Principles, Models, and Representations of the Social Order

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the hypothesis according to which, having a great importance in the history of mankind, social order is characterized by peaceful coexistence rather than violence, by predictability rather than hazard, and by cooperation rather than isolation. The aim of the study is to underline that, in practice, all these features could not ensure the desirable social order which, on its turn, has to be linked with good and justice. Among the various models of social order analyzed by political philosophy and political theory, we have settled on the one that takes into account the way in which social order is experienced by individuals. Thus, individuals acquire different representations of social order. In everyday life, people use different cognitive and conceptual schemes for explaining and justifying social order and the features of social relationships. Our thesis is that, for having a better understanding of both the individuals' behavior and ideals, it is important to identify and analyze the intellectual origins related to the models of social order. In this respect, we present several liberal philosophical perspectives related to Hobbes and Locke's works. Moreover, we correlate this approach with other important philosophical directions, theorized in the sphere of conservative, libertarian and communitarian political philosophy. In accordance with these normative perspectives, the paper highlights the nexus between political philosophy and psychology in shaping different patterns of political representations related with social order.

Keywords: Communitarianism, Conservatism, justice, Liberalism, Libertarianism, social order, social representation

I.

Maintaining the social order involves the organization of society in a way that violence is kept under control and peace

ensured (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, xi). For the existence of social order this could be seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition. As a matter of fact, we can imagine a world in which people are organized in such a way that violence is impossible and social order is still lacking. For example, we can imagine a place where there is a robust conviction that any individual' violent action against others will bring enormous harm to all, and where an invented mechanism is attached, without exception, at birth to everyone. Despite the context, this mechanism couldn't be eliminated, being useful for inhibiting aggression. Due to such mechanism, at the slightest signs of aggression, an inhibitor is triggered, avoiding the expansion of the violent action. Therefore, in such a world peace would prevail.

Continuing our imaginary scenario, anyone can do any kind of action, except those which imply physical aggression. In such a world there are no other moral norms or procedures that indicate desirable social actions, or other penal institutions. The mechanism guarantees only nonviolence. It won't be possible to anticipate the behaviors of others. Therefore, life will be totally unpredictable and it will be impossible for people to work together. However, this mechanism could encourage different actions that could disturb, upset, or offend. Under the circumstance that violence is prohibited and there are neither rules nor instances for limiting behaviors and associations, a complete exposure of each individual to everyone's whims would arise. In this kind of scenario, where everything can happen at any time, except violence, the disorder becomes obvious. It would be a chaotic world. Thus, one could observe that the lack of violence doesn't necessarily conduct to social order. In this respect, it becomes obvious the absence of two elementary dimensions which are strongly related to social order: reasonableness/cooperation and regularity/ predictability (Elster 1992).

It is reductionist to correlate social order only with the control of violence. Social order could be seen in terms of arrangements, institutions, practices, and functional rules that make social life predictable (Dellavalle 2021, 4). This kind of social order facilitates cooperation and coordination of different social activities (Hechter & Horne, 2003a). "The regularity,

repetition, and predictability of everyday social life are constitutive of social order, at both macro and micro levels." (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2015, 1) Social order refers to the complex social world in which there are functional and respected rules. This social world is characterized by peaceful coexistence rather than violence, predictability rather than hazard, and cooperation rather than isolation.

All these features couldn't ensure the desirability of the social order. Using our imaginative function once again, we can imagine a totalitarian society, where the opponents of political establishment have disappeared, and the monist political ideology has been accepted and internalized by everyone. In this kind of society violence is controlled and used only by the police, in specific and special conditions. Also, in this society there are respected rules that make life predictable down to the last detail. Individuals are placed in a complete and continuous framework of surveillance. Individuals have to coordinate their actions and cooperate in simple and complex actions, performing tasks that involve collaboration. Nevertheless, the hyper-order met in this kind of totalitarian society is incompatible with human dignity, freedom, and moral traditions. As a result, this is a dysfunctional social order that makes the decent and good life impossible.

When we take social order into consideration, we have to deal with ethical issues (Dellavalle 2021, 4-5). In this context, political philosophy is relevant for analyzing the social order's ethical dimension. Political philosophy is the field that takes into account this component of the social order. Political philosophy, interested in the study of good life and society (Strauss 1988), seeks answers to questions such as: why should exist political authority; what should be the principles of organizing the right community; what is the referential model for governing the community. In correlation with these normative questions, political philosophy could be defined, as David Miller pointed out (2003), as "an investigation into the nature, causes, and effects of good and bad government" (2). Thus, the government could represent "the whole body of rules, practices, and institutions under whose guidance we live together in societies" (Miller 2003, 4). In trying to find the best formula for good governance,

political philosophy suggests or constructs different normative models of the social order.

Social order is also experienced under circumstances in which individuals have various mental representations of the society. In everyday life, people use different conceptual frameworks for explaining both social order and the features of social relationships. To obtain a better understanding of both citizens' behavior and the nature of their social ideals it is quite important to identify the philosophical perspectives related to social order.

II.

In the 17th century, in the field of political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes theorized the problem of social order (Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2015, 2; Inglis 2006, 110). This can be reduced to the following question: how is it possible for individuals to live together, to create and maintain functional societies? (Udehn 1996, 347; Hechter and Horne 2003a). Hobbes' classical answer in the field of social theory emphasized the primordial role played by the state: social order is ensured by the sovereign political power (Hechter and Horne 2003b, 159-160). Hobbes (2003) pointed out that individuals have both rationality, which could be used correctly (32-35), and numerous desires. Among these desires, there stands a continuous and constant need to obtain as much power as possible (Hobbes 2003, 70). The skills represent the egalitarian condition of the individuals. The interaction between individual skills and limited resources creates premises for the conflicts (Hobbes 2003, 87). Hobbes (2003) described in negative terms the condition of man in the state of nature (86-90). In the absence of the institutional framework, the man lives in insolation and deprivation, having a brutal, ugly, and short life, permanently being exposed to the generalized war (Hobbes 2003, 89). Being defined by the fear of death and wishing prosperity and peace, the rational individual aims to transcend this state – the state of nature is characterized by the lack of justice or injustice, rightness or wrongness, law or property (Hobbes 2003, 90). Hobbes (2003) incorporated the natural percepts in the rule: treat others as you would like to be treated (109). In the absence of the

authority, able to enforce principles and to punish those who violate them, all the natural percepts could remain only simple words – no one respects them because they contradict both the passions and the necessary prudence (Hobbes 2003, 117). In this respect, it is necessary to create the civic community, to establish the sovereign power through a contract/agreement among each with each other, so that all individuals yield to public authority and secure protection from everyone (Hobbes 2003, 120-121). Only then could the natural percepts become laws (Hobbes 2003, 185). Civil laws, seen in terms of compulsory rules, make social life possible. Also, these rules help us to distinguish between justice and injustice, correct or incorrect, proper or improper, permitted or forbidden (Hobbes 2003, 183). The rules ensure peaceful coexistence, the predictability of social life, and human collaboration.

Staring from both the helpless condition of the man in the natural state and its deep desire to preserve life, Hobbes demonstrated the importance and necessity of ensuring the social order. Hobbes (2003) considered that political structure and governance protect people from themselves – the biggest deficiencies that could appear in the civic community are insignificant in comparison with the terrible horrors that the civil war entails when the center of power and the rules imposed by it have been dissipated (128). Moreover, Hobbes (2003) emphasized that through the civic agreement each citizen becomes the author of the established power's actions, thus no one can accuse the sovereign of being unjust or, in other words, of inflicting any kind of prejudice upon the citizen (124).

Therefore, according to Hobbes' philosophical perspective, civil laws, ensured by the sovereign, couldn't be unjust. But what exactly makes them good? Hobbes (2003) stressed that a law, in order to be good, has to be necessary, clear, and conceived in the benefit of people and, of course, to be able to achieve its purpose (239-240). The purpose of the law is not to make freedom impossible, the aim is to protect people from the harm they can do themselves, to keep individuals in the field of peaceful coexistence (Hobbes 2003, 239-240). The aim of the law is not related to the control of the whole life. Laws that are not necessary are considered by Hobbes only "trapps for mony" (240).

Hobbes emphasizes that the sovereign will ensure the goodness of laws. However, in case of failure, how could we relate ourselves to political power and social order? Most part of political scholars interested in the field of human rights protection and mechanisms of controlling and limiting political power considered that Hobbes does not have a satisfactory answer to these kinds of questions.

Despite the critics, liberal political philosophy received a strong boost through the individualist-constructivist approach of social order developed by Thomas Hobbes. However, the perspective developed by John Locke in his treatises on governance should be considered a crucial point in the evolution of the liberal normative theory related to social order. Locke described clearly the features of social order that are acceptable to all individuals.

Like Hobbes, John Locke starts its approach from the individual. More exactly, he starts his approach from the hypothetical state in which the individual would naturally be, without any kind of political organization. Locke (2016) thinks that in the condition of nature, people are rational, independent, and in a perfect state of equality and freedom (4-5, &4-6). Even in such deinstitutionalized hypostases, the individual knows, using rationality, that he couldn't negatively affect others' life, freedom, or wealth. Also, the individual knows that he could punish anyone who does those things, as well as the fact that he could be penalized if he deviates from what is right (Locke 2016, 6, &7-8). Locke (2016) showed that this is a natural law, the one that "willeth the Peace and *Preservation of all Mankind"* (6, &7). In the natural state, everyone could use the natural law (8, &12-13). The man has "by Nature a Power, not only to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty, and Estate, against the Injuries and Attempts of other Men; but to judge of, and punish the Breaches of that Law in others" (Locke 2016, 43, &87). People are in the condition of nature when they live together, according to reason, without a superior authority, commonly recognized, able to judge and impose rules among them (Locke, 2016, 11-12, &19). Although this fact is less emphasized in the academic literature, Locke stresses the fact that living together is an expression of natural sociability (McCann 2004, 2-3).

Despite the theoretical perspective developed by Hobbes, Locke (2016) argued that living together with others is an expression of a special human call to sociability, of some innate endowments that the individual possesses (39-40, &77).

However, when explaining the emergence of social order, Locke will also incorporate the theory of conflict. It is inevitable to have disagreements among people. When some individuals, having different reasons, resort to force and attempt to subjugate others, their action leads to a state of war. "Want of a common Judge with Authority, puts all Men in a state of Nature: Force without Right, upon a Man's Person, makes a state of War" (Locke 2016, 12, &19).

In this context, it is used the contractual scenario. Thus, as Locke (2016) pointed out, in order to avoid war (12-13, &21), in order to attain a comfortable, secure, and peaceful life alongside others (49, &95), for preserving life, freedom and property (63, &124) - the state of nature is characterized by the lack of the "*establish'd*, settled, known *Law*, received and allowed by common Consent to be the Standard of right and wrong, and the common Measure to decide all Controversies between them (...); a known and indifferent judge (...) [and the] *Power* to back and support the Sentence when right, and to *give* it due *Execution"* (63, &124-126) - using consensus, individuals agree to create a civil society (49, &96). "Wherever therefore any number of Men are so united into one Society, as to quit every one his executive power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a *political, or civil Society"* (Locke 2016, 45, &89).

Rational individuals, with rights and awareness of those rights, agree to create a political society for better protection of their rights than in the state of nature. The power will be illegitimate if it is used to violate the natural individual rights as it will be used against its basic purpose for which the political body was established (Locke 2016, 63, &123-124; 65, &131). Natural individual rights are the mandatory reference, preceding both the political authority and the body.

When the power is concentrated, as in the manner of political absolutism, it gives rise to the dictatorship of the ruler's whims. Locke (2016) considered that the situation characterized

by the discretionary power of absolutism could not be considered a society: "absolute Monarchy (...) is indeed inconsistent with civil Society, and so can be no form of Civil-Government at all" (45, &90). For a better protection of the natural human rights, individuals have to leave the state of nature. However, the existence of unlimited and arbitrary power is a much greater threat to freedom, life, and property than the state of nature (Locke 2016, 45-46, &91; 69-70 &137). In accordance with this perspective, the order based on discretionary power is even inferior to anarchy. It is a serious error of reasoning to think that individuals agree to be governed no matter how, just not to (re)fall into the state of nature: "this is to think, that Men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what Mischiefs may be done them by *Pole-Cats*, or *Foxes*; but are content, nay think it Safety, to be devoured by *Lions*" (47, &93).

Both, the emergence and the continuity of the society can be justified as long as they provide individuals with a better state than that found in the state of nature. In order to be functional and a better alternative to subjectivism, which is specific to the pre-political state, social order has to be based on universal and mandatory rules. The rule of law has to substitute the subjectivism. In this respect, "all private Judgment of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties" (Locke 2016, 44, &87).

The simple presence of a single center of power couldn't ensure a superior order in comparison to the state of nature. When creating the political body, rational individuals want to obtain a good society based on "enjoyment of their Properties in Peace and Safety" (Locke 2016, 67, &134). Locke (2016) underlined the fact that discretionary power is inadmissible in this kind of society (67, &135). The power, which has to remain under the guardianship of natural law (Locke 2016, 68, &135), is compelled "to dispense Justice and decide the Rights of the Subject by promulgated standing Laws, and known Authoris'd Judges" (Locke 2016, 68-69, &136). In this context, it is forbidden to appropriate any part of the individual's property (Locke 2016, 70, &138). "Absolute Arbitrary Power, or governing without *settled standing Laws*, can neither of them consist with the ends

of Society and Government, which Men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes; and by *stated Rules* of Right and Property to secure their Peace and Quiet" (Locke 2016, 69, &137). Therefore, according to John Locke's perspective, social order constructed by the assembly of individuals should be seen as a peaceful coexistence framework based on the institutionalization of the natural law. In this context, disputes are solved using impartial mechanisms and rules. Moreover, in this respect political power is limited and controlled through different procedures that ensure collaboration and guarantee the preservation of life, freedom, and individual property.

In time, the model of liberal order will take different forms. Using the individualist scenario, based on the rationalist and contractualist perspective, several theorists underlined the importance of natural rights, while others emphasized the importance of social justice desideratum. For some, a good society would be a society based on natural rights and free market. A free market could be seen in terms of the regulatory mechanism, able to ensure (almost) all the necessary tools. For others, the good society is seen as a space of cooperation, with mutual benefits and characterized by social equity. In such a space, political power is neutral, has no cultural attachments that could promote or oppress different perspectives of the world. Moreover, we can include in our theoretical approach the scholars who emphasized the principles of the liberal social order without the constructivist-rationalist scenario.

In the first category, we included the libertarian perspective, based on the natural rights theorized by Locke: life, freedom, and property. Natural rights must be universally respected and the violations of them must be punished. However, there are significant differences regarding the way in which libertarians theorize the solution for protecting natural rights. Some authors think that the free market is a universal key for protecting natural rights. Thus, individuals could create and maintain the social order through economic agreements without the state's institutional design. Other theorists underline the importance and the necessity of the minimal state.

Murray Rothbard can be considered as relevant for the first libertarian perspective. According to this perspective, any state organization is an unacceptable affront to human rights. Rothbard (1998) stressed the fact that there is a universal and eternal human nature from which derives the natural right, the one that must be the source of the norms which are engaged in coordinating human actions (17). Rothbard (1998) argued that Locke created the first systematic presentation of individual natural rights (21). These natural rights should remain the main source for any social organization. Society is seen as a necessary tool given the fact that in isolation individual faces scarcity or the absence of the necessary goods for survival. In the absence of society, the individual is absolutely free, but rather free to die of starvation (Rothbard 2009, 654). For Rothbard (1998; 2009), a good society is a place where people are organized using the full respect for natural rights and where individuals can enjoy the benefits of mutual cooperation. These rights are reduced, as in Locke's theory, to the right of property - individual ownership of oneself and the results of his work. This is the free society, a society based on free individuals (Rothbard 2009, 182), a society characterized by the fact that "each individual is sovereign over his own person and property" (Rothbard 2009, 630). This is characterized by voluntary interpersonal relationships and peaceful cooperation (Rothbard 1998, 45). Rothbard (2009) argued that mutual interactions generate a free market that is able to preserve the social order of freedom (90-91; 1024). "The regime of pure liberty - the libertarian society - may be described as a society where no ownership titles are <<distributed>>, where, in short, no man's property in his person or in tangibles is molested, violated, or interfered with by anyone else. (...) Being in a society of voluntary exchanges, each man can enjoy absolute liberty not in Crusoe-like isolation, but in a milieu of civilization, harmony, sociability, and enormously greater productivity through exchanges of property with his fellow men" (Rothbard 1998, 41). The free society is the free market society (Rothbard 2009, 654; 1047). Rothbard (2009) underlined that the free market is in accordance with freedom and generates order, efficiency, prosperity and harmony; instead, coercion and governmental interventions spoil them (1025).

The main question is: how could be preserved human rights and social order in a free society, based on a free market? Due to the fact that political entities impose involuntary taxes, they are seen as coercive and intrusive in the field of individual property. "Defense in the free society (including such defense services to person and property as police protection and judicial findings) would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who (a) gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion and (b) did not – as the State does – arrogate to themselves a compulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection" (Rothbard 2009, 1048). Concerning the fact that economic actors could offer both defense and legal services, Rothbard has seen them in terms of other economic actors, relevant in the field of the free market. The classical arguments based on *laissez-faire* and the guardian role of the state are not convincing for Rothbard (2009, 1049-1051). Using historical examples, Rothbard (2009) argued that the competitive legal protection system, as it is produced by the free market, would be fully operational (1051-1056). For Rothbard (2009) any form of state construction is considered to be aggressive. The state will inevitably use coercion against those who do nothing for justifying it as well, so this form of political organization is considered to be immoral (Rothbard 2009, 1306). Instead, the defense provided within the free market and not outside of it protects us from the state's aggression (Rothbard 2009, 1314).

Like Rothbard, Robert Nozick (1999) is convinced, on one hand, that all individuals are born with rights, an aspect that has to be respected, and, on the other hand, that Locke's scenario based on the state of nature remains relevant for understanding the social organization. Unlike Rothbard, Nozick (1999) argued that "a state would arise from anarchy (as represented by Locke's state of nature) even though no one intended this or tried to bring it about, by a process which need not violate anyone's rights" (xi). In this respect, it is supposed that individuals could create associations to maximize their own protection within the hypothetical state of nature (Nozick 1999, 12-15). In the first phase, multiple associations for human rights protection will be established (Nozick 1999, 12-15). Then, the protection agencies will associate so that "an

ultraminimal state will occur by an invisible-hand process" (Nozick 1999, 52). This kind of state protects only individuals who pay for protection. This ultraminimal state has the monopoly of using force for protecting and guarantying individual's rights and agreements, but, in contrast to the classical liberal approach, this kind of state offers the services of protection/punishment only for individuals who pay the required taxes (Nozick 1999, 26-27). For Nozick this is unacceptable. "It would be morally impermissible for persons to maintain the monopoly in the ultraminimal state without providing protective services for all, even if this requires specific <<redistribution>>. The operators of the ultraminimal state are morally obligated to produce the minimal state" (Nozick 1999, 52).

Therefore, Rober Nozick (1999) considered that the state construction has to stop here. What is beyond the minimal state is considered to be immoral because it violates human rights and dignity and uses people as means for reaching various goals despite their will. The minimal state should defend the right social order, characterized by respect for individual rights. It's compulsory to acquire and preserve justice in the field of property. If someone had obtained a property, respecting others' rights and will, he is legitimated to have it. The right society is one in which the methods of ownership functioned correctly. In this respect, property could be obtained through direct acquisition or transfer (Nozick 1999, 150-153). "The general outlines of the theory of justice in holdings are that the holdings of a person are just if he is entitled to them by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer (…) If each person's holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just" (Nozick 1999, 153). Thus, the model of social order developed by Nozick could be expressed in these terms: "from each according to what he chooses to do, to each according to what he makes for himself (perhaps with the contracted aid of others) and what others choose to do for him and choose to give him of what they've been given previously (under this maxim) and haven't yet expended or transferred" (Nozick 1999, 160). This approach included the principles of the free market (Olsaretti 2004, 89-95). On one hand, the minimal state does not have the legitimacy and

resources for economic intervention. On the other hand, individual rights conduct us to free market, as a mechanism of regulating human interactions and preserving social order. Therefore, this kind of society is desirable and right: "people want their society to be and to look just" (Nozick 1999, 158).

Other liberal perspectives emphasized the role played by social justice. For Rawls (1993), social justice should be "a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next" (14), which involve not only the idea of free and equal individuals, but also the idea of a well-ordered society. Rawls' philosophical perspective emphasized the principle of "a well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated by a public political conception of justice" (Rawls 1993, 35). In order to preserve human freedom and equality, and to be in accordance with the irreducible pluralist perspectives, the consensus is very important. In *Political Liberalism*, Rawls (1993) theorized the overlapping consensus mechanism. In this regard, we can adopt the principles of justice: "a) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society" (Rawls 1993, 291).

A well-ordered society "is a society in which everyone accepts and knows that everyone else accepts the very same principles of justice" (Rawls 1993, 35), respecting in the same time the institutions shaped in accordance with those principles. At the same time, a society is well-ordered when "its basic structure – that is, its main political and social institution and how they fit together as one system of cooperation – is publicly known (…) to satisfy these principles" (Rawls 1993, 35). Not least, in a well-ordered society "its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice and so they generally comply with society's basic institutions, which they regard as just" (Rawls 1993, 35). For free and equal citizens, the ideal society could be seen as a space for developing opportunities and advantages, not only as a framework for regulated competitions. The current

inequalities must be corrected or managed in such a way that they result in benefits for most disadvantaged individuals. Using the principles of justice, this kind of order should preserve social fairness. In order to have a good social order it is not enough to have rules that maintain a predictable and peaceful life. It is mandatory for the peace obtained to be advantageous for everyone (Dellavalle 2021, 4).

Rawls (1993) argued that it is inevitable to have pluralist perspectives regarding life in the contemporary democratic world. Taking into account these differences, if someone tries to unify society using a comprehensive ideology, "the fact of oppression" would be inevitable (Rawls 1993, 37). In order to avoid oppression, the public conception related to justice has to be only political, without any moral or metaphysical foundations (Rawls 1993, 38-39). "Social unity is based on a consensus on the political conception" (Rawls 1993, 134). The consensus shouldn't be based on imposing the specific vision of any particular comprehensive doctrine, it will appear by overlapping different public agreements related to justice for citizens with multiple and reasonable moral beliefs (Rawls, 1993).

Using other tools than Rawls' approach, Bruce Ackerman (1980) argued that social order could be explained by the dialogical model, centered on the need for public reasoning of the positions of power. "The liberal ideal is a social order in which *free* people act within a *just* power structure" (Ackerman 1980, 376). Social order, channels, and the holders of power are legitimated by rational dialogue. For a liberal social order, Ackerman (1980) considers that is more useful to discuss the legitimacy of the positions of power than the classical approach of natural rights postulation (6). But this discussion cannot take place under any conditions. It must be managed in such a way that no one is oppressed for asking questions; it must be logically consistent and morally neutralized, so that no one could invoke moral superiority as a discussion argument (Ackerman 1980, 4-11). Ackerman (1980) considers that this kind of dialogue will generate "a harmonious vision of social order" (231). This kind of dialogue will ensure the legitimacy of the liberal society (Ackerman 1980, 354-355).

There are multiple critical reactions against the liberal constructivist perspectives of the social order. The conservative reactions are the most known. For conservatives the social order pre-exists the individual. Thus, individuals will have the feeling of belonging to society. Therefore, most part of the individuals will aim to preserve social order (Scruton 1990, 21). Both social relationships and cohesion are more inherited than contractually created (Scruton 1990, 44-45). Despite the "illness" episodes or several malfunctions, social order is preserved and transferred between generations (Scruton 1990). Social order is what makes possible sociability, agreements, or promises among individuals (Scruton 1990, 30). In the conservative political philosophy, social and political good is validated by experience (Iliescu 2008). Tradition could be seen as a recovery tool for disturbed social order, within which are crystalized both the perspectives upon public good and legitimate public actions (Scruton 1990, 36). Tradition refers to those social practices that (a) had success in history (during time), (b) gained trust, using a credible perspective not only about what it is but also about what should be, and (c) endured over time (Scruton 1990, 42). At the same time, "society exists through authority, and the recognition of this authority requires the allegiance to a bond that is not contractual but transcendent, in the manner of the family tie" (Scruton 1990, 45).

One of the strongest sources of authority is represented by the moral order. In the moral sphere we can find the narration that gives meaning to life and creates community cohesion. MacIntyre (2007) argued that it is necessary to have both a genuinely lived morality which becomes alive within us and the tradition of virtue. Virtue is the way forward and a good social order, as it is presented in the classical Aristotle's perspective, facilitates the individuals a good life (Aristotle 1998, 193-194, &1324a). From the conservative perspective, there is a strong relationship between social and moral order (Kirk 2004, 16; 31). For Kirk (2004), the first principle of conservative political philosophy is related to the existence of a strong, robust, and stable moral order (16). A well-ordered society is characterized by functionality and respect of moral percepts. "A society in which men and women are governed by belief in an

enduring moral order, by a strong sense of right and wrong, by personal convictions about justice and honor, will be a good society – whatever political machinery it may utilize; while a society in which men and women are morally adrift, ignorant of norms, and intent chiefly upon gratification of appetites, will be a bad society – no matter how many people vote and no matter how liberal its formal constitution may be" (Kirk 2004, 16).

There is a middle way between the liberal constructivist approach of social order and the inherited order as it is argued in the conservative political philosophy. In this regard, we can observe a kind of conservative search for the liberal social order. This kind of philosophical approach is found in Hayek's work. But the intellectual origins of this approach are much older, going back to the 17th century (Mihailescu 2022). Excluding the constructivist and contractual scenario, without believing that social institutions could be created in the absence of any previous basis, without considering the historical particularities as secondary elements, Hayek (2022) is convinced that the well-ordered society is based on liberal order and rule of law. Using the correct and universal rules and procedures that do not affect individual freedom, a spontaneous order can be obtained, which is superior in complexity to any other planned approach (Hayek 2022, 275-279). The main elements that guarantee the existence of a well-ordered society, or a Great Society, are universal behavior rules, neutral and standard procedures, and the lack of social engineering (Hayek 2022, 277). In order to have the Great Society there is no need for interventionist effort or for contractual reflections that claim to be liberating. As long as historical evolution is not affected in a negative way, it will conduct to this type of society. "The growth from the tribal organization, all of whose members served common purposes, to the spontaneous order of the Open Society in which people are allowed to pursue their own purposes in peace, may thus be said to have commenced when for the first time a savage placed some goods at the boundary of his tribe in the hope that some member of another tribe would find them and leave in turn behind some other goods to secure the repetition of the offer. From the first establishment of such a practice which served reciprocal but not common purposes, a process has been going on for millennia

which, by making rules of conduct independent of the particular purposes of those concerned, made it possible to extend these rules to ever wider circles of undetermined persons and eventually might make possible a universal peaceful order of the world" (Hayek 2022, 281-282). Political power could not impose goals or correct imbalances. The main aim of the political power is to ensure peaceful and free coexistence in accordance with individuals' particular life style. In spite of the fact that individuals are strongly linked to the cultural field, the impersonal rules and procedures will ensure freedom within society (McCann 2004, 189-190). As a consequence, "the basic principles of a liberal society may he summed up by saying that in such a society all coercive functions of government must be guided by the overruling importance of what I like to call THE THREE GREAT NEGATIVES: PEACE, JUSTICE AND LIBERTY. Their achievement requires that, in its coercive functions, government shall be confined to the enforcement of such prohibitions (stated as abstract rules) as can be equally applied to all, and to exacting under the same uniform rules from all a share of the costs of the other, non-coercive services it may decide to render to the citizens with the material and personal means thereby placed at its disposal" (Hayek 2022, 291).

Although it exhibits significant differences from contractual liberalism, Hayek's philosophical approach is individualist. The Great Society, theorized by Hayek, is based on individuals who respect right procedures and who take care of their lives and their choices (McCann 2004, 201-202). In this context, the criticism of the liberal perspective arises again, warning us that individualism weakens all social ties, sometimes even to the point of dissolution. (McCann 2004, 202-203). Social ties are vital elements for the good life and could be strong only in a functional community, in a framework characterized by sharing moral beliefs. For communitarianism, this aspect is regarded as one of the basic truths. The individual takes care of his own life and makes choices in accordance with his personal values and skills developed in the community and by the community. Therefore, such a community must be supported and developed, which means

that the primacy of community has to prevail over the primacy of the individual (Bell 2022; Etzioni 2014).

A good society is a right society, justice cannot be separated from good, from moral assessment – this fact conducts us to the communitarian doctrine (Sandel 1998). "For a society to be a community in the strong sense, community must be constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute of certain of the participants' plans of life" (Sandel 1998, 173).

Belonging to a community is one of the basic human needs, as Walzer (1984) pointed out. This way, we obtain the important and necessary identity that provides differentiation, protecting us from the leveling of uniformity and homogeneity (Taylor 1984). There is a need for social order in which the recognition of the communitarian identity, conditioned by contemporary pluralism, should be both guaranteed and understood in its deepest meaning (Taylor 1994). In this context, cultural neutral procedures cannot be obtained, which represents the primary element of liberalism (Taylor 1994). In accordance to the communitarian philosophy, we can obtain the recognition of the multiple cultural frameworks' value. These frameworks offer individuals identity and guidelines for their development. It is obvious that it is necessary to preserve a core of values that generates social functionality and help individuals to identify the universal evils (Etzioni 1993, 157-159; Etzioni 2000, 11). Society should be thought of as the "community of communities" (52-56). In this respect, Etzioni (2000) emphasized that "a good society is one in which people treat one another as ends in themselves and not merely as instruments; as whole persons rather than as fragments; as members of a community, bonded by ties of affection and commitment, rather than only as employees, traders, consumers or even as fellow citizens" (11). A good social order is one in which everyone can live in accordance with his beliefs, formed within different communities and cultures, and that image is not deformed by unjustified public depreciations. It ensures good social order only when it is recognized the intrinsic equal value and peaceful coexistence of different cultures (Taylor 1994, 64). Taking into account the importance of the cultural

framework, the communitarianism stresses that good social order should be based on procedures that facilitate the recognition of different cultures, that support community life, prevent discrimination, and ensure a peaceful and functional society.

III.

Academic literature underlines several social order models. Using a sociological and economic approach, Dolfsma (2009) distinguished between three models: a model based on conflict, a model of consensus, and one characterized by exchange (37). The first model was developed throughout the work of several sociologists, such as Marx, Weber, and Dahrendorf, and, in this respect, the social order is derived from state institutions (Dolfsma 2009, 37). Political institutions manage the clash between individuals' divergent interests. This type of order preserves the balance of power relations between different categories of citizens (Dolfsma 2009, 37). In the consensus model society, as Durkheim pointed out, is seen as an organic whole (Dolfsma 2009, 37). Through social norms, society creates mechanisms of conformation and integration - socialization ensures the axiological consensus and social stability (Dolfsma 2009, 37). The third model, based on exchange, presents society in terms of Adam Smith's perspective: economic exchanges. The free market allows individuals to seek their own good and to participate, even if unintentionally, in achieving the general interest (Dolfsma 2009, 37).

Using the social psychology approach, based on social cognition and representation, we can observe both the descriptive and the normative dimensions. Regarding the citizen's perception of social order, we can argue that, on the one hand, the representation of the social order suggests "a need to grasp «what is going on» in a complex and often chaotic world, by endorsing representations that convey the impression of stability, predictability, and well-defined certainties. On the other hand, individuals are motivated to actively intervene in the organization of their political community by adopting political attitudes in line with their ideal social order" (Staerklé 2014, 50). Regarding the influence of the psychological discourse in the

field of social order, several theorists pointed out the major role played by social cognition in creating and preserving a personal view related to good order. In this respect, political psychologists emphasized the role played by the social context in shaping a personal view of society and of good social order. "There is an implicit sense that individuals of those species that have this capacity are especially sensitive to social contexts, and that this context brings into play a specialized suite of cognitive mechanisms not normally used in more mundane physical world contexts" (Dunbar 2011, 25). To explain the good social order and other social or political behavior individuals use a kind of "mental map" which plays an important role in social orientation and social assessment (Kanai et.al. 2011, 677-680; Elster 2007, 257; Van Dijk 2006). Internal factors such as emotions and cognitions are involved in generating various models of understanding and explaining the social world (Tomasello 1999, 201; Mandler 1999). Using personal motivations and intentions, individuals are trying permanently to construct the social reality mentally and to articulate it by personal values (Forgas 2001; Moskowitz 2005).

Regarding the social order, Staerklé (2014) underlines four lay conceptions: moral, economic, diversity, and structural inequalities (57-62). This fact expresses four different manners of legitimating the social order (Chryssochoou 2018, 307). These social representations have a significant impact in shaping individual political cognition and their political attitudes related to social phenomena (Staerklé 2014, 50).

Staerklé (2014) argued that the moral perspective on social order is based on compliance with established norms and values. Individuals with such type of thinking consider that the more people who respect and assume moral standards will be in society, there will be more good people and the society will be more ordered – in contrast, bad people who violate moral norms are seen as people who disturb social order and have to be corrected using institutional mechanisms (Staerklé 2014, 58).

According to the economic approach, individual interest is placed on the basis of human behavior. Therefore, competition is considered to be a norm in the field of social relations, the gain which is highly valuated is proportionally with individual skills

and efforts (Staerklé 2014, 58-59). For Staerklé (2014), in this approach the social order is strongly related to the free market and the state should be seen in terms of the minimal state, a guardian who defends the success of the fair players (58-59). The main threat to social order and general good is represented by competition losers, if they want to benefit from others' efforts (Staerklé 2014, 59).

The social diversity perspective has an internal logic, based on both defense and preservation of the group identity and cultural rights (Staerklé 2014, 59). The positive thinking related to cultural differences creates premises for the social order that valuates cultural pluralism. In this context, rules and procedures encourage the affirmation of various forms of identity, while the state has to protect the vulnerable communities (Staerklé 2014, 60). If cultural diversity is perceived as a threat, then the members of the dominant cultural group could impose rules and institutions to protect the main culture. Particularly, social disorder is related to the emergence of foreigners and immigrants (Staerklé 2014, 60).

Regarding the structural inequality perspective (Staerklé 2014, 60-61), social relations are regarded in terms of inherited class positions and differences. In this respect, social privileges and inequalities should be managed. Moreover, all these privileges and inequalities are not only the result of individual accomplishments. Thus, social order has to be correlated with social justice (Staerklé 2014, 60). Individuals who see in negative terms social inequalities will adopt contrariant positions, advocating for a robust redistributive state; those who consider that inequalities are justified will think that all social hierarchies are right and justified (Staerklé 2014, 60-61). In this context, egalitarians are seen as the main threat to the social order (Staerklé 2014, 61).

Concluding, the paper presents several theoretical directions related to the manner of understanding the issue of social order. Concerning the historical and ideological perspectives, the paper highlights the conceptual evolution and the nexus between political philosophy and social psychology in stressing several models and social representations of the social order. Some of the intellectual perspectives of these lay

conceptions could be discovered in the philosophical models of the social order. For example, the perspectives related to moral order are met in the sphere of conservative political philosophy. The hypostasis of the free market is specific for the philosophical perspectives developed by liberal and libertarian philosophy. The social diversity model is strongly related to communitarian political philosophy. The structural inequality perspectives are relevant for egalitarian liberalism, interested in preserving social justice. Thus, analyzing the issue of social order we can underline not only the normative approach of the political philosophy concerned with finding the good world, but we can observe how ideals are shaped by political philosophy. Moreover, the study stresses both the citizens' need for political orientation and integration in the social field and the strong nexus between political philosophy and political cognition, involved in shaping or legitimating social relationships.

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