A Critique of Metaphysical Logical Realism

Abstract

This paper disagrees with Michaela McSweeney over metaphysical logical realism. Using the method of critical analysis, it compares the metaphysical ideas in McSweeney’s metaphysical logical realism with the standard ideas of metaphysical realism in metaphysics to underscore the extent to which McSweeney’s metaphysical logical realism deviates from metaphysical realism. The paper argues that making an imaginary mind-and-language-independent world the truthmaker of a supposed one-true-logic is a categorical mistake that gives rise to what is called the Independent-Dependent paradox. The paper submits that the independent-dependent paradox is avoidable by a recourse to logical pluralism, which better handles the description of reality as a system of complex multiples rather than a single whole. Hence, logical relativity rather than the absolutism of logic appears more tenable for logic as a descriptive tool.

Keywords: One-true-logic, Logical monism, Metaphysical logical realism, Mind-and-language-independence, Logical pluralism