Human Security: A Normative Perspective

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Abstract

The globalization process, even more obvious after the end of the Cold War, offers the conditions to define human security, focusing on the normative priority of the impact of policies on the individual. The international space, transformed under the pressure of globalization, becomes relevant to the extent that an alternative discourse that encompasses all these transformations comes out. This new narrative transforms the individual in the referent object of security. The study stresses the main theoretical transformations appeared within the post-positivist framework of analysis in order to identify the central components of the new understanding of security – human security.

Keywords: security, human security, human development, normative utility

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War brings into foreground and overlaps the globalization discourse, the discourse concerning the (human) development along with the publishing in 1990 of the first UNDP Human Development Report, as an attempt of “enlarging people’s choices” (UNDP 1990, 10). Within such a context, opened by the human development debates implied by the implications of globalization, the concept of human security

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is thus introduced in the middle of the 1990s. As a reflection of the general change of the stress from the military state-centric issues (assumed by the realist and neo-realist orthodoxism) towards the non-military, *The Human Development Report 1995* stated “the real point of departure of human development strategies is to approach every issue in the traditional growth models from the vantage point of the people” (UNDP 1995, 123). Such an approach projected upon the space of security becomes responsible for what we name human security because “people-centered approach to formulating and evaluating policy is the key conceptual contribution of human development to human security” (Tigerstrom 2007, 15).

Thus, the globalization processes, whose effects are exponentially intensified alongside with the end of the Cold War, create the conditions and shape the necessity to define human development and security adding normative priority to the impact different policies have on the individual. In other words, on the background of globalization, “human development and human security could therefore be described as parallel concepts, particular instances of a more general approach that is referred to, for lack of a better phrase, as *people-centered* or *human-centered*” (Tigerstrom 2007, 15). The international space, transformed under the pressure of globalization that moves away (at least partially) the state from the epicenter of policy making and implementing, gains consistency to the degree in which an alternative discourse that takes over and develops this transformation constitutes – or, this new *narrative* is represented by the transformation of the individual into the reference object of both development and security. This paradigmatic change opens the way to the rediscovery of normative arguments, especially when the end of the Cold War is not synonymous with the optimistic scenario of the *end of history* (Fukuyama 1992, 283). On the contrary, aggression and conflict continue to be a constant of the international relations (for some the post Cold War world is a comeback to interwar barbarism) sometimes even more difficult to counteract (for instance, the recalibrating of the terrorist phenomenon), a fact which requires a just response. As a direct implication of global insecurity, the search for the pragmatic means to *dam* and eliminate such
phenomena must continue, the shaping of a theoretic scope “to put practical limits on the use of force and thus to reduce, if not completely eliminate, the barbarity of warfare remains salient in what is at best a still emergent, global civil society.” (Viotti and Kauppi 2010, 411).

2. The Cold War and the (Re)Construction of the Security Framework for Analysis

The traditional view (proposed by Realism and Neo-Realism) of understanding the international space staked on the state as the single explicative variable and therefore, placed the responsibility to protect individual security to the state. From these positions it is claimed that the international system is anarchical and determines major implications on the behavior of the states. The impact of this axiom is that the “pacifist” behavior of states can never be guaranteed and also, that the possibility of force threatening/deterrence can never be excluded. “The history of international relations exhibits clearly the fact that states can be, and often are hostile to each other, that they can resort to violence and threats for various reasons. No state can be absolutely certain that another state or other states will not resort to force and this is why they refuse to limit their liberty of action” (Terriff et al. 1999, 36). Therefore, the realist world built on power and anarchy has a series of characteristics among which we can name: the major actors are not the individuals but the groups, especially the conflict groups, the most important being the nation-state; as common implication of this the two core elements are constituted: international relations are characterized essentially by conflict, and, on the other hand, the fundamental premise in (international) politics is power and closely linked to it – security.

Power and anarchical environment – here is the overall layout in which security must be approached. That is why states must do whatever stays in their powers in order to pursue their objectives and ensure their security. The resort to force, to (military) threats is only to a small degree a reality able to encompass the entire security agenda on a national level. The
“brutal” force threat is replaced today by new more gentle, more refined and less expensive ways, that include economic, politic, social or environmental sectors. Stefano Guzzini, in Realism in International Relations foresees this perspective – of “the fragmentation of realism” (Guzzini 1998, 191 et sq.) – even on the level of the realist approach. Therefore, referring to the détente policy proposed by Kissinger, Guzzini underlines the emergence of a new type of balance of power, a multidimensional balance which avoids the zero-sum game, and according to which the military loss of one party transforms into the gain of the other. The interests’ connection on the Kissinger’s détente policy background implies the emergence of interdependencies and thus we can encounter at least two power balances: the military and the economic. The outcome of such an interpretation determines the debate to leave the (zero-sum) loss-gain binomial and place itself within an argumentation that has compensation as its core concept. Military threat can be compensated using the economic compound, the latter becoming of major importance on the security agenda. Conceived traditionally, the détente policy, the policy of connection exhibited its boundaries but it also underlined the multiplication in the nature of threats and ways to manage them. So, security must leave the narrow framework of the strictly military determinations.

Despite the attempts to reform Realism and to supplement it with new analysis coordinates including a moral termination under the form of ethics of responsibility such intentions generated a series of difficulties because, for example, in the case of the above mentioned ethics “whilst instructing leaders to consider the consequences of their actions, it does not provide a guide how to state leaders should weigh the consequences” (Smith, 1986, 51). Realism does not only offer an amoral alternative for the state leaders but even builds an entire argumentation against those who attempt to bring ethics into international relations. From these positions and “starting from the assumption that each state has its own particular values and beliefs, realists argue that the state is supreme good and there can be no community beyond borders” (Baylis and Smith 2001, 152). Considering such a discourse, the developing states – precisely from the realism position – considered the civil rights
or human rights doctrine as an instability factor because it endangers domestic cohesion; in other words, human rights transform into the mechanism through which the moral standards of a state are projected upon other or others (Morgenthau 1978, 4-15).

That is why, if in the daily international politics (in which we directly or especially indirectly take part) we share and act on the foundation of some values and beliefs referring to what from the ethical point of view should be done, in the International Relations discipline this concern lacks almost entirely. There can be identified two main arguments for such a discrepancy. Firstly, the positivist orientation of the discipline, according to which explanations must be founded in regularities, which are observable in the immediate reality. Secondly, there exists a general skepticism concerning the epistemological status of the value judgments due to the fact that these are infiltrated with subjectivism (and therefore seem to be arbitrary and relative) and contrast essentially from factual judgments. Within such logic, the normative propositions are soft, because they could not be the subject of an “empirical validation or falsification which is the hallmark of real inquire” (Viotti and Kauppi 2010, 3). Resorting to “scientificity”, both (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism try to explain the dynamics of international relations in the terms of the structures that determine and support the actors to pursue their interests. Or, such an attempt excludes, almost entirely, the explanatory value of the norms and thus, generates deficient reasoning; an example in this sense being offered by Audie Klotz who argues that “the increasing strength of a global norm of racial equality...provides a systematic though preliminary explanation of the adoption of sanction against South Africa by a broad and diverse range of international organizations and states” (Klotz 1995, 7). This does not mean anything else but the fact that the appearance and development of the policy orientated against discrimination cannot be understood outside the norms regarding racial equality. Therefore, although in the (neorealist and neoliberal) theoretical mainstream the normative aspects are considered, at best, marginal, from the perspective of a post-positivist theory of
international relations we can foresee the possibility of a normative theory to emerge.

From this perspective the traditional explanatory structures are replaced by processes especially because the “structure has no existence or causal power apart from process” (Wendt 1992, 395); or, this implies a profound change by the fact that classical elements of the international relations – self-help and power politics – “do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy” and “this is due to process, not structure” (Wendt 1992, 394). It thus becomes obvious that identities and norms must be used in order to detect and explain the dynamics of international politics reflecting the manner in which they maintain themselves as well as the way in which those identities are shaped through the different level interactions. So, we can assert that the behavior of the states is inspired by the new ideas and norms and not by power and self-interest (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), and, on the other hand we can observe that “what social scientists study are human actions and interactions” (Frost 1998, 126). In the conditions in which a given natural does not exist but rather it is built, we can then conclude that “we constitute ourselves within social formations which themselves are constituted by us” (Frost 1998, 126), a fact that further more implies that “we are not outsiders to these social practices, but insiders” (Frost 2009, 104).

Therefore, the here advanced post-positivism exercise consists in the attempt to make accessible what it is occulted by the current (traditional) way of doing politics, “to reveal our global international social order to be a human construct within which are embedded certain values chosen by us and to show how this construct benefits some and oppresses others” (Frost 2009, 127). If the norms and the way in which they constitute themselves become major explanatory factors, then we can identify at least three situations that raise ethical problems common to the international life and which subsidiarily refer to security aspects: the tension between sovereignty and human rights, the national self-determination and identifying the institution which can appeal to it legally and also the ethical problems that can spring from the market failure threatening the democratic functioning of the states (Frost 1998, 130-1).
Such a reconstruction of the international theory, on different grounds from the state-centric ones, is absolutely necessary to adequately theorize the “emerging forms of transnational political identity” (Wendt 1992, 425) and also to enlarge the explanatory sphere with the inter-subjective knowledge that constitutes identities and interests. Moreover, if we are to apply this interpretative frame to the security issue than we have to claim that neither the traditional arrangements focused on the state and its military capabilities, nor the international organizations approaches that subsume the state-centric logic (even though they contest it) can no longer represent solutions for the contemporary world problems. The licit use of force (including the military force) will have to be argued by human security, as novel formula, by this understanding as “a hard security policy aimed at protecting individuals rather than states” (Kaldor 2007, 180) – this aspect marks the first phase in the state-centric abandonment approach. On the other hand, also as a natural prolongation of this mutation, human security will reflect the importance of the norms within the construction of the social reality since “the world we built will reflect our ethical beliefs” (Frost 1998, 126), and this is even more obvious in the security discourse.

On the background of the globalization process, the security ensuring issue is obviously no longer a genuine military question. The end of the Cold War, the way in which it happened (stressing the fact that the Soviet Union’s security was compromised by the socio-economic weakness and by the lack of the institutional political legitimacy and not by the deficit in the level of military capabilities) ultimately determining the failure of the traditional manner of understanding security, intensified the debate concerning security studies in view of determining its object and study domain. As a “peace dividend”, security and the issue of security study, focused on the strictly military aspects and structures, as a result of its summation to the (neo)realist point of view, can be conceived of beginning with the end of the Cold War outside the raison d’État politics, outside the state-centric approach and thus we can foresee the normative judgments possibility.

The infrastructure to constitute the resistance pillar of the global transformation marked by the end of the Cold War is represented by the technical revolution whose effect was reflected into the diminishing of the transport, communication and information costs. All these elements are also seen in the unprecedented growth of productivity, in the economic expansion and in the growth of the international trade. But the economic globalization is merely one aspect (perhaps the most obvious and visible) that, in order not to over-impoverish the content of the process, must be supplemented with other dimensions, such as the social, politic or cultural ones. Within such a context the “value globalization” takes place as well as a way to generalize ethical principles mirrored in the declarations concerning human rights; in other words, a “growing consciousness of humanity as a single community” (Kaldor 2007, 154). One of the most encompassing forms of such a discourse is embedded in the Millennium Declaration (fundamental document in defining development as well) that can be structured on two core dimensions: firstly, civil and politic rights, due to which individuals are autonomous in relation to the state power and are entitled to take part in the decision-making process and, secondly, economic, social and cultural rights that reflect the values of the economic and social equality, of solidarity and non-discrimination. Therefore, globalization as a term that interprets and explains the issues concerning the complexity and extremely fast evolving contemporary world, must be understood as an integration process not only of economies but also of culture and government and therefore of norms.

From a similar perspective and resorting to the same document – Millennium Declaration – we can identify the general plan that allows such a mutation to be sub summed to a set of fundamental values, “essential for the international relations of the XXI century” namely: liberty, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for the environment and responsibility (UN 2000). Thus, the reconceptualization of security becomes possible and at the same time necessary – in the formula of human security – on the background of its projection onto the broader framework of
development and moreover, as the core element of it, because “development must be understood as a process of positive transformation of one society” (Lawal 2006, 66), and globalization and development are basically “the two broad concepts of transformation” (Lawal 2006, 66). But, in the post-Cold War context, by moving away from the state-centric analyses, development in its turn comes closer to a broader conception placing at its core the individual, because “people are the real wealth of a nation” (UNDP 1990, 9) or, as Amartya Sen considers “the double recognition of the fact that human beings (1) can become better and (2) can do more in this sense, can be also seen as a double thesis of human development approach” (Sen 2009, iii). From such a position and in complete convergence with the human security, “development can be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999, 3), in other words, any individual constraint formula is excluded even if in its favor there could be invoked a series of material advantages (more often attained in short term). Human development requires in the first place the elimination of all the major sources that obtrude individual freedom, from poverty to tyranny, from the lack of economic opportunities to the systemic social deprivations, from the lack of public facilities to the intolerance or to the hypertrophied formulas of statality (Sen 1999, 3). That is why Amartya Sen will consider that there can be identified at least two reasons why liberty should occupy the core position in defining the development process. On the one hand, for evaluation reasons, estimating the registered progress (by a society or community) must refer firstly to the degree to which individual liberty has been respected and consolidated. On the other hand, due to efficiency reasoning, development is completely dependent on the voluntary decision of the individuals (Sen 1999, 4-5). In this sense, the main objective of development must be represented by the consolidation of the individual capabilities or by the reinforcement of the opportunities individuals have in order to maximize their potential.

From the development perspective, the economic component is considered to be important, but not vital, the stress being on the “quality of growth and on the equity of its distribution” (UNDP 1995, 122), a fact mirrored in the
substantial and necessary (consciously created) connection between economic growth and the life of the individuals. The change of the stress from the state towards the individual within the sphere of development is embedded in *Human Development Report 1995* (UNDP 1995), and this project deeply marks the manner in which (individual, human) security will be approached. Within such a comprehensive frame, development is no longer thought in the national security subsidiary, as a presentation formula of the national interest. On the contrary, “redefining the concept of security to move away from military-focused state security and toward a holistic view of human security would reinforce the impetus to transfer resources from military to development spending. Human security was therefore intended to be not only similar, but also complementary, to human development” (Tigerstrom 2007, 16).

Although, very often the causes for the conflicts are of cultural source, still one can notice that frequently economic fractions/inequalities overlap the cultural differences. This means that the nature and the level of development can be identified as causes of the conflict and that the economic assumptions – that encompass the factors that predispose to conflict, and thus can offer explanations regarding the intra-state wars – can be grouped as it follows: group motivation associated with group inequalities; individual/private motivation and the social contract failure (Stewart 2004, 270-4). Therefore, a strong relation between development and security can be settled as long as promoting security implies social progress, and the other way around, as long as development represents the necessary underlayer for security. Or, in the conditions of the theoretical recalibrations that followed the Cold War, this means that “promoting security is instrumental for development, and that inclusive patterns of development are an important element in avoiding conflict, so that the development is instrumental to the achievement of security” (Stewart 2004, 277-8). If the *Human Development Report 1990* considered that “the basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives” (UNDP 1990, 9), and in 1994, human security was defined as the answer to the global poverty threat (UNDP 1994), then the connection between the
two concepts becomes obvious; the biunivocity of the this connection must be understood by the fact that the societal progress demands the diminishing of insecurity and, at the same time, the inclusive development represents a solid indicator for the increase of the security level (Stewart 2004, 285). But, moreover, we must underline that none of the two concepts can replace or substitute the other, remaining autonomous enough so that to be separately (but interconnected) analysed – “sorting out local security situations may be a necessary condition for sustainable development, but it is by no means a sufficient one. Equally, sorting out development may be a necessary, but it is by no means a sufficient condition for security, order, and justice” (Freedman 2004, 259).

4. Theory and Human Security Genealogy

In an essay entitled “Redefining Security” published in Foreign Affairs, Jessica Tuchman Mathews argues that security as concept must be rethought because “global developments now suggest the need for broadening definition of national security to include resource, environmental and demographic issues” (Mathews 1989, 162). Thus, the majority of the threats, identified by those who choose the redefinition of security, are related to the health and wealth of the individuals, to the social problems, to the domestic sources for instability as well as to the implied social costs. Although the strong connection between state and security is altered by the new threats that appear on the background of globalization, still these transformations are not extremely visible for the (neo)realist theoretical mainstream, aspect identified by Ronnie D. Lipschutz when stating that “whilst these threats obviously affect security, cohesion and the stability of the individuals, families, communities, societies and even states, it is not clear at all why they don't represent threats to national security in the neorealist terms” (Lipschutz 1995, 6). Nevertheless, redefining security becomes necessary from at least two points of view: on the one hand, because territorial security is replaced with individual security and, on the other hand, because military security is replaced with security built on sustainable development (UNDP 1994, 24). That is why human security need
not be conceived as a defensive concept, in the manner in which territorial or military security is defined, but as an integrative concept built on (human) development; it must be conceived as “an integrated approach to human well-being, one that emphasized the interrelationships between poverty, human rights, public health, education and political participation” (Battersby and Siracusa 2009, 3). Similar to the case of human development, the redefining the reference object of security stressing the protection of the individual is determined by a series of structural factors, among the most visible being: the end of the Cold War (and of the ideological confrontation), the impact of the globalization, that often excludes the national level from the global-local causality, the ever clearer presence of the transnational actors, redefining the power relations and the emergence of new non-military nature threats as well as the increasing number of the intra-national conflicts (Fuentes and Aravena 2005, 22-3). These transformations generated sufficient arguments in order to define human security as encompassing four fundamental characteristics: (1) human security is a universal challenge and concern; (2) the human security components are interdependent; (3) human security can be sooner accomplished using prevention than subsequent intervention; (4) human security is centered on the individual (UNDP 1994, 23). On this foundation, human security faces two convergent perspectives: “safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” as well as “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP 1994, 23). The demilitarization of security does not imply the elimination of traditional strategic concerns but only their supplementation with some other that no longer can be solved through the exclusive focus on the state level. Therefore, the human security concern does not replace the state security concerns that continue to be important in managing the violent threats, but transforms into a complement of the latter: “such a strategy should be developed on the dual framework of protection and empowerment in which the state and civil society have a complementary role to play” (Fouinat 2004, 294). Encompassing the optimism as well as the anxieties associated with the end of the Cold War human security analyzes aggression at the subnational, intranational
and international levels constituting into an analytical discourse “disassembling the state into its smallest components (people) in order to put it back together again” (Weinert 2009, 154) just that the reconstruction brings in the foreground a state whose sovereignty is “increasingly conditional – dependent both on domestic behavior and consent of the outside world” (Kaldor 2007, 156).

Such a discourse is thus possible only under a post-positivist perspective, a critical perspective that eliminates the traditional tension between rights and sovereignty through the fact that ethical arrangements resulting from our affiliation to the global civil society (built on the human rights principles) do not enter into collision with the arrangements we assume as citizens of a sovereign states’ society (built on the law of states). In other words, from the position of the constitutive theory (Frost 1998; Frost 2009), the relation between the two arenas is “a sophisticated one such that certain ethical shortcomings we experience in one are remedied through our participation in the other” (Frost 2009, 104). Without mutually excluding themselves, but shaping the structures of the actors especially through their simultaneous participation within the two, “we are both civilians and citizens” implying that “we value the ethical standing that we enjoy in these roles” (Frost 2009, 104). Therefore, the new framework of analysis that occurs at the international level aims at the recovery of the normative aspects underlying the connection between individual and society and “translates the stability, resilience and security of each in terms of the other” (Weinert 2009, 155). Without denying the state and its importance in the context of the relation with its citizens – “states can be powerful custodians of human welfare, and thus worthy of contingent loyalty” (Harbour 1990, 80) – one can conceive of two simultaneous levels of analysis (apparently placed on contrary positions).

This analysis is initiated by Alexander Wendt, who does not contradict the neorealist depiction of the international system as an entirely competitive and populated by entities defining their actions in terms of self-help, but contests only the neorealist explanation of this world (Wendt 1992). Wendt says that what we traditionally consider to be a constitutive structure is no more
than an institution reflecting a social identity, which originates in the theories the actors develop from some towards others. Thus, if we cannot pragmatically contradict the international world order, then we can consider this a still frame in an ongoing process. Within this process, security depends on the way different norms, different worlds interact, in other words “concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other” (Wendt 1992, 399), and from this process the power distribution and international anarchy develop. This encompassing perspective, due to the fact that it operates with identities and not structures, enables the existence of apparently irreconcilable entities. So, assuming the cosmopolitan position, a series of authors argue in favor of the individual centrality within the moral and political universe (Harbour 1999; Kuper 2004). On the other hand, we have to highlight that the state and the international system encompassing the states continue to be a reality (even though a social built one), a fact for which the pragmatic limitation of the cosmopolitanism is thus entitled. The pragmatic cosmopolitanism (Weinert 2009) – transcending this cleavage marking two opposed manners of understanding and explaining international politics – preserves the individual as the referent and immediate beneficiary of security, but, at the same time, sees the state as the last referent and beneficiary and that is why human security can be also read as the means through which the state viability can be built. The implications of this grating are major because thus “human security both defends the sovereign state, and locates the state in a larger moral project” (Weinert 2009, 158), implying, on the one hand, the defining of the obligations towards the others, and, on the other hand, the (re)construction of the state according to the general accepted moral norms.

The 1990s are marked by a whole series of (re)theoretizations, security occupying a major place among them, that “has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust” (UNDP 1994, 24). Within such an atmosphere Barry Buzan will claim that the security of human collectivities is affected by factors belonging to five main sectors:
military, politic, economic, social and environmental (Buzan 1983, 75-83) and the Human Development Report 1994 will identify seven components of the human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (UNDP 1994, 24-5). From this general perspective, human security presents two fundamental dimensions: freedom from fear and freedom from want (UNDP 1994, 24) so, at the individual level this distinction is attenuated by the United Nations Commission on Human Security which defines human security as the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfillment” (CHS 2003, 4).

The realist traditional explanation, through its exaggerated attention conferred to the state, fails to foresee or even hides a series of real threats towards the individual and thus, the security fails even in its core objective: to protect (the individual). Therefore, overcoming the traditional approaches brings into foreground a series of new concepts such as societal security, comprehensive security, (global) international security and human security; this paradigmatic rethinking is reflected in The Human Development Report 1994, document within which the end of the Cold War represents the boundary between old/obsolete (traditional) and new. In the new international context – deeply marked by the implications of globalization – the exclusivity of national security is no longer possible due to the fact that a series of new concepts interfere in the realities with which we operate because “abstract concepts such as value, norms, and expectations also influences both choices and outcome of security” (Liotta and Owen 2006, 51). On the background of the mutations occurred at the end of the Cold War and as a direct implication of it “the ubiquitous idea is of security in an extended sense” (Rotschild 1995, 55), meaning the defining of a “permissive or pluralistic understanding of security, as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of state” (Rotschild 1995, 60).

In this new principles’ geometry that shapes contemporary security, the enlargement of the concept is undertaken in several directions. Therefore, from the point of view of the entities to which security must be ensured, the concept of security is extended from the security of the nations to
the security of the individuals. On the other hand – the concept is extended upwardly – from the nation to the international system. Third, the concept of security extends horizontally, supplementing the military perspective with the political, economic and environmental ones and thus, the range of security can basically receive human dimension. Forth, it also extends (as a natural consequence) the politic responsibility to ensure security from states to international institutions, subnational authorities, nongovernmental organizations, public opinion or markets (Rotschild 1995). Therefore, the major transformations generated by the enlargement of security and the make-up of security under these conditions became easily observable; the road thus covered marks the profound differences between the traditional paradigm and the new approach, as well as the complexity of the expansion of the new concept.

Coming back to the two components of the human security – *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear* – we have to mention that each of them circumscribes a different approach in defining: broad, respectively narrow approach. The enlargement of the analysis perspective can be considered as a revolutionary initiative because, unlike the state-centric security perspective, “it brings what are traditionally considered *development* or *humanitarian* considerations into the security discourse” (Liotta and Owen 2006, 42). From a more narrow perspective, the Canadian government, in a document entitled *Freedom from Fear* defines human security as “the freedom from the generalized threats to human rights, their safety and lives” (DFAIT 2000, 3) meaning that human security represents the focus on “protecting the individuals from violence and defining an international agenda based on this objective” (DFAIT 2000, 1). The narrow perspective in defining security individualizes the security issue in relation with development underlying “the more immediate necessity for intervention capability than long-term strategic planning and investing for sustainable and secure development” (Liotta and Owen 2006, 43). This view is also undertaken in *The Human Security Report 2005* according to which “the primary goal of security is the protection of individuals” (Human Security Centre 2005) (this aspect being of great importance for the reaffirmation of the change regarding the referent of security).
and focuses on security from political violence. In a more general manner, the report entitled *In Larger Freedom* stresses the necessity of the interrelation of the various perspectives on security and highlights the importance of the development as a strategy for the fulfillment security. The combination of these two points of view must bring to the foreground the relation (not easy to identify and theorize) between security and development “since human development is a key component of human security [...] today it is impossible to separate security and development” (Kaldor 2007, 193, 196).

This equals the necessity to sum the two perspectives – broad and narrow – a premise assumed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) when proposing an encompassing formula – “responsibility to protect” (R2P) that translates into the responsibility of some agents or even states to implement the principles of security that sovereign states owe to their own citizens. Only that such an approach can become problematic due to the fact that the “responsibility to protect” also involves the right to interfere, moreover since in the current power topography some of the (dominant) states can appeal to this anywhere and anytime. In order to avoid such a situation, ICISS considers that the sovereign states have the responsibility “to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but what when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of the states” (ICISS 2001, viii). This responsibility is in its turn constituted on “specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law” (ICISS 2001, xi). Moreover, the ICISS report explicitly refers to the language of the just war theory when identifies the constitutive elements of the “responsibility to protect” as the: responsibility to prevent, responsibility to react and responsibility to rebuild (ICISS 2001, 11-47) which, in turn represent a reiteration of the actions inserted by the UN General Secretary – Boutros Boutros Ghali – in *An Agenda for Peace* (1992): preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building. All of these represent in fact contemporary interpretations of the
classical principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*, to which a third one is added – *jus post bellum*. Thus the resemblance with the just war becomes obvious and still the ICISS document “engages in only limited reflection on the ethical implications of its *responsibility to protect* agenda” (Holliday 2003, 119). Nevertheless, Nicholas Rengger considers that “it would be a mistake to abandon the just war tradition” (Rengger 2002, 363), and Mary Kaldor goes beyond that suggesting the transition from just war to just peace. This glide becomes possible since “states remain the only authorities capable of upholding the legitimate use of force, but their use of force – is much more circumscribed than earlier by international rules and norms” (Kaldor 2007, 173). More, the writer argues, there can be identified three principles that mark the difference between a *jus in bello* approach (a state-centric approach) and an approach based on human rights (a human-centered approach): the task of human security operations is to protect civilians, the protection can be thus fulfilled through stability rather than victory and, last but not least, those who violate human rights are individual criminals and not collective enemies (Kaldor 2007, 176-8). If, from the perspective of such debates, the normative component of the human security appears to be obvious, the “R2P” transformation into the fundamental principle of the collective security marks “a commitment to ethical progress in international relations” (Weinert 2009, 159) that becomes possible only to the degree that we understand the “indivisibility of security, economic development and freedom” (UN 2004, 1). Moreover, the necessity to develop a functional ethical compound for the analysis and interpretation framework of international politics becomes increasingly visible under the conditions of the terrorism recrudescence that needs to be counteracted and, on the other hand, the just mechanisms to offer the necessary criteria for legitimating the right to interfere must be identified.

Defining human security as comprehensive part in the debates marking the conceptual reshaping of the politic and social space from the last two centuries becomes relevant from at least three points of view. Firstly, human security unlocks the opportunity to address questions and challenges regarding the implications of the globalization process. Secondly, human
security can be used as an encompassing concept, a concept catalyzing the contemporary security agenda. And, last but not least, human security can be approached as a normative project and from this perspective the glide towards the individual as core of the security concerns is remarkable.

5. Epilogue

If the theorization of the human development represents an extremely important contribution to the paradigm change from the last decades, reflected in the shift of the stress from the economic growth (development) to the impact the development has on the lives and welfare of the individuals, human security completes human development introducing the perspective of descendant risks involved by severe poverty or different other intrastate sources.

Away from placing itself beyond a series of powerful contestations, the elaboration of the human security concept constitutes an important step towards the reconstruction of the international system gravitating around a just international order. Therefore, human security legitimates itself in the contemporary conceptual universe mainly through its implied ethical and normative dimensions. Placing at its core human rights’ respect human security promotes the protection of the individuals and thus follows the necessity to put it in practice not as an illusive concept, but a basic request and fundamental right. Moreover, human security and human rights reinforce reciprocally because the former has the duty to establish the rights that are endangered in certain contexts, and the latter have the duty to draw the trajectory human security needs to frame. The ethical aspect is firstly implied by the core position the individual holds in the security discourse and by the redefinition of the international system according to this tectonic transformation built on the pre-eminence of human rights, aspect underlined by Kofi Annan when saying “we will not enjoy security without development, development without security, and neither without respect for human rights” (UN 2005, 6). The increasing importance and impact of the values and principles inserted in the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights
determines that the international order is no longer limited only to the aspects regarding the prevention of international conflicts but also extends upon the human rights promotion, upon maximizing means of personal welfare and freedom. Therefore, starting with the words of the Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo, we can argue that the core element of human security is to generate the normative framework within which “human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired”. These ethic-normative coordinates are reaffirmed by Mary Kaldor when she identifies the principles of human security, that need to be applied both to the expected outcomes and also to the used means (both to how and why) as following: the supremacy of human rights, legitimate political authority, multilateralism, the bottom-up approach and the regional focus (Kaldor 2007, 190 et sq.).

In his attempt to operationalize human security answering the question *why human security?* Amartya Sen identifies a series of arguments that impose such an approach (Sen 2000). Human security is thus a way to manage security of survival by the stress added to the aspects related to health, peace and tolerance. Therefore, human security must be understood as a compound of the daily life and of the manner in which the quality of life must be preserved, mainly through social, political and economic participation. Also, in the context of the technical advancement implied by globalization, human security must build a *linkage between informational access and ecological responsibility*, in the conditions in which human dignity, human equity and human solidarity are its constitutive elements. The human security perspective must shape the framework that will diminish global inequality and insecurity through the global human solidarity and thus, the dual danger globalization might generate be avoided: unfair inclusion or exclusion. And not least, the strengthening of human security built on the principles of the individual pre-eminence, redefines the international institutional framework supplementing it with a series of new actors reflecting this precise transnational solidarity.

On the other hand, the debates concerning human security must be projected in the broader framework of the critical studies of security. Contesting the methodology
exclusively state-centric concentrated brings human security in the proximity of the point of view developed by the representatives of the Copenhagen School, in the formula of the securitization theory (Buzan 1983; Lipschutz 1995; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998; Buzan and Waever 2004). Therefore, the raising question is again—why human security? Is human security an alternative to securitization or just a necessary supplement in order to capture the complexity of the contemporary security? Human security—as part of the critical theory of security—identifies and reflects the chronic insecurities individuals and groups of individuals face, fact due to which, regardless its manner of conceiving (broad or narrow) the core element that conducts this concern is that the individual becomes the last object of reference (of security). Just that related to the question who must offer security? the human security theory doesn’t give a clear response and doesn’t neither suggest analytical mechanisms for this issue. On the contrary, from the Copenhagen School point of view—in its turn staking on the individual as the last security referent—a solid analysis framework is shaped, the securitization theory encompassing the following components: (1) identification of existential threats, (2) requiring emergency measures and (3) justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 23-4). Therefore, from the analytical utility point of view, human security is irrelevant, precisely because it does not set out a sui generis framework for analysis. Still, it becomes extremely useful through its capacity of identifying existential threats to individuals/groups of individuals. In other words, “human security is positioned at the explanandum end of security studies, whilst the process tracing tool that is the securitization approach can be used to analyze and explain who does what, and with what effects in the human security literature” (Floyd 2007, 42). Unlike the Copenhagen School, from which perspective it is settled and analyzed who, what and under which conditions securitizes, the human security position will be able to settle the insecurities that threaten the individual referent of security. More, human security supplements the analytical utility of securitization with the normative one reflecting the “security analyst’s ability to influence the securitization process in a
deliberate and thought-out fashion to a desired effect” (Floyd 2007, 39), since the analyze framework of the Copenhagen School “leaves the securitization analyst without any means to rectify what she/he her/himself has co-constituted, simply by virtue of performing security analysis” (Floyd 2007, 43). The convergence and complementarity of the two perspectives follow also from the fact that we can judge a securitization as positive or negative only through the point of view of its consequences and in accordance with an agent-neutral value and “human security constitutes just such an agent-neutral value, and the various elements of the human security agenda are thus valid examples of positive securitizations” (Floyd 2007, 44). Meaning that, if from the Copenhagen School point of view we can analyze securitization, human security offers the necessary lens to understand the manner in which the securitization functions. In other words, human security offers a normative correction of securitization more focused on analysis of the way it can be applied to reality. Nevertheless, each of these models is important in its own sense “one contributing to our understanding of how security is practiced, the other – on occasion and if successful – to its practice” (Floyd 2007, 45-6).

Also, the normative utility of human security results from the fact that, the task of such a discourse is to prioritize and arrange preferences due to the fact that the available resources (including those of the states) are limited, and, on the other hand, the obligations towards the others cannot be unlimited (limits appear at least in some situations if not all). Arranging preferences must take into account that both protection as well as the empowerment of the individuals must be fulfilled encompassing the state and not eliminating it from the security equation, moreover since “in ethical terms, human security is both a system and systemic practice that promotes and sustains stability, security, and progressive integration of individuals within their relationships to their states, societies and region” (Liotta and Owen 2006, 40) or, in other words, “human security allows individuals the pursuit of life, liberty, and both happiness and justice” (Liotta and Owen 2006, 40).

Although we can identify at least two major inconsistencies of human security: an endogenous one, in the lack
of intellectual sophistication (a sort of theoretical underdevelopment) and an exogenous one represented by its assuming by the political body through a contextual ideological interpretation, still “how we develop the concept of human security and imbue it with relevant meanings is, in fact, part of the process of implementing the paradigm shift” (Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2008, 2). Without being a panacea for the international politics and international environment prophylaxis, human security can be fundamental in the justification of the ethics of interventions. The answers for the questions when and how must/can intervene? can be identified combining the analytical and normative utility, or in other words, constructing securitization on the normative argument of human security.

REFERENCES


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