The Nature of Intersubjectivity in Buber, Husserl and Waldenfels: An Encounter, an Intentional Constitution, or a Happening?

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Abstract

This text involves the concept of intersubjectivity in Buber, Husserl, and Waldenfels. For these authors, the other has an important place in the constitution of ourselves. Buber presents an innateness of the You, whereby it fosters in us a longing for relation, bringing the directness of love, which implies acts of responsibility toward the other. Husserl affirms that the transcendental subjectivity is a transcendental intersubjectivity implicit in the intentional constitution of the Ego. Waldenfels precludes an idea of the innateness and of the implication in order to explore the event of what happens between us in its integrity. Therefore, Waldenfels conceives the opening of the personality as a latent process. The event of what happens can divert the course of our determination, bringing new possibilities to the personality itself. Now, the meaning is shared, and not endowed by the transcendental Ego (Husserl) as the only thing responsible for meaning. We share meaning because we originally have the experience of the other, of the world, and of ourselves. In Waldenfels, we respond to the others’ and the world’s demands, which occur as original events, instead of responding to them as innate demands, coming from us.

Keywords: event, response, personality, other, experience

1. The emergence of the I-You and the emergence of the I-It

At the beginning of Buber’s book *I and Thou*, he uses the term *attitude relationship* (Buber 1970, 53) as a mode of living in the world. In addition, he indicates that there are two ways of interacting in the world through the basic words *I-It* and *I-*
The attitude toward each will establish what kind of relationship (Buber 1970, 58) we will have toward them. The I is twofold in relation to the world, representing two sorts of attitudes. Buber becomes conscious of the role that language plays in forming our lives. These basic words are, in fact, word pairs rather than single words. In calling these words basic, Buber proposes that their very utterance establishes a means of existence. When labeling someone or something as It, we become a certain kind of I, and exist in a certain, conscious way; when labeling someone as You, we become different sort of I, and exist in a different way. It is perceived here that language and attitude play an important role side by side. Both are expressed in the context of our lives. According to Buber, being and saying I are one in the same, even though although the life of human beings does not merely exist in the sphere of goal-directed verbs, nor of activities that have something for their object (Buber 1970, 54). For Buber, whoever says You does not have the idea of anything for his/her object (Buber 1970, 55).

The basic word pair I-It represents the world of experience and that of I-You, the world of relation. Buber brings to light the example of a tree. When we look at a tree, we can classify it in a table thereby transforming it into an I-It relation, but when we contemplate or think about the tree, we find it unnecessary to objectify it. In contemplating the tree, we establish a relationship with it, not a one-sided relation, but a reciprocal one (Buber 1970, 58). In the reciprocal relation, what is excluded in the strict sense of experience can now seize us and be included in the very process of relation. Contrary to the I-It experience, in the I-You relation, we now see movement as the grace of life. In context of the I-It experience, we stop the movement so that the tree can be seen in a classification table, whereas in the reciprocal You relation, we continue the eternal movement as grace.

The You as a firmament (Buber 1970, 59) characterized by Buber, when we say the basic word I-You, is not limited by experience, but by involving a reciprocal relation that goes beyond our knowledge. Differing from experience, the relation is actual. The relation towards the world demands from us a creative power in front of the form that appears (Buber 1970,
Such creativeness actualizes the form that confronts us rather than arrests it. Thus, the experience stops the process of actual life because of its objectification. However, the relation keeps the process constant due to its actualization. The actualization is not a clarification to our knowledge, but at the time we actualized it, we uncovered it. As Buber writes: “Such work is creation, inventing is finding” (Buber 1970, 61). In the mode of actualization, we rediscover a creative process, whereby an inventive course brings with it a finding course of possibilities.

The relation between You and us propitiates an encounter by grace (Buber 1970, 62). In this encounter our whole being is at once passive and active. Therefore, nothing conceptual, imaginable, or knowable can intervene between the I and You, because our relation to You is unmediated. This necessity means that the encounter is actual. For Buber, the meaning would only be an obstacle for the encounter. As Buber says: “Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur” (Buber 1970, 63). As it is an encounter by grace nothing is necessarily presupposed in order for it to happen. As a result, there is an immediacy of relationship.

Under these circumstances, Buber draws the conclusion that only as the You becomes present, does presence come into being. As the encounter between us is unmediated, it also corresponds to the idea of an unmediated present. In the I-It experience we are surrounded by a multitude of contents which has only a past, no present, in other words, it loses its actuality. Buber writes: “Presence is not what is evanescent and passes but what confronts us, waiting and enduring” (Buber 1970, 64). The state of being exists only insofar as presentness, encounter, and relation exist. The actuality of the present drives us not into what is presupposed but, instead toward what confronts us. What confronts us breaks down our presuppositions. According to Buber, this confrontation conducts us into the threshold (Buber 1970, 65) whereby, for an actual human being, the real boundary also runs across the world of ideas. Normally, we misunderstand the essential act that establishes directness as a feeling. Nevertheless, feelings accompany the metaphysical and metapsychical fact of love, but they do not constitute it
(Buber 1970, 65). To illustrate this, Buber brings the example of Jesus’ feeling toward those He healed and toward His disciples. The feeling is different, but the love is one. For Buber, love is a worldly force (*Liebe ist ein welthaftes Wirken*) (Buber 1970, 66) in order to produce responsibility in relation to a You. Through love, the exclusiveness comes constantly into inclusiveness so that one can act, help, heal, educate, raise, redeem what once was excluded, but which now has the possibility to take part in the directness of love. The directness of love means that the love is unmediated, producing acts of responsibility in relation to a You.

The encounter starts with the relation, but will eventually be transformed into a thing. Every You in the world is doomed by its nature to become a thing or at least to enter into thinghood (Buber 1970, 69) continuously. When we love someone, we see that person as wholly unique, and without any qualities. The person is purely present, in the sense that he/she is there without presupposition. Even in love, though, the You must inevitably fade periodically into an It. As soon as we see our as giving qualities as beautiful, kind, and so on, the beloved has ceased to be a You. This does not mean that love cannot endure, but only that it constantly oscillates between I-You and I-It. Despite the fact of such oscillation, the relation of love is performed with our whole being. On the contrary, hatred by its very nature, cannot be directed toward a whole being. We cannot hate a whole person, only a part of a person. Relation, instead, by its very definition, can only be directed toward a whole being. Buber concludes that love is relation and, for that reason, reciprocal in the sense of its passive and active nature.

Once we live the original encounter, the original relational character of the appearance remains effective for a long time (Buber 1970, 71). The original encounter brings with it the possibility of love, which produces acts of responsibility due to the whole being involved in the relation. The context of the encounter propitiates the directness of love.

Buber brings the idea of readiness (Buber 1970, 78), characterized by the relational being, as a form that reaches out to be filled so that the being carries with it the innate You. Such an innate You is realized in the You we encounter. The You
aims at reciprocity and tenderness. Nevertheless, in the I-You relation, straight after, we can also witness the detachment of the I in relation to the You. It happens because inevitably we will try to conceptualize the very encounter, objectifying its spatial-temporal structure. From now on, the I starts to form itself and reaches its subjectivity.

It is possible to see the dynamism when the event of relation runs its course. The You will become an It, and the individual It can become a You (Buber 1970, 84) by entering into the event of relation. This twofold character represents the condition wherein we live.

2. The emergence of the You-world and the emergence of the It-world

When Buber expresses both (two) ways of responding to You, he draws the possibility of a response made with the uniqueness of the Spirit. Buber says: “Man lives in the spirit when he is able to respond to his You” (Buber 1970, 89). Nevertheless, all the responses in the sense of explanations, denominations, clarifications, and so on, bind the You into the It-world.

The It-world is clearly discernible in history. It is the civilization that has lost its relational character, and is no longer able to live in the spirit. The It-world is the world of experience, that is to say, a civilization that only considers the functional aspect of things. However, for Buber, the It-world can be changed by an act that is not arbitrary, in other words, an attitude of encounter, an attitude through a You, whereby we respond with our life. The language and the response not clarified and explained become life (Buber 1970, 92).

The It-world has the strong capacity to alienate us, making us slaves (Buber 1970, 107) to its causality laws. We feel like a cog caught in the inexorable machine of various causal systems (Buber 1970, 103) such as biological, social, historical, cultural, and psychological. These laws might blind us in order to make us believe that there is no truth beyond them. Authors who belong to the period of the Frankfurt School, between the years 1933-1960, will be influenced by the
alienation idea from Buber. For Buber, the redemptive (Buber 1970, 96) power of the You carries with it a responding spirit (Buber 1970, 99) that is able to incorporate human life back again in communal life. That is a saving process brought by the response of the living spirit. Such redemption fosters the possibility to return to relation itself, and as long as we enter into the relation, we are free and thus creative.

When our freedom is guaranteed we do not feel oppressed by causality (Buber 1970, 101). Despite the oscillation between You and It, we are able to go beyond the causality laws, and see the threshold. As Buber writes: “There, on the threshold, the response, the spirit is kindled in him again and again; here, in the unholy and indigent land the spark has to prove itself” (Buber 1970, 102). Based on the attitude toward relation, now we are able to bring freedom to our fate. Freedom and fate embrace each other to form and to give meaning. This meaning is a response from the living spirit without any objectification; instead it generates freedom and creativity.

Under these circumstances, we can move ourselves either through experience or through relation. The existence is permeated by these twofold Is. The I of the I-It appears as an Ego, detaching from other Egos. The I of the basic word I-You appears as a person, entering into relation to other persons. The I-It becomes conscious of itself as a subject and the I-You becomes conscious of itself as subjectivity. The person becomes conscious of him/herself as participating in being, as being-with (Buber 1970, 113) and the Ego is conscious of his/her being-that-way. The I-You is conscious of the I-It so that it can apprehend simultaneously its connectivity and its detachment. Notwithstanding, we live in a twofold I, some men are so person-oriented that one may call them persons, while others are so ego-oriented that one may call them Egos (Buber 1970, 114-115). It is important to note that Buber is trying to avoid solipsism. Despite the fact of the alienation of the I-It concerning relation, it cannot avoid to live among others. Considering that, the I-It is an egotical being (Buber 1970, 112). The Ego lives as detached, making use of experience, appropriating things and persons.
3. The nature of the encounter in our actions

For Buber, through the intersections of relationships, we are driven to the Eternal You (Buber 1970, 123). It happens because the innate You is actualized each time without ever being perfected due to the fact that it can become an It. The Eternal You in accordance with its nature cannot become an It. It is Eternal and remains as a mystery that fulfills everything. We cannot encounter God without encountering other beings. Through our relationship with God, every other encounter enflames an unconditional necessity within us.

In an absolute encounter, God fills the universe in a similar way that the other person does in an interpersonal encounter. But, the way that God fills the universe is different: when we enter into a relationship with God we are also entering into a relationship with everything else in the world, because encountering God involves encountering everything belonging to God, that is, the world. In absolute relation, we do not ignore the rest of the world, but relate to it through relating to God. In the relation to God, unconditional exclusiveness and unconditional inclusiveness are one (Buber 1970, 126-127). That means that the I-It experience that promotes the It-world will be reviewed, and the world, the things, and others will be enlightened by the power of the relation. Such exclusiveness will be included because everything will have the perspective of the very encounter. Exclusiveness without condition is an unconditional inclusiveness. As Buber writes: “One does not find God if one remains in the world; one does not find God if one leaves the world” (Buber 1970, 127). This encounter is exclusive because we are related to the You as if it were all that mattered for us, and see the rest of the universe through its light. It is inclusive because it is not just the divine being but also His entire universe with whom we are relating in this way.

Buber drives our attention to some misunderstandings about the nature of the encounter with the Eternal You. First of all, it is not a feeling of dependency. One’s encounter with God is accompanied by such feelings, but is not itself that feeling. Any feeling exists only in the I, and encounter exists between
the *You* and the *I*. Buber reminds us that the very nature of the encounter is relational, which means a kind of actualized dialog, not a one-sided one. We do not lose the *I* and the *You* in the relation, we recreate them. In other words, the encounter comes as a creative power. What is more, the encounter is not a sort of immersion whereby the I-hood is drawn by God itself. Such a unification doctrine causes a deactualization and a depersonalization of our subjectivity. For Max Scheler, our personality is constituted by the love of God for us (Scheler 1973, 390). Thus, against a pure passivity in our relation to God, forming the base of a concrete person in Scheler (Junglos 2013, 366), Buber maintains instead, that our relation to God is not deterministic, but creative.

The confrontation fetches exclusion into inclusion, but without eliminating the antinomy between both, whereby the universe is comprehended (Buber 1970, 148). Thus, the encounter brings with the possibility that is able to embrace also the boundaries wherein we live. In this sense the Buber’s project involves an unconditional inclusiveness. Such inclusiveness moves towards the stranger that confronts us. Actions of responsibility come forth from the very nature of this encounter. Such actions go beyond duties and obligations, because what we received is not a content but a presence as strength (Buber 1970, 158). This presence comes into action through three ways. First, the whole abundance of actual reciprocity of being admitted in such connectivity is actualized as meaning in our lives. Second, we have a guarantee of the inexpressible meaning; nothing can henceforth be meaningless. Third, it is not the meaning of another life, but that of this our life, our world. For Buber, the nature of the encounter is a mystery that can be received but not experienced (Buber 1970, 159). We know it as salvation and not as solution. Despite the fact that we cannot explain what happens, the truth is that something happens and comes as renovation into our lives.

Is the encounter not also an experience? As we have seen, for Buber, experience belongs only to the *I-It* relation. Nevertheless, in order to have an attitude towards another, how can I perform it without experience? Buber himself speaks of the inevitability of transforming the *You* into an *It*.
Moreover, he says that this very antinomy between the relationship of You and It reveals the very situation wherein we live. Under these circumstances, we draw the conclusion that a contradiction is performed in Buber’s work in relation to the term experience. Into our view, our longing for relation, which characterized a respondent spirit, would have a static meaning without the presupposed of experience itself.

The challenge now is: How could we conceive experience without falling into an objectivism, which is peculiar to it? Through Husserl, we intend to find, in the dynamism of experience, a possibility of an open flux, which implies a process of constitution that not authorizes us to build incontestable generalities.

4. Between doubt and evidence: consequences for a fundament of science

After the doubt’s process realized by Descartes, he came to the conclusion that no matter how fully we are deceived, we cannot be deceived about the fact of our thinking. For deceived thinking is but a deficient mode of thinking generally. Thus, even though we can have false perceptions of things, or we can have doubts if we are awake or living a dream, notwithstanding, we are sure about our thinking itself. As Husserl points it out, it is from here that Descartes initiates his modern turn (Wendung) (Husserl 1973, §1, 46). The Cartesian turn to the subject from naïve objectivism inaugurates a new kind of philosophy with a specific task of building a fundament for the entire science. The aim of the Meditations is a complete reforming of philosophy into a science grounded on an absolute foundation (Husserl 1973, §1, 43). For that, Descartes develops from a pure inwardness an outwardness objectivity (Husserl 1973, §1, 45). Such objectivity would standardize a ground for all sciences.

So far, Husserl raises a question: It is possible a science that is absolutely grounded? Husserl answers that we should not take for granted any already established norms (Husserl 1973, §3, 49). But now, if Husserl wants to look for a fundament for all science, which kind of fundament is he looking for? First,
he says, we must not presuppose even its possibility. According to Husserl, we cannot fashion, by a process of abstraction, the idea of a fundament for all science. Moreover, we must neither make nor go on accepting any judgment as scientific that we have not derived from evidence, from experiences (Husserl 1973, §5, 54), wherein we are living in the present where the things appear to me by themselves. By now, we draw the conclusion that the fundament that Husserl is looking for is based on evidence, and evidence, for Husserl, is experience. In experience, we are faced with a constancy of possibilities that have their own evidence. Thus, it is necessary to examine its range and make evident to ourselves how far that evidence, how far its perfection, the actual giving of the affairs themselves, extends. Basically, we need to go toward the evidence, but not in the sense of establishing general abstractions for it, instead, to demonstrate its actuality.

Descartes and Husserl start at different directions. Descartes starts with the doubt to arrive at absolute evidence. Husserl starts with the evidence in the sense of a continuous actualization of it. To put in other words, the doubt for Descartes is a problem that must be extinguished, for Husserl, instead, the doubt is in the very process of the actualization of evidence itself. Due to the actuality of the world, we cannot force an objective judgment on it. The world claims its own being (Seinsanspruch) (Husserl 1973, §8, 58), but not the world as a static block, but the lived-surrounding-world (Lebensumwelt), a phenomenon of being (Seinsphänomen) (Husserl 1973, §8, 59), which I live along with. The evidence of the world comes to us as a field of presence (Gegenwartsfelde), so that we can perceive it as it appears to us.

From now on, Husserl introduces his method called epoché or phenomenological reduction. This method consists in a universal depriving of acceptance (Husserl 1973, §8, 60) of what is taking for granted objectively and subjectively. Proceeding in this way, Husserl emerges a living Ego, a pure Ego in its transcendental sense with the pure stream of our cogitationes (Husserl 1973, §8, 61). In this sense, the evidence comes from givenness itself through the lived-surrounding-world. This means that neither our pure objective abstraction,
nor the world as a static block bring with them pure evidence, instead, consciousness and world live in their very stream of living (experience = evidence). Therefore, the world is neither a piece of our Ego, nor our Ego is a piece of the world (Husserl 1973, §11, 65). The reduction to the transcendental subjectivity means a living subjectivity.

As the epoché lays dawn an infinity realm of being of new kind (Husserl 1973, §12, 66) we can suppose that there is also an a priori science, which confines itself to the realm of pure possibility. The concrete Ego (Husserl 1973, §12, 67) is not a solipsistic Ego, but an Ego that exists with its individual content made up of subjective process, abilities and dispositions, in other words, the Ego is given and not a kind of objective thought which is able to determinate the world. Without doubt, the sense of the transcendental reduction implies (Husserl 1973, §13, 69) that, at the beginning, this science can posit nothing, but the Ego and what is included in the Ego himself, with a horizon of undetermined/determinability. The modes of consciousness have a noetic and a noematic structure (Husserl 1973, §15, 74). We can understand them just by a transcendental reflection performed by a transcendental reduction. In the process of reduction, we abstain ourselves from a natural attitude that takes for granted what is meant, to wit, an attitude of positing thing in an objective abstract sense. That is the noematic side of our consciousness. Instead, the noetic side recognizes the infinite spatial-temporal flux of the consciousness/world. Therefore, the transcendental reflection causes a splitting of the Ego (Ich Spaltung) (Husserl 1973, §15, 73) in relation with the noetic and noematic mode of being. Thus, the Ego is concrete when it is implicated with the appearing world (Husserl 1973, §16, 76) lived by the noematic and noetic structure of consciousness.

5. Actualization of the Ego and horizons implications

If we take a look at a die, it leaves open a great variety of things pertaining to the unseen faces; yet it is already construed in advance as a die, in particular as colored, rough,
and the like. According to Husserl, each of these determinations always leaves further particulars open. This leaving open (Offenlassen) (Husserl 1973, §19, 83), prior to further determinations, is a moment included in the given consciousness itself; it is precisely what makes up the horizon. In the process of constitution, the Ego experiences a determinate/indeterminate structure (noetic/noematic). In this sense, the object itself, like the die, will never be completely grasped. Despite of it, we have a predelineation of the die. Nevertheless, this predelineation is never present to actual consciousness as a finished datum, it becomes clarified only through explication of the given horizon and the new horizons continuously awakened. The stream of consciousness brings with it the implication of a non-graspable actuality wherein constantly new possibilities can arise.

As Husserl points it, the intentional consciousness implies its horizon (the living world in its broad sense), the stream of the own consciousness (noetic/noematic), and a meaning more (Mehrmeinung) (Husserl 1973, §20, 84). Through our process of intentional constitution, the meaning more is done when we describe, characterize, and delineate the appearance of the object. This meaning more creates unity in all consciousness and which, noetically and noematically, constitutes unity of objective sense and avoids the chaos of the flux of intentional synthesis. The impossibility of the objective thought in the strict sense comes as a possibility to apprehend the reality in its essentiality, in other words, the reality as a flux; as it is essentially. Although, the unity of consciousness is important as an essential moment of the process itself.

The Ego creates ideal types in order to build a unity of consciousness. Such ideal types come into being due to the immanent conception of time, to wit, our determination of past, present, and future. Now, through the process of epoché, we develop a transcendental phenomenology which shows the meaning more. Each type brought out, by these clues, is to be asked about its noetic-noematic structure, (Husserl 1973, §21, 87) is to be systematically explicated and established in respect of those modes of intentional flux that pertain to it. The ideal types are essential to build an infinite regulative ideal (Husserl
1973, §22, 90), avoiding a chaos in the process of constitution. The transcendental reduction will enable its infinity process which precludes its inexorability and inflexibility.

In spite of a constant process of reduction, abiding convictions can remain as it is obvious. Such volitions, acceptances, believe and so on, develop a particularization of the Ego itself, which Husserl calls personal character (Husserl 1973, §32, 101). Nevertheless, the attitude of openness, to the possibilities brought by the epoché, lived by our immanent consciousness of time, forming its ideal types (noematic) together with its implicit flux, develop also our personal character. Thus, our personal character is constituted by our very attitude toward the process itself; may be an attitude of openness, or a natural attitude. So, every Ego has his own particular constitution (Husserl 1973, §41, 117), forming a concrete Ego. The concrete Ego includes also the whole of actual and potential conscious life; it includes all constitutional problems without exception.

Husserl has shown the implication represented by a transcendental subjectivity in relation to the stream of conscience (the immanent consciousness of time), the genesis process between passive and active constitutions (passive synthesis), the constituted and the constituting dynamism of consciousness (noetic/noematic), and the horizontality of the world itself with its constancy and claims (the original world). Such implications are involved in a transcendental subjectivity by its intentionality. In this way, the intentionality embraces the intentionality of the world (objects) and the intentionality of consciousness in which a unity is performed constantly. But, going further, what about the other Egos? They are like us, no more or less special than us. Thus, in the process of reduction (epoché), how cannot we forget the others and, inevitable, fall in a transcendental solipsism? How the other is implicated in the transcendental subjectivity? Husserl draws the conclusions that transcendental subjectivity is transcendental intersubjectivity. Let us see it in detail.
6. Transcendental subjectivity as a transcendental intersubjectivity against solipsism

There is a thereness-for-me (für-mich-da) of others, and, accordingly, as the theme of a transcendental theory of experiencing someone else, a transcendental theory of so-called empathy (Husserl 1975, §43, 124). This theory contributes to the founding of a transcendental theory of the objective world due to a thereness-for-everyone (Für-jedermann-da). Husserl mentions the spiritual objects (books, tools, works of any kind, and so forth), which are elaborated by a cultural community, being there for everyone, whereby everyone belonging to the corresponding cultural community.

In experience, we experience something that is not us, like the world, the objects and other in its mode of givenness. Notwithstanding, such modes of givenness are implicated in our concrete Ego (Husserl 1973, §48, 136). In spite of the transcendental Ego being the endower of meaning, it is not arrested in a transcendental solipsism. The static analysis (thematised, the constituted) is confronted with the flux genesis of the world, the other, and of our consciousness (the thematising, the constituting). Under these circumstances, the solipsistic Ego is split in its concreteness by the very temporal flux. This means that the other, the world, and the objects are included/implicated in the sphere of our ownness. Now, the surrounding world is just constituted/constituting together with others. Thus, a transcendental subjectivity can be only conceived as transcendental intersubjectivity, in other words, the objects, the others, the world, and even ourselves are only understood intersubjectively.

What is excluded from our Ego (Husserl 1973, §49, 137), to wit, what is not our Ego, is included, implicated transcendentally. Despite the fact that we have our own originality as Egos, such Egos live in a kind of harmony (Husserl 1973, §49, 138) with the world due to the fact that there is a thereness for everyone in it. Thus, the noetic/noematic constitution process carries with it the sense of harmony and transformation. We, as original Egos, live in a community of
Egos harmonically. The process of experiencing the other, lacks the access in relation to its originality which is peculiar of each one. The disclosure of the other will just be possible through *appresentation* (Husserl 1973, §50, 139), whereby my relation with other reveals its openness. This appresentation will go beyond the manifestation of the physical body, done as an object, but as a lived body which motivated us differently, in a deep and more challenged way, bringing a diversity of new possibility to our concrete Ego.

The *alter Ego* is presented as accessible of what is not originally accessible (Husserl 1973, §53, 144). Here, Husserl is trying to avoid any identification between us and the other, instead, he tries to reveal a kind of *association*, analogy which motivates the sphere of our ownness. This motivation is done due to the appresentation of the other, whereby it is seen as accessible, because it is in front of me, already there to be analysed, but at same time, it is inaccessible, because of his/her own originality. The other cannot be seen as a duplicate of us, but, we can objectively conceive that we can do what the other Ego can, and, also, we can be at the place of the other if we want. In Husserl’s words, our *Ego* is constituted as *Here* (in relation to our psychophysical body) and the other as *There* (in relation to his/her psychophysical body). Thus, we are able to transfer every *There* into a *Here* (Husserl 1973, §53, 146), but we are not able to uncover its originality, its temporal flux structure. Therefore, we draw the conclusion that, in spite of our objectification characteristic, we are not able to grasp the temporal flux. This means that an original presence will be always ungraspable, although, by perception, it is lived by our transcendental subjectivity.

What is primordially incompatible, in simultaneous coexistence, becomes compatible: because our primordial Ego constitutes the Ego who is other for us by an appresentative apperception, which, according to its intrinsic nature, never demands and never is open to fulfilment by presentation (Husserl 1973, §54, 147). It is impossible a transcendental solipsism, because of two basic factors: the surrounding world and the other. The surrounding-world, due to the fact that it is already there in advance, sustaining our cogitations, the other,
by breaking our pretention of objectifications. The accessibility/inaccessibility of the other allows a challenge for the openness of our consciousness. The world is given to us and to everyone only as a cultural world, and as having the sense: accessible to everyone (Husserl 1973, § 58, 160). Such world for everyone has an ontological, a priori structure, which is natural, psychophysical, social and cultural (Husserl 1975, §59, 164).

Despite the fact that the transcendental subjectivity endows meaning, such meaning is constituted in a togetherness of monads (community of Egos) in relation to a common world. For Husserl, it is inconceivable (Husserl 1973, § 60, 167-168) to create a second world, instead, even our fantasies are related to the original world, whereby all senses are based. Therefore, the psychology cannot lose its implication with the world, and with the other, because it would be closed into a solipsistic noematic objectivity. Husserl draws the conclusion that phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense that this world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing.

7. What does Buber not want to lose that Husserl does lose?

The answer to this question starts with the immediacy of relation in Buber. We are not saying that Husserl does not have the sense of immediacy between what confronts us in experience. In Husserl, the originality of the other, the world, and the Ego fetches givenness, which comes before any objectification whatsoever. Notwithstanding, Buber conceives to this immediacy of relation an innate character. In this sense, we have a kind of longing for relation which inhabits us inwardly. Consequently, for Buber, we have a respondent spirit due to the fact of our encounter with the You. As the You conveys us the directness of love, it also follows that it produces acts of responsibility towards others. Buber does not want to lose the very nature of the encounter itself that is inexplicable in its content, but is effective in its nature.

Buber is aware of the antinomies in dealing with relationships, specially, about the inevitability of transforming
the You into an It. In Husserl, we can also find an ambiguity between the noetic/noematic process of constitution. For both authors, such paradox becomes actualized in the present, as a constant flux of the process itself. The difference is on the conception of intersubjective relationship. For Husserl, the other is implicated, as alter Ego, in our own process of constitution. In contrast with Husserl, for Buber, the You is already in us, it is innate and it is developed by my response toward it. For both philosophers, our attitude toward the other will demonstrate the open or close development of our reflection, and the character of our relationship. Thus, for Buber, the other is not implicated, but is intrinsic in us and will appear accordingly of an attitude of treating the other as a You or as a It. Under these circumstances, Buber is not concerned with intentionality, because the Ego is not the only responsible for endowing meaning, but the meaning comes through an actualization of the present in a respondent way based on the encounter itself.

In Buber, we have a what happens in the encounter which give us a creative power against all objectivity. Such creativity conveys freedom to our fate in order to have a relationship based on saying the word You. In saying You, our language becomes action toward other through a creative process, whereby the creativity is understood as effective power that emerges the directness of love as an actualization and potentialization, transforming the It-world in a You-world. As Husserl works on the process of constitution, we miss a practical ethical orientation, because it lacks such a respondent character which fosters acts of responsibility. We are able to say that, for Husserl, actualization works, basically, on the process of constitution, while for Buber, the actualization has also an ethical meaning, when we actualized the content of the encounter itself, giving meaning to our fate.

To maximize the word You, Buber brings the idea of the Eternal You, whereby we do not have antinomies like we have in our relation to one another, because the Eternal You cannot be transformed into a It. This Eternal You propitiates a longing for such relation that we can have in contemplation (prayer) which has the potentialization to give a divine meaning for
everything, including a divine meaning in our relationship to one another. Thus, our encounter to one another is based on our encounter with the Eternal You. For Husserl, our conception of God cannot change the process of constitution itself, in other words, even God would not escape from the noetic/noematic structure.

We draw the conclusion that in Buber there is a way to escape from experience through the nature of the encounter, while, from Husserl, there is not such possibility, because everything that affects us pass through experience.

8. What does Waldenfels not want to lose?

Waldenfels does not want to lose the integrity of the event itself. The event that happens to us is responsive, opening new possibilities due to its characteristic of pushing us to the threshold zones. The responsive event is not something that starts in our consciousness and it is controlled by it, but comes as a possibility to the consciousness. That means that a gap emerges from the established order that can even change the established order just because it is full of possibilities. To whom something happens is not a matter of choice, but my attitude toward what happens makes all the difference in my relation to the other. Waldenfels keeps the concept of a respondent spirit from Buber, but not the presupposed innate idea of it. Therefore, Waldenfels preserves the originality of the flux in the world, in consciousness and in other consciousness. There is a presupposed meaning (tradition, thereeness for everyone, a cultural world, and so on), but not determinative in the sense of innateness nature or an intentional constitution. Different from Husserl, Waldenfels will maintain the meaning as closed/opened, in other words, the meaning is not just a possession, instead, it is a share. The endower of meaning, as a last word of the subject, does not contemplate the integrality of the event itself, where something happens. As Waldenfels says:

Throughout this happening something becomes visible, audible, sensible, in such a way that it comes to our mind, strikes us, attracts or repels us an withdraws from our knowing and willing, without
been ascribed to a subject who would function as the author or bearer of acts and actions. (Waldenfels 2007, 45)

At the moment of what happens (Widerfahrnis) (Waldenfels 2007, 48), Waldenfels explores an intermediary realm (Zwischenreich) to try to understand how something happens between us that can neither be reached by summarizing, nor by unifying perspectives, but intermediary events (Zwischenereignisse) that always come from elsewhere, making it impossible for us to determine the position of a first or last event. We can call the what happens the possible/impossible event, or simply the responsive event. Waldenfels puts it in these words: “[…] as a lived impossibility, im-possible measured on the possibilities which are available for me, for you and for us altogether (Waldenfels 2007, 49)”. This deviation, caused by the event itself, raises a responsive movement toward us, bringing all the possible/impossible experiences that happen between us. The nature of the event that happens between us can make all the difference in our relationships, and also in our concrete Ego. Our objectifications can be put down, and push our pre-conceptions to the threshold, where new possibilities can emerge. When different people (different ideas, projects, believes, social classes, and so forth) come together, it is not because they have a universal ideal of unity innately, or one of them resolves, intentionally, to come closer, but it happened because the threshold zones that once divided them, now come as a possibility of mutual sharing.

The responsive event makes a split (Waldenfels 2007, 75-81) in the self. We are affected (pathos), stimulated, surprised, violated in our static Ego. The response appears whether we want or not, just because it depends neither on our knowing, nor on our willing, but depends on our body that comports the event of what happens as a whole. The event of what happens between us is marked in a responsive way deal to its indetermination, incapability of imprisonment, that just happens to our body to whom our consciousness belongs and to whom it finds its concealment, its hideout. The event doesn’t make only a split in the self, it makes a double (Waldenfels 2007, 81-85) in the self, characterized by the alter ego to whom we will be constituted. Therefore, in the event of what happens
between us, we perceive ourselves from elsewhere, so that the first and last word don’t belong to us, because even our constitution isn’t ours.

We see ourselves through the others’ eyes, and this means that we are interlaced with others. The event does not belong to our consciousness, but to our body, for the body is always there before everything, and what affects, affects first of all the body – the zero point. The incorporeity implies that the own and the alien are entangled. Waldenfels says: “There are no ready-made individuals; rather there is only a process of individualization which presupposes certain anonymity and typically of our bodily self. What we feel, perceive, do or say is interwoven with what others feel, perceive, do or say.” (Waldenfels 2007, 84) We are not the owner of our own house, the responsive movement bears to im-possible (possible/impossible) experience that makes profound scars in what we truly are. As Buber does not have the concept of a body, as an essential character of experience, he could conceive an encounter outside experience. Therefore, for Husserl and Waldenfels, the experience is inseparable from the lived body, and we are orientated toward it.

We draw the conclusion, that, in Waldenfels, the meaning is shared in the very process of constitution itself, instead of just being implicated; and that, in Waldenfels, we respond to others and the world demands, which comes as an original event, instead of responding to an innate demand in us. For Waldenfels, like Buber, what once was excluded, now can be included, because we are confronted with the thresholds zones, whereby our pretentions are broken to give space to new possibilities; this is in the very center of what Waldenfels does not want to lose from the contribution of Buber’s thought. For Waldenfels, like Husserl, the flux of time prevents any attempt of objectification whatsoever, and according to Waldenfels, like Buber and Husserl, the time expresses itself in the actualization of present, raising potentialization to the constitution of personality, tracing meaning, which is done intersubjectively, being it implicated in Husserl, shared in Waldenfels, and divinely giving in Buber.
NOTES

1 Much of the work of the Frankfurt School was just a trying of clarification of the intricacies that the reason used to dominate and exploit the man himself and the nature. See Wiggerhaus, Rolf. The Frankfurt School: its history, theories, and political significance. Trans. by Micheal Robertson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1994, pp. 597-609.

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