, on the contrary, science only disorients the Dasein, preventing it to fully embrace its history. In Heidegger’s acceptance, history is nothing more than lived destiny, a revigorated Dasein that manages to overcome its decline and to take possession of its own being, although briefly and unconsciously. ‘History is the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endowment’ (Heidegger 2001, 74).

Once posited as determined being-for-death, the Dasein’s strangeness towards itself vanishes: it has conquered its world and it is able to see it in its continuity. Now, the former strangeness towards itself is projected upon others, the ‘strangers’ who are not part of the phenomenological world of the Dasein and can impede its future advancement (Heidegger 1999). If it wishes to raise itself to the task its historical destiny has set up for it, the Dasein is bound to assert itself through creative violence and to leave behind, as we remember, all morality and inappropriate social ties that obstruct its renewal (Heidegger 2000).

In Hegel’s system, ontology is also a possibility that being may use in its quest of superseding its condition as being-in-itself in order to become being-for-itself (Hegel 1979a). But the present stage of being is a progression from former historical phases, not a regression, like in the case of
Heidegger. Furthermore, like in the case of truth, Hegelian ontology is built up through the contribution of everyone, although this contribution is rarely a voluntary one, not by the voluntary contribution of a few determined individuals, as it happens with Heideggerian ontology.

Hegel is accused by Heidegger that he is a metaphysician disguised in rationalist clothes (Schmidt 1982, 19). In fact, any thinker that dissociates between being and thinking is, for the author of Being and time, a metaphysician (Heidegger 2000). Other philosophers assumed this position as well (Kolakowski 2001). But Hegel does not make this distinction in an arbitrary way; it proceeds so with the purpose of introducing conscience in his system. In Hegel’s logic, being and thinking represent, at first, an undistinguished whole, the initial absolute. As quality emerges from its difference with reference to quantity, it becomes the first moment of conscious being. And as the system unfolds at the scale of history, quality converts itself into liberty, the teleology of the modern world which does not seek to fulfill itself in isolation, but by reintegrating quantity, nature, mechanism – the otherness of the Idea – into a speculative relation that does not annul their different identities, but transforms themselves into active parts of spirit. These functional elements of the system are placed within a trajectory towards the future Absolute, one in which being and thinking will assume and voluntarily affirm their identity, being fully aware of it (Hegel 2010; Hegel 1986a). For Heidegger’s Dasein, this grand historical unfolding is perceived as a threat to the authenticity of the Dasein, and the lingering of the unconscious absolute is something to be kept and treasured like an ontological landmark, not a limited condition that needs to be overcome.

Most importantly, Hegelian ontology is not metaphysics because quality does not arise as something alien to quantity, laying ‘outside’ it, but as differentiation within quantity, as limit that understands itself in the form of quantity which has become aware of itself; in this new-found relation, quality is superior, representing the first moment of consciousness, but this consciousness is, in the last instance, quantitative (Hegel 1986a). But this quantitative understanding of itself as quality
advances slowly, with numerous setbacks, within a continuum, a historical dynamic that is in itself the truth of being. This is why ontology represents a permanent succession of phenomenological hypostases; to privilege one of these hypostases at the expense of other means to block the dialectical mechanism infusing them with sense and purpose. Indeed, Heidegger’s assumption that ontology is only possible as phenomenology fails to take into consideration that phenomenology in itself is nothing more but pure becoming. This attempt to forcibly fixate a ‘now’ (Heidegger 1998a) is, like any other philosophy that tries to anchor itself in a certain principle, be that phenomenological or not, bound to err (Hegel 2010). No principle, no stage of development finds the truth in itself, but only in the ones that precede it and will, at a certain point, succeed it. Being aware and knowing only itself, Heideggerian phenomenology is therefore untrue. True knowledge is only the knowledge of the whole in its historical-spiritual becoming.

4. Epistemology

Knowledge, rational knowledge in the first place, but also emphatical, intuitive knowledge – represents one of the key factors of the Hegelian system. Only knowledge furthers the progression of being, be that individual, as concept, or universal, as reason. Heidegger is right to point out the meaning of concept for Hegel: self-thinking, self-conceiving, becoming aware and fulfilling our personal potentialities (Heidegger 1988b; Heidegger 1989). Far from being an idealist, abstraction, the concept is pure immanence, the driving force, the purpose of each particularity, even if the respective particularity is or is not in accordance with its own concept.

Heidegger reproaches Hegel that he treats phenomenology as mere appearance, and this leads him into numerous and irresolvable difficulties. Indeed, Heidegger’s critics regarding the Hegelian epistemology are very powerful and pertinent. I shall present and analyze them briefly. First of all, Heidegger is reluctant towards Hegel’s ambition of treating his philosophy as a complex scientific system; by doing so, Hegel falls into the trap of modern technics, of positivism that
has infused all sciences, including philosophy, and guides them towards a technocratic world of standardizations and consumerism that is very likely incapable of overcoming this huge inauthenticity that has become the being, the ontology of modernity. Second, if absolute science is thinking’s certitude of itself, this being the supreme truth, how can all secondary truths be evaluated if they are not in the presence of the supreme, scientific truth? And how is this truth to be trusted, when it cannot be criticized, on the grounds of its permanent supremacy? Third, Hegel distinguishes between natural, common knowledge and real, scientific knowledge, the latter being superior to the first, but this is similar to the distinction he makes between subject and object, intellect and reason, nature and spirit; this is nothing more than metaphysics and it is also susceptible to positivism, because modern technology praises itself as natural knowledge and turns the world into a passive, knowable object for an all-knowing subject. In other words, ‘that man becomes the subject and the world the object, is a consequence of technology's nature establishing itself, and not the other way around’ (Heidegger 2001, 110; see also Fink 2016, 181). It should follow that natural conscience, due to its inadequacy with reference to real conscience, would start to become anxious and doubt itself, when in fact it is the scientific conscience which does so, rejecting the effective existences in the name of a future, superior existence, and becoming skeptical in the course of this process. The frustration accumulated by the real, scientific conscience, propels it to invade natural conscience, trying to become one with it and thus violating and ultimately destroying it (Heidegger 1989, 32-82).

Fourth, Hegel’s science cannot appropriately measure phenomenological truths, because it is missing a standard; this instrument becomes available only within the emancipatory progression of history. In its anxious isolation, this scientific conscience tries to substitute knowledge for the above-mentioned standard, but it ends up with a paradox: the advancement of spirit is measured through the expansion of knowledge, or with the expansion of knowledge? In other words, what is Hegelian knowledge in the end: what measures or what is to be measured (Heidegger 1989, 100)? Fifth, this conscience
which endlessly tries to separate itself in the form of truth from objects in the form of nature in order to bring them back together as accomplished spirit cannot possibly have this kind of access to the objectivity of nature due to its irreducible subjectivity. Consequently, real, scientific knowledge is nothing more than natural knowledge trying to test itself in this peculiar way of denouncing itself in the first instance as untrue. Not only that, it is also an epistemic impasse: this conscience is positing itself as the standard of absolute knowledge and rejects the outside world as inconsistent phenomenology not worth taking into account. But scientific conscience is and always will be a part of this world. Growing more and more skeptical, scientific conscience realizes that it cannot be a standard of measuring a prospective spiritual truth: the outside world engulfs it and the natural conscience’s indifference towards it is also unbearable, because it forces it to come to terms with its ingrave condition: its phantasmal historical ontology irremediably dissolves itself into phenomenology, the existing Dasein which suddenly realizes the futility of such a convoluted journey from its temporarily strayed self to its actual, authentic self (Heidegger 1989, 104-116; Schmitt 1977, 65-69).

In his book about Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Heidegger tackles the problem of philosophy taken as science further: ‘why is philosophy called the science? We are inclined—because of custom—to answer this question by saying that philosophy provides the existing or possible sciences with their foundations, i.e., with a determination and possibility of their fields (e.g., nature and history), as well as with the justification of their procedures. By providing all sciences with their foundation, philosophy must certainly be science’ (Heidegger 1988b, 10; italics in original). However, this is not the case. ‘One cannot decide whether or not philosophy is the science by considering some epistemological criterion or other. This decision can be made only from out of the actual content and the inner necessities of the first and last problem of philosophy—the question of being. If we suggest that philosophy cannot and should not be the science, then we are also not saying that philosophy should be made a matter of whim. Instead we are saying that philosophy is to be freed for the task which always
confronts it whenever philosophy decides to turn into work and become actuality: It has become free to be what it is: philosophy’ (Heidegger, 1988b, 13; italics in original).

In close connection to the separation between subject and object, Heidegger places the distinction made by Hegel between being and thought, along with the coercive identity that tries to bring them together as spirit. But this identity is not only destructive, it is also impossible, because being and thought are not and should not be separated in the first place (Heidegger 2002b; Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 30-31). As Dennis Schmidt points out, Hegel’s thought is relevant to the extent it closes the gap between being and thinking, while Heidegger’s thought has a precise opposite role: to maintain this difference as a way of placing both parts in an opening that offers them new meanings (Schmidt 1988, 153-154).

On the whole, Heidegger epistemological critique of Hegel is pertinent and extremely powerful, but it is not safe from some major shortcomings and even distortions, as Bernard Mabille observes (Mabille 2004). Heidegger presupposes, wrongly, that Hegel’s fondness of the term science is proof enough that he abides to the modern political ontology of technique, to the gradual ‘scientification’ of the world that turns the subject into a machine and, repeating the same standardization processes required by the market and by the advancement of commodification that hinder a real renewal of mankind (Heidegger 1998b, 183-230, 239-276; Arendt, Heidegger 2004) – conveys this new ideology through his system. But Hegel used the term science with a different purpose in mind: he simply intended to introduce a much-needed rigorousness into the philosophy existent at the beginning of the 19th century, which had decayed into all sorts of popular and amateurish exercises of entertainment (Pinkard 2000); hence his insistence on systems as a means of regaining the exactness and precision philosophy once enjoyed. Moreover, Hegel also perceived and denounced the possibility of a technocratic world taking over modernity; his sharp critiques of mathematics and mechanics are highly helpful in this respect (Hegel 1979a; Hegel 1986b, 145; Hegel 1986a, 6-45; Hegel 2010; Hegel 2006; Posch 2004, 9).
Furthermore, it is precisely the distinction between subject and object that Hegel himself places at the basis of metaphysics. Hegel made this distinction not for subjective ends, but for eventually attaining a self-understanding of the whole. Consequently, even if written in the language of German idealism, his philosophy is highly phenomenological in the sense Husserl and Heidegger attributed the term, because he tries to explain and better the present, and this present is mere appearance not to a future world we are too eager to imagine, but to itself, due to its constant change. Effectiveness is to be understood only in its constant dynamics; any attempts of fixing it are doomed to fail (Bondor 2013, 137-158; see also de Boer 2000, 44-45).

Consequent to his anti-metaphysical position, Hegel does not separate common and rational consciousness in order to impose the superiority of the latter upon the former, but to compel the former to bring itself to the new conditions of the modern world. Heidegger keenly observed that rational consciousness is nothing more than natural consciousness trying to test and understand itself in different ways. This is perfectly true, and Hegel would surely agree with Heidegger’s observation, adding probably that natural consciousness must renew itself as rational consciousness but also maintain its own identity nevertheless, in order to be able to tackle the significant challenges entailed by the modern world. Natural conscience must change in a rational way and also remain the same in what is spiritual in it, religious, empathic and so on.

With respect to knowledge, the ambiguity identified by Heidegger is inconsistent. Knowledge is not a standard of measuring progress for Hegel, but a part of that process, among others, a part that also enables the dialectical process to comprehend and meliorate itself whenever the case. Hegel’s ontology is totality; the knowing subject emerges from it only to be consciously reunited with it, as he understands the determinations of being and the rational tasks incumbent to him in the present stage of history’s spiritual unfolding. However, as Heidegger justifiably points out, the Western subject’s conscience was highly destructive with reference to other, non-Western forms of conscience; is rational knowledge
underlined by violence after all? This is a question worth asking, especially in the light of Hegel’s troublesome ambivalence towards colonialism. But not before addressing Heidegger’s issues with the dialectical philosophical method brilliantly theorized by Hegel.

5. Dialectic

Heidegger’s quarrel with dialectic is outlined in detail in his *Ontology. The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Although he recognizes the ‘magnificence’ of this method and how deeply it is rooted into Hegel’s system (Heidegger 1988b, 112), Heidegger nevertheless considers it inferior to phenomenology, in an attempt to defy the long post-Hegelian canon that stated otherwise. ‘Dialectic places itself in a position of superiority over phenomenology from two related points of view, both of which have to do with the dignity of the knowledge it purportedly attains. 1. Dialectic sees in phenomenology the stage of the most immediate immediacy of grasping. This immediacy can only become acquainted (...) with something-knowing (...) remains beyond its reach, i.e.: it does not attain the higher kind of immediacy, i.e., mediated immediacy. The best it can do is to define the appearance of Spirit in its first stage – the authentic being of Spirit in its self-knowing remains closed off to it. 2. Moreover: owing to its higher authentic possibility of knowledge, dialectic alone succeeds in penetrating the irrational, and if not completely, then nonetheless more so than in phenomenology—the irrational, something spoken of at the same time as the transcendent and the metaphysical’. But phenomenology is immediate knowledge, appearance, only through the lens of dialectic. On its own, it represents the basic philosophical method (Heidegger 1999, 35).

But Heidegger is not merely over: ‘Regarding what it procures in philosophy, *all dialectic in fact always lives from the table of others*. The shining example: Hegel’s logic. That it simply assimilates and reworks the one traditional form of logic leaps into view after just a cursory examination. And not only this, but he himself expressly underscores it: “this traditional material”: Plato, Aristotle, is “an extremely important source, indeed a necessary condition (and) presupposition to be
gratefully acknowledged”. (In addition: when Hegel picked up his material, what state of interpretation was it in?) Thus dialectic lacks radicality, i.e., is fundamentally unphilosophical on two sides. It must live from hand to mouth and develops an impressive eloquence in dealing with this readymade material. If it gains acceptance, the burgeoning Hegelese will once again undermine even the possibility of having a mere sensitivity for philosophy. No accident that Brentano, from whom came the first impulses for the development of phenomenology, sensed in German Idealism the deepest ruin of philosophy. A year of reading and one can talk about everything, such that it really looks like something and the reader himself believes he’s really got something. One ought to have a close look at the sophistry being pursued today with schemata like form-content, rational-irrational, finite-infinite, mediated-unmediated, subject-object (Heidegger 1999, 36-37; emphasis mine; see also Heidegger 2002a, 4).

Indeed, this is a blunt and direct attack to dialectic. Phenomenologically, however, it is not without substance. Heidegger argues that only from the point of view of dialectic is phenomenology immediate and therefore frivolous knowledge; in itself, phenomenology does not have to proceed dialectically to discover its own truth, but only to reveal itself to itself by determinately leaving the state of concealing its decline brought upon it. Furthermore, from a phenomenological perspective, dialectic is incapable of fixating its own object of analysis and ‘lives from the table of others’, as Heidegger contemptuously presumes. But when did dialectic affirm an objective like this? Never. Hegel’s Science of Logic is very clear in this regard: a proper philosophy cannot allow itself to be immobilized and incapacitated by a certain principle, because a principle like this is basically an impossible abstraction. ‘It is only in recent times that there has been a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy, and the reason for this difficulty, and so also the possibility of resolving it, have been discussed in a variety of ways. The beginning of philosophy must be either something mediated or something immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other; so either way of beginning runs into
contradiction. The principle of a philosophy also expresses a beginning, of course, but not so much a subjective as an objective one, the beginning of all things. The principle is a somehow determinate content – “water,” “the one,” “nous,” “idea,” or “substance,” “monad,” etc. – or, if it designates the nature of cognition and is therefore meant simply as a criterion rather than an objective determination, as “thinking,” “intuition,” “sensation,” “I,” even “subjectivity,” then here too the interest still lies in the content determination. The beginning as such, on the other hand, as something subjective in the sense that it is an accidental way of introducing the exposition, is left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle in which alone the interest of the fact seems to lie, the interest as to what is the truth, the absolute ground of everything (Hegel 2010, 45; italics in original).

This long quote is highly useful in determining the purpose of the dialectical method. Since philosophy cannot start neither with something mediated, because it has to reach that mediation, not take it for granted, nor with something immediate (phenomenology), it follows that only dialectic can avoid the inconsistencies of both these inadequate philosophical beginnings. Dialectic is mediation, but mediation achieving itself along with the development of the system, not one of its premises, being it the same time a mediation of immediacies acknowledged in their speculative succession. Dialectic cannot stay true to a specific object because this is what it denounces in the first place, this unphilosophical attachment to an abstraction and not to change, to movement, which is the real philosophical principle, if there ever was a need for one (see also Xiaomang 2009, 294-307). On the whole, dialectic is ontological, not metaphysical, being, in Hegel’s logic, the finitude’s consciousness of itself in the process of acquiring infinity, in the process of developing its own concept, that is, under the form of reason, which represents the true and ultimate concept of reality (Lugarini 2004, 286-287).

As for the allegation regarding the lack of seriousness of dialectic, which can be acquired by anyone, in a short time and
without a considerable effort, because is nothing but a facile interplay between pair of opposites, I have partially dismissed it in the epistemology section of the paper. I will only add that the institutionalization, reification and often the ridiculous simplification of Hegelian philosophy that took place (and still takes place) in the decades after Hegel’s death in 1831 and almost transformed it into a caricature of its former self represents a regretful turn of events that has nothing to do with Hegel himself. To find the culprit for this denouement in Hegel’s writings is similar to finding the incipient doctrine of the Spanish Inquisition in the gospels of the New Testament.

6. Alienation

As we have already seen, Heidegger’s treatment of ontological alienation resides in awakening the Dasein from its prolonged state of decline induced by its own lack of seriousness, its own lack of capacity and will to unveil itself to itself as pure intentional phenomenon reflected by its specific world - to fulfill its historical task of manifesting itself regardless of the costs, and doing away with the guilt and social solidarity deeply seeded into it by religious moral principles and modern day sciences and/or socialist or conservative ideologies (Heidegger 1971, 74).

In Hegel’s case, Heidegger considers that alienation is concealed in the sole method destined to expose and finally eliminate it: dialectical knowledge, a knowledge that cannot understand without aggressing what it postulates as its object. I will not repeat here the details that have already been presented within the epistemology part of this article, but pick up the debate regarding colonization as it was left in suspension there.

Heidegger may be up to something when he accuses modern philosophy and especially modern sciences of unconsciously internalizing the inherent violence of capitalist colonialism in the quest of expanding the being of technique worldwide. ‘Now that modern technology has arranged its expansion and rule over the whole earth, it is not just the sputniks and their by-products that are circling around our planet; it is rather Being as presencing in the sense of
calculable material that claims all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of this determination of Being. (Evidently those who desire such a knowledge least of all are those busy developers who today are urging the so-called underdeveloped countries into the realm of hearing of that claim of Being which speaks from the innermost core of modern technology.)’ (Heidegger 2002a, 7; see also Heidegger 1977, 3-36).

Although he recognizes that European expansion may induce alienation among non-European peoples, Hegel considers this process to be somewhat justified in the light of his master-servant dialectic: in order to make their entrance into history and be worthy of recognition as (second hand) Europeans, non-European peoples must first endure the violence of colonization (Hegel 2003, 269; Hegel 1979b, 176; Tibebu 2011). Indeed, this is a highly sophisticated form of Eurocentrism that Heidegger was aware of and, to his merit, exposed and condemn it. But Hegel does not fully endorse colonialism; he perceives it as a potential solution for overpopulation, another solution to this problem consisting in state intervention oriented towards minimizing the social inequalities induced by the political economy of capitalism (Hegel 2003). Furthermore, the displacement and alienation produced by colonialism are subsumable to quantity, to necessity awaiting to be sublated into its constitutive other, rational liberty. This historical dialectic cannot proceed from mere moral abstractions, but only from sheer existence, which is to be overcome through itself and by itself, as it ethically incorporates rational liberty into its political project. If it fails to become necessity, liberty will amount to nothing by persisting in its limited condition of moral, isolated particularity.

Colonialism is, however, only a single element in Hegel’s ontological economy of alienation, despite its continuous relevance. Alienation is both natural and socially induced. At first, nature represents the necessity of the Idea. As nature is transformed from hostile, alienated exteriority into acknowledged interiority, alienation can move on to specific being problems, in the transition from being-in-itself to being-
for-itself. As spirit thinks and constructs itself historically, people become more aware of each other both individually and collectively, as communities, societies and states. This new level of recognition, and the ones that will follow it, can only be attained through work. Meaningful, dignified work is what allows man to liberate himself both from nature and from distorted projections of himself that hindered his emancipation (Hegel 1983, 120-121). However, just like in the case of dialectical knowledge, the process is never ending and develops along with the entire human history. Consequently, alienation becomes tantamount to representation and hence it will never disappear completely because being is not fully transparent to itself, not to mention nature, which will always maintain an impenetrable rest of incommunicability (Fink 2016, 182).

One final remark, before moving on to the next section. Despite the major shortcomings of Hegelian alienation, the fact that it is both materially and spiritually grounded, no matter how scornful Heidegger is with reference to distinctions like that – makes it more aware of and allows it to avoid the mystical and ultimately metaphysical traps that Heideggerian alienation finds itself tangled into (see Marga 2014a, 61-78). Although I am not implying that Heidegger’s philosophy is actually a philosophy of national-socialism (Marga 1994, 33-36; Marga 2014b, 334-363), there is without doubt a worrisome ontological continuity between Heidegger’s phenomenological voluntarism and the militant irrationality of the ideology of the Third Reich.

7. Art

As Alain Badiou remarked, Heidegger’s philosophy is highly esthetical (Badiou 1999). Art plays therefore a big role within its economy, and it is quintessentially related to what we have analyzed in the first section of the paper – truth. ‘Art is the setting-into-work of truth. In this proposition an essential ambiguity is hidden, in which truth is at once the subject and the object of the setting. But subject and object are unsuitable names here. They keep us from thinking precisely this ambiguous nature, a task that no longer belongs to this consideration. Art is historical, and as historical it is the
creative preserving of truth in the work. Art happens as poetry. Poetry is founding in the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning. Art, as founding, is essentially historical. This means not only that art has a history in the external sense that in the course of time it, too, appears along with many other things, and in the process changes and passes away and offers changing aspects for historiology. Art is history in the essential sense that it grounds history.

Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work’ (Heidegger 2001, 74-75). Only in art, philosophy, politics and sacrifices one can find truths; there is no thing such as a scientific truth, because ‘science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically by apprehending and confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that field’ (Heidegger 2001, 60).

As technics and its scientific truth gradually take over the world, art seems to remain for Heidegger the only remedy we have left in order to reverse this ontological tragedy. ‘Whether art may be granted this highest possibility of its essence in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell. Yet we can be astounded. Before what? Before this other possibility: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may come to presence in the coming-to-pass of truth. Because the essence of technology is nothing technological (but metaphysical, m.n.), essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are questioning’ (Heidegger 1977, 35; italics in original).

Heideggerian art is therefore intimately connected to politics, although not immediately, but on an ontological level. Only the rediscovery of a poetical way of living that could kidnap us from the prosaic and enclosing realm of technic can
save us nowadays (Heidegger 2001, 209-227. The unchaining of the Dasein can only occur through its determination to esthetically renew itself.

What about Hegelian art? Located somewhere between nature, phenomenology and spirit, Hegel’s art represents an alienated form of thinking. A very important aspect that Heidegger notices is that the spiritual tasks of art in modernity are pretty much over; art survives as a form emptied of content, because is no longer able to truly move the world: the age of heroes is long gone. Art matters to us now strictly for philosophical reasons: ‘art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place. What is now aroused in us by works of art is not just immediate enjoyment but our judgement also, since we subject to our intellectual consideration (i) the content of art, and (ii) the work of art's means of presentation, and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of both to one another. The philosophy of art is therefore a greater need in our day than it was in days when art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction. Art invites us to intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for knowing philosophically what art is’ (Hegel 1988b, 11).

Even so, art remains very important for us. Its modern mission is not to arouse feelings and passions, because feelings and, to a certain extent, passions, are confined to the narrowness of the intellect, just as miracles are, when art is replaced by religion. Although it uses sensible, phenomenological means to present itself, the message of art goes beyond the immediate world and it is internalized by spirit. This is why art is not destined to reproduce nature, thus ignoring its spiritual tasks. Furthermore, one more clue that proves the philosophical affinities of modern art is that the intellect cannot interact with art in the way it usually interacts to things, by consuming them; on the contrary, art compels the intellect to advance beyond its limited, phenomenological condition and intuitively grasp spiritual truths. What reason accomplishes through philosophical, theoretical means, art
accomplishes through esthetical means. On the whole, the intellect is not capable of beauty, because it is not free; only the concept of beauty is free, due to the fact that it has access to the universal, although only as shape, not as pure concept: ‘beauty can devolve only on the shape, because this alone is the external appearance in which the objective idealism of life becomes for us an object of our perception and sensuous consideration. Thinking apprehends this idealism in its Concept and makes this Concept explicit in its universality, but the consideration of beauty concentrates on the reality in which the Concept appears’ (Hegel 1988b, 124-125; italics in original).

It would be wrong to consider that Hegel treats art like a poor relative of philosophy. Art is just another possibility to achieve the universal, like religion, politics and philosophy, each requiring their own methods and conceptual instruments (Grossman 1990, 115). But, although it considers it highly important, Hegel does not invest art with the militant-political mission of changing the modern ontology, like Heidegger does. For him, despite potential accidental outbursts in this direction, the political role of art is over. However, the spiritual role of art is only at the beginning.

8. Conclusion: Hegel and the challenges of Heideggerian phenomenology

Appealing to numerous and diverse domains of analysis, that sometimes can induce the reader a sensation of exaggerate eclecticism, even pointing maybe towards a lack in the overall coherence of the paper, the present endeavor is nevertheless a unified one in its striving to extract from the comparison of Hegel and Heidegger arguments that give credit to the hypothesis that the critiques of the latter towards the first are ultimately vulnerable and even unfounded, to some extent. Hegel was not the metaphysician Heidegger accused him to be; on the contrary, his Phenomenology and his Logic make important phenomenological claims, although without using the vocabulary of the 20th century phenomenology. But this phenomenology cannot be understood as an end in itself, but only taking into account its intimate dialectical dynamic, its prospectivity; in its absence, phenomenology is nothing more
than isolated abstractedness devoid of spirit. On its turn, spirit is not ontology in the metaphysical sense of the term, not even in the Heideggerian sense, as possibilities of being that await the Dasein to reach up to them. Spirit is immanent to phenomenology, to quantity, and arises as a differentiation within phenomenological quantity that propels it within a new, qualitative perspective. Spirit is thus not the beyond of phenomenology, but its inherent driving force. Hegel approaches therefore the Dasein (spirit) in an immanent way, and, beginning with the being-in-itself he sets out to seek the being-for-itself, and not the other way around. The rational Idea represents the otherness of nature only from the point of view of isolated intellects, unable of understanding this relation in its entire network of mediations, unable to approach the problem from a speculative angle, to place effectiveness into perspective. But when we look at it rationally, the Idea negates nature only to the extent it is negated by it; the exteriority of the Idea and the interiority of nature seek to become one another, within a historical process that is ongoing and represents the overcoming of ontological alienation through spirit. Gradually, the Idea recognizes nature as itself-other and returns to it with the power of conscience. After all, the Idea is nothing but a means through which nature understands and accepts itself within a new and rewarding dynamic. On short, the whole Hegelian system is some kind of dynamic phenomenology that unavoidable alienates itself as differentiations within itself arise, seeking to negate the whole and to assert its superiority with reference to it; however, these alienations are not permanent. They are to be understood and superseded in historical terms, in the contexts that have produced them.

By arguing that the Dasein cannot be understood starting with itself, but only with its being, its ontology, where it occasionally manifests itself as a celebration, an event of its singularity that is abruptly connected with its history understood as the possibilities of the Dasein to assert itself in the most appropriate ways as being-for-death and thus to overcome its structural contingency, its Angst - Heidegger makes use of a method that is highly non, even anti-Hegelian.
As previously argued, for Hegel, the ontic creates ontology from itself, while for Heidegger it is precisely the other way around: only being (ontology) has the capacity of offering meaning to being-ness, to the ontic level of existence. It follows that Heideggerian phenomenology is inextricably linked to ontology and has, so to say, a more pronounced metaphysical touch than Hegelian phenomenology.

Leaving aside the Husserlian phenomenology in favor of a more determined and less ethical, I would add, Dasein, which is ultimately an individual construction of conscience, even if that particular conscience is on its turn a phenomenological, contextual product, Heidegger’s truth is a unilateral, assertive truth, while Hegel’s truth is an all-comprehensive, equilibrated truth of the whole, a truth of mediations. It is exactly these mediations that Heidegger’s Dasein is trying to overcome, perceiving them as the premises of the decay that impedes the possibilities of an authentic rebirth of being through being-ness. Projected into the realm of ontology, that truth aims to rip out the veil of opacity and superficiality that the Dasein has surrounded itself with and compel the Dasein to live up to its being and to its history, without being diverted from this immensely important task by moral or ethical concerns. Here, the influence of Nietzsche on Heidegger is very visible. Basically, following Nietzsche, Heidegger warns the Dasein not to crumble upon history as openness and diachronically shared guilt, because this guilt weakens the vitality the Dasein needs in order to shake itself from the slough surrounding it. For Hegel, the historical understanding of the Dasein means reconciliation with other communities, as the divine spark of history materializes itself as redemption available for everyone, everywhere. Of course, this is not a peaceful process, and the contradictions between communities will never disappear entirely; after all, they provide a form of constructive emulation that helps better communities both in themselves and in relation to one another.

Next, Hegelian epistemology is not metaphysical in the sense it arbitrarily postulates a subject and an object, and it is neither imbued with the scientific positivism that allows modern technique to devoid the Dasein of a proper being. Hegel
clearly specifies that the subject and the object cannot be understood separately, but only in their speculative unity from which agency first arises as a split within the object, within substance, only to return to itself in a new intelligible and assumed way. As for technique, Hegel and Heidegger share in fact a similar position: Hegel is also critical towards mathematics and mechanics to the extent their development threatens to signify the development of the world in repetitive, non-dialectical terms. And dialectic, another field of quarrel between Heidegger and Hegel, is not without object, as the first claims; on the contrary, as I insisted in the section of the article that dealt with this issue, Hegelian dialectic poses its own object as finitude, as quantity, but finitude that is not reduced to itself and is constantly on the search for infinity, for quality. This particular search is acquired through the dialectical method, because philosophy in itself is change and cannot allow itself to be restrained to a principle or another, and thus to be transformed into common knowledge, no matter how elevate or scientific that knowledge may appear.

Finally, alienation is produced for both Hegel and Heidegger by the Dasein, but while Hegel understands it as an unavoidable result of the transition from being-in-itself to being-for-itself, a result that it is also diminishing in time, Heidegger refers to it as a weakness of the Dasein that allows itself to be seduced by mauldering and frivolities of all sorts, thus furthering itself from its historical task. Simply put, if for Hegel alienation is a progress, because the advancement of spirit keeps on reducing and taming it, for Heidegger, alienation amounts to a shameful regress, one that needs not be approached passively as a fatality of a cruel destiny, but as a challenge the Dasein needs to overcome if it is to be authentically reunited with its being and with its history. However, in this challenge otherness does not matter, even more, it can impede on the task of the Dasein, while for Hegel the Dasein cannot truly reinvent itself and progress on its own, as an isolated entity, separated from its constitutive otherness, from mediation, from the absolute. Art represents one of the most important possibilities of the Dasein to reconcile with itself. If Hegel refers to modern art as an art that has lost the
political influence it held during the ancient times, but remains nevertheless important as a privileged connection between effective existence and spirit, teaching the intellect how to go beyond its daily pragmatism and thus perceive beauty in a rational, non-selfish way, Heidegger’s hopes for art are much more militant: aesthetics offers a much needed escape from the technique that modern Dasein tries to posit as its being but is irremediably doomed to fail.

Heidegger was perfectly aware of the distance separating him from Hegel: ‘For Hegel, being (infinity) is also the essence of time. For us, time is the original essence of being. These are not theses which can be simply played against each other antithetically. Rather, the term essence [Wesen] says something fundamentally different each time, precisely because being is understood differently’ (Heidegger 1988b, 146; italics in original). Simply put, Heidegger seems to be more Kantian when it comes to concepts like time and space than Hegel. Although he was highly skeptical regarding Kant’s revolution in philosophy and to the Kantian thesis that being does not expand existence in any way, arguing that even if Kant successfully dismissed the old theological metaphysic, he still appealed to it in order to develop his theory of the subject, therefore metaphysically postulating a knowing subject surrounded by an infinity of knowable objects (Heidegger 1988a, Heidegger 2008) – Heidegger interprets time as an emanation of being, in a manner reminding to that of Kant from the Critique of pure reason (2008). Hegel, on his turn, tries to regain a certain objectivity for time and space, without pushing them away from the subject’s experience; they are both elements for the dialectical understanding of movement (Hegel 1970).

However, when it comes to Heidegger’s comments on Hegel’s notion of time, things may not be that simple, Stefan Kaufer warns us. Heidegger’s presupposes a far too abstract and tranquil identity between being and time in Hegel’s philosophy and fails to comprehend that being converts itself into spirit only by essentially fighting against time, not by allowing itself to be passively carried out by time into history. ‘Heidegger does not grasp Hegel’s conceptions of time and spirit in sufficient detail or at a sufficiently fundamental level. Only
by overlooking the common origin of time and spirit (...) can Heidegger reduce their commonality to a mere empty, formal structure. For Hegel, spirit falls into time as the actual historical struggle to appropriate its externality, or as the detailed unfolding of the notion. In this conflict-ridden effort of becoming itself spirit struggles against time (...)’ (Kaufer 2012, 132; italics in original; see also Surber 1979, 358-377 and Trawny 2000, 12-39). Or, in the words of Howard Trivers, ‘Hegel’s view is rather that the power of the spirit over time lies in the intimate and direct conceptual relation between the two, through which relation time is, as it were, included in the spirit. Thus it is not through the aspect of time as external, but rather as internal to spirit through which the spirit’s sway over time is mediated’ (Trives 1942, 165). Even Hegel himself, in his Philosophy of Nature, defines time (and space) not as abstractions able to be filled with and emptied of content, but as reflections of finitude. ‘It is said that everything arises and passes away in time, and that if one abstracts from everything, that is to say from the content of time and space, then empty time and empty space will be left, i.e. time and space are posited as abstractions of externality, and represented as if they were for themselves. But everything does not appear and pass in time; time itself is this becoming, arising, and passing away, it is the abstraction which has being, the Cronos which engenders all and destroys that to which it gives birth’. And better yet: ‘Time does not resemble a container in which everything is as it were borne away and swallowed up in the flow of a stream. Time is merely this abstraction of destroying. Things are in time because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are themselves that which is temporal. Temporality is their objective determination. It is therefore the process of actual things which constitutes time, and if it can be said that time is omnipotent, it must be added that it is completely impotent’ (Hegel 1970, 230-231; emphasis in original). It would seem, therefore, that Hegel and Heidegger’s notions of time are much more similar than the latter is willing to admit.

I have argued, in this article, that Heidegger’s claim of a metaphysical Hegel preoccupied more with ontological being
than with effective existence is not valid. Although written in an idiom highly different than Heidegger's, Hegel's philosophy is, by the standards of the 20th century phenomenology, substantially phenomenological. In all the themes approached – truth, ontology, epistemology, dialectic, alienation, art – Hegel emerged not as a metaphysician dressed in the suit of reason and making use of its vocabulary, but as a cornerstone thinker of modern philosophy that managed to dismiss all of Heidegger's accusations, some of them truly challenging. On the contrary, Heidegger's mystic of being-for-death turned out to be more metaphysical than Hegel's spirit. By combining Husserlian phenomenology with German political romanticism, Heidegger ended up in the metaphysical depths of a dense irrationalism that is still to be fully elucidated. What is the praising of the 'overwhelming' and of creative violence if not the culmination of the romanticist metaphysic that could so easily be channeled on the path of fascist ideologies? 'Violence-doing, the human being disturbs the calm of growth, the nourishing and enduring of the tireless one. Here the overwhelming does not hold sway in self-devouring wildness but as that which, without toil and without tiring, from out of the superiority of the calm of great riches, ripens and dispenses what is inexhaustible and rises above all impatience. The violence-doers break into this sway, year by year they break it up with plows and drive the toilless earth into the restlessness of their toiling' (Heidegger 2000, 164).

Still, Heidegger always recognized Hegel's magnitude, arguing that he has seen farther and better than anyone else in philosophy (Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 28). He did that also with the involuntarily help of language which is, especially in the Western world, infused by metaphysics; this is why for Heidegger language creates thinking, while, for Hegel, the reverse is true (Janicaud in Comay, McCumber 1999, 39-40). We should concede, at least in this regard, Heidegger's ascendant on Hegel.

By criticizing Hegel's work, Heidegger aimed to actualize it and also to prove its respect for it: We protect the uniqueness of Hegel's work only when we take the trouble to confront it thoroughly' (Hegel 1988b, 74). Heidegger's work is
also challenging and unique. Yet, as a successor of Hegel, Heidegger does not achieve, in his own words, more than a ‘mutiny’ against him: ‘People speak of a collapse of Hegel's philosophy after his death and see in that collapse the collapse of previous philosophy generally, which, presumed to be finished, is awarded the consolation prize of being condescendingly called ... classical philosophy. However, it is not that Hegel's philosophy has broken down. Rather, his contemporaries and successors have not ever yet stood up so that they can be measured against his greatness. People managed to “stand up” to him only by staging a mutiny’ (Heidegger 1988b, 40).

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