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Le concept philosophique à l'épreuve de la traduction

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Abstract

The Philosophical Concept tested by Translation

This article aims to present, from a hermeneutical point of view, the ins and outs of the conceptual work required to translate the contemporary French thought. It does so through two collaborative translations into Bulgarian, namely those of Difference and Repetition by Gilles Deleuze and The Birth of the Clinic by Michel Foucault. Starting from the premise that the primacy of concepts in philosophical discourse makes its translation particularly complex, we will try to highlight the contribution of translation to the building of a conceptual language in the field of philosophy.

Keywords: concept, Deleuze, discours, Foucault, hermeneutics, philosophy, translation

Si l'enfermement idéologique s'impose comme une caractéristique majeure de l'activité traductive en Bulgarie à l'époque du régime totalitaire instauré dans ce pays au lendemain de la Seconde guerre mondiale, l'ouverture se profile comme son trait distinctif après la chute du Mur de Berlin. Cet événement crucial attise l'intérêt pour des œuvres littéraires qui n'étaient pas traduits ou retraduits pendant des décennies (celles des modernistes, pour ne citer que James Joyce et Virginia Woolf, ou des « décadents », pour ne citer que Georges Rodenbach et Marcel Proust) ; pour les écrits de Sigmund Freud et d'autres théoriciens de la psychanalyse ;

pour la pensée occidentale. Selon le rapport de l'Institut National de la statistique, au cours des dix dernières années du XXe et des dix premières années du XXIe siècle, les titres traduits représentent 28,9 % des livres publiés, soit un livre sur trois est une traduction. En 2009, le français constitue, avec 7,6 % du total des traductions, tous secteurs éditoriaux confondus, la troisième langue traduite, dépassé par l'anglais avec 59,4 % et le polonais avec 9,5 % (National Statistical Institute 2010, 41). La French Theory est très appréciée. Afin de satisfaire la demande des universitaires qui ne peuvent pas les lire en version originale, on traduit une quantité d'ouvrages de Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida et Lévi-Strauss, à côté de Barthes, Bourdieu et Ricœur, et bien entendu, de Kristeva et Todorov, vu leur origine. Et même si la qualité d'une bonne partie de ces traductions vite faites laisse à désirer, elles sont susceptibles de combler un manque, voire de servir de modèles aux travaux des intellectuels bulgares.

La prolifération des traductions en sciences humaines durant cette période s'accompagne d'une prise de position critique à l'égard de l'acte de traduire. Très contrôlée dans les années 1970-1990, la réflexion traductologique se libère de la pression idéologique et s'oppose au logocratisme de l'ancien régime politique. Au tournant du XXe et du XXIe siècle, les traducteurs eux-mêmes acquièrent le droit et le courage de se prononcer sur leur propre activité. Dans ce contexte, nous allons présenter les tenants et les aboutissants du travail conceptuel et discursif impliqué par la traduction philosophique à travers notre expérience collaborative concernant les versions bulgares de Naissance de la clinique de Michel Foucault (1994) et Différence et répétition de Gilles Deleuze (1999). Ainsi, nous allons essayer de circonscrire l'apport de la traduction pour l'élaboration d'un langage conceptuel à partir de la prémisse que la primauté du concept dans le discours philosophique rend la traduction de celui-ci particulièrement problématique. A cette fin, nous allons mettre successivement en valeur la visée dominante et les stratégies appropriées de cette entreprise.

1. Les défis du discours philosophique

> « [P]our la philosophie, la question de son sens et de son essence la constitue, bien plus que ne la définit une réponse à cette question. Le fait que la question renaisse incessamment, faute de réponse satisfaisante, est, pour qui voudrait pouvoir se dire philosophe, une raison d'humilité et non une cause d'humiliation » (Canguilhem 1994, 365).

Qu'est-ce que la philosophie ? est sans doute une question « gênante » pour tout philosophe à laquelle on ne peut pas répondre de façon univoque. Toutefois, notre objectif ici et maintenant n'est pas de définir la philosophie, mais de mettre en évidence les défis traductionnels du texte philosophique. Afin de déterminer la singularité du texte philosophique et d'élucider ses défis pour la traduction, nous allons d'abord souscrire à la distinction entre *knowledge-about* (la connaissance par description) et *knowledge by acquaintance* (la connaissance directe) (James 1890, 220). *To know about* est un acte cognitif, situé au cœur de la méthode scientifique, qui vise une connaissance objective des faits, partageable avec d'autres. Ne pouvant ignorer ce type de connaissance, la traduction doit s'appliquer à transmettre avec précision le *knowledge-about* total, contenu dans le texte-source, pour permettre à son lecteur dans la langue-cible d'évaluer les idées qui y sont présentées et de se rendre compte de leur véracité, validité, teneur morale.

Or, la nature de la connaissance n'est pas exclusivement scientifique : il existe aussi une connaissance morale qui relève du domaine de la raison pratique ; une connaissance esthétique qui relève du domaine des arts ; une connaissance transcendantale qui relève du domaine de la religion. Ces trois types de connaissances, qui interprètent le monde vivant et nous aident à l'approprier, seraient-elles moins importantes ? Certainement pas. Et pourtant, il ne suffit pas purement et simplement d'être au courant de l'existence de ces expériences et de pouvoir les décrire. On a besoin d'en faire la connaissance directe. Le *knowledge by acquaintance* est essentiel, mais difficile à partager parce qu'il reste hors de la portée de la science. La traduction « relevante » (Derrida 2004, 563) ne doit pas se limiter alors à

fournir le *knowledge-about*, mais stimuler l'*acquaintance*, favoriser l'« expérience intérieure » (Bataille 1973), l'accès immédiat à la vigueur et à la rigueur du texte-source, à sa plénitude, à sa force, à son attrait dans la quête du sens. La tâche principale de la philosophie est notamment de comprendre en quoi consiste cette expérience et pourquoi elle est significative.

On sait bien que la philosophie cherche la réponse aux questions les plus générales que l'être humain se pose. Elle n'est pas pour autant une solution technique, mais une technique de réflexion : un effort de clarification, de compréhension, de prise de conscience de l'existence des problèmes là où on est loin de les soupçonner, et en particulier dans notre propre pensée. Cet étonnement quelque peu angoissé devant le sens obvie[1] des mots et des choses se trouve à l'origine de la philosophie. Par conséquent, la vocation du philosophe exige de problématiser les évidences. La philosophie apprend donc à réfléchir de manière argumentée et critique sur ce qui paraît transparent et évident. Elle provoque notre sens commun, notre pensée, nos croyances, nos convictions et nos valeurs : bref, tout ce qu'on appelle la *doxa*. Et si un philosophe veut penser et dire quelque chose hors du commun, il doit non seulement ouvrir une nouvelle perspective et émettre un point de vue différent, mais utiliser un autre langage, capable de transformer l'évidence des choses en dehors du langage, pensées être objectives parce qu'empiriques, en l'*evidentia*[2] du discours. Ce n'est qu'ainsi qu'il peut à la fois inventer des formes inédites de pensée et proposer un usage insolite du langage. Il s'en suit que chaque phrase, voire chaque mot d'un texte philosophique, représente un défi à affronter. De surcroît, le langage, les images, les perspectives et les hypothèses des philosophes sont souvent plus difficiles à traduire que leurs idées.

Aujourd'hui, on a l'impression qu'en dehors des sciences exactes *anything goes*, que la philosophie, comme du reste les autres sciences humaines, n'a ni une méthode claire, ni un corpus de connaissances solide. En effet, les travaux les plus remarquables dans le domaine de la philosophie et de l'histoire des idées démolissent « à coups de marteau » (Nietzsche, 1977)

la tradition antérieure et avancent de nouvelles interprétations et de nouveaux jugements qui visent à changer notre façon de penser. Il en découle que la philosophie est un « entretien infini » (Blanchot 1969). Être philosophe signifie participer à cet entretien. Ainsi, le but de Deleuze n'est pas de comparer ou de confronter diverses philosophies, mais de renouveler l'élan philosophique et, surtout, la force de l'amour qu'il contient. Rappelons à ce sujet que la première composante du mot *philosophie* provient du substantif grec qui désigne l'amour : la *philia*. D'ailleurs, quand on a demandé à Deleuze pourquoi il n'écrivait que des livres sur les philosophes qu'il aime, il a répondu que si on n'aime pas une chose, il n'y a pas de raison d'écrire à son sujet. Ceci regarde *a fortiori* le traducteur. S'il n'aime pas le texte original, ce n'est pas la peine de le traduire, parce que, dans ce cas-là, à la résistance objective au texte-source de sa langue-culture se superposera sa résistance subjective, consciente ou inconsciente. Ce phénomène va empiéter inévitablement sur la qualité de la traduction, d'autant plus que le transport de signifiants et de formes se heurte forcément à la résistance de la langue-cible. L'entretien infini, et c'est bien en cela que consiste la force explosive de Foucault, ne concerne pas uniquement les grands noms, mais également les écrits d'auteurs oubliés ou marginaux : les fous, les malades, les hommes infâmes, etc. Deleuze et Guattari démontrent, pour leur part, que la philosophie émerge de la non-philosophie, comme l'art naît du non-art et la science de la non-science. Cette compréhension a permis de faire sortir la philosophie des départements de philosophie pour la transformer en pratique expérimentale qui jette un défi à la traduction.

2. Traduire le concept philosophique

> « Le philosophe est l'ami du concept, il est en puissance de concept. C'est dire que la philosophie n'est pas un simple art de former, d'inventer ou de fabriquer des concepts, car les concepts ne sont pas nécessairement des formes, des trouvailles ou des produits. La philosophie, plus rigoureusement, est la discipline qui consiste à créer des concepts. L'ami serait l'ami de ses propres créations ? Ou bien est-ce l'acte du concept qui renvoie à la puissance de l'ami, dans l'unité du créateur et de son double ? Créer des concepts

> toujours nouveaux, c'est l'objet de la philosophie. C'est parce que le concept doit être créé, qu'il renvoie au philosophe comme à celui qui l'a en puissance, ou qui en a la puissance et la compétence. On ne peut pas objecter que la création se dit plutôt du sensible et des arts, tant l'art fait exister des entités spirituelles, et tant les concepts philosophiques sont aussi des « sensibilia ». À dire vrai, les sciences, les arts, les philosophies sont également créateurs, bien qu'il revienne à la philosophie seule de créer des concepts au sens strict » (Deleuze et Guattari 1991, 10).

La philosophie ne se réduit pas au savoir ni à la « réflexion sur les savoirs disponibles » (Comte-Sponville 2013, 698). Pour guider le bon usage de la raison, elle expérimente le langage et s'engage dans la création de concepts qui instaurent de nouvelles dimensions de l'expérience. Les mots qui suscitent notre curiosité et éveillent notre imagination nous incitent du reste à penser à des choses que nous ne connaissons pas autrement.

Or, si les sciences exactes se servent d'une terminologie plus ou moins universelle, la philosophie suppose des interprétations extrêmement variées du même phénomène, ce qui entraîne la mise en place de concepts aussi variés. Ceci n'exclut pas d'emblée le recours à d'anciens concepts, le plus souvent révisés, qui cohabitent dans la pensée contemporaine avec ceux forgés par les philosophes de notre temps : tels sont *pouvoir* et *gouvernementalité* chez Foucault ou bien *différence* et *déterritorialisation* chez Deleuze. Le concept peut se rapporter alors tant aux idées de son créateur qu'à celles empruntées à d'autres ouvrages, modifiées au fur et à mesure qu'il développe sa pensée afin d'être adaptées au nouveau contexte (Petrova et Kristeva 2017, 12). Il contient « le plus souvent des morceaux ou des composantes venus d'autres concepts, qui répondaient à d'autres problèmes et supposaient d'autres plans. C'est forcé parce que chaque concept opère un nouveau découpage, prend de nouveaux contours, doit être réactivé ou retaillé » (Deleuze et Guattari 1991, 23).

Le concept représente donc une unité de pensée et d'expérience, qui médiatise le monde. Il réunit des choses dispersées sous une caractéristique commune. Il exprime chez tout individu sa ressemblance avec d'autres individus. Et si son invention implique, philosophiquement parlant, l'unité de la vie

et de l'expérience, sa formation résulte de plusieurs années de bataille et de croissance intérieure. Le concept n'est pas un attribut permanent de la pensée humaine, mais apparaît dans une culture à un moment donné. Par conséquent, il n'est universel que pour la culture pour laquelle il a du sens. La tentation du traducteur est de présumer qu'il a toujours été là, surplombant le monde, pour reprendre la façon de penser platonicienne.

Il s'avère fondamental que le traducteur arrive à transmettre correctement les concepts du texte-source pour ne pas confondre le lecteur du texte-cible. Leur traduction « relevante » devrait repérer les survivances de l'originaire dans le texte-source afin d'inscrire dans la langue-cible leurs équivalents les plus pertinents, en utilisant dans cet objectif le langage le plus convenable :

> Une traduction relevante serait donc, tout simplement une « bonne traduction », une traduction qui fait ce qu'on attend d'elle, en somme, une version qui s'acquitte de sa mission, honore sa dette et fait son travail ou son devoir en inscrivant dans la langue d'arrivée l'équivalent le plus *relevant* d'un original, le langage *le plus* juste, approprié, pertinent, adéquat, opportun, aigu, univoque, idiomatique, etc. (Derrida 2004, 563)

La traduction « relevante » respecte aussi bien la langue et la culture étrangères que sa propre langue et culture. Elle n'est ni une réécriture ni une adaptation. Elle ne bascule ni dans le commentaire ni dans l'explication. Elle cherche le « point de capiton »[3] (Lacan 1998, 14), c'est-à-dire le point où le signifiant « épingle » son signifié choisi parmi tous les signifiés possibles comme l'unique équivalent ; le point qui ne laisse qu'une seule interprétation, la plus relevante, en éliminant les autres.

Le processus du traduire affronte par ailleurs des expériences langagières particulières et non pas des structures immanentes à la langue. Ces expériences reflètent des visions du monde qui dépassent ce qu'un texte signifie *stricto sensu*. Ainsi, « ce qui est finalement à comprendre dans un texte, ce n'est ni l'auteur et son intention présumée, ni même la structure ou les structures immanentes au texte, mais la sorte de monde visé hors texte comme la référence du texte » (Ricœur 1977, 38). Il s'en suit que le traducteur doit appréhender la dialectique entre l'enfermement et l'ouverture du texte dont le

contenu est dirigé vers quelque chose qui va au-delà de son espace : son référent. L'ouverture du texte vers son référent devient la condition de son interprétation.

La traduction « relevante » est conditionnée, entre autres, par la faculté de reconnaître les références explicites et implicites du texte-source. Le traducteur a l'obligation de confronter les traductions existantes des penseurs dont les concepts sont mentionnés avec la lecture qu'en propose le texte-source. Les équivalents retenus par ses pairs vont l'aider à mieux saisir la signification des concepts et à émettre des hypothèses interprétatives plus objectives ; lui éviter de s'enfermer dans son interprétation subjective et limitée ; l'encourager à surmonter l'horizon d'attente déterminé par ses propres expérience et culture. Cette opération est d'autant plus importante qu'elle assure la continuité de la pensée philosophique, tout en clarifiant l'intertextualité du texte à traduire. Il n'est pas rare non plus qu'un concept s'inscrive implicitement dans le raisonnement du texte-source ou qu'il coïncide avec un mot courant : c'est bien le cas du concept *problème*[4] dans *Différence et répétition*. Le traducteur doit être particulièrement vigilant à ne pas omettre ce type de concepts afin de ne pas compromettre l'intention du texte et de son auteur (Eco 1992, 29-32). Pour ne pas désorienter son lecteur, il doit utiliser l'équivalent établi du concept dans la langue-cible, conformément à sa traduction dans l'ouvrage auquel se réfère le texte-source. Et pour restituer le sens originaire du concept, il doit évaluer ses interprétations antérieures, en les confrontant avec sa propre interprétation en fonction de la contextualisation de celui-ci dans le texte philosophique qu'il est en train de traduire. Cette attitude critique vis-à-vis du concept ne signifie pas qu'il faut subordonner la philologie à la philosophie, mais qu'il faut y incorporer une réflexion critique (Bollack 2006, 12). Somme toute, la traduction du texte philosophique est problématique aussi bien au niveau de la recherche, voire de la création des équivalents conceptuels, qu'au niveau du choix des stratégies discursives appropriées.

3. De l'Ethique de Spinoza à l'éthique de la traduction

> Dans le livre principal de Spinoza, et qui s'appelle l'*Éthique*, c'est écrit en latin, on trouve deux mots : *affectio* et *affectus*. Certains traducteurs très bizarrement traduisent de la même manière. C'est une catastrophe. Ils traduisent les deux termes, *affectio* et *affectus*, par « affection ». Je dis que c'est une catastrophe parce que, quand un philosophe emploie deux mots c'est que, par principe, il a une raison, surtout que le français nous donne aisément les deux mots qui correspondent rigoureusement à *affectio* et à *affectus*, et c'est affection pour *affectio* et affect pour *affectus*. Certains traducteurs traduisent *affectio* par affection et *affectus* par sentiment, c'est mieux que de traduire par le même mot, mais je ne vois pas la nécessité de recourir au mot sentiment alors que le français dispose du mot affect. Donc, quand j'emploie le mot affect ça renvoie à l'*affectus* de Spinoza, quand je dirai le mot affection, ça renvoie à l'*affectio*. (Gilles Deleuze 1978)

Depuis Schleiermacher, l'herméneutique distingue la traduction (*Übersetzen*) de l'interprétation (*Dolmetschen*), en relevant le nouveau rapport au langage, unique en son genre, instauré par la traduction : « L'interprète, en effet, exerce son office dans le domaine des affaires, le véritable traducteur essentiellement dans le domaine de la science et de l'art » (Schleiermacher 1999, 33). La traduction présuppose la compréhension du texte à traduire et la perception de la sensibilité linguistique de son auteur, tandis que l'interprétation vise l'explication du texte et l'élucidation de ses ambiguïtés. L'interprétation se déroule sur le plan des apparences et des truchements de l'oral, la traduction implique la connaissance approfondie et l'entendement subtil de la pensée de l'auteur et de la sensibilité de son langage. L'interprétation obéit aux impératifs de la communication, la traduction ouvre un horizon culturel par la présentation d'un modèle de connaissance. Par conséquent, le traducteur ne devrait pas se contenter de communiquer sa compréhension du texte, mais essayer de transmettre « l'esprit » de la langue-source :

> Pour que ses lecteurs puissent comprendre, ils doivent saisir l'esprit de la langue qui est la langue natale de l'écrivain, ils doivent pouvoir intuitionner sa façon de penser et de sentir ; et pour parvenir aux deux choses, il ne peut leur offrir que sa propre langue, qui ne

> coïncide jamais pleinement avec l'autre, et que lui-même, avec sa connaissance plus ou moins claire de l'auteur, avec l'admiration et l'approbation plus ou moins grande qu'il lui voue. (Schleiermacher 1999, 45)

Il faudrait mettre entre parenthèse ses propres idées, préjugés ou convictions pour pouvoir accepter et traduire ceux des autres. Penser avec l'autre, adopter son point de vue, repenser ce qu'il pense, manifester son empathie intellectuelle deviennent les conditions de sa compréhension. Autrement dit, comprendre c'est apprendre le langage de l'autre.

Pour traduire Deleuze et Foucault, nous avons opté pour une approche qui s'inscrit dans la lignée de l'herméneutique philosophique, d'autant plus que l'herméneutique et la traduction partagent un objectif commun : la compréhension des textes. L'herméneutique veut rassembler les éléments multiples et divers du texte dans la « chose du texte » (Gadamer 1996, 410), dans l'unité du sens tel qu'il est inséré dans l'expérience et le langage. A cette fin, elle *com-prend* son objet pour le projeter vers ses possibilités grâce à la correspondance établie entre le sujet et le texte qui se révèlent mutuellement *com-pris*. La traduction qui s'en inspire se focalise sur la compréhension de l'original, parce que si *expliquer* (du verbe latin *ex-plicare*) déplie les articulations du texte, *comprendre* (du verbe latin *com-prehendere*) saisit le sens du texte[5]. Or, si l'herméneute interprète les textes afin de les comprendre, le traducteur doit comprendre les textes afin de les traduire. Ainsi, nous avons tenté d'apprendre le langage des deux philosophes, de respecter la singularité de leur discours, de circonscrire les « réseaux signifiants sous-jacents » (Berman 1999, 61-62) dans leurs ouvrages, de ne pas recourir à l'explicitation de l'implicite : enfin, de restituer l'original avec toutes ses ambiguïtés, contrariétés, nouveautés.

En outre, nous avons tenu compte du fait que, du point de vue herméneutique, la traduction relève de l'expérience du monde et du rapport à l'autre ; qu'elle est une expérience existentielle et dialogique, fondée sur la compréhension de la pensée de l'autre à travers son discours : un entretien infini. La traduction est bipolaire : l'identité et la différence y cohabitent, en s'opposant. Conçu comme un problème essentiel de la

traduction, le cercle dans lequel sont pris le même et l'autre devient le moteur à la fois de l'herméneutique et de toute réflexion sur la traduction : de Friedrich Schleiermacher et Hans-Georg Gadamer à Paul Ricœur et Antoine Berman. Et comme traduire est de l'ordre du sens, la réflexion herméneutique sur l'acte de traduire ne peut pas être négligée.

Nous avons traduit aussi bien Foucault que Deleuze avec la conscience que les textes-cibles, fondés sur notre interprétation, seraient toujours imparfaits et instables par rapport aux textes-sources, dans l'incertitude d'avoir toujours compris à fond la pensée des deux philosophes et d'avoir saisi l'esprit de leur langage. La concordance du tout et de la partie s'est imposée comme le critère de la compréhension des textes. Schleiermacher indique d'ailleurs la double constitution du *cercle herméneutique* : objective ou grammaticale ; subjective ou psychologique. L'interprétation objective se réalise grâce à la méthode comparative qui poursuit une analyse comparée des significations de tel ou tel mot pour définir son sens contextuel. L'interprétation subjective essaie de deviner son sens concret à partir de ses usages particuliers par un auteur. Ces deux aspects de l'interprétation qui caractérisent la circularité de la compréhension se sont révélés très importants dans le processus du traduire. Au-delà d'une explication scientifique rigoureuse qui veut cerner le typique, la traduction nécessite donc une interprétation herméneutique dynamique et temporelle, qui aspire à atteindre l'individuel. On pourrait dire qu'en ce sens, elle est une métamorphose : l'être même de la traduction est un être métamorphosé non pas comme une répétition statique, mais en tant que rythme dynamique. Cette circularité de la traduction, celle du *cercle herméneutique* postulant que la compréhension du tout repose sur celle de la partie, et vice versa, présente la compréhension comme une interaction du mouvement du texte et du mouvement du traducteur (Kristeva 2009, 101 ; 214).

Au cours de notre travail en commun sur les traductions de *Naissance de la clinique* et de *Différence et répétition*, nous nous en sommes tenus à la visée éthique au sens bermanien du terme, à savoir le respect de l'étrangeté de l'autre et la mise à l'épreuve de cette étrangeté. Cette visée éthique est fort bien

résumée par « l'épreuve de l'étranger »[6], expression remise en circulation par Berman qui y entend l'épreuve dans la double acception de peine affligée et d'opération d'évaluation. La traduction devient ainsi la métaphore et le paradigme éthique de la coexistence et de l'interaction des cultures et des hommes qui parlent des langues différentes mais appartiennent à la même humanité.

« L'épreuve de l'étranger » exige de conserver la voix de l'œuvre et l'esprit de la culture étrangère sans craindre de modifier la propre langue par la langue étrangère. Ce défi regarde avant tout le lecteur : pourrait-il être satisfait d'une traduction qui sonne bizarrement dans sa langue et en conclure qu'il en est de même pour l'original ? Quand il se heurte à ce genre de difficultés, le traducteur averti sait bien qu'il ne s'agit ni d'absurdités ni d'erreurs de l'original qu'il faudrait transposer dans la traduction, mais qu'il doit examiner d'une manière critique l'état des deux langues. Cette critique intérieure au texte n'est qu'un point de vue provisoire, une contre-version singulière temporaire et limitée. Le grand problème du traducteur ne réside pas dans le degré de sa tolérance vis-à-vis de l'intention de l'auteur, mais dans sa capacité de tester la tolérance de sa propre langue et l'aptitude de celle-ci à laisser entendre la voix de l'autre quitte à accepter des formes langagières insolites. C'est pourquoi le dépassement des limites des usages linguistiques habituels, la re-formulation et la re-formation de la propre langue à travers la traduction ne sont nullement faciles et prévisibles, mais dépendent dans une grande mesure de la propension de la langue-cible à se soumettre à la force transformatrice de la langue-source.

4. Des stratégies traductives

> La difficulté de traduire est qu'il faut d'abord bien savoir le latin ; ensuite, il faut l'oublier. (Montesquieu 1950, 412)

Nous allons illustrer les partis pris de notre traduction collaborative des textes en question par *Différence et répétition*. Le fil conducteur dans notre travail de longue haleine sur cet ouvrage philosophique était à la fois de nature théorique et éthique. Heureusement, nous partageons

quelques convictions. La traduction n'est pas une copie de l'original, mais elle entretient un rapport avec le tout qu'il représente et dont elle transmet autrement la complexité, les particularités, les nuances. Comme une totalité sémantique et formelle, l'original demeure toujours différent, et donc transcendant, à l'égard de toute traduction possible. Comme une autre compréhension de l'original, la traduction demeure toujours différente par rapport à l'original. Rédigés en deux langues différentes, l'original et la traduction sont séparés par une distance qu'il est toujours problématique de combler. La compréhension de la traduction réclame alors un langage au deuxième degré capable de décrire et d'expliquer ces deux essences incommensurables, nécessite une réflexion, demande une prise de position. Dans cette optique, le traducteur ne se livre pas à la recréation de l'œuvre, à sa reproduction mécanique, à sa transposition littérale ; il s'attaque au mot (et non pas uniquement au concept) et à la signification dont celui-ci est porteur (Kristeva 2009, 10).

Nos idées se recoupent en plus avec les réflexions de Foucault sur la « traduction verticale », dans son hommage à la version de l'*Enéide* de Virgile, sortie sous la plume de Klossowski en 1964 : « Une traduction où le mot à mot serait comme l'incidence du latin tombant à pic sur le français, selon une figure qui n'est pas juxta- mais supra-littéraire. […] Pour traduire, Klossowski ne s'installe pas dans la ressemblance du français et du latin ; il se loge au creux de leur plus grande différence » (Foucault 1994, 424-425). La traduction éthique doit se tenir à la littéralité, entendue non pas comme une transposition *mot à mot*, mais comme un souci de transmission exacte des mots et du sens dont ils sont porteurs. Toute traduction transformante qui change l'un ou l'autre ou sacrifie l'un à l'autre fait perdre le sens de l'original. La littéralité ne vise pas à traduire purement et simplement la langue étrangère, mais à faire passer l'œuvre originale dans la traduction ; ne vise pas à traduire purement et simplement les mots, mais à transmettre leur association dans le texte, qui devient révélatrice de leur sens.

Nous avons évité la « bulgarisation » du texte-source, la clarification, la paraphrase, l'explicitation, l'explication. Nous

avons tâché de rien ajouter ni enlever, sauf omission involontaire. Nous nous sommes abstenus d'y inclure des commentaires pour ne pas influencer la lecture du texte-cible. Partant du présupposé de la prédominance du discours argumentatif dans l'ouvrage de Deleuze et prenant en considération l'articulation singulière de la pensée du philosophe, nous avons suivi le mouvement du texte-source, le ton dont il s'inspire, le rythme dont il s'anime ; nous avons cherché à déplier sa réflexion et à respecter, autant que possible, non seulement les concepts, mais aussi les mots communs. Et comme, dans le discours deleuzien, chaque mot a sa propre valeur et sa raison d'être, nous l'avons traduit de la même façon dans tout le texte, sauf dans les rares cas où cela s'est avéré impossible en raison de la polysémie ou de l'emploi spécifique contextuel. Nous espérons avoir pu échapper ainsi tant à l'*appauvrissement qualitatif* qui consiste dans le remplacement des termes, des expressions et des tournures de l'original, qu'à l'*appauvrissement quantitatif* lié aux pertes lexicales (Berman 1999, 58-60). Quand il fallait choisir entre les équivalents bulgares des concepts, attestés et utilisés par plusieurs sciences exactes ou humaines, nous avons systématiquement préféré l'équivalent philosophique en raison de son universalité par rapport aux termes réservés à d'autres domaines scientifiques : par ex., *problème – проблем,* désigné par *задача* dans le langage mathématique. Nous avons néanmoins observé les divers emplois traditionnels de quelques mots polysémiques : *puissance – мощ, степен* ; *sens – смисъл, усет, посока ; terme – термин, член* (math.)

Dans les cas de parenté sémantique des mots qui jouent un rôle essentiel dans l'argumentation de Deleuze, nous avons observé le principe étymologique afin de ne pas détruire les « réseaux signifiants sous-jacents ». Les équivalents des termes présentant une parenté sémantique en français ont donc conservé cette parenté dans la traduction, étant donné que « lire (percevoir le *lisible* du texte), c'est aller de nom en nom, de pli en pli ; c'est plier sous un nom, puis déplier le texte selon les nouveaux plis de ce nom » (Barthes 1970 : 89). Tels sont notamment les dérivés du mot *pli* (*гънка*), qui est d'une importance capitale dans l'œuvre de Deleuze, de la série

réplication – отгъване ; perplication – прегъване ; implication – вгъване ; explication – разгъване ; complication – сгъване. Quand les ressources de la langue bulgare se sont avérées insuffisantes pour transmettre toutes les nuances lexicales des mots français, nous avons eu recours à l'utilisation des préfixes : *lier – свързвам ; nouer – завързвам*.

Nous avons tâché d'observer le factitif, dont la traduction exige une substitution obligée, conditionnée par son inexistence en bulgare : par ex. « C'est la même illusion qui nous *fait penser* la différence à partir d'une ressemblance et d'une identité supposées préalables… » (Deleuze 1968, 159) – « Една и съща илюзоя ни *кара да мислим* различието въз основа на предполагаемо предзададени подобие и тъждество... » (Deleuze 1999, 159) ; l'articulation logique : par ex. les connecteurs exprimant l'opposition *mais – но*, *or – ала*, *cependant – обаче*, *pourtant – все пак*, *toutefois – при все това*, *néanmoins – въпреки това* ; et la modalisation : par ex. les modalisateurs *certainement – разбира се, évidemment – очевидно, probablement – вероятно, peut-être – може би*, etc. Bien que ces constructions ne soient pas typiques pour la langue bulgare, elles ont une fonction argumentative déterminante pour le discours deleuzien, et par conséquent, ne peuvent pas être négligées.

Partageant l'avis de Cordonnier qui demande « que chaque traducteur se double d'un néologue » (Cordonnier 1995, 131), nous avons forgé des néologismes chaque fois que Deleuze lui-même en forgeait : par ex., *sans fond – без основа ; sans-fond – без-основно ; effondement – изосновополагане*. Nous avons gardé les distinctions *sens commun / bon sens – общ усет / добър усет* et *Je / Moi – Аз / Мен*, que malheureusement très peu de traducteurs bulgares observent. Nous avons respecté la préférence du philosophe pour l'*instinct de mort* au lieu de *pulsion de mort*, bien que Freud n'utilise pas ce concept.

Bref, nous avons essayé de résister autant que possible aux tendances déformantes de la traduction qui se résument à deux grands groupes de modifications du texte-source, matérialisant la dialectique de l'excès et du défaut. Les déformations *par excès* se manifestent par des rajouts, des

commentaires, des périphrases explicatives, des déplacements, des recoupes, des concordances superflues sous prétexte de clarification. Celles *par défaut* apparaissent dans les enlèvements, les omissions, les simplifications sous le même prétexte. « La traduction procède couramment à ces quatre modes de distorsions, qui correspondent aux quatre types de monstres : les monstres par excès, les monstres par défaut, ceux par renversement d'organes, ceux qui présentent une partie d'une autre espèce » (Meschonnic 1999, 164)

5. Conclusion

Dans les traductions de *Naissance de la clinique* de Foucault et de *Différence et répétition* de Deleuze, nous avons tenté de manifester dans la langue-cible la pure nouveauté qu'est le texte étranger dans la langue-source, en préservant la voix de son auteur. Ce n'est qu'ainsi que le traducteur se transforme en « maître secret de la différence des langues, non pas pour l'abolir, mais pour l'utiliser, afin d'éveiller, dans la sienne, par les changements violents ou subtils qu'il lui apporte, une présence de ce qu'il y a de différent, originellement, dans l'original » (Blanchot 1971, 71). Seule la traduction qui conserve la présence de l'original dans la langue-cible, sans ramener l'étranger au propre, réussit l'« épreuve de l'étranger » et ceci grâce à « l'hospitalité langagière » (Ricœur 2004, 19) offerte à l'autre qui donne « un sens plus pur aux mots de la tribu » (Mallarmé 1998, 38). En fin de compte, « l'acte éthique consiste à reconnaître et à recevoir l'Autre en tant qu'Autre » (Berman 1999, 74), autrement dit, à faire entendre la voix de l'Autre dans la propre langue. Nous espérons y avoir réussi.

NOTES

[1] C'est un adjectif dérivé du mot latin *obvius*, c'est-à-dire quelque chose que l'on rencontre chemin faisant, quelque chose d'accessible, de routinier qui vient sans effort à l'esprit (Platon 1824, 155d ; Aristote 1879, I, 2, 982b).
[2] L'*evidentia* était, dans la rhétorique classique, le langage persuasif d'une vive clarté visuelle et d'un appel subjectif.
[3] Le *point de capiton* signifie, selon Lacan, le moment de production du sens dans une chaîne signifiante et fixe le sens une fois pour toutes.

[4] Nous allons y revenir plus tard.
[5] La dichotomie *Erklären/Verstehen* fut introduite en 1900 par Dilthey qui attribuait l'*explication* aux « sciences de la nature » et la *compréhension* aux « sciences de l'esprit ». Ricœur définit, pour sa part, l'herméneutique « comme l'une des mises en œuvre du rapport expliquer-comprendre, où le comprendre garde la primauté et maintient l'explication sur le plan des médiations requises, mais secondaires » (Ricœur 1992, 432).
[6] Berman emprunte l'expression *Erfahrung des Fremden* (« l'épreuve de l'étranger ») à Heidegger qui l'utilise dans son commentaire du poème *Andenken* (« Mémoire ») de Hölderlin (Heidegger 1996, 147).

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Body, World and Dress: Phenomenological and Somaesthetic Observations on Fashion

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Abstract

Hilary Putnam introduced the idea of the threefold relation between mind, body and world that it is necessary to take into consideration to adequately account for human perception and understanding. Recent philosophical debates on aesthetic practices that are characteristic of the present age have paid great attention to the fundamental role played by the body in our world-experience and, in case of the aesthetics of fashion (as part of the investigation of aesthetic experiences that have acquired an extraordinary power and significance in today's widely aestheticized world), also to the essential role played by dress to understand the human beings' particular relation to their own bodies. In this article, I first offer a general overview on the often problematic but nevertheless intriguing relationship between fashion and philosophy, and on the importance of the body/dress relation in the work of some relevant fashion theorists. Then, I focus on the contribution of Eugen Fink who inquired into fashion with great interest and accuracy, understanding it as a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and connecting it to other fundamental topics of investigation like the body and play. Finally, I show how these questions, and especially that of the central role played by the body in all aspects of our world-experience (where the body is understood as both a natural and cultural entity, or even as the place in which nature and culture intersect themselves), are also crucial in the philosophy of Richard Shusterman, and how the latter's reflections can be fruitfully compared to Fink's abovementioned phenomenological investigation of the significance of clothing and fashion.

Keywords: aesthetics of fashion, embodiment, phenomenology, pragmatism, Eugen Fink, Richard Shusterman

I.

In recent debates on aesthetic practices, experiences and dimensions that are characteristic of the present age, and that have acquired an extraordinary power and significance in

shaping our *sensus communis aestheticus* in today's widely aestheticized world[1], one of the main fields that have emerged is the aesthetics of fashion. Moving from the pioneering contributions on fashion of such thinkers as Simmel, Veblen or Benjamin, and also from more recent philosophical-sociological writings by such authors as Barthes, Baudrillard, Bourdieu and Lipovetsky, several original and important works on this topic have appeared in recent times[2]. This clearly testifies, also with regard to fashion, the general need to overcome what Richard Shusterman has called "the narrowness of [a certain] dominant conception" (Shusterman 2000, 140) in aesthetics and to broaden this field beyond the limits of the traditional philosophy of fine arts. As has been noted, in order to develop an adequate understanding of the present aesthetic situation it is important to take into account

> the essential difference between the traditional reference points of aesthetics and the reality we effectively experience today. According to what we may define the aesthetic common sense, grounded on a traditional conception of art, the latter represented a noble and refined domain designated to shape people's taste in certain institutional circumstances in which everyday life was somehow interrupted or suspended (as it still happens today in museums, art galleries, concert halls, theaters, and academies). But the dynamics presiding over the shaping and education of taste today are vice versa nearly completely coincident with those experienced in our "high-aesthetical" everyday lives, namely in the "aestheticized reality" that represents the ideal setting for the cultivation and diffusion of processes that are primarily embodied by fashion. It is not coincidental that the difference between art creations, entertainment performances, and fashion events has grown increasingly imperceptible as far as both the participants to the events, the logic underlying them, the way they take place, and finally the institutional settings of these happenings, are concerned (Matteucci 2016, 50).

With regard to fashion, already at the beginning of the 20th century Georg Simmel had understood and made explicit that "the *increased* power of fashion [had] overstepped the bounds of its original domain, which comprised only externals of dress", and had now acquired "an increasing influence over taste, theoretical convictions, and even the moral foundations of life in their changing forms" (Simmel 1997, 193). About one

hundred years later, this has been acknowledged by many other theorists. For example, according to Lars F. Svendsen,

> [f]ashion has been one of the most influential phenomena in Western civilization since the Renaissance. It has conquered an increasing number of modern man's fields of activity and has become almost 'second nature' to us. So an understanding of fashion ought to contribute to an understanding of ourselves and the way we act. […] Fashion affects the attitude of most people towards both themselves and others, […] and as such it is a phenomenon that ought to be central to our attempts to understand ourselves in our historical situation […]. [A]n understanding of fashion is necessary in order to gain an adequate understanding of the modern world. (Svendsen 2006, 7, 10)

However, notwithstanding the great importance for the human being of clothing and fashion, there has been until recent times a general tendency to ignore them and to neglect their intellectual and institutional significance. Indeed, "the study of fashion is of recent origin", and it took quite a long time "before fashion became a legitimate research topic for scholars, including social scientists" (Kawamura 2005, 6). An interest in fashion as a topic arose during the 19th century, but even in the 20th century "fashion and/or clothing as a research topic have never been popular": the scholars involved in the field of fashion studies often had and still have to face "the academic devaluation of fashion as a topic" (Kawamura 2005, 8).

As noted by Elizabeth Wilson, fashion has been "constantly denigrated" and therefore "the serious study of fashion has had repeatedly to justify itself": "all serious books about fashion seem invariably to need to return to first principles and argue anew for the importance of dress" (Wilson 2003, 47, 271). If this is true for the field of social and human sciences in general, it is even more valid for and appropriate for the specific field of philosophy. If we set aside a list of literary and essayistic writings of poets and novelists, intellectuals, artists or moralists[3], and if we limit ourselves to works that can be considered as strictly philosophical and undoubtedly belonging to the academic domain of philosophy, it becomes difficult to avoid the impression of a veritable "philosophic fear of fashion" (see Hanson 1993). A philosophical fear, the latter,

that is mostly connected to squeamishness about the body as an object worthy of intellectual attention (Pappas 2016a, 87n).

Of course, it is possible to come up with a list of philosophers who have provided sometimes only short and episodic remarks on fashion but occasionally instead extended analyses and systematic observations about it[4]. However, notwithstanding the existence of a minor but interesting tradition of philosophical perspectives on fashion, it is difficult to deny that, in general, "fashion has been virtually ignored by philosophers, possibly because it was thought that this, the most superficial of all phenomena, could hardly be a worthy object of study for so 'profound' a discipline as philosophy": in short, fashion "cannot at any rate be said to be a fashionable theme in philosophy", it has not been "considered a satisfactory object of study" (Svendsen 2006, 7, 17). Anyway, as observed by Nickolas Pappas, "sooner or later everything comes to interest philosophy"; if, on the one hand, "there is a view of the field according to which philosophy once encompassed every inquiry and went on to lose parts of itself one by one as each field saw how to be scientific", on the other hand there is also a view of the field according to which "philosophy's curiosity continues to seize on more of what is said and done and not yet brought into philosophy's consciousness": if it was "relativity a century ago", perhaps "it's brain science and film today" (Pappas 2016a, 73) – and also fashion, we could add.

2.

As noted by Elizabeth Wilson, dress "links the biological body to the social being, and public to private", and this "makes it uneasy territory": in fact,

> it forces us to recognize that the human body is more than a biological entity, It is an organism in culture, a cultural artefact even, and its own boundaries are unclear. [...] If the body with its open orifices is itself dangerously ambiguous, then dress, which is an extension of the body yet not quite part of it, not only links that body to the social world, but also more clearly separates the two. Dress is the frontier between the self and the not-self. […] In all societies the body is 'dressed', and everywhere dress and adornment play symbolic, communicative and aesthetic roles. Dress is always 'unspeakably meaningful'. […] Dress in general seems then to fulfill a

> number of social, aesthetic and psychological functions; indeed it knots them together, and can express all simultaneously. This is true of modern as of ancient dress. What is added to dress as we ourselves know it in the West is fashion. The growth of the European city in the early stages of what is known as mercantile capitalism at the end of the Middle Ages saw the birth of fashionable dress, that is of something qualitatively new and different. Fashion is dress in which the key feature is rapid and continual changing of styles. Fashion, in a sense is change, and in modern Western societies no clothes are outside fashion (Wilson 2003, 2-3).

From this point of view, inasmuch as dress immediately covers the surface of our body and thus presents it to the world as "never naked" but rather "always dressed", thus representing something like a "second skin" (see Entwistle 2000) for such "second-nature animals"[5] as the creatures that we are, clothing (and fashion, since the modern age) is clearly connected to the bodily dimension of human life. Indeed, understanding the phenomenon of clothing even appears as indispensable to adequately account for the particular relation that human beings normally have with their bodies throughout their life. Now, together with some recent developments of pragmatism like somaesthetics – the new disciplinary proposal introduced by Richard Shusterman and defined as "the critical, meliorative study of the experience and use of one's body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation [*aisthesis*] and creative self-fashioning" (Shusterman 2000, 267) –, the philosophical tradition that has probably paid the greatest attention to the rehabilitation of the embodied constitution of the human world-experience as such is phenomenology. From Husserl until today, investigating the body has represented a major goal of inquiry in the phenomenological tradition that has shown the body's "ontological centrality as the focal point from which our world and reciprocally ourselves are constructively projected" (Shusterman 2000, 270-271)[6].

As has been noted, the "denial of the cognitive significance of the body has a long tradition", stemming from Plato and arriving to the present age, inasmuch as "a disembodied view on the mind was also found in classical cognitive science" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 131). However, "an alternative philosophical backdrop" or "alternative approach" to the perhaps still prevailing but inadequate

conceptions of the mind/body and mind/world relationships "is alive and well", and has been "worked out in the phenomenological views" of various philosophers who attempted to "dig deeper into the meaning of embodiment, how it situates us and how it shapes our cognitive experience" (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 134). So, in general, according to phenomenological investigations of the body, the latter is not "one object among others" but rather

> is considered a constitutive or transcendental principle, precisely because it is involved in the very possibility of experience. It is deeply implicated in our relation to the world, in our relation to others, and in our self-relation, and its analysis consequently proves crucial for our understanding of the mind-world relation, for our understanding of the relation between self and other, and for our understanding of the mind-body relation. The phenomenological emphasis on the body obviously entails a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism. But it should be just as obvious that this does not entail an endorsement of some kind of Cartesian materialism. It is not as if the phenomenological way to "overcome" dualism is by retaining the distinction between mind and body, and then simply getting rid of the mind. Rather, the notion of embodiment, the notion of an embodied mind or a minded body, is meant to replace the ordinary notions of mind and body, both of which are derivations and abstractions. […] The lived body is neither spirit nor nature, neither soul nor body, neither inner nor outer, neither subject nor object. All of these contraposed categories are derivations of something more basic. […] The body is not a screen between me and the world; rather, it shapes our primary way of being-in-the-world. […] Moreover, all of [the] aspects of embodiment shape the way I perceive the world. […] Since this is the lived body with which I perceive and act, it is in constant connection with the world. And this connection is not a mere surface-to-surface contact, as a corpse might lie on the surface of a table; rather, my body is integrated with the world. To be situated in the world means not simply to be located someplace in a physical environment, but to be in rapport with circumstances that are bodily meaningful (Gallagher and Zahavi 2008, 135, 137).

In my view, this can be easily connected to some developments in the abovementioned field of somaesthetics, as testified for example by Shusterman's book *Body Consciousness*, where we read:

> The term "soma" indicates a living, feeling, sentient body rather than a mere physical body that could be devoid of life and sensation, while the "aesthetic" in somaesthetics has the dual role of emphasizing the soma's perceptual role (whose embodied intentionality contradicts the body/mind

> dichotomy) and its aesthetic uses both in stylizing one's self and in appreciating the aesthetic qualities of other selves and things. […] If embodied experience is so formative of our being and connection to the world, if (in Husserl's words) "the Body is […] the *medium of all perception*", then body consciousness surely warrants cultivating, not only to improve its perceptual acuity and savor the satisfactions it offers but also to address philosophy's core injunction to "know thyself" […]. The body expresses the ambiguity of human being, as both subjective sensibility that experiences the world and as an object perceived in that world. A radiating subjectivity constituting "the very centre of our experience", the body cannot be properly understood as a mere object; yet, it inevitably also functions in our experience as an object of consciousness, even of one's own embodied consciousness. […] I thus both *am* body and *have* a body. I usually experience my body as the transparent source of my perception or action, and not as an object of awareness. It is that *from which* and *through which* I grasp or manipulate the objects of the world on which I am focused, but I do not grasp it as an explicit object of consciousness, even if it is sometimes obscurely felt as a background condition of perception. But often, especially in situations of doubt or difficulty, I also perceive my body as something that I *have* and *use* rather than *am*, something I must command to perform what I will but that often fails in performance, something that distracts, disturbs, or makes me suffer (Shusterman 2008, 1-3).

3.

Far from being irrelevant for an aesthetics to fashion, what has been said above about the phenomenology of the body proves to be very important, because not so many philosophers, in general, have addressed fashion as a subject of inquiry, and because even among those philosophers who have, not so many really took into consideration the body/dress relationship. A relationship, the latter, that is of fundamental importance to adequately account for both dress as a sort of "second lived body" and fashion as an essential aesthetic practice. A relevant exception to this mainstream is precisely represented by a phenomenologist, and indeed a very important one: Eugen Fink, emphatically defined by Husserl himself as "the greatest phenomenon of phenomenology" (Husserl, quoted in Moore and Turner 2016, 1). In fact, in his 1969 book entitled *Mode: ein verführerisches Spiel* Fink investigated clothing and fashion with great interest and accuracy, connecting them to the basic anthropological structure of the human being.

If Fink's entire path of thinking can be divided into different phases (as argued for example by Simona Bertolini, an expert scholar of Fink who has distinguished three steps or phases in Fink's *Denkweg*) (see Bertolini 2012), then his short but remarkable book on fashion from 1969 must be placed in the context of the late phenomenological-anthropological development of his philosophy, especially focused on play (*Spiel*) and world (*Welt*)[7]. As Fink explains in another short but fundamental work, *Oase des Glücks*, "play is not a marginal manifestation in the landscape of human life" but it rather "belongs essentially to the ontological constitution of human existence": play "is an *existentiell*", "a fundamental phenomenon of existence, just as primordial and independent as death, love, work and ruling"; it is "a phenomenon of existence of an entirely enigmatic sort", "a fundamental possibility of social existence", "an intimate form of human community", or even "the strongest *binding* power. It is community-founding" (Fink 2016, 15-16, 18-19, 21-23, 27). For Fink, playing

> is always a confrontation with beings. In the plaything, the whole is concentrated in a single thing. Every instance of play is an attempt on the part of life, a vital experiment, which experiences in the plaything the epitome of resistant beings in general. […] [W]e must distinguish between the real human being who "plays" and the human role within the instance of play. […] In the enactment of play, there remains a knowledge, albeit strongly reduced, about [the player's] double existence. It exists in two spheres […]. This doubling belongs to the essence of playing. All the structural aspects touched on until now come together in the fundamental concept of the *playworld*. Every sort of playing is the magical production of a playworld. […] The playworld is an imaginary dimension, whose ontological sense poses an obscure and difficult problem. We play in the so-called actual world but we thereby attain (*erspielen*) a realm, an enigmatic field, that is not nothing and yet is nothing actual. […] [T]he imaginary character of the playworld cannot be explained as a phenomenon of a merely subjective appearance, nor determined to be a delusion that exists only within the interiority of a soul but in no way is found among and between things in general. The more one attempts to reflect on play, the more enigmatic and questionworthy it seems to become. […] The relation of the human being to the enigmatic appearance of the playworld, to the dimension of the imaginary, is *ambiguous*. […] The greatest questions and problems of philosophy are lodged in the most ordinary words and things. The concept of appearance is as obscure and unexplored as the concept of

> Being and both concepts belong together in an opaque, confusing, downright labyrinthine way, permeating one another in their interplay. […] Play is creative bringing-forth, it is a production. The product is the playworld, a sphere of appearance, a field whose actuality is obviously not a very settled matter. And nevertheless the appearance of the playworld is not simply nothing. […] The playworld contains [both] subjective elements of fantasy and objective, ontic elements. […] Playing is finite creativity within the magical dimension of appearance. […] Human play is (even if we no longer know it) the symbolic activity of bringing the sense of the world and life to presence (Fink 2016, 23-26, 28-30).

Fink's philosophical conception of fashion – that also pays great attention to the relevance of the body/dress relation, as I said – must be contextualized within his more general theory of the central role "played" by play in the whole of the human existence. This is confirmed by a few strategic passages of *Mode: ein verführerisches Spiel*, where Fink employs the concept of play to explain what fashion really is in its very "essence", i.e. also from an ontological point of view concerning the *Seinsrang* or *Seinssinn* of this phenomenon. Inasmuch as it belongs to the sphere of play that, in turn, is part of what Fink calls "the decisive fundamental phenomena of human existence", fashion proves to be extremely useful also from a philosophical point of view. Indeed, fashion proves to be a phenomenon that can allow us to better grasp some of the significant aspects of human existence already emphasized by Fink with regard to play, such as the status of appearances, the relevance of appearances for the life of a community or society (and hence also the question of so-called social appearances[8]), and the complex, polysemous, multidimensional and fundamentally ambiguous relation of the human being to his/her body and the world.

4.

Starting from the question concerning the particular nature of the human being, in his book on the aesthetics of fashion Fink significantly defines the human being as "a player"[9]; as a peculiar, odd animal that unites in itself nature and freedom, impulse and rationality; as "a curious creature" that "is condemned to self-organization and self-formation"[10]. It

is in this context that the fundamental significance of play for the human being (and, arising from this, the "playful" character of fashion itself) emerges. Fink is quite explicit on this point, and in fact he says that fashion relies on "the free play-impulse of the human being": for him, "fashion belongs to the realm of freedom and play" and, from this point of view, developing an adequate understanding of what fashion actually is represents "a cultural-pedagogical task of the first rank, in order to gain a self-comprehension of the human being as a player" (Fink 1969, 90, 96, 113). This also leads Fink to understand fashion as belonging to the dimension of sociability and free time or leisure: a question, the latter, to which he dedicates many pages and remarks in his book[11].

What is remarkable in Fink's investigation of fashion is also his capacity to provide a non-reductionist approach: namely, an approach that is able to avoid the reduction of such a complex phenomenon to a single and supposedly simple principle, aspect or element, and even to recognize fashion as a human activity whose antinomical essence, so to speak, consists in being one thing and at the same time the opposite. This makes it possible, for example, to explicitly compare his phenomenological approach to fashion to Georg Simmel's understanding of fashion as grounded at one and the same time on the twofold drive toward imitation and differentiation (both individual and collective), or even as peculiarly suspended or oscillating between being and not-being. For Simmel, fashion

> possesses the peculiar attraction of limitation, the attraction of a simultaneous beginning and end, the charm of newness and simultaneously of transitoriness. […] Fashion is […] imitation of a given pattern and thus satisfies the need for social adaptation; it leads the individual onto the path that everyone travels, it furnishes a general condition that resolves the conduct of every individual into a mere example. At the same time, and to no less a degree, it satisfies the need for distinction, the tendency towards differentiation, change and individual contrast. […] Hence fashion is nothing more than a particular instance among the many forms of life by the aid of which we seek to combine in a unified act the tendency towards social equalization with the desire for individual differentiation and variation. […] Connection and differentiation are the two fundamental functions which are here inseparably united, of which one of the two, although or because it forms a logical contrast to the other, becomes the condition of its realization (Simmel 1997, 188-192).

With regard to the question of the unique character of the human being, Fink stresses the latter's particular relationship to its body and, connected to this, the central role played by dress precisely in its relationship to the body[12] (including, among other things, the fashion/sexuality relationship)[13]. In doing so, i.e. in claiming that our existence is constitutively embodied, that we are world-open in an embodied way, that reality is bodily disclosed to us, and that the human body is not a thing but is rather the human being's effective reality, Fink clearly relies on insights into the dual dimension of our bodily life – namely, into the dual way we can refer to our own body both as *Körper* (an objective body, i.e. a mere object, a thing among things examined from a third-person perspective) and as *Leib* (a lived body, the body of a living organism experienced from a first-person perspective) – that have characterized to a great extent the development of phenomenological philosophy. An insight, the latter, that has also been paid great attention to by Richard Shusterman in the context of his latest developments of somaesthetics, for example when he claims that,

> if somaesthetics has introduced the term "soma" to distinguish the living, sentient, purposive human body from the lifeless bodies of corpses and all sorts of inanimate objects that are bodies in the general physical sense, this does not preclude the term from having its own rich ambiguity. Embracing both the mental and the physical, the soma is both subject and object. It is the bodily, sensory subjectivity through which we perceive things, including the soma itself as a bodily object in the world. It thus straddles both sides of the German phenomenological distinction between *Leib* (felt bodily subjectivity) and *Körper* (physical body as object in the world). If Helmut Plessner described the self as *being* a *Leib* while *having* its body as object (*Leibsein* and *Körperhaben*), then somaesthetics takes its task as understanding and cultivating the soma as both perceiving subject and expressive object, as being both what it is and ineluctably has. […] Besides its complexity as both subject and object in the world, the soma embraces other ambiguities. It exemplifies the ambiguity of human existence as both shared species-being and individual difference. Philosophers have emphasized rationality and language as the distinguishing essence of humankind. But human embodiment seems just as universal and essential a condition of humanity. […] The soma reveals that human nature is always more than merely natural but instead deeply shaped by culture (Shusterman 2019, 14-15).

Once again, far from being irrelevant for the specific purposes of a philosophical inquiry into fashion, the phenomenological conception of *Körper* and *Leib* rather proves to be essential, inasmuch as it also opens up the possibility of a general rethinking of the body/dress relationship ("*Verhältnis von Kleid und Leib*", in Fink's own words) (Fink 1969, 102). In fact, clothes serve as a cover, as a protection for the human being, but also (if not in the first place) as a proximate, "close-to-the-body" means of expression (see Fink 1969, 50). What emerges is thus a concept of dress, and in particular of fashionable dress, as a sort of "second lived body (*zweiter Leib*)" (Fink 1969, 69) for such particular "second-nature animals" as the human beings that, following again John McDowell (and a long tradition of philosophical-anthropological theories that his insights rely on), are not merely embedded in a natural environment (*Umwelt*) like all other animals but are rather characterized by the possession of a "second nature" and thus live in a historical-cultural world (*Welt*)[14].

Quite interestingly, somehow analogous observations on body and dress have been made by such influencing fashion theorists as Joanne Entwistle and Malcom Barnard (without ever mentioning Fink, however). The former, in her influential study *The Fashioned Body*, also speaks of dress as a sort of extension of our embodied Self, i.e. as a sort of "second skin" (see Entwistle 2000)[15]. While Barnard, for his part, explicitly refers to Entwistle herself and still other theorists, and argues that fashion is "about the 'fashioned' body", by which he understands "*not a natural* […] *body*" but rather

> a "produced" and therefore "cultured" body. This is partly because one of the meanings of fashion (as a verb) is "to make" or "to produce", and partly because *there can be no simple, uncultured, natural body*. […] Even when naked, the body is posed or held in certain ways, it makes gestures and it is thoroughly meaningful. To say that the fashioned body is always *a cultured body* is also to say that the fashioned body is *a meaningful body* […]. This is because saying that fashion is meaningful is to say that *fashion is a cultural phenomenon* (Barnard 2007, 4; my emphasis).

In this context, returning to Fink, a decisive element in his conception is represented by the human capacity to assume a distanced position from natural impulses (especially those

concerning natural attraction and seduction), to learn how to manage and control them, to establish a mediated relationship with them rather than immediately attempting to satisfy them, and finally to sublimate such impulses by means of cultural activities. It is precisely at this point that fashion comes into play, inasmuch as the latter is understood by Fink as a seductive game, as a "sphere-in-between" or a "field-in-between": namely, as a space that is the result of a typically human process of sublimation of impulses but does not function as a means for the latter's mere repression or suppression, but rather leads to their intensification and even exaggeration, although always in the context of culturally domesticated activities.

From this point of view, fashion's relation to natural impulses and seduction is not immediate and one-sided, but rather complex and also ambiguous, as if fashion played with them and at the same time was played by them, in an inextricable intertwinement of activity and passivity[16]. In more general terms, in Fink's perspective fashion seems to share with human existence as such a fundamental ambiguity[17]: or better, fashion embodies the ambiguous character that is typical of the human being as both a natural and a cultural being, it takes this ambiguity on, and it actually brings it to extremes. For Fink, "the phenomenon of fashion is connected to change, instability, fleetingness" (Fink 1969, 32), and this may be understood as a reflection, as it were, of the unstable, uncertain, always transient character of human nature as such (see, in particular, Fink 1969, 111-113).

5.

It is clear that making fashion's essentially ambiguous and multiform character fully explicit implies a refusal to adopt a simplifying or reductionist approach to this phenomenon, and thus leads one to ask the question as to whether or not there is a particular aspect or dimension of fashion that may be taken as a privileged key to gain an adequate access to it. Fink's answer to this question is that such a privileged key is represented by the aesthetic dimension: that is, should one want to assign fashion to a particular domain within the broad

and complex realm of various philosophical disciplines (ontology, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, politics, metaphysics, etc.), it would be definitely aesthetics.

Quite interestingly, this is also something that several fashion theorists have paid great attention to. To quote again Elizabeth Wilson, what is required in order to adequately account for fashion is "an explanation in aesthetic terms": for Wilson, fashion is "a branch of aesthetics", it is "one among many forms of aesthetic creativity which make possible the exploration of alternatives", in short it is "a serious aesthetic medium" (Wilson 2003, 116, 245, 268). Indeed, one of the main reasons why fashion greatly conditions our lives and even contributes to the definition of the *Zeitgeist* of the present age, probably lies in its aesthetic potentialities. For example, it lies in the capacity of fashion to express, through aesthetic means, symbolic contents that come to play a relevant role in the definition of both our individual and collective identities. As further observed by Wilson, fashion represents "an aesthetic medium for the expression of ideas, desires and beliefs circulating in society": for her, "everywhere dress and adornment play symbolic, communicative and aesthetic roles", and she adds that in various cases the theorists' attempts to reduce fashion to psychology or sociology have led us to exclude, "or at best minimise, the vital aesthetic element of fashion" (Wilson 2003, 3, 9).

In Fink's essay *Mode: ein verführerisches Spiel* the idea of a "peculiar aesthetic function of fashion" (Fink 1969, 70) emerges, for example, in connection to the question of leadership or command in fashion. A question, the latter, that Fink proposes to solve, as it were, by introducing the concept of seduction as quintessential to understand what fashion really is and how it functions (see Fink 1969, 96-101). In fact, for Fink fashion's influence on us, its capacity to determine our taste and preferences, often extending its conditioning power to our lifestyle and our decisions in other dimensions of our life, does not derive from some kind of command or authoritative coercion. Rather, it is the result of fashion's persuasive power deriving from its incomparable ability to play with seduction, with the human being's fundamental need to fascinate and at

the same time be fascinated or seduced. This persuasion and seduction power is precisely exercised by fashion with aesthetic means, i.e. thanks to its capacity to play in always new ways with forms and contents, materials and colors, in order to produce original works that may fascinate us and may be aesthetically appreciated and enjoyed by us. On this basis, Fink strategically makes use of such important concepts of aesthetics as *Schein*, *Verklärung*, *Phantasie* or *Illusion*, and eventually draws the conclusion that fashion's essential way of being, i.e. what it really *is*, is precisely "a seductive play" and "a seductive appearance" (Fink 1969, 101).

6.

It is quite intriguing to see how many of the questions and aspects that have emerged from Fink's phenomenological treatment of the body/dress relation and the idea of clothes as a sort of "second skin" for the "second-nature animals" that we are, can be fruitfully compared to some recent somaesthetic observations on body, dress and fashion from the pragmatist philosopher Richard Shusterman. As already observed before, the concept of "soma" introduced precisely by somaesthetics refers to "the living, sentient, purposive human body" and is aimed to embrace "both the mental and the physical", and also both the natural and the cultural in their complex mutual intertwinement, thus including "both sides of the German phenomenological distinction between *Leib* […] and *Körper*": as Shusterman explains, "the soma reveals that human nature is always more than merely natural but instead deeply shaped by culture" (Shusterman 2019, 14-15). Now, it is clear that the cultural nature (so to speak) of the human body's relation to the world does not depend only on the fact that, as Elizabeth Wilson claims, "in all societies the body is 'dressed', and everywhere dress and adornment play symbolic, communicative and aesthetic roles" (Wilson 2003, 2). However, it is also clear that clothing, inasmuch as it is such a universal and thus fundamental-anthropological phenomenon, plays a great role in this process. This evidently makes it an interesting object for inquiry for such a philosophical discipline as somaesthetics, with its aim to favor

> [a] critical study and meliorative cultivation of the experience and use of the living body (or soma) as a site of sensory appreciation (aesthesis) and creative self-stylization. An ameliorative discipline of both theory and practice, somaesthetics seeks to enrich not only our discursive knowledge of the body but also our lived somatic experience and performance; it aims to improve the meaning, understanding, efficacy, and beauty of our movements and of the environments to which our actions contribute and from which they also derive their energies and significance. To pursue these aims, somaesthetics is concerned with a wide diversity of knowledge forms, discourses, social practices and institutions, cultural traditions and values, and bodily disciplines that structure (or could improve) such somatic understanding and cultivation" and its internal division in branches (Shusterman 2016, 101).

From the point of view of somaesthetics – which is "an interdisciplinary project, in which theory and practice are closely connected and reciprocally nourish each other" (Shusterman 2016, 101) – clothing and fashion especially appear as interesting objects of inquiry because of their essentially ambiguous character. This can be clearly and explicitly connected to some of Fink's abovementioned observations on the same topic. In fact, if the human body's intrinsic dialectic of *Leibsein* and *Körperhaben* "expresses the ambiguity of human being" (Shusterman 2008, 1), in an analogous way also "the notion of fashion embraces considerable ambiguity" (Shusterman 2016, 95). Fashion – understood by Shusterman as "a complex, paradoxical enterprise of trying to reconcile contrasting elements into a compelling fit", and as "a complex process of fitting a striking variety of conflicting forces together in a productive and dynamic balance" – is surely "a social and cultural product" (Shusterman 2016, 92, 95, 98). At the same time, however, especially because of its relation to the fundamental human phenomenon of clothing, fashion "appears to derive from the deeper physiological and psychological essence of human nature", i.e. it is "'by nature' artificial" (Shusterman 2016, 98) like the human being. This, once again, clearly reminds us of some of the abovementioned observations on fashion offered by Fink from a phenomenological perspective that can be fruitfully compared to Shusterman's recent somaesthetic developments of this topic. According to him,

> fashion paradoxically reveals the body it conceals precisely by concealing it. […] Though clothing is not strictly speaking part of one's body in the way that a tattoo belongs to it, our bodies shape our clothes in ways that they do not shape more external fashion accessories. […] [O]ur clothes shape our bodies. […] We need also to consider the ways our clothing shapes our somatic habits, because the purposive body is not simply a bundle of bones and flesh but a complex of postural and behavioral dispositions that guide our actions without our needing to think about them explicitly. […] [C]lothes also have a social meaning as they are associated with certain attitudes that wearers of those clothes spontaneously adopt through prior experience in wearing those clothes. […] As clothes are made to fit the bodies and movements of men and women, so the bodily behavior of those men and women are conversely made (through training or implicit learning) to fit the meanings of those clothes (Shusterman 2016, 98-99).

As Shusterman claims, "a vast and complex array of pragmatic disciplines has been designed to improve our experience and use of our bodies", and this includes "forms of grooming and decoration, martial and erotic arts, yoga, massage, aerobics, bodybuilding, calisthenics, and modern psychosomatic disciplines" (Shusterman 2016, 102), and also clothing and fashion. If it is true that "our bodies are visible social markers of our values, affiliations, and tastes", then we can say that it is also through the particular kind of "somatic self-stylization" (Shusterman 2016, 103) provided by fashion (in its being an unceasing play with forms, colors and seductive appearances) that individuals, in the present age of widespread aestheticization, have the chance to develop their unique "somatic styles" (Shusterman 2011). Returning once more to the question of play, our goal should thus be that of becoming acquainted with fashion, of freely, actively and even joyfully playing with it (instead than being passively played by it, i.e. conditioned and even determined by its often incomprehensible and unbearable caprices), of autonomously developing our own "somatic style", and of individually finding the right connection between our own *Leib* and the "second lived body" that, as we have seen, is dress.

NOTES

[1] For a reconstruction and interpretation of current debates on aestheticization (sometimes also viewed as the aesthetic counterpart of globalization), see for instance: Michaud 2003, Lipovetsky and Serroy 2013, Di Stefano 2017, Matteucci 2017, Mecacci 2017, Iannilli 2018.
[2] Recent and relevant *philosophical* works on fashion include, for example, for instance, the books and collections by Scapp and Seitz 2010; Wolfendale and Kennett 2011; Matteucci and Marino 2016; Pappas 2016b.
[3] An excellent reconstruction and interpretation, that also takes into examination earlier literary and essayistic studies on fashion before the 19th century, can be found in Esposito (2004, especially 7-16, 34-42, 65-73).
[4] On this topic, let me remind the reader of Marino 2016.
[5] I freely adapt here to my purposes the important concept of "second nature" employed by John McDowell in his famous epistemological work *Mind and World* (1996), which can be also connected to a long and influential tradition of phenomenological, hermeneutical and philosophical-anthropological reflections on human nature in 19th- and 20th-century German thought (on this topic, see Marino 2015, chapter 1).
[6] To be precise, Shusterman refers here to Merleau-Ponty that he also emphatically defines in subsequent writings as "something like the patron saint of the body […] in the field of Western philosophy" (Shusterman 2008, 49).
[7] According to Simona Bertolini, "the notion of *world* is the key concept of Fink's entire post-war philosophical work. […] The concept of *world-totality* is the veritable barycentre of Fink's philosophy" (Bertolini 2012, 128, 242). In turn, for Bertolini, Fink's idea of "cosmological difference", clearly deriving from the concept of *kosmos* (expressed in German with such words as *Welt*, *Weltganzheit*, *Weltsein*), reminds of Heidegger's famous idea of the "ontological difference" between Being and beings but does not fully correspond to it.
[8] On this topic, see for example Carnevali 2020.
[9] "The human being – as a player – is close to fashion and all its phenomenical forms" (Fink 1969, 40).
[10] See also the insights and explanations on this aspect provided at pages 22-23, 53, 64 of Fink's book.
[11] On the general significance of sociability for human life, in general, and its connection to the domain of play, in particular, see Fink 1969, 79-81, 85-86, 88, 93.
[12] For Fink, "the human body always already shows, reveals […] and permeates at the same time clothing with its tendency to communication. […] Fashion is a phenomenon that is essentially connected […] to the human being's embodied nature, to our existence's being-incarnated" (Fink 1969, 50, 77).
[13] On this aspect, see Fink 1969, 51-53, 69, 71.
[14] On this topic, let me remind the reader of Marino 2017.
[15] It is probably not by chance that Entwistle's original account relies, among others, also on phenomenological insights into the significance of the bodily dimension for the constitution of our experience of the world in general.

[16] More in general, the complexity and, as it were, the eminently dialectical character of Fink's conception of fashion (using here the concepts of "dialectics" and "dialectical" with a broad and quite general meaning) emerges in the perhaps clearest way when Fink introduces the idea of an intrinsic relation between opposite moments, antagonisms and contrasts as relevant and indeed decisive for the definition of fashion: for example, struggle for eternity vs. transience, naturalness vs. artificialness, imitation vs. distinction, conformism vs. originality, assimilation to others vs. individualism, public life vs. private life, dressing vs. undressing (see Fink 1969, 33, 45-46, 62, 69-70, 105). On a terminological level, this aspect especially emerges in the use of such concepts as *Gegenwirkung*, *Gegenwendigkeit* or *Gegensatzmotiv* (see Fink 1969, 30, 53, 96-97).

[17] "Dress has an ambivalent, equivocal and plurivalent expressive value" (Fink 1969, 36). Fashionable dress is characterized by its "ambivalence, its ambiguity and its intrinsic oppositive character" (Fink 1969, 55). "Fashion has many faces, its smiling gracefulness is more enigmatic than the smile of the Gioconda" (Fink 1969, 77).

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Leben als sinnloses Leid. Versuch einer Einordnung des Antinatalismus von David Benatar im Lichte der Philosophie A. Schopenhauers

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Abstract

Life as Meaningless Suffering: Reflections on David Benatar's Antinatalism in the Light of the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer

The South African philosopher David Benatar argues that not being born is preferable to coming into existence as only the fact of non existing can prevent suffering. From an ethical and pragmatic viewpoint this means that we have to forego procreation. Benatar's main line of argumentation is the claim of an asymmetry between harms and benefits such that not being born does not withhold benefits from anybody whereas it surely prevents suffering. The present paper will argue that the persuasiveness of Benatar's claim depends fundamentally upon a premise which in fact remains totally undiscussed by the philosopher himself. This crucial premise is revealed, however, if one analyzes Benatar's philosophy in the light of the metaphysically grounded anti-natalist ethics of Schopenhauer.

Keywords: Antinatalism, Nihilism, Metaphysics, Suffering, Meaning

I.

Es ist eine in der Regel unproblematisierte Grundüberzeugung der modernen westlichen Gesellschaften, dass das Leben ein besonderes und wertvolles Gut sei[1]. Nicht zuletzt durch die Ominipräsenz lebensbejahender Botschaften in den Medien, der Werbung und in populärwissenschaftlichen Veröffentlichungen wird uns das Leben mit seinen vermeintlich schier unerschöpflichen Möglichkeiten als Quelle von Abenteuer und Erlebnis, von Glück und Erfüllung nahegebracht. Mit

Gerhard Schulze ließe sich sagen, dass die Erlebnisdimension in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft geradezu paradigmatischen Charakter erhalten hat[2]. Umso irritierender wirkt es da, wenn die Wünschbarkeit des Lebens grundlegend infrage gestellt wird. Wie irritierend, das zeigt eloquent der Auftakt einer Rezension, in der Christopher Belshaw das 2006 erschienene Buch *Better to never have been. The Harm of coming into existence* des südafrikanischen Philosophen David Benatar bespricht. Belshaw beginnt diese wie folgt: „This year's winner of the Bookseller/Diagram prize for the oddest title of the year is *Stray Shopping Carts of Eastern North America: A Guide to Field Identification*. Other finalists included *How Green were the Nazis?*, *Tatooed Mountain Women and Spoon Boxes of Daghestan*, and the book I'm reviewing here. *The title is indeed odd.*" (Belshaw 2007; meine Hervorhebung) „Odd", seltsam, sei dieser Titel, und die Einreihung in eine Liste mit thematisch fremden Titeln, die mit letzterem nur die vermeintliche Skurrilität gemein haben, illustriert als wie seltsam der Hinweis auf die Nichtwünschbarkeit der Existenz empfunden wird. Dass selbst eine philosophische Rezension in einem Fachorgan Benatars Titel in der Skurrilitätenschublade ablegt, ist freilich mit der erwähnten medialen Allgegenwart von Lebensbejahung nicht hinreichend erklärt, lässt sich aber beispielsweise mit Max Horkheimer auf tieferliegende strukturelle Gründe zurückführen. So konstatiert Horkheimer bereits in der Mitte des vergangenen Jahrhunderts eine fortschreitende Abwendung der Philosophie von traditionellen philosophischen Fragestellungen und insbesondere grundlegende Existenzfragen. Stattdessen orientiere sich die Philosophie sowohl methodologisch als auch thematisch in zunehmendem Maße an der Wissenschaft und richte ihre Aufmerksamkeit wie diese pragmatisch, utilitaristisch, positivistisch und möglichst konstruktiv auf zukünftige Möglichkeiten und auf die Verbesserung des Gegebenen (Vgl. Horkheimer 1947, 44)[3]. Mit anderen Worten ordne sich die Philosophie weitgehend den prädominanten gesellschaftlichen Paradigmen und Imperativen unter. Unter dieser Prämisse ist dann auch erwartbar, dass eine antinatalistische Position *odd* erscheinen muss. Interessanterweise beklagte freilich schon der wohl

bekannteste philosophische Antinatalist Arthur Schopenhauer vor über 200 Jahren mit einer erheblichen Portion Sarkasmus: „[D]ie Welt will hören, dass sie löblich und vortrefflich sei, und die Philosophen wollen der Welt gefallen“ (Schopenhauer 1920, 345), weshalb sich auch die erfolgreichen philosophischen Systeme ausnahmslos den Optimismus auf die Fahnen geschrieben hätten, eine Schopenhauer zufolge „ruchlose Denkungsart“ (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 424)[4].

Antinatalistische Positionen bringen mithin aus naheliegenden Gründen, damals wie heute, nicht die besten Voraussetzungen mit, eine größere Breitenwirkung oder Popularität zu erzielen. Das heißt aber keineswegs, dass sie hierdurch vorderhand philosophisch disqualifiziert wären. Im Gegenteil ist die Stichhaltigkeit einer Position selbstverständlich von deren Popularität oder Attraktivität kausal gänzlich unabhängig und Albert Camus' Aussage, dass das Wahre suchen nicht bedeute, das Wünschenswerte zu suchen, hat nach wie vor Gültigkeit (Camus 1998 [1942], 47f.)[5]. Der vorliegende Beitrag bemüht sich nachzuweisen, dass der Antinatalismus Benatars aus einer bestimmten Perspektive heraus als plausibel zu betrachten ist. Dabei wird argumentiert, dass die Überzeugungskraft der Position Benatars von einer Prämisse abhängt, die bei ihm selbst nahezu völlig unthematisiert bleibt und die auch in der Vielzahl der Auseinandersetzungen mit Benatars Argumenten in der Regel nicht problematisiert wird[6]. Diese wird jedoch sichtbar, wenn der Position Benatars durch einen Blick auf die Philosophie Schopenhauers eine größere Tiefenschärfe verliehen wird.

II.

Das zentrale Postulat Benatars findet sich klar formuliert im Titel seines 2006 erschienenen Buches, in dem er seine antinatalistische Position detailliert entfaltet: *Better never to have been. The harm of coming into existence*[7]. Die Argumentation, die er vor dem Hintergrund dieser These entwickelt, ist zweistufig. In einem ersten Schritt bemüht er sich, unter der Berücksichtigung einer Reihe von möglichen und tatsächlichen Einwänden, die Richtigkeit dieses Postulats

stringent nachzuweisen. Die Pointe seiner Argumentation für das Vorziehen des Nichtgeborenwerdens vor dem Geborenwerden (*coming into existence*) ist die Identifizierung einer Asymmetrie zwischen dem Vermeiden von Leiden (*harm*) und dem Vorenthalten von Angenehmem (*benefit*), die die Bevorzugung des Nichtgeborenwerdens ethisch geboten sein lasse. In einem anschließenden zweiten Schritt entwickelt Benatar aus der dieserart gewonnenen Einsicht ein ethisches Programm, das darauf gerichtet ist, das Leiden der Menschen zwecks progressiver Extinktion der Spezies unwiderruflich aus der Welt zu schaffen[8].

Angesichts dieses ebenso drastischen wie ambitionierten Programms ist es wichtig, bezüglich dessen Reichweite auf zweierlei hinzuweisen. Zum einen gilt es zu betonen, dass Benatars These, dass es ein Unglück (*harm*) ist, geboren zu werden, sich nicht als perspektivisch-subjektive Bestandsaufnahme eines konkreten, besonders unglücklichen oder leiderfüllten Lebens versteht. Im Gegenteil ist Benatars Postulat auf eine Ebene gehoben, die gerade nicht auf Einzelschicksale oder subjektives Erleben fokussiert, sondern sich auf eine „*harm-benefit*"-Kalkulation stützt, die den Anspruch auf Objektivität erhebt und die er anhand verschiedener Szenarien in Tabellenform illustriert[9]. Der zweite Aspekt, der in diesem Zusammenhang wichtig ist, ist die Tatsache, dass sich die Arbeit Benatars der Intention nach weder als eine polemisch zugespitzte Provokation versteht[10], noch gar als eine melancholische Auseinandersetzung mit den menschlichen Unzulänglichkeiten und der menschlichen Sterblichkeit[11].

Dabei konstruiert Benatar seine antinatalistische Argumentation zunächst mithilfe der Universalisierung einer konkreten ethischen Problemstellung. Im Kontext einer Diskussion der „non identity"-Problematik nimmt Benatar die Frage in den Blick, wann ein Leben als lebenswert zu betrachten sei. Konkret wird diese Frage etwa gestellt, wenn es um mögliche Behinderungen oder soziale Nachteile geht, die einem noch nicht existierenden Kind mit auf den Weg gegeben würden[12]. Eine Herausforderung der Ethik sei es in diesem Zusammenhang zu erörten, mit welchen Arten von Behinderungen oder Beeinträchtigungen ein potentielles Leben

als nicht lebenswert einzuschätzen wäre[13]. Der Einschätzung, wann ein Leben als nicht mehr lebenswert zu betrachten sei, würden, so Benatar, *benefit-harm*-Abwägungen zugrunde gelegt. Ist das zu erwartende Leid zu groß, so sei es für das potentielle Kind besser, nicht zu sein[14]. Benatar nimmt diese Diskussion auf, um sie auf eine allgemeine Ebene zu heben: Die Frage, wann ein Leben mit so viel Leiden behaftet wäre, dass es für den betreffenden Menschen besser wäre, nicht geboren zu werden, stelle sich nicht erst für potentielle Kinder mit zu erwartenden Behinderungen oder Beeinträchtigungen, sondern sie sollte, Benatar zufolge, für *jedes* mögliche neue Leben gestellt werden. Dann aber, so sein radikales Postulat, werde sich zeigen, dass es *in jedem Falle* und für *jedes* mögliche neue Leben besser sei, nicht zu entstehen (Benatar 2006, 28ff.)[15]. Benatar zufolge ist nicht geboren zu werden dem In-die-Existenz-Kommen *immer und unter allen Umständen* vorzuziehen, denn, so Benatar, dadurch werde *immer* Leiden verhindert, während die durch das Geborenwerden möglichen *benefits* erstens niemandem vorenthalten werden und zweitens in ihrem Umfang höchst ungewiss sind. Das Argument, dass durch das Nichtgeborenwerden niemand zu Schaden komme, ist die zentrale Stütze seines Postulats und basiert auf der Annahme einer grundlegenden Asymmetrie. Der entscheidende Gedankengang ist der folgende:

> It is uncontroversial to say that (1) the presence of pain is bad, and that (2) the presence of pleasure is good. However, such a symmetrical evaluation does not seem to apply do the absence of pain and pleasure, for it strikes me as true that (3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas (4) the absence of pleasures is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation. (Benatar 2006, 30)[16]

Mit anderen Worten: Es gebe eine perfekte Analogie zwischen den Urteilen, dass Schmerz schlecht ist und Angenehmes gut; jedoch gelte das in der Umkehrung nicht in gleicher Weise. Zwar ist die Abwesenheit von Schmerz ausnahmslos wünschenswert, jedoch sei es ethisch unproblematisch, wenn *pleasures* ausblieben, solange und insofern diese niemandem konkret versagt würden: Einem hypothetischen zukünftigen Menschen wird durch das Nichtgeborenwerden also Leiden erspart (denn es wäre sicher,

dass dieser hypothetische Mensch als wirklicher Mensch Leiden ausgesetzt wäre), aber ihm wird nichts vorenthalten, wenn er nicht in die Existenz gelangt, insofern es in diesem Falle keine konkrete Person gibt, der etwas vorenthalten werden könnte. Aus dieser Asymmetrie ist für Benatar, wie gesagt, der Schluss zu ziehen, dass das Nichtgeborenwerden dem Geborenwerden *immer* vorzuziehen ist ungeachtet der Frage, wieviel Leid oder Freude für ein zukünftiges Leben zu erwarten wäre.

Zwar ist diese Asymmetrie das entscheidende Element, um den Antinatalismus als folgerichtig aufzuzeigen, aber Benatar scheint sich nicht allein auf dieses eher abstrakte Argument verlassen zu wollen. Denn er legt großen Wert darauf zu betonen, dass die Menschen prinzipiell die *benefit*-Seite überschätzen und die negativen Seiten der Existenz oft vernachlässigen würden. Das gelte zunächst in Bezug auf die Erinnerung an besondere Lebensereignisse, bei denen unsere psychologische Prädisposition uns dazu neigen lasse, erfreuliche Ereignisse in Erinnerung zu behalten und unerfreuliche zu vergessen[17]. Das gelte aber auch dahingehend, dass wir auch im Alltag im Grunde permanent mit negativen Zuständen konfrontiert seien, ohne dies in Anschlag zu bringen – auch wenn Benatar konzediert, es handle sich bisweilen lediglich um „relatively mildly negative [states]“ (Benatar 2006, 71)[18]. In der Konsequenz laufe dies darauf hinaus, die wirkliche Qualität unseres jeweiligen Lebens in der Regel erheblich zu überschätzten, wir Menschen seien mithin überaus schlechte Richter, wenn es darum geht, unser Leben in seiner Lebenswertigkeit objektiv einzuschätzen[19]. Wenn man aber die Qualität des Lebens unter Ausschaltung subjektiver Verzerrungen bewerte, dann werde die Erwartung relativiert, dass einem möglichen Leben eine Menge Freude vorenthalten werde, sollte es nicht in ein wirkliches Leben überführt werden. Andererseits sei im Falle eines Geborenwerdens das Leiden gewiss, so dass gesagt werden könne: „[E]xistence is always a serious harm“ (Benatar 2006, 1). Die kohärente Abwägung der Asymmetrie zwischen möglichen *benefits* und sicheren *harms* lässt Benatar zufolge

nur den Schluss zu, dass es ethisch geboten ist, das Nichtgebären der Prokreation vorzuziehen[20].

III.

Die Überzeugung, dass das Nichtgeborenwerden dem Existieren vorzuziehen ist, und dass eine nähere Betrachtung des Lebens kaum den Schluss zulasse, dass im Leben die Freuden gegenüber den Leiden überwiegen, vertritt in vergleichbarer Unzweideutigkeit auch Arthur Schopenhauer. So heißt es in seinem Hauptwerk *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*:

> Ehe man so zuversichtlich ausspricht, daß das Leben ein wünschenswerthes, oder dankenswerthes Gut sei, vergleiche man ein Mal gelassen die Summe der nur irgend möglichen Freuden, welche ein Mensch in seinem Leben genießen kann, mit der Summe der nur irgend möglichen Leiden, die ihn in seinem Leben treffen können. Ich glaube, die Bilanz wird nicht schwer zu ziehen seyn. (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 669)

Die schlichte Aufrechnung von Freude und Leiden freilich scheint Schopenhauer letztlich dem Problem in seiner ganzen Tiefe nicht gerecht zu werden, denn kurz darauf hebt er die These, dass das Nichtsein dem Sein vorzuziehen sei, auf ein deutlich grundsätzlicheres Fundament, wenn er konstatiert:

> Im Grunde aber ist es ganz überflüssig, zu streiten, ob des Guten oder des Uebeln mehr auf der Welt sei: denn schon das bloße Daseyn des Uebels entscheidet die Sache; da dasselbe nie durch das daneben oder danach vorhandene Gute getilgt, mithin auch nicht ausgeglichen werden kann. […] Denn daß Tausende in Glück und Wonne gelebt hätten, höbe ja nie die Angst und Todesmarter eines einzigen auf. (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 669f.)

Angst, Marter, Leiden allgemein ist mithin Schopenhauer zufolge prinzipiell inkommensurabel, so dass die Aufrechnung von Glück und Unglück in letzter Instanz nicht ausschlaggebend und dem Skandal des Leidens grundlegend unangemessen ist[21]. Das Verdikt, dass Nichtsein dem Sein vorzuziehen ist, bedarf mithin nicht des kleinteiligen Nachweises eines Übergewichts des Leidens, vielmehr macht die Anerkenntnis der Inkommensurabilität von Leiden schlechthin jede Art von Aufrechnung hinfällig. In diesem

Sinne wäre für Schopenhauer auch das Asymmetrieargument Benatars unnötig, denn allein die Existenz des Leidens entscheidet die Frage – und zwar umso eindeutiger als ein Leben „in Glück und Wonne", das bei Benatar zumindest nicht strukturell unmöglich ist, sich bei Schopenhauer ohnehin als eine Illusion erweisen muss, worauf noch zurückzukommen sein wird. Schopenhauers Antinatalismus ist daher in seiner Begründung weit radikaler als der Benatars, und diese Radikalität findet ihre Erklärung sicherlich zum Teil darin, dass Schopenhauer seine antinatalistische Ethik metaphysisch fundiert. Das wird deutlich, wenn man den Blick auf eine Frage richtet, die für Schopenhauer zentral ist, jedoch bei Benatar keinerlei Rolle spielt und nicht einmal erwähnt wird, und zwar ist dies die Frage nach dem *Grund* des Leidens. Anders als bei Benatar, der rein analytisch-utilitaristisch argumentiert und sich mit der Konstatierung der Faktizität des Leidens begnügt, um sein Postulat des Hinarbeitens auf das Aussterben der Menschheit zu plausibilisieren, versucht Schopenhauer, zu den strukturellen Gründen für das Leiden der Menschen vorzudringen. Ein solcher Schritt jedoch ist erforderlich, um die Forderung nach dem Aussterben der Spezies zu fundieren. Denn nur so kann abgesichert werden, dass das aus dem Asymmetrie-Argument abgeleitete *harm-benefit*-Kalkül nicht nur aktuell valide ist, sondern dies auch künftig bleibt. Allein vor dem Hintergrund eines Verständnisses der strukturellen Ursachen des Leidens kann sichergestellt werden, dass grundsätzlich eine *Perspektive der Überwindung* des Leids, die sich diesseits der Forderung nach dem Aussterben hält, ausgeschlossen werden kann. Denn solange eine Beseitigung der Asymmetrie zumindest *möglich* ist, stellt sich die Frage der Plausibilität des Antinatalismus erneut und unter veränderten Voraussetzungen. Erst die Einsicht in die metaphysische Fundierung der anthropologischen Tiefenstrukturen, die für das Leiden ursächlich sind, bildet bei Schopenhauer das unhintergehbare Fundament für die Abweisung aller eventuellen innerweltlichen Veränderungsoptionen und macht die radikale ethische Forderung unabweisbar, dass das Leiden nur durch den Verzicht auf Fortpflanzung zu überwinden sei. Die umfassende Soteriologie, die Schopenhauer im vierten Buch

der *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* entwickelt und die sich auf reichhaltige Zeugnisse philosophisch-mystisch-religiöser Traditionen des Westens, aber auch des Ostens stützt, erhält also eine ideengeschichtlich untermauerte metaphysische Verankerung, wie sie bei Benatars Ansatz völlig fehlt. Das Fundament von Schopenhauers Antinatalismus ist dabei die zentrale These, dass die Welt in ihrem Wesen Wille ist.[22] Was diesen Willen auszeichnet ist nach Schopenhauer – und hier wendet er sich explizit gegen die zu seiner Zeit angesagten teleologischen Geschichtsphilosophien –, dass dieser keinerlei Teleologie in sich schließe, sondern im Gegenteil *blind* und *ziellos* sei (Vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 418). Der Wille[23] ist ein blindes Streben, das unaufhörlich sich fortsetzt und seinen Fluchtpunkt nicht in einem religiösen Jenseits, sondern in der Leere des „[N]ichts" (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 528)[24] findet.

Diese Einsicht ist nun aber der Hintergrund, der benötigt wird, um die Lage des Menschen vollumfänglich bewerten zu können, wie Schopenhauer sich nachzuweisen bemüht. Denn ausgehend von der Einsicht in den Willen als Grundprinzip der Welt kann Schopenhauer nun dessen anthropologische Implikationen und Konsequenzen in ihrer Unausweichlichkeit nachvollziehen. Im Menschen nämlich äußert sich dieser blinde, ins Nichts strebende Wille immerfort und unausweichlich als ein jeweils konkretes *Wollen von Etwas*. Dieses Wollen wiederum verweist auf einen Mangel und wird von uns von daher als Leiden erlebt. Wenn wir etwas wollen, wollen wir diesen Mangel beheben, wir sind unbefriedigt und streben nach der Befriedigung dessen, worauf unser Wollen gerichtet ist. Schopenhauer argumentiert hier zunächst ganz auf der Linie von Kant, der in seiner *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* davon spricht, dass die Natur dem Menschen einen „Stachel der Tätigkeit" (Kant 1980 [1798], 155) eingepflanzt habe, der ihn immer wieder dazu veranlasse, aus einem aktuellen Zustand herauszugehen und zu einem neuen Ziel aufzubrechen. Genauer meint Kant, dass für den Menschen der Schmerz immer das erste ist und gleichsam der Motor, um einen gegebenen Zustand zu

verlassen, um in einen Zustand der Befriedigung zu gelangen. So schreibt Kant:

> Sein Leben fühlen, sich vergnügen, ist also nichts anderes als; sich kontinuierlich getrieben fühlen, aus dem gegenwärtigen Zustande herauszugehen (der also ein ebensooft wiederkommender Schmerz sein muß). (Kant 1980 [1798], 155)

Vor diesem Hintergrund deutet Kant das Leben als ein Alternieren zwischen zwei Zuständen: Vom Schmerz geht die Bewegung zur Befriedigung und wieder zurück zum Schmerz vor einer erneuten Befriedigung[25]. So vollzieht sich das Leben also in einer Pendelbewegung, in der das Pendel im Idealfall mehr oder weniger gleichmäßig zwischen Wunsch und Befriedigung hin- und herschwingt, bzw. zwischen dem Schmerz, der zur Bewegung veranlasste und der Befriedigung, das Ziel erreicht zu haben, das zum Ausbruch aus dem Schmerz gesetzt wurde. Schopenhauer übernimmt diesen Ansatz strukturell, gibt ihm jedoch vor dem Hintergrund seiner Willensmetaphysik eine negativ-pessimistische Wendung. Denn gegen Kant bestreitet Schopenhauer, dass das Erreichen des Gewollten Befriedigung verschafft. Vielmehr zeige sich, sobald ein Ziel erreicht werde, dass dieses nur ein vermeintliches war, da der Wille sich unmittelbar auf ein neues Ziel ausrichte beziehungsweise, wenn dem Willen gerade kein neues Ziel ‚greifbar' ist, sich der Wegfall des erreichten Ziels und der Mangel eines neuen in Form von – wiederum als schmerzhaft empfundener – Langeweile manifestiere[26]. Damit gibt es bei Schopenhauer kein Alternieren mehr zwischen einem negativen und einem positiven Pol, zwischen Schmerz und Befriedigung, sondern in der Pendelbewegung in ihrer Schopenhauerschen Umdeutung wird ein Schmerz jeweils durch einen neuen Schmerz ersetzt unter Ausschluss der Befriedigung selbst als Möglichkeit[27]. Der Moment zwischen den Endpunkten der Pendelbewegung, das heißt zwischen zwei schmerzhaften Zuständen ist dann allenfalls ein Moment der Illusion, denn er birgt die Hoffnung auf Befriedigung bei Erreichen des Zieles. Diese Illusion jedoch wird in dem Augenblick als solche erkennbar, in dem jenes vermeintliche Ziel erreicht wurde, sich jedoch keine Befriedigung einstellt, insofern der Wille sich nun bereits auf

etwas Neues ausrichtet. Diese Struktur erklärt auch, warum für Schopenhauer eine Aufrechnung von *harms* und *benefits*, auch unabhängig von der Inkommensurabilität des Leidens, keinen Sinn hätte. Denn in einem eigentlichen Sinne kann es vor dem Hintergrund seiner Willensmetaphysik keine *benefits* geben, da der positive Pol sich als Illusion erweist[28]. Das Leiden jedoch ist unhintergehbar:

> Die unaufhörlichen Bemühungen, das Leiden zu verbannen, leisten nichts weiter, als daß es seine Gestalt verändert. Diese ist ursprünglich Mangel, Noth, Sorge um die Erhaltung des Lebens. Ist es, was sehr schwer hält, geglückt, den Schmerz in dieser Gestalt zu verdrängen, so stellt er sogleich sich in tausend anderen ein, abwechselnd nach Alter und Umständen, als Geschlechtstrieb, leidenschaftliche Liebe, Eifersucht, Neid, Haß, Angst, Ehrgeiz, Geldgeiz, Krankheit usw. usw. (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 410)

Wenn die Philosophie trotz dieses evidenten Elends der menschlichen Existenz, wie es laut Schopenhauer aus den zuvor genannten Gründen unausweichlich und unüberwindbar mit der *conditio humana* verbunden ist, dem Optimismus das Wort rede, so sei dies schlicht Opportunismus und Eitelkeit[29]. Wäre die Philosophie aufrichtig an der Wahrheit interessiert, so könne sie nur zur der Einsicht gelangen, dass das Leben im Wesentlichen nur „ein mattes Sehnen und Quälen“ ist, „ein träumerisches Taumeln durch die vier Lebensalter hindurch zum Tode, unter Begleitung einer Reihe trivialer Gedanken“ (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 419).

Wenn man sich von der Verklärung der philosophischen Systeme nicht blenden lasse und das Leben in seiner Essenz betrachte, dann zeige sich dessen völlige Sinnlosigkeit und eine Banalität und Redundanz, die das menschliche Leiden unerträglich mache. Das Leiden ist dabei umso unerträglicher als die mit dem Leben verbundene Mischung aus Monotonie und Leiden keine Perspektive dahingehend eröffnet, dass dies irgendwann einmal besser werden könnte. Denn insofern dem Elend der Welt und des Menschen der Wille als Wesen zugrunde liegt, kann es für Schopenhauer *in der Welt* kein Heil geben – die Welt kann nicht verbessert werden, da sie *in ihrem Prinzip* Leiden verursacht. Es kann also nur darum gehen, den Kreislauf von Geborenwerden und Sterben zu durchbrechen,

will man die unsägliche Quälerei beenden, die das Leben in seinem Wesen darstellt.

IV.

Es zeigt sich also, dass sich der Schopenhauersche Antinatalismus aus den Erkenntnissen seiner Willensmetaphysik speist. Insofern dem menschlichen Leiden strukturell ein unstillbarer Wille zugrunde liegt, kann es keinen Ausbruch aus dem Leid geben. Es gibt also, bei Berücksichtigung dieser metaphysischen Begründung des Leidens, keine Asymmetrie zwischen *harms* und *benefits*, sondern die Seite der *benefits* entfällt, wenn man Schopenhauer folgt, völlig, insofern sich die Freuden als Illusion erweisen. Konform gehen Benatar und Schopenhauer aber in ihrer grundsätzlichen Fokussierung auf das Leiden der Menschen: Ob Leben *prinzipiell* Leiden ist (wie bei Schopenhauer) oder ob Leben unausweichlich neben Freuden *auch* Leiden enthält (wie bei Benatar), es kommt beiden darauf an, dieses Leiden zu verringern bzw. zu beenden. Insofern sind die Postulate beider zunächst einmal schlüssig, wenn die Vermeidung von Leiden oberste Priorität hat. Wie gesehen, hatte Benatar ausdrücklich betont, es sei „uncontroversial to say that […] the presence of pain is bad" (Benatar 2006, 30). Genau an dieser Stelle aber ist es notwendig, etwas genauer hinzusehen. Denn die „uncontroversality" dieser Prämisse gilt, so soll an dieser Stelle als These formuliert werden, nur in einem bestimmten Horizont. Dieser wiederum bleibt bei Benatar, anders als bei Schopenhauer, nahezu unthematisiert. Und zwar geht es darum, dass sowohl Benatar als auch Schopenhauer, um zu ihrem Urteil zu gelangen, dass aufgrund der Unausweichlichkeit des Leidens das Nichtsein dem Sein vorzuziehen ist, die *Sinnlosigkeit* des Leidens voraussetzen. Bei Benatar kommt dieser Aspekt zwar in einer kurzen Bemerkung zur Sprache, ohne dass ihm jedoch bewusst zu sein scheint, wie fundamental seine gesamte Argumentation hiervon abhängig ist.

Wie gesehen ist die zentrale Begründung, mit der Schopenhauer und Benatar den Grundkonsens, dass das Leben etwas Gutes und Wünschenswertes sei, aufkündigen, die

Betonung des mit der Existenz unausweichlich einhergehenden Leides, sei es weil das Leben im Innersten wesentlich Leiden ist oder weil es aufgrund der gezeigten Asymmetrie ethisch geboten ist, dem Vermeiden von Leid die Priorität vor dem Gewähren von Freude zu geben. Der Verweis darauf, dass Existieren unvermeidlich mit Leiden verbunden ist, ist als Erklärung ihrer antinatalistischen Position bei Schopenhauer und Benatar zwar notwendig, aber im Grunde noch nicht hinreichend. Denn zwar ist zunächst sicher zutreffend, dass der Mensch darum bemüht ist, Schmerz und Leid zu vermeiden, und mit Sigbert Gebert könnte man in der ethischen Forderung, anderen kein Leiden zuzufügen so etwas wie den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner einer Ethik unter den Bedingungen der Spätmoderne erblicken (Vgl. Gebert 2010, 156ff.). Aber dass ein Leben besser nicht wäre, nur weil in ihm Leiden unvermeidlich ist, eine solche Schlussfolgerung ist daraus noch nicht zwingend ableitbar. Denn es wäre durchaus naheliegend davon auszugehen, dass (auch erhebliches) Leiden als akzeptabel hingenommen werden kann, insofern und solange es in irgendeiner Hinsicht als gerechtfertigt erscheint. Dies illustriert nicht zuletzt sehr eindrücklich die Geschichte des Christentums. Aus christlicher Perspektive waren die Leiden Christi ebenso notwendig – und in diesem Sinne wünschenswert – wie die der unzähligen Gläubigen, die den Märtyrertod gestorben sind. Unter der Prämisse der Leidensvermeidung wären die Passion Christi und der Märtyrertod vermeidbares Leid. Aus der Perspektive des Gläubigen hingegen ist dieses Leiden in einem paradoxen Sinne sogar erwünscht und zwar nicht in erster Linie, weil am Ende des Leidens die Erlösung steht, sondern weil dem Leiden ein *Sinn* attribuiert werden kann[30]. In vergleichbarer Weise integrieren teleologische Geschichtsphilosophien den Einzelnen in ein sie transzendierendes Narrativ und erlauben es ihm damit zumindest potentiell, eventuelles Leiden als individuelles Schicksal im Kontext eines sinnhaften Ganzen zu erleben. Es ist von daher auch kein Zufall, dass Schopenhauer diesbezüglich ausdrücklich einen Bruch mit der philosophischen Tradition vollzieht. So betont er nicht zuletzt gegen das geschichtsphilosophische System eines Hegel, aber

auch gegen traditionelle theologische Modelle, dass der Wille als Wesen der Welt auf keinerlei höheren Zweck zuläuft, sondern in Wahrheit blind und ziellos ist. Ein *telos*, eine höhere Absicht könnte das Leiden als gerechtfertigt erscheinen lassen, aber in einer gottlosen Welt ist das Leiden der Menschen ohne Horizont, der es zu legitimieren vermöchte[31]. Am Ende des leidvollen Daseins des Menschen wartet kein Paradies – sei es innerweltlich oder transzendent –, kein Reich der Freiheit, das Leiden in der Welt ist nicht der Preis, den es zu bezahlen gilt für das Erreichen von etwas Besserem oder Höheren, sondern der Tod setzt schlicht dem Leiden zu einem unbestimmten Zeitpunkt, aber unausweichlich ein Ende. Das Leiden der Menschen war gleichsam ‚für Nichts' und insofern letztlich völlig sinnlos. Bei Schopenhauer gibt es mithin ein klares Bewusstsein einer Interdependenz der Problematik des Leidens und der Sinnfrage[32] und die Radikalität seines Denkens besteht nicht zuletzt genau hierin: Er entkleidet die Welt endgültig ihrer Zweckhaftigkeit und lässt uns mithin mit einer sinn-, heil- und haltlosen Welt zurück. Erst vor diesem Hintergrund wird das Leiden der Menschen (bzw. aller fühlenden Wesen) unerträglich[33].

Anders als Schopenhauer entwickelt Benatar diesen fundamentalen Aspekt seines Antinatalismus nicht, auch wenn naheliegend ist, dass er hier eine vergleichbare Position vertritt. Darauf deutet zumindest ein Hinweis auf die Sinnlosigkeit des Leidens, der jedoch, anders als bei Schopenhauer, nur beiläufig erwähnt und anschließend weder kontextualisiert noch problematisiert wird. So schreibt Benatar:

> Not only is this harm all readily avoidable, but it is also so *utterly pointless* (at least if we consider only the interests of the potential persons and not also the interests others might have in that person's coming into existence. (Benatar 2006, 5; meine Hervorhebung)[34]

Diese Bemerkung wird, wie gesagt, an keiner Stelle wieder aufgenommen oder vertieft, aber es lässt sich daraus wohl ableiten, dass auch Benatar seinen Antinatalismus ausgehend von der Prämisse konstruiert, dass das Leiden, dem wir Menschen mit der Geburt ausgesetzt sind, deshalb unerträglich ist, weil es *sinnlos* ist.

Von hier aus lässt sich eine doppelte Hypothese formulieren. Zunächst scheint es plausibel davon auszugehen, dass eine antinatalistische Position wesentlich dann vertreten wird, wenn es nicht gelingt, das Leiden der Menschen in einen weiteren Sinnhorizont zu integrieren; darauf aufbauend ließe sich die Hypothese formulieren, dass Positionen wie die Schopenhauers und Benatars in ihrer Plausibilität folgerichtig von einem bestimmten Sinnhorizont abhängig sind. Sie würden ein höheres Maß an Plausibilität aufweisen in einem Kontext, in dem die traditionellen „großen Erzählungen" zunehmend in die Defensive geraten und ihre Glaubwürdigkeit und ihre Orientierungsfunktion verlieren bzw. verloren haben[35]. Man könnte also mit anderen Worten die Vermutung äußern, dass, wenn die Diagnose von Jean-François Mattéi zutreffend ist, dass wir uns in der Spätmoderne in einer orientierungslosen *crise de sens*[36] (Mattéi 2006) befinden, der Antinatalismus[37] tatsächlich gute Gründe für sich reklamieren kann. Genau in diese Richtung geht eine zentrale These des Philosophiegeschichtlers und Religionsphilosophen Rémi Brague. Brague vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Spätmoderne sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass ihr – freilich weitgehend unbewusst – ein legitimes *Warum* des Fortbestehens der Menschheit abhandengekommen ist und der moderne Mensch im Grunde nicht mehr plausibel begründen könne, warum Leben „gut" ist, insofern ihm ein Referenzpunkt fehle, der hierfür die Grundlage bieten könnte (Vgl. Brague 2014, 310). Nach Brague kann aber ein solcher in überzeugender Weise allein in einem transzendenten Bezug liegen, da der Mensch sonst unvermeidlich zugleich „juge et partie"[38] sei. Bragues Gedankengang lässt sich in aller Kürze wie folgt resümieren: In der Antike hatte der Mensch seine begründete Stellung im Kosmos – in dieser transzendenten Gesamtstruktur ist alles im Einzelnen gerechtfertigt, weil das Gesamte gerechtfertigt ist, insofern es auf das Gute ausgerichtet ist[39]. In der christlichen Tradition schuf Gott die Welt „und sah", wie es in der Bibel heißt, „dass es gut war" (1. Mose 1:10). Im Rahmen eines dieserart sinnhaften Ganzen kann auch das Leiden – mehr oder weniger gut[40] – seinen Platz finden, weil der Mensch sich einem sinnvoll geordneten Ganzen zugehörig fühlt (Vgl. Brague

2014, 25)[41]. Wenn der Mensch aber nur durch das zufällige Geschehen der Evolution entstanden ist und die Evolution bzw. die Natur damit nichts „bezweckt", zugleich aber der Mensch über die Fähigkeit der Reflexion verfügt und damit über die Fähigkeit zu ethischen Abwägungen, gibt es letztlich keinen plausible Grund mehr, warum er Leiden akzeptieren – und erst recht: Leiden selbst *generieren* – soll[42]. Aus einer rein immanenten Perspektive, so Brague, lässt sich mithin nicht sinnvoll rechtfertigen, dass das Sein gut und dem Nichtsein vorzuziehen ist.

Die Argumentation Benatars kann als perfekte Illustration der These Bragues dienen, dass eine rein immanentistische Ethik letztlich unausweichlich in den Nihilismus münde. Und so ist es auch nicht überraschend, dass Brague in einer Fußnote auf Benatar verweist mit der Bemerkung, dass dessen Position bei genauer Betrachtung tatsächlich die einzig konsequente sei für das Denken in einer Gesellschaft, die eine höhere bzw. tiefere Verankerung verloren habe – die ultimative Form des Nihilismus, auf den die Spätmoderne sich zubewege. Schopenhauers Metaphysik des Willes antizipiert diese Entwicklung, indem sie der für das abendländische Denken charakteristischen Teleologie das *telos* nimmt und die Dynamik der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung ins Leere laufen lässt. Schopenhauer erkennt bereits klar die grundstürzenden Konsequenzen jenes Sinnverlustes, denn der Tod Gottes generiert, aber er hält sich noch im Rahmen einer Metaphysik, die es ihm auch zumindest noch erlaubt, eine Heilslehre zu formulieren, wenn auch unter negativem Vorzeichen[43]. Klar ist, dass sich bei Schopenhauer bereits sehr deutlich der Zusammenbruch jener großen Erzählung ankündigt, die das Abendland über Jahrhunderte getragen hat und deren Destruktion mit dem Namen Nietzsches verbunden wird. Benatars Antinatalismus ist in diesem Sinne das *aboutissement* dieser ideengeschichtlichen Entwicklung und zwar dahingehend, dass mit dem Entfall eines den Einzelnen transzendierenden Sinns die Existenz des Menschen auf ein Abwiegen von *harms* und *benefits* reduzierbar ist: Insofern ein höherer Sinn entfallen ist, bleibt allein die Fokussierung auf das Hier und Jetzt der Immanenz[44]. Ohne Horizont, der über

diese hinausreicht, ohne Perspektive, die eine Evaluierung der Existenz im Rahmen von *harm-benefit*-Kalkulationen transzendieren würde, kann – oder muss sogar – eine Untersuchung, die zu der Einsicht gelangt, dass das Leiden einen erheblichen Teil des Menschseins ausmacht, zu dem Ergebnis gelangen, dass es besser wäre, nicht zu sein[45].

Im Ergebnis ließe sich festhalten, dass ein Antinatalismus, der sich in der gezeigten Weise auf die Frage des Leidens konzentriert, nicht *per se* überzeugend bzw. fragwürdig ist. Vielmehr hängt seine Überzeugungskraft von dem Sinnhorizont ab, vor dessen Hintergrund er sich entfaltet bzw. Plausibilität beansprucht. Konkret bedeutet dies: Je weniger eine Gesellschaft in der Lage ist, einen Sinnhorizont zu etablieren, der es vermag, Leiden zu integrieren, desto plausibler und überzeugender wird der Antinatalismus[46]. Traditionell waren solche Sinnhorizonte in der Transzendenz verankert, so dass sich aus dieser Überlegung zwei konkrete und dringliche Fragen ergeben, nämlich (1) ob und inwieweit es möglich ist, neue und tragfähige Sinnhorizonte zu entwerfen, die einen nihilistischen Immanentismus zu überwinden vermögen; und (2) ob diese notwendig, wie Brague dies suggeriert, Transzendenzbezug aufweisen müssen, ob es mithin gelingen muss, die gegenwärtige Orientierung an einer positivistische Vernunft zu erweitern durch andere Formen der Rationalität[47]. Seien die postmodernen Gesellschaften nicht in der Lage, solche neuen Perspektiven zu erschließen, so die Überzeugung von Rémi Brague, dann müsste eine kohärente Ethik in der Tat auf eine Position wie die Schopenhauers oder Benatars hinauslaufen, der Antinatalismus würde mithin ethische Pflicht: „Wenn wir nicht felsenfest davon überzeugt sind, dass das Leben gut ist, ist es nicht nur möglich, Buddha oder Schopenhauer [und ich ergänze: Benatar; d. Verf.] ernstzunehmen, sondern es wird zur heiligsten Pflicht.“[48] Allerdings gilt eine derartige Einschätzung selbstverständlich nur für diejenigen, für die die Sinnfrage zum Problem geworden ist und auch dann nur, wenn diejenigen, denen sie zum Problem geworden ist, daraus Handlungskonsequenzen ableiten. Insofern argumentiert Gebert sehr plausibel: „Nur für das Sinnfragen geht es um Begründungen, und nur wenn man

nachmetaphysisch die Halt-losigkeit des vom Nichts umgegebenen Lebens und die nicht mögliche Rechtfertigung von Leiden anerkennt, ergibt sich das Aussterben als humane Perspektive." Aber, so gibt Gebert zu bedenken: „Das Leben will leben – unabhängig davon, was philosophisch plausibel erscheint." (Gebert, 2010, 201). Mit anderen Worten: Sollte der Antinatalismus zwar tatsächlich gute Gründe vorzubringen haben, jedoch so marginal bleiben, wie er es in der heutigen gesellschaftlichen Diskussion ist[49], so zeigt dies vermutlich vor allem, wie weit sich die Philosophie vom Leben entfernen kann und wie ohnmächtig das philosophische Argument angesichts des Faktums des Lebens ist.

ANMERKUNGEN

[1] Auch aufgrund des Relevanzverlustes religiöser Lebensfundierungen rückt es tendenziell gar immer öfter auf in den Rang eines „höchsten Guts", im Unterschied zur Idee des *summum bonum* bei Aristoteles. Denn für Aristoteles war das Leben noch hingeordnet auf ein höheres *summum bonum* und konnte nicht selbst dieses sein (vgl. Aristoteles, *Nikomachische Ethik*, 1094 A15-20). Im Übrigen gilt diese Setzung des Lebens als höchsten Gutes gewissermaßen nur als Abstraktion, konkret hingegen zeigt sich eine starke Ambivalenz in der Setzung des Lebens als höchstes Gut, wie der Soziologe Didier Fassin überzeugend herausgearbeitet hat (vgl. Fassin 2007). Walter Reese-Schäfer weist zu Recht darauf hin, dass ein Setzen des Lebens als höchstes Gut gerade hinsichtlich menschenrechtlicher Argumentationen nicht unbedenklich ist (vgl. Reese-Schäfer 2000, 355f.).

[2] Vgl. Schulze 1993, insbes. pp. 34ff. Die mit diesem Erlebnisparadigma einhergehenden Erwartungen wiederum erreichen ein derartiges Gewicht, dass es dem Individuum nicht selten schwerfällt, auf der Höhe dieser Erwartungen und Verheißungen zu bleiben. Dass Burn-out und Bore-out endemische Erkrankungen des modernen Menschen sind, liegt sicherlich nicht nur an den in vielen Bereichen stetig steigenden Anforderungen im Beruf, sondern auch an einem Überreizen des individuellen Erwartungshorizontes. Vgl. zur Überforderung der Menschen in der Postmoderne Thomas 2005, bes. pp. 43f. und 106f.; sowie Schulze 1993, 14.

[3] Sigbert Gebert spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einer zunehmenden Ausrichtung der Philosophie auf Wie-Fragen, statt, wie traditionell, auf die Warum-Frage. Vgl. Gebert 2010, 192. Zugleich zeigt sich in der Einschätzung des Titels Benatars als *odd* eine erstaunliche Distanz zur abendländischen Geistesgeschichte, die von Sophokles über Calderon und Leopardi bis zu Cioran eine ganze Reihe illustrer Figuren aufzuweisen hat, die sehr Ähnliches geäußert haben. Vgl. Sophokles 2002, 466, Calderon de la Barca 1826, 8f., Leopardi 1990 [1898], 1, 209. Eines der bekanntesten Werke

Ciorans wiederum trägt eine ähnliche Reflexion bereits als Titel: *Vom Nachteil, geboren zu sein* (Cioran 1979 [1973]).

[4] Zitate aus Arthur Schopenhauers *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* werden im Haupttext mit der Abkürzung „WWV", gefolgt von der Seitenangabe nachgewiesen.

[5] Mit E. Tugendhat könnte man dies auch als die Forderung nach intellektueller Redlichkeit bezeichnen. Vgl. hierzu Tugendhat 2006, 79ff.; ders. 2010, 85ff.

[6] Das gilt für die genannte Rezension von Belshaw 2007, aber auch z.B. für Harman 2009, Hallich 2018 oder James/Shackelford 2018.

[7] Benatar 2006. Die wesentlichen Argumente Benatars finden sich auch in einer aktualisierten Form in dem Band *Debating Procreation*, in dem er seine eigene mit der von David Wassermann vertretenen Gegenposition konfrontiert (vgl. D. Benatar & D. Wassermann 2015).

[8] Ich konzentriere mich im Folgenden auf die Überlegungen auf der ersten Stufe und vernachlässige das Programm, welches Benatar daraus ableitet, insofern dieses für die hier entwickelte Fragestellung nicht relevant ist.

[9] Ein Denker wie Friedrich Nietzsche würde selbstverständlich bestreiten, dass so etwas sinnvoll oder auch nur möglich ist. Vgl. z.B. Nietzsche 1900, 431.

[10] Benatar ist die ironisch-provokante Haltung eines Nietzsche, Kierkegaard oder Friedrich Schlegel grundlegend fremd und es ist ihm, wie er explizit sagt, mit seinem Anliegen grundlegend ernst: „I am entirely serious in my arguments and I believe in the conclusions. I am serious about these matters because what lies in the balance is the presence or absence of a vast amount of harm" (Benatar 2006, 5).

[11] Hier könnte man selbstverständlich an die Tradition der Melancholie in der abendländischen Literatur- und Geistesgeschichte denken, aber auch an das japanische *mono no aware* (物の哀れ), einen Gefühlszustand der Traurigkeit angesichts der Vergänglichkeit der Dinge. Vgl. hierzu Nishitani 1982 [1961], 372; Elberfeld 1999, 49. Benatars einzige Abweichung von seiner methodologischen Sachlichkeit findet sich in den den einzelnen Kapiteln vorangestellten Zitaten, die in der Regel von Dichtern und Schriftstellern stammen und in denen die grundlegende Relevanz der Problematik für den einzelnen Existierenden durchscheint. Diese Zitate stehen freilich bisweilen in einem eigentümlichen Spannungsverhältnis zu Benatars Abhandlung. So stehen einige schlicht im Widerspruch zu seinen Ausführungen, andere beinhalten ein Erkenntnispotential, das von Benatar gänzlich ungenutzt bleibt. In die erste Kategorie gehören aus verschiedenen Gründen die von ihm verwendeten Zitate aus der Bibel. Hier sei nur darauf verweisen, dass etwa das Zitat aus Hiob (vgl. Benatar 2006, 132) gerade auf besondere Einzelne verweist, die mit Benatars Ansatz, die Diskussion auf eine universelle Ebene zu bringen, nicht einmal in den Blick gelangen können, sowie auf die Tatsache, dass die Bibel-Zitate die immanentistische Argumentation Benatars untergraben (vgl. zu diesem Aspekt den letzten Teil meines Beitrags). Als Illustration für letztere Kategorie sei vor allem auf ein Zitat von Flaubert verwiesen (vgl. Benatar 2006, 93), in dem der Langeweile eine ganz fundamentale Rolle zukommt. Eine Reflexion auf das Erkenntnispotential der Langeweile vermöchte es sicherlich, dem für Benatar

zentralen Problem des Lebens als Leiden eine größere Reichweite zu geben, insofern sie unvermeidlich Ambiguitäten in den Blick bringen würde, die in Benatars Ausführungen gänzlich fehlen.

[12] Vgl. Benatar 2006, 19. Ausgeblendet wird in diesem Zusammenhang selbstverständlich eine andere – wohl immer wichtiger werdende – Perspektive, nämlich inwieweit Eltern „es sich antun" wollen, ein Kind mit Behinderungen aufzuziehen. Vgl. hierzu Schulze, 1993, 13.

[13] Dabei muss betont werden, dass die englischsprachige Diskussion über „lifes worth living" (Benatar 2006, 20), auf die Benatar sich bezieht, von den im Deutschen aus historischen Gründen unvermeidlich vorhandenen Konnotationen weitestgehend frei ist. Es ließe sich jedoch die Frage stellen, wie losgelöst von historischen Bezügen eine solche Diskussion legitimerweise geführt werden darf, zumal die Berücksichtigung dieser historischen Dimension und der unvermeidlich inhaltlich mitschwingenden Reflexionshorizonte der Diskussion helfen könnte, sich unthematisierter Voraussetzungen bewusst zu werden.

[14] Benatar betont zu Recht, dass die Frage, ab welchem Ausmaß an Leiden ein Leben als nicht mehr lebenswert zu betrachten ist, anders gefällt wird, wenn es sich um potentielles Leben handelt, als wenn es sich um reales Leben handelt: „We require stronger justification for ending a life than for not starting one" (Benatar 2006, 23).

[15] Die Reichweite seines Postulats erstreckt sich im Übrigen in der Tat auf *jedes* Leben, denn Benatar erwähnt, zumindest *en passant*, dass im Grunde auch die Tiere in diese Reflexionen mit einzubeziehen wären. So heißt es ausdrücklich, er sei der Überzeugung, dass „coming into existence harms all sentient beings" (Benatar 2006, 2), und Benatar hebt besonders hervor, dass die Tierhaltung zur Fleischproduktion eine schier unvorstellbare Menge an vermeidbarem Leiden hervorbringe (ebd., 2f.), auch wenn er die Problematik des Leidens der Tiere anschließend nicht weiter ausführt. In der Einschätzung, dass die Existenz auch für Tiere wesentlich leiden bedeutet, hat er im Übrigen Arthur Schopenhauer auf seiner Seite (vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 405).

[16] Eine kritisch-konstruktive Diskussion des Asymmetrie-Arguments bietet Hallich 2018.

[17] Benatar verweist auf verschiedene psychologische Studien, die belegen, dass der Mensch dazu neigt, sich eher an Positives als an Negatives zu erinnern, wodurch die Einschätzung des eigenen Lebens zum Überschätzen des Guten hin verzerrt werde. Vgl. Benatar 2006, 64ff.

[18] Benatar ordnet quasi sämtliche Lebensphänomene in seine *harm-benefit*-Klassifizierung ein und geht dabei über nicht unerhebliche qualitative Unterschiede hinweg. Kritisch einzuwenden wäre zudem, dass seine binären Klassifizierungen nicht den geringsten Raum für Ambivalenzen lassen. Wie notwendig aber hier Nuancierungen wären bzw. wie komplex und wohl unentwirrbar *benefits* und *harms* miteinander verknüpft sein können, das zeigt sich zum Beispiel beim Sport, bei dem Anstrengung und Genuss bisweilen ineins fallen können.

[19] Benatar bemüht sich, diese Tatsache sorgfältig zu belegen. Vgl. Benatar 2006, 60 ff. Jedoch stellt sich Frage, inwieweit hier objektive Kriterien

wirklich in sinnvoller Weise als Maßstab herangezogen werden können ohne die subjektiven Faktoren mit einzubeziehen. Der Ansatz einer objektiven Evaluierbarkeit der Lebenswertigkeit ist sicherlich nicht nur methodologisch fragwürdig, sondern auch in seiner ethischen Dimension alles andere als unproblematisch.

[20] Die ethische Grundlage seines Postulats untermauert Benatar im Übrigen auch dadurch, dass er seine Position explizit gegen den Vorwurf des Egoismus verteidigt, wenn er sagt, Menschen bekämen Kinder „for any number of reasons, but among these cannot be the interest oft he potential child. One can never have a child for the child's sake." (Benatar, 2006, 2) Wenn man in bewusster Entscheidung Kinder bekomme, dann entsprechend dem Kinder*wunsch der Eltern*, mit dem die Vorstellung eines erfüllenden Lebens verbunden wird (vgl. Benatar 2006, 98).

[21] In diesem Sinne würde Schopenhauer auch der Ansicht Hallichs klar widersprechen, dass es *a priori* keinen Grund dafür gebe, das Vermeiden von Leiden dem Vorenthalten von Freuden überzuordnen. Vgl. Hallich 2018, 194f.

[22] Der Begriff des Willens geht bei Schopenhauer in seiner Bedeutung weit über den gemeinhin damit assoziierten Sinngehalt hinaus, insofern er auf ein metaphysisches Prinzip verweist, das er in allen uns gegebenen Gegenständen vorhanden sieht. Schopenhauers auf Kant aufbauende Erkenntnistheorie bildet bekanntlich die Grundlage für das Verständnis seiner Metaphysik des Willens. Der Gedanke, dass die Welt zunächst einmal unsere Vorstellung ist, ist zentral für Schopenhauer. Allerdings lässt Schopenhauer die Kantische Kategorie der „Erscheinung" – nämlich des Dings für uns – unter der Hand zum „Schein" im Sinne von Trug und Illusion werden, wenn er die Welt der Erscheinungen als Täuschung der Maja begreift (vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 335). Zudem glaubt Schopenhauer über die doppelte Gegebenheit des eigenen Körpers als Wille und Vorstellung einen Zugang zum Ding an sich gefunden zu haben (vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 150ff.), was im Rahmen der Kantischen Philosophie selbstverständlich unmöglich ist.

[23] Freilich hat der Wille als Wollen des Menschen einen Zweck, der jedoch kein Endzweck ist: „Der Wille im Menschen", so betont Schopenhauer, „hat genau denselben Zweck, wie der Wille im Thier: Sich mehren und Kinder zeugen" (Lindner/Frauenstädt 1863, 352).

[24] So lautet bezeichnenderweise das letzte Wort von *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*. Vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 528.

[25] Auf der Grundlage dieser Einsicht gibt Kant auch den pragmatischen Ratschlag, diesen Sachverhalt quasi strategisch für sich zu nutzen, um sein Leben als ein erfülltes zu konstruieren, nämlich indem man sich ein fernes Ziel definiert, das über viele kleine Etappen des Alternierens von Schmerz und Befriedigung nach und nach erreicht wird. Vgl. Kant 1980 [1798], 159.

[26] Auch Kant kommt auf die Langeweile zu sprechen. Allerdings erscheint sie bei ihm wie ein eigentümliches und unverständliches „Steckenbleiben" des Pendels. Zwar sieht er dabei durchaus, dass dies die dramatischsten Auswirkungen haben kann. So erwähnt Kant, dass der durch Langeweile verursachte Leidensdruck so stark werden könne, dass er bis zum Suizid führe, in dem verzweifelten Versuch, „sich die Zeit zu passieren" (Kant 1980

[1798], 158). Im Übrigen ist es charakteristisch, dass die Langeweileproblematik von Kant im Kontext seiner pragmatischen Anthropologie zur Sprache kommt, die metaphysische Tiefe, die sie bei Schopenhauer, aber auch bei Kierkegaard und später bei Heidegger bekommt, bleibt ihm wohl allein schon hierdurch verschlossen. Vgl. zur metaphysischen Dimension der Langeweile Hüsch 2014, 36. Vgl. auch Große 2008.

[27] Entsprechend ist auch Glück bei Schopenhauer allein negativ definiert als die – nie dauerhafte – Abwesenheit von Leiden. Überhaupt seien wir positiv nur empfänglich für Leiden: „Wir fühlen den Schmerz, aber nicht die Schmerzlosigkeit; wir fühlen die Sorge, aber nicht die Sorglosigkeit; die Furcht, aber nicht die Sicherheit" (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 668). Diese Bestimmung impliziert, dass das (allein negativ bestimmbare) Glück nur erreichbar ist dadurch, dass das Wollen suspendiert wird. Daraus ergibt sich Schopenhauers ‚Lösung', die in der Askese besteht und in dem Hinarbeiten darauf, den Willen immer konsequenter zu verneinen.

[28] Der höchste *benefit*, der im Rahmen der Schopenhauerschen Willensmetaphysik erreichbar ist, ist insofern nur negativ fassbar als Abwesenheit von Leiden dadurch, dass man des Wollens enthoben ist. Dies freilich gelingt nur unter Aufgabe des Selbst. Denn dem das Leiden verursachenden Wollen entkommt der Einzelne allein dadurch, dass er als wollendes Individuum gerade verschwindet. Er verwandelt sich in ein reines Erkennen jenseits des Wollens und damit auch außerhalb der Individuation (vgl. Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 409).

[29] Vgl. die eingangs zitierte Kritik Schopenhauers am Optimismus als „ruchloser Denkungsart" (vgl. S. 52 dieses Beitrags).

[30] Eine utilitaristische Position könnte selbstverständlich versucht sein, den Nutzen auf die Transzendenzebene auszuweiten und zu argumentieren, dass das Leiden in diesem Sinne zum Glück im Jenseits führe. Wie in der Immanenz das Leiden durch harte Arbeit den Wohlstand mehre und damit perspektivisch ein höheres Maß an Zufriedenheit erzeuge, so sei für den Gläubigen die Selbstaufopferung ein Mittel zum Zweck der Zufriedenheitsmehrung. Ich halte eine solche Argumentation für bedingt überzeugend bzw. nur überzeugend für Fälle, in denen der Glaube konventionellen Strukturen verhaftet bleibt. Sie kann aber meines Erachtens weder für die mystische Tradition der Selbstaufgabe, noch zum Beispiel für die zen-buddhistische Tradition sinnvoll vertreten werden, insofern es dort gerade darum geht, jede Selbstverhaftung zu überschreiten. Vgl. dazu aus christlicher Perspektive Jean de la Croix (1990, 654-655; vgl. hierzu auch Galland 2015, 144ff.). Bei Dōgen, dem Begründer der zen-buddhistischen Tradition in Japan wiederum heißt es in Bezug auf das Eigeninteresse ausdrücklich: „Mitgefühl mit den Menschen haben und dabei nicht zwischen Vertrauten und Fremden unterscheiden; immer bestrebt sein, alles ohne Unterschied zu retten, und dabei *niemals an den eigenen Gewinn denken, weder im Sinne weltlicher noch überweltlicher Vorteile* […]" (zitiert in Han 2002, 123f.; meine Hervorhebung). Wo es in letzter Instanz um eine völlige Auslöschung des Selbst geht, kann nicht mehr utilitaristisch argumentiert werden. Die Trennlinie zwischen einem indirekten Egoismus und authentischer Selbstaufgabe könnte man mit Tugendhats Differenzierung

zwischen Religion und Mystik markieren (vgl. Tugendhat 2006, 111ff.). Freilich bleibt die Einordnung in letzter Instanz zweideutig und kann nur kategorial sichtbar gemacht, nicht jedoch konkret attribuiert werden.

[31] Schopenhauer wirft der Geschichtsphilosophie, wie gesagt, vor, dies aus Eitelkeit und Opportunismus zu verschweigen. Ihre positive Geschichtskonzeption sei nichts anderes „als ein bitterer Hohn über die namenlosen Leiden der Menschheit" (Schopenhauer 2005 [WWV], 424).

[32] Auch wenn Schopenhauer die Sinnfrage noch nicht explizit so formuliert. Dies wird dann sein Schüler Friedrich Nietzsche tun, der in *Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben* ausdrücklich vom „Sinn des Daseins" spricht. Vgl. F. Nietzsche 1954 [1874], 216.

[33] Die Radikalität, mit der Schopenhauer mit der Tradition bricht, illustriert auch folgende Überlegung von François Jullien zu einem charakteristischen Grundzug der abendländischen Philosophie: „Autant le discours philosophique innove et se radicalise, en quête chaque fois de nouvelles figures saillantes de la vérité, autant le propos de théodicée s'en retourne-t-il, sous lui, vers les voies tracées, et mixe-t-il ainsi des éléments divers, constatons-nous, sans plus s'embarrasser. *Pour justifier le monde et la vie de ce monde, tous les arguments sont bons, d'où qu'ils viennent – s'efface la marque d'école –, et l'on fait flèche de tout bois*" (Jullien 2005, 42; meine Hervorhebung).

[34] Freilich wird an der Aussage, dass all das Leiden leicht zu verhindern wäre deutlich, dass Benatar die Verhältnisse in modernen, entwickelten Staaten als Standard setzt, denn es gibt durchaus auch heute noch Regionen in der Welt, in denen das Bekommen von Kindern nicht so leicht zu vermeiden ist, wie Benatars Aussage nahelegt.

[35] Vgl. zum Ende der „großen Erzählungen" Jean-François Lyotard (1983). Schopenhauers Philosophie ist selbstverständlich eine Philosophie, in der der Tod Gottes, den sein Schüler Friedrich Nietzsche ausrufen wird, bereits eine Tatsache ist. Insofern er freilich am Anspruch eines metaphysischen Welterklärungsmodells festhält, bietet er seinerseits noch einmal eine „große Erzählung" als Gegenentwurf an, wobei es sich aber um einen negativen Gegenentwurf handelt, der gerade auf das Nichts und die Sinnlosigkeit hinausläuft.

[36] So der Titel seiner Studie. Mattéi spielt dabei mit der im Französischen vorhandenen Doppeldeutigkeit des Begriffs sens, was „Sinn" bedeuten kann, aber auch „Richtung". Gerade in Bezug auf das heutige Fortschrittsparadigma scheint dieser doppelte Bedeutungsgehalt sehr angemessen zu sein.

[37] Ich beziehe mich hier auf den ethischen Antinatalismus, wie er von Schopenhauer und Benatar vertreten wird. Das Gesagte gilt nicht in gleicher Weise für den ökologischen Antinatalismus, der im Augenblick eine gewisse Medienpräsenz hat.

[38] Brague 2015, 262. Brague spricht vom Bedarf einer Metaphysik als Infrastruktur. Vgl. Brague 2011, 16f.

[39] Bei Aristoteles zeigt sich dies sehr gut in der Idee der Entelechie. Vgl. Grondin 2004, 103.

[40] Das Theozidee-Problem zeigt, dass es so einfach letztlich auch nicht ist, die Gründe hierfür sind aber theologischer Natur und widersprechen nicht dem hier formulierten Nexus von Akzeptanz von Leiden und Sinn.

[41] Brague verweist darauf, dass der Mensch, sowohl im antiken als auch im christlichen Verständnis aktualisiert, was er im Grunde schon ist und wird damit, wie und was er sein soll. Dieses „Was er sein soll" fällt jedoch in der Moderne weg. Sehr deutlich erkennt dies Nietzsche, der deshalb fordert, der Mensch müsse sich als künstlerischer Mensch, als *Schöpfer*, selbst zu einer Art Projekt machen, indem er sich selbst künstlerisch gestaltet.

[42] Im Übrigen betont Benatar, wie gesehen, dass erstaunlicherweise in der Regel bei der Prokreation ethische Erwägungen in der Regel völlig außer Acht gelassen werden (vgl. Anm. 14).

[43] Unter negativem Vorzeichen steht sie insofern als die Erlösung bei Schopenhauer im Nichts liegt. Insofern aber Schopenhauer durchaus die Möglichkeit erkennt, aus dem Kreislauf von Tod und Wiedergeburt auszubrechen, ist sein Pessimismus weniger absolut als ein verbreitetes Vorurteil meint. Vgl. zu Schopenhauers Soteriologie die detaillierte Studie von Rudolf Malter 1991.

[44] In ambivalenter Weise ist der Ansatz Benatars auch insofern charakteristisch für diese Entwicklung, als seine Argumentation nahezu komplett abgeschnitten ist von einer ideen- oder philosophiegeschichtlichen Kontextualisierung, so dass sein Antinatalismus paradoxerweise in vollständiger Ausblendung der Kontingenz des eigenen Erkenntnisstandpunktes entwickelt wird.

[45] In ähnlichem Sinne argumentiert auch Sigbert Gebert (2010, 197).

[46] Im Grunde könnte man sogar vermuten, dass die Logik des Sekuritären, die gegenwärtig die Politik vieler Staaten prägt, ebenfalls auf einen Antinatalismus hinauslaufen müsste – wenn sie denn in letzter Konsequenz ernst genommen würde. Insofern die Reduzierung des Risikos (sei es durch Kriminalität, Umweltverschmutzung, im Straßenverkehr, durch Fehlernährung, mangelnde Bewegung, etc.) immer nur bis zu einem gewissen Grade möglich ist, aber die Schwelle dessen, was als ein (noch) akzeptabler Grad an Risiko angesehen wird, kontinuierlich nach unten verschoben wird, müsste zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt ein Punkt erreicht sein, an dem die Vermeidung des verbleibenden Restrisikos nur noch dadurch sicherzustellen wäre, dass grundsätzlich darauf verzichtet wird, eine Konstellation zu schaffen, in der man mit diesem Restrisiko konfrontiert ist. Dies aber ginge nur dadurch, dass man die Bedingungen für die Möglichkeit von Risiko beseitigt, was wiederum nur durch den Verzicht auf Prokreation realistische Perspektiven auf Erfolg hätte. Zugespitzt bedeutet das: Wenn man kein Sterberisiko in Kauf nehmen will, dann muss man darauf verzichten, zu leben. Vgl. zur Spannung zw. Risiko und Sicherheit in der Gegenwartsgesellschaft auch Hüsch 2016.

[47] Interessanterweise formuliert auch ein der Metaphysik unverdächtiger Philosoph wie Ernst Tugendhat die Notwendigkeit eines Transzendenzbezugs. Vgl. Tugendhat 2006, 112f.

[48] Brague 2011, 68 („Si nous ne croyons pas dur com fer à la bonté de la vie, prendre Bouddha ou Schopenhauer au sérieux ne devient non seulement une possibilité, mais le plus sacré des devoirs.").

[49] Ich spreche hier allein von einem Antinatalismus, der sich einer Leidensminderung und -vermeidung verschrieben hat. Der ökologischen

Antinatalismus, dem es nicht um ein Vermeiden menschlichen Leides geht, sondern um die Erhaltung der Umwelt, ist deutlich weniger radikal, weil er die Natur für erhaltenswert hält, während der Antinatalismus sowohl Schopenhauers als auch Benatars, wie gesagt, es für wünschenswert hält, auch das Leiden der Tiere zu vermeiden (vgl. Anm. 18).

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Nietzsche's *Leib*: A Glance at *Zarathustra*

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Abstract

The essay is a close reading of Nietzsche's view on the body in his famous Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The essay seeks to show that in his Zarathustra, Nietzsche attempts a philosophy of the body that looks like an inversion of Plato's view on the soul from his Phaedo. At a certain point in the discussion it will become obvious that Nietzsche doesn't simply go for a reversal of Plato's stance: he attempts more, a whole new, "body-centered", philosophy. The paper will try to identify and describe three main clusters of concepts (soul-body, spirit-body, body-earth-life) around which Nietzsche's philosophy of the body in Zarathustra appears to take shape.

Keywords: body, soul, Plato, spirit, Zarathustra

1. Introduction

The very first problem with Nietzsche's text in general is its interpretation. And with this, we are already on "Nietzschean" grounds, so to speak, as this kind of premise is almost like a tribute to an author who valued interpretation higher than the text itself. I have tried to show elsewhere (Maftei 2013) that Nietzsche's texts are notoriously idiosyncratic, highly intertextual and intratextual, profoundly confessional, revelatory and self-revelatory:

> "Philosophy, as I have understood it hitherto, is a voluntary retirement into regions of ice and mountain-peaks – the seeking-out of everything strange and questionable in existence, everything upon which, hitherto, morality has set its ban. (...) Every conquest, every step forward in knowledge, is the outcome of courage, of hardness towards one's self, of cleanliness towards one's self (...) *Nitimur in vetitum* [we strive after the forbidden]: with this device my philosophy will one day be victorious: for that which has hitherto

> been most stringently forbidden is, without exception, truth" (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 168).

His philosophy is always his philosophy, to use a phrase he himself made famous, "my philosophy", echoing Montaigne's *c'est moi que je peins*. And, as well as Montaigne, Nietzsche saw philosophy not only as a traditional Stoic art of living, but also as an incessant and personal "hunt for knowledge" (Montaigne), "knowledge" in this case meaning something close to a private "wisdom"[1] and not the attainment of any "objective" philosophical truth. Thus, "knowledge", in an active sense, concerns here the quest for a truth which is an existential truth and it is privately revealed. "Knowledge" is in this case more soul-searching than seeking for the best argument or the best opinion. The last chapter of Montaigne's *Essays* (III: 13, *On experience*) reveals his particular discomfort with the opinions of philosophers and lawmakers and their futile struggle in attaining the best opinion and in reaching the argument closest to the truth through an almost Sisyphic effort of "interpretation" and "glossing", which leads ultimately only to "uncertainties and quarrels" (Montaigne 2003, 1210). His frustration with interpretation is legendary: "Yet do we ever find an end to our need to interpret? Can we see any progress or advance towards serenity?" (Montaigne 2003, 1211).

Montaigne thinks here like an Ancient skeptic: he sees serenity as the professed end of the act of thinking, a serenity which can be achieved only by starting with the skeptic's "indifference" (*epokhē*), in the sense of the "withholding of assent" in relation to the opinions of others. Thus, by implication, the only real philosophical truth ever to be attained is the personal truth, which one achieves through gaining "wisdom" (above all with respect to your own self): here, Montaigne's skepticism and stoicism shake hands. *Epokhē* goes hand in hand with the Stoic "care of the self". The result is a philosophical experiment which can only be envisioned as a private quest for a personal truth. The reality is that there is no real philosophy other than your own, and no real truth but your own truth. Being true to yourself means rejecting all this vicious circle of glossing over the opinions of others and not finding your own truth, but only speculating over the truth of

others: "It is more of a business to interpret the interpretations than to interpret the texts, and there are more books on books than on any other subject: all we do is gloss each other. (...)" (Montaigne 2003, 1212). The only way out of this is achieving your philosophical "freedom", your freedom of thought through your own philosophy, whose subject is none other than yourself: "I must have more freedom in this than others do since I am specifically writing about myself and (as in the case of my other activities) about my writings." (Montaigne 2003, 1213).

However, even if the method of the quest is Stoic or Skeptic, the main thrust of Montaigne's doctrine is modern: serenity is just a professed end, yet the quest may be infinite: "There is no end to our inquiries: our end is in the next world." (Montaigne 2003, 1211). No end in sight, thus limitlessness, uncertainty and lack of definite form: this is the modern in Montaigne. Unlike the ancient Skeptic which strives for limit and serenity, the modern one sees relentless struggle and inquiry as a heroic virtue: only a mind "diminished" or "weak" would be content with a definite answer. Thus, it seems that as long as interpretation is not caught in the vicious circle of regurgitating the opinions of others, and is attached to a personal[2], tireless, self-overcoming quest, it becomes a virtue, the privilege of a "powerful mind" – a foregoer of Nietzsche's 'free spirit' – whose active principle is not "glossing", but "inventing"[3]:

> "It is only our individual weakness which makes us satisfied with what has been discovered by others and by ourselves in this hunt for knowledge: an abler man will not be satisfied with it. (…) When the mind is satisfied, that is a sign of diminished faculties or weariness. No powerful mind stops within itself: it is always stretching out and exceeding its capacities. It makes sorties which go beyond what it can achieve: it is only half-alive if it is not advancing, pressing forward, getting driven into a corner and coming to blows; its inquiries are shapeless and without limits; its nourishment consists in amazement, the hunt and uncertainty (…)." (Montaigne 2003, 1211)

So much, apparently, for elbow room left for balance and intended *objectivity*[4] in one's argument: a notion that, in certain ways, Nietzsche strongly resented. An aspect that complicates the picture is the self-conscious, relentless presentation of at least some of his ideas and arguments not just as thought experiments[5], but as linguistic experiences as well. Nietzsche

was keenly aware of and deeply interested in the role language plays in the structuring of thinking. Some interpreters may see this as a big hindrance in the process of evaluating the meaning of his arguments. Nietzsche saw this not as an encumbrance, but as a way of emphasizing and encouraging the creative role of language in the structuring of philosophical thought. His famous phrase, that "we think *only* in the form of language (...) we cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language"[6] is a powerful testimony of the ambiguous role played by language with respect to philosophical thinking: on one hand, language structures thinking, it creates a "linguistic order of thinking" (Hatab); on the other hand, language "flexes", so to speak, thinking, it "bends" it, precisely because of its power to communicate meanings in arguments. Additionally, the posthumous fragment quoted above is a perfect example of seemingly Nietzschean conflicting arguments, as the idea of a thinking revealed only linguistically appears to undermine other Nietzschean arguments, such as the idea of a body which is the seat of thinking (see Z, I.4: "On the Despisers of the Body"). However, these contentions may not appear in conflict if the argument runs differently: supposing that language is the only medium for thinking, the second argument ("body is the seat of thinking") would also be acceptable if language itself would be seen as an embodied process. Thus, in this case, Nietzsche's arguments are not necessarily conflicting if one accepts them as being under a different perspective. The latest trends in the field of the philosophies of the body[7] refer to *embodied cognition*, defined as the body's so-called "thinking" which seems to lie beyond (or beneath) the linguistic level: i.e. all that "meaning-making" encompassing „all the processes by which we enact meaning through perception, feeling, imagination and bodily movement", in the words of the *embodied cognition* theorist Mark Johnson (Johnson 2018, 2).

2. The Status of *Zarathustra*

Burnham & Jesinghausen (2010), in their comprehensive analysis of *Zarathustra*, underline the intricacy and intractability of the text and state a few reasons for this: the complexity of the writing itself; the apparent unusability of the

text; the offensive, misogynistic rhetoric in some of the fragments; the history of the reception of the text, sometimes grotesquely misread as part of the fascist rhetoric and propaganda (2010: 2). The intractability of the *Zarathustra* is so intense, that "to say anything about *Zarathustra* is to interpret it" (2010, 14).

As *Zarathustra* appears as literary work, the status of the work as a philosophical text may be an issue. Andrew Bowie[8] argues in his *From Romanticism to Critical Theory* (1996) that "style"[9] in literature embodies a kind of discourse which is, according to him, *unique, inimitable, aesthetically relevant and immune to paraphrase* (Bowie 1996, 10). In short, Bowie argues that literary discourse is shielding itself from "ideology" precisely because it bears the status of illusion, of fiction. Ultimately, the literary text simply does not let itself be thoroughly criticized. Bowie argues that when dealing with literature, one sees the "text's resistance to being clearly understood, despite its apparent meaningfulness" (Bowie 1996, 11).

Surely, this raises a challenge to traditional philosophical discourse, which claims to remain meaningful even when all style and all literary expression is abstracted from it. Thus, philosophical discourse is believed to possess a certain "philosophical" autonomy, coming from the meaningfulness of its arguments, whereas the literary text, on the other hand, is believed to enjoy aesthetic autonomy, which makes it, up to a certain point, philosophically unreadable – ultimately, there is no philosophical "standard of truth" to be defended in a literary text. Nevertheless, this distinction between literature and philosophy raises more problems than is meant to solve, since it leaves out the *avant la lettre* existentialist self-search peculiar to philosophers such as Seneca, Montaigne, Pascal, Rousseau, Emerson, Nietzsche.

This makes Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the literary-philosophical experiment that, according to its author, began with an epiphany about Eternal Recurrence (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 230), even more challenging. In the *Preface* to *Ecce Homo*, his last written work, Nietzsche acknowledges Zarathustra as his greatest achievement and as the coronation of his work as a "disciple of the philosopher Dionysus" (Nietzsche 2007, 167):

> "In my lifework, my *Zarathustra* holds a place apart. With it, I gave my fellow-men the greatest gift that has ever been bestowed upon them. This book, the voice of which speaks out across the ages, is not only the loftiest book on earth, literally the book of mountain air – the whole phenomenon, mankind, lies at an incalculable distance beneath it – but it is also the deepest book, born of the inmost abundance of truth (…)" (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 169)

Against the apparently religious overtones of the book's style, Nietzsche wants to make sure that he will not be misunderstood: "Here is not a 'prophet who speaks (…) No fanatic speaks to you here; this is not a 'sermon'; no faith is demanded in these pages" (169). Yet he is also aware that his work may be misread or even not understood at all: "But I should regard it as a complete contradiction of myself if I expected to find ears and eyes for my truths today: the fact that no one listens to me, that no one knows how to receive from me today is not only comprehensible, it seems to me right that it is so." (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 204). He also acknowledges that his *Zarathustra* book is the product of an epiphany and the expression of a very powerful and intimate experience. Actually, the whole philosophy in *Zarathustra* is the result of this epiphany. This is why the critique regarding this book will always be difficult, if not impossible: after all, how can one interpret one's personal, unique experience?

> "After all, no one can draw more out of things – books included – than he already knows. A man has no ears for that which he cannot access through experience (*Wofür man vom Erlebnisse her keinen Zugang hat, dafür hat man kein Ohr*). To take an extreme case, suppose a book contains only incidents which lie outside the range of general or even rare experience – suppose it to be the first language to express a whole series of experiences. In this case nothing it contains will really be heard at all and thanks to an acoustic delusion people will believe that where nothing is heard there is nothing to hear. This at least has been my usual experience and proves if you will the originality of my experience (*die Originalität meiner Erfahrung*)." (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 205).

In the part of *Ecce Homo* dedicated exclusively to *Zarathustra* ('Why I Write Such Excellent Books. Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book For All and None'), he acknowledges writing this book under the power of "inspiration". This experience of creating the work is one of "revelation"

(*Offenbarung*) (Nietzsche 2007, 237), described in the terms of a poetic rapture: "One hears – one does not seek; one takes – one does not ask who gives: a thought suddenly flashes up like lightning, it comes with necessity, without faltering – I have never had any choice in the matter." (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 234). Nietzsche acknowledges *Zarathustra* as his best achievement in writing, as the ultimate "art of speech" (*Kunst zu reden*), where "eloquence has become music" (*die Beredsamkeit Musik geworden*). Zarathustra is also the text where he creates the "language of the dithyramb" (*die Sprache des Dithyrambus*) (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 237-9). He himself declares: "I am the inventor of the dithyramb" (*Erfinder des Dithyrambus*) (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 239). *Zarathustra* is the coronation of his "Dionysian philosophy" (*dionysische Philosophie*) (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 215) which began, apparently, with the Birth of Tragedy and with his discovery of the "tragic" philosophy of Dionysus. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche names himself the "first tragic philosopher" (Nietzsche 2007, 215), whose philosophy is a "most joyous, most exuberant, and exultant yea to life, (…) not only the highest, but also the profoundest conception (…) nothing that exists must be suppressed, nothing can be dispensed with" (214). The tragic philosophy is an affirmation of life, yet this one is not unlike any other affirmation: "it is a yea-saying to the point of justifying, to the point of redeeming even all that is past", as he contends when speaking again of his *Zarathustra* (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 241). When mentioning the *Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche also seeks to invent a genealogy of his most intimate philosophical ideas, from the "great Greeks in philosophy", the Pre-Socratics, to himself. Heraclitus and the Stoics are mentioned as the philosophical foregoers of his doctrine of "Eternal Recurrence". Heraclitus is also mentioned as the forefather of Nietzsche's "Dionysian philosophy", with respect to the "yea-saying to the impermanence and annihilation of things (*Bejahung des Vergehens und Vernichtens*), which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; the yea-saying to contradiction and war (*das Jasagen zu Gegensatz und Krieg*), the postulation of Becoming (*das Werden*), together with the radical rejection even of the concept Being (*Sein*) (...)" (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 215). In *Ecce*

Homo, Nietzsche sees all his writings in retrospect, and he is almost naturally inclined to see his latest ideas (the thought of *Eternal Recurrence*, the Dionysian *yes-saying*) as anticipated by all his earlier works. For example, the key figure of Dionysus now appears to have been present throughout all his earlier works (Nietzsche 2007, 204-252).

3. "But the poets lie too much"

Burnham & Jesinghausen (2010) contend that, in his *Zarathustra*, Nietzsche indulges in a thorough 'play[ful]' rhetoric, which, apart from the presence of the main figures of the text ("Zarathustra, Dionysus, the animals, the different other voices that sometimes take over"), makes abundant use of four "types of textual 'play'": allusion, satire, symbol and allegory (see 2010, 8 ff.). So much so, that, in this text, it seems that "everything has meaning; often more than one meaning" (*ibid*.).

And there's more: it seems that Zarathustra is not just an anti-prophet, but also a "seducer" (*ein Verführer*) (EH, 'Preface', §4). In a later fragment from *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche speaks of the "Dionysian" as the "highest deed" of his Zarathustra, but also of a kind of poet, "der die Wahrheit erst *schafft*", who "first *creates* the truth" (Nietzsche 2007, 237), unlike Dante, for example, who was "no more than a believer." The presence of the allusion to the poet as the "creator" in the same fragment where he writes about his "revelation of truth" in *Zarathustra* is a subtle indication that this "truth" is the result of an artistic "inspiration", *i.e.* of a creative act. The presence of the "poet" and of his creative impetus is unmistakable. At this point, Nietzsche becomes the advocate of a long-standing tradition which envisions the poet as the inventor of "truth" in *fiction* – a "truth" which cannot be distinguished from "lying". Lawrence J. Hatab (Hatab 2018) analyzes this tradition at length[10]. Suffice is to say that chapters from *Zarathustra*, such as "On the Poets" or "The Song of Melancholy",[11] take on a whole constellation of philosophical issues, such as "truth", "appearance" and "falsehood", as Hatab argues. For example, he contends that Nietzsche tries to detach the problematic of "truth" from its double, untruth, or "error". With respect to appearance, it seems that "'mere' appearance in

a deficient sense" is not acceptable anymore. With respect to "falsehood", Nietzsche goes back to the roots of the problem, which lie in the Platonic appearance-reality dichotomy. As a classical philologist, he was aware that Plato fought against a tradition that saw poetry as the creation of a *pseudos*, of a "fictive truth" (Hatab). This "fictive truth" undermined Plato's ontological and epistemological dichotomies, as well as the discipline of the soul. Moreover, Plato was aware of the poetic tradition, starting with Homer and Hesiod, which blended *pseudos* (fiction) with *alētheia* (truth) (Hatab 2018). The Pre-Socratic Greeks were thus particularly aware of the power of the poetic words or of speech to create or to invent things, to create 'things' with words and to persuade other minds of the "reality" of those things.

With respect to this, Hatab launches an interpretation about Nietzsche's truths. The *first* of Nietzsche's 'truths' is a fundamental, "tragic" truth about becoming. The *second* truth would be the truth of the "true world" (TI, Nietzsche 2007, 22-23), a truth postulated by "Platonic" philosophies (Kant included), that seeks a standard of truth above the world of becoming. The *third* truth, Hatab argues, would be the reply to the "error", *i.e.* the confirmation of the eventual irrelevance of the second truth. Thus, as Nietzsche argues in the *Twilight of the Idols*, rejecting the idea of a "true world" would also abolish the "world of appearance" (Nietzsche 2007, 23). This is the moment of the *incipit Zarathustra*, of the Zarathustrean promise of a world without false "ideals" (EH, 'Preface', §2): embracing this truth would restore the "value, meaning and truthfulness" of "reality", as Nietzsche writes.

> "I do not set up any new idols (...) To overthrow idols (idols is the name I give to all ideals) – that is much more like my business. In proportion as an ideal world has been falsely assumed, reality has been robbed of its value, its meaning and its truthfulness. The "true world" and the "apparent world" - in plain English, the fictitious world and reality ... Hitherto the *lie* of the ideal has been the curse of reality" (EH, Nietzsche 2007, 167-8)

Hatab assumes that this third "truth" is "in a positive sense" an "apparent truth" which "balance[s]" the "negative truth of becoming" with the "error of Being" (Hatab 2018). This move, according to him, would also agree with the "perspective

of art" as "art's overt non-foundational posture gives it a distinctive position among cultural productions, and that is why Nietzsche uses the metaphor of art to characterize all forms of thought." (*ibid.*)

This is, in "Dionysian" terms, the truth of the creator or the "artistic" truth preached by Zarathustra: a truth which is always aware of its non-foundational, creative roots. Hatab also argues that this creative truth can cope with the first, tragic, truth of becoming, as, for example, these two truths come together in *Zarathustra's* "Dionysian philosophy", which embraces and accepts the tragic, existential, truth about becoming in a non-pessimistic way – through the spreading, efflorescence, of new – 'lying' – truths. This also entails the possibility that all this "artistic" construction may be a deception, yet this is acceptable, as long as this deception is life-affirming and "truthful", *i.e.* candid about its falsehood: "the deceptive character of art, therefore, is far from falsehood in the strict sense; it 'accords' with tragic truth." (*ibid.*)

Obviously, this raises the question about the status of the character Zarathustra himself and of his pronouncements: Nietzsche's work is ripe with allusions to the 'lying' of the poet. At the same moment, the "poet" is characterized several times as a "fool"[12]. At this point, we might say, Nietzsche is true to his words: if "whoever must be a creator always annihilates," (Z, I.15 "On the Thousand Goals and One"), then Nietzsche metaphorically elevates but also undermines the main character of his book "For Everyone and Nobody": Zarathustra is not only heroic, but anti-heroic as well. He speaks the truth by lying and he is serious in his foolishness. He laughs, yet his is a tragic, yet conquering, laughter. This is the "Dionysian philosophy" of – creatively – coping with sorrow, meaninglessness and death.

Actually, the initial storyline from Zarathustra was fully tragic. As Babich (2013, 64 ff.) suggests, the first sketches included Zarathustra's "literal" death. Babich also spots in the posthumous fragments an "outline" dedicated to the "death" of Empedocles, which ended with the "death of the great Pan." (*ibid.*) There is also an episode, Babich adds, in the published version of Zarathustra, which seems to suggest the death of Zarathustra (Z I.19 "On the Bite of the Adder").

In sum, we may contend that the philosophical poem *Zarathustra* is already an illustration of the creative/ destructive "Dionysian" philosophy. Seeking an answer to our initial queries regarding the status of the text, one can observe that *Zarathustra* is an attempt at breaking the barrier between literature and philosophy, as an example of the new philosophy envisioned by Nietzsche.

4. *Zarathustra*, Body and Soul – With Plato as Preface and Epilogue

As early as Plato, philosophers have usually undermined the significance of the body in their normative assessments of philosophical living. This had tremendous impact upon the basic philosophical view of what constitutes the 'essential' human element, or man's fundamental nature. Plato, voiced by Socrates, thought that the fundamental experience that sets philosophy in motion is a meditation upon death: "those who pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead." (*Phaedo*, 64 a-b, in: Plato 1914). Also, when describing death as a departure of the 'soul' (*psukhḗ*) from its mortal coil, the 'body' (*sõ̃ma*), Plato concluded that the departed soul "exists alone by itself" (64 c-d). Thus, since the soul is all that remains, and, in sum, the essential in man, the life of the "true philosopher" (*alēthõ̃s philósophos*) would mean "despis[ing] (*atimázein*)... [the] cares of the body (*tàs perì tò sõ̃ma therapeías*)" or the "turn[ing] away from the body (*aphestánai autoũ*) and concern[ing] himself with the soul (*pròs dè tḕn psukhḕn tetráphthai*)" (64 c-e). This would result in not indulging in the "pleasures of the body" (65a), and, basically, not caring about things related to the body "except so far as it is necessary to have them" (64 e). In terms of the power of knowledge, living philosophically would mean the "acquirement of pure knowledge", in which case, the body would be a "hindrance" in the "search for wisdom". In its search for the "truth", the soul is "deceived" (*exapatãtai*) by the body (65 b). When in contact with the body, the soul is hindered by "hearing [or] sight (...) pain [or] any pleasure", thus, it cannot "reach out toward the reality" (65c). In the end, the "soul of the philosopher" is the one who "greatly despises the body" (*hē toũ*

philosóphou psukhè málista atimázei tò sõma) and "avoids it and strives to be alone by itself" (65 d). The body is an "evil", and the soul is "contaminated" by it (66b). And, as far as we can notice from Socrates' monologue later in the text, philosophical practice is very much disturbed by the body, which becomes an issue of great concern to the one whose life is dedicated to the mind:

> (...) And the body fills us with passions and desires and fears, and all sorts of fancies and foolishness, so that, as they say, it really and truly makes it impossible for us to think (emphasis mine) at all. The body and its desires are the only cause of wars and factions and battles (...) And so, because of all these things, we have no leisure for philosophy. But the worst of all is that if we do get a bit of leisure and turn to philosophy, the body is constantly breaking in upon our studies and disturbing us with noise and confusion, so that it prevents our beholding the truth (...). (*Phaedo*, 66 c-e)

Philosophy in itself is seen as a kind of constant struggle to contain the body. The effort and the result of this endeavour is a continuous "purification" (*kátharsis*), Socrates argues, which refers to the "separating, so far as possible, [of] the soul from the body", where the soul is constantly "freed from the body as from fetters" (67 c). *Phaedo* (71 e *sqq*.) mentions that "our souls exist in the other world" and that the soul is the only one "coming to life again" by transmigration. This is Plato's answer to the pivotal issue of death. The "souls of the dead" do not perish, they "exist somewhere, whence they come back to life" (72 a). Our essential element is our soul, and it is immortal. Thus, our whole life should be a philosophical preparation for the moment of death, which is just the beginning of a new life for the soul. In seeing and preparing for this, the mind of the philosopher is a mind of a man who has made peace with his death, with his bodily mortality. It would thus seem absurd for someone "who had been all his life fitting himself to live as nearly in a state of death as he could" to be "disturbed when death came to him". As well as in the case of other ancient philosophies, the purpose of the Socratic struggle with the body is to cope with one's fear of death by a mental, moral and physical preparation, *i.e.* to see fear of death as utterly irrational – as the fear which is marked, as Plato argues, by an excessive "love" for the body. It is not accidental

that the "lover of wisdom" (*philósophos*) is the opposite of the "lover of the body" (*philosṓmatos*), as to the former would be entirely "foolish (...) to fear death" (*alogía eíē ei phoboῖto tòn thánaton*): "the true philosophers practise dying (*hoi orthṍs philosophoũntes apothnḗskein meletṍsi*), and death is less terrible to them than to any other men" (*Phaedo*, 67 e-68b). The one who is prepared for death "will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world" (68b). Only they will rightfully bear the name of philosophers, "those alone who despise the body and pass their lives in philosophy (*toῖs málista toũ sṓmatos oligōroũsín te kaì en philosophíą zṍsin*)" (68c). The philosopher's "soul" is thus the one who has no "fear of the invisible and of the other world" (*toũ aidoũs te kaì Háidou*), who also knows that is not "imprisoned in a body." (81d-e)

However, there are other dialogues (*Alcibiades*) where Socrates explores the possibilities of defining human being either as a soul, or as a body, or as the unity between them: "*Soc*. (...) man must be one of three things. *Alc*. What things? *Soc*. Soul, body, or both together as one whole" (130 a). A few lines later (130 c-d) Socrates will return to his favourite version: man is "nothing else than soul". Thus, only the soul is "himself" [the human being], others (such as body and things relating to it) are just "his own things", not "himself" (131 c): "he who enjoins a knowledge of oneself bids us become acquainted with the soul" (130 e). Because of this, Socrates acknowledges concerning his partner in dialogue, which is Alcibiades, that he is the "only lover of *him* [Alcibiades]" and not of "what is *his*" (131 e), as he is the one who loves Alcibiades' soul, and not his body: "and that [the body] is losing its charm, while *you* [the soul] are beginning to bloom" (132 a), Socrates replies. The passages are important, as they review the possible relationships between soul and body. Other sources, such as Xenophon, remind us that the young Socrates did not desert his body, on the contrary. As any other Athenian of his age, he was taught to take and took great care of his body, with physical training: "He [Socrates] did not neglect his body, and he did not praise those who neglected theirs" (Xenophon, in: Hughes 2011, 101). This is consistent with Socrates in other contexts, such as

Plato's *Republic*. The aim of the *Republic* is to imagine the best *politeia*. The functioning of the best *politeia* is dependent on the fact that its citizens must be useful not only to themselves, but also to their city. The purpose of the state's *paideia*, or education, in the ideal republic, is to create citizens which are ultimately useful to their *polis*. Useful to their *polis* are only those, whose "bodies and souls are constitutionally sound" (410 a). Physical training – for the guardians – is thus a necessary part of the *paideia* of these citizens of the ideal state, and the care of the body goes hand in hand with literary education, "poetry and music" – both, physical and literary education, must be kept "simple and flexible" (404 a). The physical training must also be associated with a good, healthy, diet – just as in the case of the literary tastes. Socrates condemns the "excessive" concern with the body, which goes beyond the need to keep the body in good health (407 c). Yet this physical education is not – or, more exactly, should not be – for its own sake: both physical and literary training need to be exercised with the aim of "improving the soul" (410 b); otherwise, "merely literary and musical education makes men softer than is good for them", whereas "unmitigated athletics produce a sort of ferocity" (410 c-d). In sum, both types of education should "aim chiefly at improving the soul" (410 b-c). Socrates' views in the *Republic* with respect to the role of physical training are thus fairly in accordance with the common ancient Greek perceptions concerning the body (Hughes 2011, 101-110).

Nietzsche views on the body have been disputed amongst phenomenological, naturalistic, "embodied", hermeneutical, feminist, psychoanalytical and existentialist interpretations[13]. Our interpretation will only focus on a close reading of the essential passages from Zarathustra that refer to the "body" or to the concepts pertaining to the body and to the relations thereof. The presence of the "body" in Zarathustra is, nevertheless, somewhat special: the "body" is often contextualized by or in special clusters of concepts. There are at least three important "clusters" involving the notion of "body:" First, there is the historical "soul-body" conceptual pair, constant almost throughout the entire text. Then, there is the special relation of the "body" to the "spirit", referred to several times in the text.

Thirdly, there is a larger cluster of concepts mentioning "body", "earth" and "life" that Nietzsche at some point refers to.

All in all, it is obvious from the start that it is not clear what Nietzsche refers to exactly when mentioning "body" in *Zarathustra*: a phenomenological, biological, cultural, rhetorical or a hermeneutical aspect. The available reading is given only by the use of the concept in particular situations. One can often observe the meaning of the term only in relation to other concepts from the "cluster." In the following, we will analyze the aforementioned "clusters".

Soul-Body. This is the most important cluster, around which almost the entire Nietzschean-Zarathustrean thinking on the "body" revolve. We have already suggested that "despiser of the body" (Z I.4 *Von den Verächtern des Leibes*) is accurately a Platonic phrase and that it is the exact definition of a philosopher, according to Plato's *Phaedo*. The opposite of the Platonic "lover of wisdom" (*philósophos*) would thus be the "lover of the body" (*philosṓmatos*). The Platonic philosophical soul is an entity striving for the "other world", and not "imprisoned in a body." (*Phaedo*, 81d-e). The Platonic philosopher is the one "who is really in love with wisdom and has a firm belief that he can find it nowhere else than in the other world (*è en Háidou*)". Also, if "he is really a philosopher (...) he will confidently believe that he will find pure wisdom nowhere else than in the other world" (68b). A direct reference to the "other world" (*jener Welt*) is also present in Z I.3, in an emphatic anti-Platonic stance: "But the 'other world' is well concealed from humans, that dehumaned unhuman world that is a heavenly nothing" (Nietzsche 2008, 28). It appears thus that the best of the Nietzschean "body" rhetoric, which mostly appears in the first part of *Zarathustra* (Z Prologue 3-4; Z I.3; Z I.4; Z I.22) is an anti-Platonic stance, with a Nietzschean twist. As *Phaedo* claims that the soul "is most like the divine and immortal and intellectual and uniform and indissoluble and ever unchanging", whereas the body is "on the contrary, most like the human (*anthrōpínǭ*) and mortal (*thnētō̃*) and multiform (*polueideī*) and unintellectual (*anoétǭ*) and dissoluble (*dialutō̃*) and ever changing" (80b), Nietzsche simply refuses the Platonic claim. His philosophy is not supporting an "unhuman" stance,

but rather a "human" (the Platonic *anthrōpínō*), "all-too-human" one. Opposite to Plato, – to whom the soul is "the invisible, divine, immortal and wise" (81a), and thus superior, in terms of value, to the body – Nietzsche's philosophy overturns the verdict: what Plato labels as "error and folly and fear and fierce loves and all the other human ills (*plánēs kaì anoías kaì phóbōn kaì agríōn erṓtōn kaì tṑn állōn kakṑn tṑn anthrōpeíōn*)" (*Phaedo*, 81a), or simply "body", Nietzsche sees as the most real and the most important. A philosopher is therefore no more the one who "lives in truth through all after time with the gods" (81a). A philosopher is not the one amongst those "who have duly purified themselves by philosophy" and "live [in the afterlife as souls] henceforth altogether without bodies" (*Phaedo*, 114b-c). Nor are the Nietzschean philosophers a species of those "who are found to have excelled in holy living [and] are freed from these regions within the earth and are released as from prisons" (114b). Socrates acknowledges that the authority of the soul over the body should be a position of force: with the help of a quote from Homer, he claims that the soul must not be seen as a "harmony which would be led by the conditions of the body", but "rather as something fitted to lead and rule them, and itself a far more divine thing than a harmony" (94e). Indeed, the soul "tyranniz[es]" (94d) those elements which are under his power. Moreover, Plato claims that the soul must present itself philosophically, and not mythologically, and that "our soul before it entered into the body existed just as the very essence which is called the absolute exists" (92 d-e). Thus, the soul becomes the object of a philosophical argument. In fact, Nietzsche strikes back at Plato with the same argument put into practice by Plato himself: misology, the hate of argument, of philosophy and misanthropy, the hate towards man, have common origins. The one who hates free thinking will be the one who hates or despises man. The hate towards the human being comes from ignoring man's real nature. As Plato himself claims, "misology and misanthropy arise from similar causes. For misanthropy arises from trusting someone implicitly without sufficient knowledge (...) [the ignorant] has no knowledge of human nature (*áneu tékhnēs tẽs perì tanthrṓpeia*)" (89d-e).

What the Nietzschean message acknowledges overall and, in a sense, pushes forward, is the unavoidable dissolution of the (immortal) "soul" in modern culture, an exact opposite of the "impending dissolution of the body" (88 b-c), against the hypothesis that "the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable" (88 b), advocated by Plato. The move in *Zarathustra* is thus a double move: first, to criticize the so-called Platonic-Christian worldview about the body (see Burnham & Jesinghausen 2010, 5); then, to secure a place for the "body" in the new architecture of reality that emerges after the "God is dead" event (Nietzsche 2008, 11). It is obvious that the "death" phenomenon of the "soul" is an effect of the "death of God" phenomenon and that there is a whole history of the "body" in European culture from the early Renaissance to the Modern Age, a history at the end of which the "soul" remains nothing more than a "dogma", its place being taken by the "psyche" (Porter 2003, 28-61; 347-373). "Death" of the "soul" emerges in *Zarathustra* with a rather sarcastic remark of the protagonist: "On my honour, friend (...) all you are speaking of does not exist: there is no Devil and no Hell. Your soul will be dead even sooner than your body: so fear nothing more!" (Nietzsche 2008, 18). This is another anti-Platonic charge (*Phaedo* 111c – 114c), against the myth of the punishment of corrupt souls in the afterlife: with the "death" of Hell, the fear of an afterlife full of punishments and cruelty for the lost, corrupted souls, also vanishes; nor is the false hope for a future reward of a good deed in the "other world" acceptable anymore. The "despisers of life" or *despisers of the body* appear very early in the text (Z Prologue 3), as they relate to the "sacrilege against the earth", which is "to revere the entrails of the unfathomable more than a sense of the earth" (2008: 12). The intention of the protagonist, which also marks the intention of Nietzsche as philosopher, I believe, emerges right from the start (2008, 9): "Zarathustra wants to become human again", signalling, in my opinion, the turn of philosophy towards the anti-Platonic "human affairs", ta *anthrṓpina*. Nietzsche's concept of a philosopher is at this point exactly the opposite of the Platonic *philósophos*: the Nietzschean philosopher is a *philosṓmatos*, a "lover of the body" in a broad philosophical

sense. The body becomes a pivotal element in this move of turning to the – authentically – human. Actually, "body" becomes the metonymy, if not the symbol, of human being itself. That is why the concept sometimes emerges literally, as "body" in opposition to "soul", or figuratively, as symbol or mark in a new, anti-Platonic, philosophy. In a certain way, the body takes over the role that had previously been attributed to the soul: "Once the soul looked despisingly upon the body, and at that time this despising was the highest thing (...) Thus she thought to slip away from the body and the earth. Oh this soul was herself still lean, ghastly, and starved" (2008: 12). The counter reaction is that the "body" is now the one which "proclaim[s] about your soul" (2008, 12). The difference that Nietzsche now works on is the one between "body" and "corpse", a difference which he achieves by symbolically transferring the Platonic moral rejection of the "body" (*Leib*) upon the "corpse" (*Leichnam*):

> "(...) No human did he catch, but rather a mere corpse (...) companions I need and living ones – not dead companions and corpses that I carry with me wherever I will. But living companions I need, who follow me because they want to follow themselves (...) Companions the creator seeks and not corpses, nor herds or believers either. Fellow creators the creator seeks, those who inscribe new values on new tablets" (2008, 18-21).

Obviously, the "corpse" is not a dead body; it is a moral dead body, a refusal of "life", which marks a moral fossilization, a moral lifelessness. This lifelessness is specific to the Platonic-Christian worldview: "They want very much to be dead, and we should applaud their wish! Let us guard against waking these corpses and damaging these living coffins"; "As corpses they meant to live, in black they decked out their corpse (...)" (Z I.9 "On the Preachers of Death", in 2008, 40-41; Z II.4 "On the Priests", in 2008, 79). Actually, this mentioning of the "corpse" in opposition to what Nietzsche calls a "creating body" (*schaffende Leib*) (2008, 31) body is a reaction to the same Phaedo (80c), where Socrates refers to the lifeless body as "corpse (*nekròn*), which is naturally subject to dissolution and decomposition", in the context of putting an emphasis of the frailty and mortality of the body – at the same time reminding Cebes that even a corpse leaves something "indestructible"

behind, such as bones, let alone the soul. To Plato, thus, the body itself is close to a living corpse, an entity which possesses no authority, no leadership – Plato mentions the "soul" as "leading" (*hēgemoneúousá*) (*Phaedo*, 94c) –, no reason and no consciousness without the soul, and that must be constantly kept in check as it is the source of "desires and passions and fears" (*epithumíais kaì orgaĩs kaì phóbois*) (94d).

But, in the new paradigm of the "body" emerging in *Zarathustra*, everything changes: the "body" becomes the leader of the "soul". The "body" is the ultimate authority in spiritual as well as bodily matters, so to speak. The body emerges as the active, not the passive element, of the relationship. The body is the one which, let's say, calls the shots. Suddenly, Nietzsche's philosophical worldview is turning the tables on these matters: the "body" is now the real source even of the old Platonic "care for the soul" and despising of the body: "From their bodies and this earth they imagined themselves transported, these ingrates. Yet to what did they owe the spasms and rapture of their transports? To their bodies and to their earth." (2008, 29) The same idea emerges a few passages later: "Verily, not in worlds behind and redemptive drops of blood: but the body is what they [the Christian believers] too believe in most, and their own (emphasis mine) body is their thing-in-itself" (2008, 29). It is obvious that the new "bodily" perspective is associated with a "healthy body", which, in turn, is associated with the "sense of the earth": "Listen rather, my brothers, to the voice of the healthy body (...) more honestly and purely does the healthy body talk, being complete and four-square: and it talks of the sense of the earth" (2008, 29). Notice also the earlier reference to the "earthen head", instead of a "head [buried] in the sand of heavenly things", an "earthen head that creates a sense for the earth!" (2008, 28). On the opposite side, the "sick and moribund" are the ones who "despised body and earth and invented the heavenly realm and the redemptive drops of blood", although "even these sweet and dismal poisons they took from body and earth!" (2008, 29). Towards these "sick and moribund", Zarathustra is "gentle", as he wishes them that "they [may] become convalescents and overcomers and create for themselves a higher body!" (2008, 29).

Z I.4 "On the Despisers of the Body" is where the so-called "doctrine" of the body unfolds. In contrast to the "child", who still believes in body and soul – "Body am I and soul" (2008, 30) – the "awakened" discovers that he is "body (...) through and through, and nothing besides (...) soul is merely a word for something about the body" (2008, 30). In this perspective, "reason" is a faculty that belongs to the body altogether. Moreover, the body is itself a "great reason, a manifold with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman" (2008, 30). Hence, the traditional faculty of "reason", which now becomes the "small reason", is in its own turn "a tool of the body", which carries the name "spirit" – in fact, a "small tool and toy" of the "great reason", which is the body itself (2008, 30). The body is even greater than the "I", which one imagined to be the seat of reason: "the greater thing (...) is your body and its great reason: it does not say I, but does I" (2008, 30).

Spirit-Body. Already shown above, spirit-body is the second cluster of notions important with respect to the Zarathustra conception of the body. Burnham and Jesinghausen (2010, 28-30) agree that there are two main meanings of "spirit" in Zarathustra. One, already suggested, is the "spirit" seen as "small reason" or as "soul", according to the Platonic-Christian difference between soul and body. The other meaning of the term envisions a more active sense, of "spirit as a mode of the living body", which "cuts right across the distinction between body and mind" (2010, 29). "Spirit" is in this case the name for what Nietzsche sees as the "spiritualization" of drives (2010, 29). Throughout the text, as the two commentators mention, "spirit" is often associated with "heart". According to Burnham and Jesinghausen, "heart" means "the dominant will to power insofar as that manifests as the immediate expressivity of the body as pathos or affect: one's inner emotional life and desires." (2010, 29). Out of this new context, there emerges a new idea of the "Self". Nietzsche seeks to conjugate his new vision of body with this new notion of "Self", by declaring that the body, the successor of "soul" and "I", *is* the Self: "behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown wise man – his name is Self. In your body he dwells, he is your body" (Nietzsche 2008, 30). To the "Self", "senses and spirit" are mere "tools and

toys". The Self is the "I's ruler" (2008, 30). In this line of argument the "creating body" becomes the "creating Self" (2008, 31).

Body-Earth-Life. The connection body-earth-life is, at this point in our discussion, implicit. As already shown, the "despisers of life" as *despisers of the body* appear early in the text (Z Prologue 3), as these despisers practice a "sacrilege against the earth", which is "to revere the entrails of the unfathomable more than a sense of the earth" (Nietzsche 2008, 12). The bodies of the "despisers" are, thus, despising themselves. More clearly stated, they are despising their own "Selves", as Nietzsche states that the "Selves" of the despisers "want to die and turn away from life": "Your Self wants to go under, and therefore you became despisers of the body!" (2008, 31). These "Selves" have become "angry with life and the earth" (2008, 31).

5. Conclusion

To conclude, Nietzsche's view of the body in *Zarathustra* is a splendid example of Nietzschean transvaluation attempt with respect to the body-soul dichotomy. In *Zarathustra*, his literary-philosophical masterpiece, he begins with an anti-Platonic stance that seems to show a reversal of Plato's position on the soul-body relation from the *Phaedo*. At a certain point in the discussion it becomes clear that Nietzsche does not just go for a reversal of Plato's arguments: he attempts more, a whole new perspective, whereupon the body takes the command of "soul", "spirit" and "reason", and becomes our entire "reality", our only paradigm – albeit with infinite possibilities of interpretation. This paradigm shift, which involves a shift towards the "body", the "life" and the "earth", is a necessary step in the shaping of a human, anti-Platonic, "philosomatic", way of understanding reality.

NOTES

[1] On the distinction between "philosophy" and "wisdom", see Seneca, Epistles, LXXXIX.

[2] "In the philosopher, on the contrary, there is absolutely nothing impersonal (...)" (BGE, Nietzsche 2014, 521).

[3]"[O]ur minds do not find the field any less vast when examining the meanings of others than when formulating our own – as though there were less animus and virulence in glossing than inventing!" (Montaigne 2003, 1208).

[4] Actually, Nietzsche sought to redefine objectivity through the lens of perspectivism. See Hatab (2018) and his interpretation of Nietzsche's new notion of objectivity as "pluralized 'objectivity', wherein the more perspectives one can adopt, the more adequate one's view of the world will be".

[5] As Anderson (2017) suggests, Walter Kaufmann's 1950 *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* addresses Nietzsche's manner of philosophizing as an "experimentalist" one, at least with respect to his aphoristic fragments. Yet Anderson shows that "not every Nietzschean aphorism is an experiment, and not every short section (...) an aphorism". Anderson contends that some fragments are "summative conclusions" or "compressed formulations" of ideas that are to be found in relation to other similar ideas from the larger texts themselves. With respect to "thought experiments", Anderson gives the example of "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same", which has been interpreted by some commentators not as a doctrine, but as a "practical thought experiment" that Nietzsche proposes with a view to "test whether one's life has been good".

[6] KSA 12:5 [22]. The translation appears in Hatab (2018).

[7] See, for an introduction to the topic, Marzano (2012).

[8] Bowie (1996). The issue has been previously discussed in Maftei (2013, 90-91).

[9] See Nietzsche's remarks on "style" in EH, 'Why I Write Such Excellent Books', § 4.

[10] See also Zittel (2000), for a thorough investigation of the role of "art" in Zarathustra, and for an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophical poem as "poetic nihilism". On poetic lying, see Zittel (2000, esp. 39-58).

[11] See Z IV.14: "The Song of Melancholy"; Z, II.17: "On the Poets".

[12] Z IV.14 "The Song of Melancholy". See also Babich (2013) and her interpretation of the *Übermensch* in the light of Lucian's Kataplous and his parody of the *Hyperanthropos*, the Tyrant, as the *Übermensch* "unmasked" (Babich 2013, 67).

[13] See, among others: Vallega-Neu (2005, 21-37); Dries (ed.) (2018); Brown (2006); Gerhardt (2006); Emden (2005); Acampora (2018); Heit (2018); Torjussen (2009). For an introduction to the issue in Romanian: Bondor (2012). General historical accounts on philosophies of the body: Porter (2003).

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The Utopia of Eidetic Intuition: A Phenomenological Motif in Adorno

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Abstract

In this article I attempt to discuss several phenomenological imports in Adorno's work, which center around his various interpretations of Husserl's eidetic intuition. In the first part, I underline the presence of a phenomenological component in Adorno's interpretative method and show that the interest in concrete, singular phenomena motivated Adorno to retain the idea of a non-reducible, immediate given, emphasizing its function as a moment of resistance in the face of classificatory thought, be it scientific or philosophical. In the second part, I focus on how eidetic intuition is discussed by Adorno in relation to the methodological difficulty that consists in moving from the level of first order givenness to theoretical, conceptual insight, and I argue that eidetic intuition plays a methodological role here insofar as it carries a utopic promise. In the last section, I tackle the question of language and the possibilities it opens for approaching this utopic promise, and I attempt to show that, in spite of its failings, eidetic intuition is further employed in relation to what Adorno calls the configurative use of language.

Keywords: eidetic intuition, phenomenology, utopia, language, constellation

1. The question of method

From as early as his inaugural address, *The Actuality of philosophy* (1931), in which he emphatically declared the demise of philosophy's claim to grasping the totality of reality and called instead for its rebirth as interpretation, and up until

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his full-fledged late investigations from *The Negative Dialectics* (1966), Adorno engaged in the contradictory pursuit of giving a conceptual account of phenomena that could never be fully accounted for in the realm of thinking. Placing the non-identity between concept and reality at the heart of philosophy, and refusing any all-encompassing, synthetizing figures of thought meant that philosophy had to constantly jump over its own shadow and, firmly keeping in view its defining paradox, proceed "methodically unmethodically" (Adorno 1986, 161). We are certainly not dealing here with the classic universal method that can be applied at will by any theoretician, but rather with an approach in which the philosopher's work resembles to some extent that of an artist, insofar as it relies on a certain type of creative immersion in the subject matter. So, while Adorno did not develop a method in the classic sense, and even though his work is predominantly critical and deconstructive, a certain working model can be detected throughout his writings[1]. Whether about sociology, mass culture or the history of philosophy, the blueprint of Adorno's analysis can be sketched out starting from a handful of concepts, such as "model," "configuration" or "constellation."

For the elaboration of this string of concepts, Adorno famously drew inspiration from Walter Benjamin's theory of ideas, sketched out in the prologue of *The Origin of the German Tragic Drama*, but also from Max Weber's ideal types. What united these two thinkers was the fact that, admittedly with very different styles and pursuing different objectives, they had put to work a type of interpretation that accounted for the facticity of the phenomena under scrutiny as well as for the inadequacy of a theoretical, concept-based language for doing justice to these very phenomena. With this same problem in view, Adorno develops his own so-called constellative approach, which, put briefly, sets out to bring concepts together in such a way that, similar to a constellation, a web of conceptual relations, a certain configuration will emerge, and the phenomena themselves rather than the concepts will come to expression. In this approach, both the limits and the possibilities opened up by language play a decisive role.

It is also generally known that Adorno had been influenced by phenomenology and that a perspective that emphasizes not only the negative, more prominent side of Adorno's philosophy, but also the admittedly more elusive "positive core"[2] of it will inevitably discover a phenomenological moment of his method[3]. This moment is reflected for example in the concept of "physiognomy," which clearly draws on phenomenology by taking as its starting point "the living-experience of the radio listener" (Adorno 2006, 66), as well as in his similar concept of "unregulated experience" (Adorno 2019, 123), which envisages phenomena as they are lived and encountered in daily life, undistorted by the lens of theoretical categories. It is certainly from the point of view of a direct interest in concretion and material contents that Husserl, together with Bergson, is praised in the beginning of *The Negative Dialectics*, which consists of a critique of philosophy's disinterest in factual life – a centuries-long omission that, in Adorno's eyes, Husserl and Bergson had partially begun to set straight. More concretely however, when discussing the idea of constellation or configuration, Adorno also constantly references, along with Benjamin and Weber, Husserl's eidetic intuition. If we consider *The Actuality of Philosophy* to be the first programmatic exposition of Adorno's shift to a metacritical position, in this new perspective, Husserl, who Adorno had formerly tackled in his dissertation on the concept of noema, is now credited with having recognized the meaning of the "non-reducible given," while the eidetic intuition receives a special mention as a method that has proven to be "externally effective" (Adorno 1977, 121). Nevertheless, Adorno had an ambiguous, seemingly contradictory position towards Husserl's eidetic intuition. On the one hand, in a letter from Benjamin to Adorno from 10 June 1935 the former says, referring to a previous, lost letter that he would like to know more about Adorno's project of destroying eidetic intuition (Adorno and Benjamin 1994, 132). On the other hand, Adorno will continue to speak of the eidetic intuition in positive terms, linking it with his own efforts of bringing forth something essential about the phenomena under investigation (Adorno 1992, 167).

Rather than raise questions about the possibility and legitimization of knowledge, Adorno investigates knowledge in its relation to power and to social processes. The shift to a metacritical perspective rests on the conviction that the field of philosophical thought reflects contradictions pertaining to reality and is ultimately determined by it. Accordingly, the primacy of epistemology has to be measured up against the background of a historical and social development in which intellectual work is only a component. The content of philosophical works can therefore be linked back to determined historical situations and to underlying driving forces and needs, which philosophers themselves were not necessarily aware of but tacitly driven by. In Adorno's philosophy, historical, economic, sociological, and psychoanalytic insights are mobilized together in order to reveal the formation processes and the functions of central concepts of the history of philosophy.

From a bird's-eye view perspective, the philosophies of Husserl and Adorno are divided by an unbridgeable gap: whereas the first wanted to found transcendental phenomenology as a science and thereby re-establish faith in reason, the second aimed at providing a metacritique of the universality traditionally assigned to philosophical concepts, in light of their embeddedness in a socio-economic context. For Adorno, any comprehensive, unitary view of the world is just an illusion that reason has been feeding to itself for some time. If Adorno himself believes that there is a certain affinity between his critical endeavors and phenomenology that goes beyond an initial general interest in concrete phenomena, it is due to the fact that the objective of investigating "the things themselves" forced Husserl to break out of the confines of idealism and to ultimately develop ideas laden with subversively fruitful self-criticism (Adorno 1940, 18). However, while Adorno's critique of Husserl's logical absolutism and then of the latter's conception of transcendental subjectivity falls in the domain of his metacriticism of the history of philosophy – linking it therefore with bourgeois ideas and certain naïve ideals of modernity –, the problem of eidetic intuition touches a central theme of Adorno's own "methodological" difficulties.

In the following, I attempt to determine why is it that, in spite of a negative diagnosis of Husserl's attempt at eluding comparative abstraction, Adorno considers eidetic intuition to be phenomenology's "moment of truth" (Adorno 2017, 41) and keeps referencing it in his key writings. How does this concept that Adorno wanted to destroy also serve as a springboard for his own interpretative approach? Doesn't Adorno's approach, which relies heavily on language and interpretation, eventually do away with any descriptive content, which is ultimately to be denounced as falsifying in its ambition to "read" an underlying reality? Is the idea of configuration or constellation truly phenomenologically inspired on the basis of a relation to the Husserlian eidetic intuition or is it actually a complete transformation of a concept that Adorno cites rather ironically?

In the following, I first underline the presence of a phenomenological component in Adorno's interpretative method, which is reflected in his interest in the concept of the "non-reducible given" and in the singularity of phenomena. Second, I deal with Adorno's critique of eidetic intuition, which denounces the fact that Husserl hit upon the singularity of phenomena only to actually eliminate it through the reintroduction of general concepts. I then argue that the idea of an eidetic intuition that can retain singular phenomena becomes methodologically relevant for Adorno from the perspective of a utopic component. Finally, I tackle the question of language, and the possibilities it opens for approaching the unattainable unity of concept and thing, and I attempt to show that, in spite of its failings, eidetic intuition is further employed and re-configurated in relation to what Adorno calls the constellative use of language.

2. The non-reducible given

For Adorno, the suspicion towards theories of knowledge and philosophical systems goes hand in hand with a suspicion towards concepts themselves. Concepts inherently disregard the particular: any judgment of an object is only an element of an infinite series of other possible judgments. The object will always be infinitely richer than a concept can express. True to this principle and avoiding all rigid conceptual delineation, Adorno does not offer a unique determination of how objects

exceed concepts, but thematizes this excess in discussions about suffering, language, and art. Most frequently however, non-identity is discussed in the context of philosophical thought itself, which, especially in its idealist version, is for Adorno the best representation of how concepts lose sight of this excess, withdraw in an immanent field and claim to hold the key to reality. A makeshift solution Adorno constantly warns against is the reliance on concepts which are meant to formally designate precisely that which escapes them. Categories such as "facticity," "historicity" or "life" are all another way of obstructing access to the object. More particularly, against Heidegger, Adorno underlines the fact that the category of "historicity," for example, will never allow us to account for "history itself, in its most extreme agitation" (Adorno 1984b, 114), in its factual details and radical contingency. The hypostatization of history in the concept of historicity only serves to void the former of its content, relevance, and implications. What Adorno calls for, therefore, is an immersion in the social and historical material, a new "extremely material-based work and theory" in which the theoretician, similar to Weber, sees himself "pressured by the weight of facts" towards conceptualization (Adorno 2019b, 11). In Adorno's eyes, Weber managed to strike a balance between an attention to facts and concrete data, and the necessity to transcend them towards a theoretical stance. This was not a bad kind of theoretical transcending because Weber did not allow concepts to be anything more than auxiliary tools which can be discarded as soon as their function had been accomplished, and a certain understanding (*Verstehen*) had been brought to light. This understanding was attained from within in order to "find a way of identifying something substantive or essential about the interrelatedness of social actions" (Adorno 2019b, 5). So, if the first step consists in the thinker's "immersion in the concretions" and in an insistent devotion to the individual materials, the second step is the more problematic one as it should consist in revealing "more than simply the blind, concept-less material" (Adorno 2019b, 11). This two-step model is present in most of Adorno's methodological considerations, even though the demarcation line between them tends to get

blurred. The first step consists in a focus on a first order phenomenality and a moment of resistance to classificatory thought, while the second implies, in Hegelian fashion, the dissolution of the irreducible unity pertaining to the first step. We will first take a closer look at this first step, which is definitely the more phenomenological of the two, even though, as we shall see, eidetic intuition is brought into play in relation to the second step. Adorno's tendency to conflate the two steps into one distinctive experience is also reflected in his interpretation of the Husserlian concept.

The immersion in the concrete phenomena presupposes that they should be seen in their singularity, in their *hic et nunc* particularity and not as instantiations of universal categories. This is clearly expressed in the striking mission that Adorno assigns to the essay in *The Essay as Form* (1958), when he affirms that the essay sets out to make the transitory eternal. By focusing on that which cannot be grasped through timeless, universal categories, on social and historic contents in their contingency and singularity the essay salvages these contents *as singularities*. As such, phenomena are saved both from the passage of time with its inexorable forgetting and from a science which would only use from these phenomena whatever corresponds to its interests and concepts. As we have already seen, this means that critical thinking, instead of subsuming experience under pre-established concepts, will take a phenomenon in its singularity as its starting point and will apply to it "a monadological insistence," hoping to pry it open "from within" (Adorno 1992, 163).

The first step of the interpretative work, the immersion into concretions, echoes the presence of a phenomenological moment that consists in the focus on a particular moment and its irreducibility. This idea of a "non-reducible given" is what motivates the talk of monads as well as the choice of the term "physiognomy" in Adorno's radio study, perhaps more than whatever use Lavater and the other physiognomists had made of it. As Adorno puts it: "within our experience of live voice and faces the phenomenon is not merely a superficial sign of whatever is behind it, replaceable by another as well" (Adorno 2006, 49). Along with the anchorage in the lived, concrete

experience, holding on to the one given object also implies that pre-made categorical schemes and imported objectivities will not sabotage the analysis. The phenomenological vow to presuppositionlessness is clearly invoked: "This, of course, does not mean that the consideration has to stop with the phenomenon. To 'penetrate' it actually means to dissolve it and to reduce it to its conditioning factors. It makes all the difference, however, if we actually start from the phenomenon and then 'reduce' it, or if we think in terms of objectivity before having determined whether that 'objectivity' can actually be spotted within the living-experience of the radio listener" (Adorno 2006, 66). Thus, when speaking of the "within" of the object or of an understanding "from within" (*Von-innen-her*), Adorno refers to a focus on first-hand experiences and to the primary observation of what pertains to those lived experiences.

Keeping all exterior objectivity at a distance implies that a new, unprejudiced objectivity must be pursued, and this is where we come to the second step of the interpreter's work. The reduction that Adorno applies to the phenomenon is equally reflected in the idea of monad, face or voice. While these elements seem to carry their own, irreducible meaning, this meaning is only explicable in relation to their exterior. For Adorno, the real reduction is the one that accounts for the object's dependence on a web of social and practical relations and for its grounding in the "collective life of the spirit" (Adorno 2019a, 201). This is undoubtedly one of the main points of tension in Adorno's philosophy, reflected in contradictory remarks: on the one hand, playing on this phenomenological moment, Adorno emphasizes the need of upholding the irreducible given – or the insoluble (*das Unauflösbare*) as he calls it (Adorno 1992, 134) – while also pointing out, on the other hand, the *illusion* of its autarchy and the need to *dissolve* it in the elements that give it life. According to him, phenomena should not be reduced to self-sufficient entities, but to the form of an index, of an intersection of sociological, psychological or technological aspects.

On the one hand, a problem that Adorno identifies is that philosophy, and Adorno's main interest goes to idealism, actually still operates on the premise of fully determining its

objects and does this, more notably, by *stopping* at "insoluble" elements. Even when the temporal becoming behind an irreducible given is accounted for (and here we can safely assume that Adorno is thinking of Husserl's "inner historicity of thought" (Adorno 1992, 54), this philosophy subsumes this temporal becoming *under the concept* and retains the primordiality of the latter. Negative dialectics, however, shows that this becoming took place under certain exterior conditions and is indicative, as we've seen, of the falsehood of the "insoluble." This insolubility is not only an illusion, but when not seen as such, it also becomes the warrant for immutable knowledge and for building theories of knowledge. If, however, this necessary moment of immediacy is dissolved, if the concept is approached by denying it, the object will open up to its true becoming. The constellative method, in which concepts cite one another without any of them taking centre stage is Adorno's answer to the issue of the dissolution of the insoluble.

A further phenomenological moment is echoed in Adorno's emphasis on the subjective, individual experience. According to him, a first person account of experience, such as that provided by Proust, brings to light "necessary and compelling perceptions about men and their social relations which science can simply not match, while at the same time the claim of these perceptions to objectivity would be neither lessened nor left up to vague plausibility" (Adorno 1984, 156). In the face of scientific claims to universal objectivity, it is the subjectively mediated experience that needs to take center stage, but only insofar as it is – and any view to the contrary would be an illusion – indicative of an all-encompassing social and collective field. Like Benjamin, Adorno envisages experience not as the isolated acts (*Erlebnisse*) of an individual consciousness but as a comprehensive whole (*Erfahrung*) in which the life of a community is reflected. If Benjamin was signaling the atomization of experience in the urban environment and through factory work, according to Adorno this reality had its counterpart in modern thought: for instance, Husserl's laser-focused analysis of perception and cognition were indicative of a subjectivity that had lost its substance (Adorno 1982, 91). What both Benjamin and Adorno oppose to

isolated experiences is a type of experience that is mediated by memory and tradition and that is, to borrow a phrase of Miriam Hansen, "discursively organized" (Hansen 1949, 12) – which is hence formed through language.

For the kind of creative work in which individual consciousness crosses the false barriers of its individuality by becoming the expression of its immersion in a social and linguistic milieu Adorno coins the term of intellectual or spiritual experience (*geistige Erfahrung*)[4]. This is the experience in which a further element will accomplish the move from the conceptless material or from the immediate experience of singular phenomena to the "essence," which is the constellation-like theoretical insight into the matter. This experience is also linked to phantasy: if in the *Actuality of Philosophy* Adorno talks of "an exact fantasy" (Adorno 2019, 21), a creative production that is "exact" in as far as it crystallizes out of an immersion in facts, in *Philosophical Elements of a Theory of Society* "productive imagination" is the tool that the researcher needs in order for his work to be more than a mere registration of facts (Adorno 1977, 131). Adorno often likens this move from the subjective to the objective to musical compositions: they are subjectively produced but work only when their product, the constellation, acquires objectivity (Adorno 1992, 165). The two steps are clearly dependent on each other: the immersion in the realm of unregulated experience is done in view of the spiritual experience, and the latter takes its experiential character from its factual basis. What holds these two kinds of experience together is the immersion into the subject matter. At both the stage of the individual, subjective, irreducible moment and of the social, objective moment, it is neither the autocratic, transcendental subject and nor the theoretician that projects his categories, but the object that speaks. It is however true, that at different times, Adorno underlines one or the other aspect of this interpretative procedure, often with a tendency to suppress the first step or to identify the two by talking of a unique moment of immediate insight, in which a singular object isn't just given as such but also suddenly brings out the constellation that it is embedded in. Proust's work is in itself the locus of the

emergence of a new constellation, and so are all singular works of art as well as all forms of philosophical reflection. If Adorno often goes back to splitting this procedure in two moments, it is not only, as we have seen, in order to emphasize the resistance against classificatory thought that pertains to the first, but also to warn against the dangers of neglecting the second. Relating to Benjamin for example, Adorno often praised his immersion in a wealth of details about his subject, but also often criticised him for what Adorno had perceived to be an insufficient theoretical insight, which in his view, could easily lend descriptive thought to propaganda. For Adorno, renouncing the concept of essence and its link to theoretical, interpretative work would amount to embracing positivism and to blindly accepting as truth what is merely ideology.

Adorno employs the term "essence" in an emphatic way, sometime as we do in normal conversation to mean "the most relevant aspect" or what will give us the real measure of a phenomenon. For example, in the *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, we read: "A statistical compilation of those slaughtered in a pogrom, which also includes mercy killings, conceals its essence, which emerges only in an exact description of the exception, the most hideous torture" (Adorno 1991, 92). The emphasis is on the direct, lived experience and its testimony as opposed to the quantitative approach that purports to measure phenomena and that will ultimately actually mask the essential. The counterpart of essence is *Unwesen*, non-essence, which refers to a depravation of the true essence, by denying its existence. Thus, the ideology of mere facts as well as the dismissal of suffering in the name of the law of fatality amount to a resignation that eliminates the idea of essence and the need for its search. Consequently, the concept of essence is separated from the idea of an adequacy to a model or to an immutable truth and is engaged in a search of intellectual insight that includes a reflection on its own relevance, beyond the issue of verifiability: "The stubborn urge to check the accuracy of irrelevancies rather than to reflect on relevancy at the risk of error is one of the most widespread symptoms of a regressive consciousness" (Adorno 1992, 170). In the face of a conceptuality that arbitrarily truncates phenomena, Adorno

believes that there are moments of insight that stem from an immersive, language-mediated type of work that finds and affirms its own relevance.

3. Against eidetic intuition

Once again, it is not singularity *as such*, it is not the *hic et nunc* or *tode ti* character of phenomena that needs to be emphasized, but the fact that specific, singular phenomena themselves need to take the philosophical stage. If Adorno's interest goes to the ephemeral and the transitory, and he is not merely looking to set up the category of "*the* transitory," he tries to provide a method for bringing out that "something essential" that pertains to each individual phenomenon. Beyond a starting point in concrete phenomena and in the directly intuited, Adorno was also interested in the way Husserl proposed to move from particular experiences to the development of a universal science. This was obviously Husserl's main concern once the phenomenological reduction was set into place: how can a science be developed if all that we are left with is a Heraclitan flow of phenomena in which only singular *tode ti* come to view? This is where the eidetic intuition came into play. By further abstracting from the *tode ti*, by converting our intuiting from the red as this particularly given red to "red in general," one could, according to Husserl, take hold of an eidos and thus move from intuition to eidetic intuition, which would allow phenomenological descriptions to bring to light eidetic laws.

The main aspect of eidetic intuition that Adorno was interested in was its claim to be able to "extract" essences from singular phenomena and thus to bypass the procedure of comparative abstraction, in which essences are abstracted on the basis of the identity between multiple objects. However, what the eidetic intuition promised to do was exactly that which Adorno believed concepts can never accomplish: designate a singular object and not limit itself to designating one or some features that the object shares with others. Unsurprisingly, Adorno believes that the idea of eidetic intuition is fallacious and points out that Husserl makes certain illegitimate equations in order to set it up. In *Against Epistemology*, Adorno takes issue with the fact that in speaking

of the identical red that can be abstracted directly from a particular intuition of a particular red, first of all, the use of the term "identical" is justified only in relation to a multiplicity, which for Husserl is the multiplicity of red aspects that we intend in perception as one red. So even at this level, identity is played against multiplicity. Secondly, the shift from the particular to the species red within eidetic intuition cannot be justified, according to Adorno, if red as a concept isn't already instituted, *i.e.* if there is no awareness of the fact that there is such a thing as an eidos, the nature of which is to apply to multiple objects (Adorno 1982, 98). In general, Adorno reproaches Husserl a constant purification of his objects of study of all mediation, even within the field of individual consciousness, tendency which is mostly due to the extreme separation Husserl instituted between the real and the ideal in his attempt to refute psychologism. Besides this "extracting" procedure, Adorno also reproaches Husserl the fact that the essences that he was interested in were the very general concepts that Adorno was trying to ward off: "The logician Husserl, on the other hand, sharply contrasted the mode by which one becomes aware of the essence against the generalizing abstraction. He had a specific intellectual experience in mind, which was supposed to be able to descry the essence in the particular. The essence, however, to which this referred, did not differentiate itself in the slightest from that of the then-current general concept" (Adorno 1992, 9). The essences that Husserl was aiming at were just the classic general concepts, brought to their utmost idealistic expression and not at all analysed in relation to mediation. We can already see that, in Adorno's interpretation, eidetic intuition is equated with spiritual experience. Adorno is interested in the passage from singular phenomena to their essence in such a way that this essence will guarantee the preservation of that very singularity. He therefore believes that *there is* an eidetic intuition: Husserl brought to light the need for such an intuition but oversaw its real application. Both the first and the second step of Adorno's own interpretative procedure are missing: the first because for Husserl the starting point were the particular *Erlebnisse* of individual acts and not experience

as an encompassing whole and the second because the sought-after essences where the general concepts that are actually responsible both for evacuating singularity and overlooking mediation. In *Against Epistemology*, as well as in *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno explained this mediate character in terms of historical mediation, affirming that Husserl did not see that essences are themselves a product of a process of becoming, point which can be easily disproven by taking into consideration Husserl's later reflections on habituality and sedimentation. However, is not only historical but also subjective as well as linguistic mediation that Adorno is looking at.

Adorno contends that Husserl, by trying to give categorical thought unities a perceptual like-givenness, falsifies the very process of thinking, which is intrinsically linked to action and social agents. In Adorno's understanding, the fault lies in the way this immediate character is used to justify an idea of givenness that serves to veil a subjective mediation that is not however that of the transcendental subject. If Husserl uses eidetic intuition to smuggle ready-made ideal unities in the immediate field of perception, Heidegger, says Adorno, will mishandle this immediate character even further by using it to justify an idea of donation of being which completely does away with the subjective moment. In *Ontology and Dialectics*, Adorno emphasizes the fact that Heidegger's own deconstructions of philosophical concepts are only paving the way to further reifying termini, the emptiest of which is that of Being. So, while Heidegger's philosophy might approach concepts from a certain historical perspective, the main issue here is that this history is reflected back on an anonymous process, failing to "break the spell that human beings have made of their concepts" (Adorno 2019a, 204). Instead of giving this donation over to an impersonal, demiurgic being, it needs to be related back to human agency. Even though most of the time it is Heidegger and the emptiness of his concept of being that Adorno takes issues with, this objection towards the de-subjectivation of meaning is also applied to Husserl. Adorno says that by endowing the subject with transcendental powers, Husserl rightly shows that the subject is condemned to obeying laws there where he seemed to be prescribing them. However,

this powerlessness is aggravated by the fact that this subject which is ultimately another type of object is placed in relation to pre-set essences and laws which cover up "the essential laws of society" (Adorno 1992, 168) and thus amount to nothing less than a fall into ideology and a masking of true essence. A subject that is itself non-identical will acknowledge its historical character and its own constitution through a mediation that, while out of its controlling hands, is decipherable under concepts of its own doing. While essences are not the *ex-nihilo* production of an autonomous subject, we can say with Martin Jay, that it is Adorno's objective to reintroduce the individual subject in constellations (Jay 1984, 261).

The critique of eidetic intuition can be related to a more general theme in Adorno, of central significance for the development of negative dialectics, which is that of the utopia of knowledge. There is a kinship between the ambitions of eidetic intuition and the model of the name, which was taken up by Benjamin most notably in *On Language as Such and the Language of Man* and which is based on the premise that the essence of language is to name and not to communicate subjective intentions. The originary adamic language was the language in which things were directly named rather than intended, whereas the fallen languages of today are limited to communication. For Benjamin, it is only through commentary that thought can attain some of that initial power of the adamic language. It is of course hard to imagine how such a language would work, and if we could even call it a language. In *Negative Dialectics*, Adorno invokes this model in order to point out its inherent utopia: according to the archetype of the language of names, things would not be covered up by categories, but, in the same time, knowledge as such would also be impossible. Adorno often invokes the model of the name, only to underline its utopic character and the necessity of its negation (Adorno 1992, 53). Names cannot give us the truth of their unique objects anymore, which is why concepts have to be placed in constellations, be brought to cite one another. Constellations are the only form of retaining something "of the hope of the name," or, he might as well have said, of the hope of eidetic intuition. So, we could argue that one reason why eidetic

intuition became a constant reference for Adorno is because it allowed him to underline a utopic intention.

The focus on singular essences, in spite of the call for their dissolution, can thus be interpreted from the perspective of the hope of the name. This hope is in turn linked to what we might call the ethical imperative of Adorno's work, which consists in doing justice to the phenomena, despite the impossibility to do so. The key to this whole endeavor is linked to this utopic element that resides in the targeting of an unattainable comprehensive unity. But the positive core of Adorno's philosophy is not concerned solely with the first order givenness of phenomena but also with the ways in which this unattainable unity can nonetheless be approached. That which the concept cannot adequately designate can be expressed through language and Adorno often mobilizes considerations about rhetoric and literature in order to highlight that there is a point of convergence between art and knowledge where the sought-after unity becomes material. The configurative power of the second step of the interpretative work relies on the expressive power of language, and here eidetic intuition plays a role as well.

4. Language

Another one of Adorno's early programmatic writings is *Theses on the Language of the Philosopher*, in which he emphasises the pivotal role of language for philosophical thought. He denounces the idea of the arbitrariness of signs[5], claiming that this is a symptom of the idealist philosophy that gives the naming power to the subject and thus veils the historical nature of language and thereby of all philosophical thought. Because truth stands in an essential relation to language, philosophy is only possible as a critique of language. In his lecture courses on *Philosophical Terminology*, Adorno first underlines the fact that philosophical concepts can only be understood from the perspective of their historical developments and in their transitions from a philosopher to another. To understand a philosophical argument is in a way to understand the whole of philosophy. The shifts in meaning, however, are not just the consequence of concepts being placed by a philosopher in a new construction but are also due to the fact that this very

construction is subjected to a historic lawfulness, that has social implications. Philosophers therefore also stand in a direct relation to "unregulated experience" because their concepts are the expression of the socio-linguistic context they live in.

In *The Essay as Form*, Adorno actually compares spiritual experience with language learning, stressing the fact that this particular experience is similar to the immersion of a language learner in the speaking context, where he will repeatedly hear and see words being used in various combinations and thus acquire an understanding for the possibilities of those words that are far superior to whatever definitions a dictionary might provide (Adorno 1984, 161). Philosophical terminology, Adorno notes, has its sources in such immersive experiences but loses its connection to them by closing itself in an immanent conceptual realm. Therefore, for Adorno, the task of anyone who wants to understand philosophy is to "awaken the congealed life in words, in terms" (Adorno 2016, 18; my translation). In relation to Plato, for example, Adorno makes the point that the term "eidos" was so effective philosophically because it was commonly used in the Greek language of the time and carried a wealth of meanings and nuances. On the other hand, he also praises Plato as a first constellator, as someone who has brought words into rich philosophical figures of thought and incriminates the observations of someone like Diogenes Laertius, who had criticized the fact that Plato had not pinned concepts down to clear definitions but had allowed them to acquire different nuances depending on the constellation they were in (Adorno 2016, 49). We note in passing that, for Adorno, phenomenology shares Laertius' drive towards exact definitions and consequently ends up fetishizing language (Adorno 2016, 49). Indeed, Husserl's initial objective of accounting for the donation of ideal unities required the development of an ideal language, in which the possibility of applying concepts to different objects had to be curtailed (Husserl 2009, 140). This seems to be for Adorno yet another way in which eidetic intuition fails its true mission by proceeding reductively rather than configuratively.

The objectifying tendencies of rational and objectivistic thought have their roots in an inherent tendency in language

itself to lose its initial, adequate content. As contended in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, language and the drive for self-preservation, which then transforms into a drive to dominance, are coextensive. The magic practices that were instituted in the face of fear, in an attempt to respond to the recurrent natural phenomena, were also the birthplace of language (Adorno 2002, 15). The tendency to reification that plagues conceptual thought is the reification inherent to the social development that led to modern societies. In the modern, bourgeois society, language becomes subjected to fetishization: like commodities, words appear now to be independent of objects, and the experiences that went into establishing their signification have become forgotten. Words do not adhere to particular experiences anymore: "The more completely socialized the world becomes, the more densely its objects are enveloped in universal determinations" (Adorno 2019a, 202). So is language itself at fault for its classificatory, reductive, fetishizing use? The implicit premise for Adorno seems to be that, similarly to Ulysses' cunning use of reason, that was the condition for his liberation from natural forces, there is a cunning use of language that allows for knowledge but doesn't however fall into the trap of the autonomy of the concept and can bypass its fall into vacuity. So, if today, due to the human need of dominance and stability, language has become an empty creation, and words have lost their adequacy towards content, it is precisely a method of bringing experience and language together that is called for.

We can thus see that the idea of constellation is not some made-up solution but the theoretical crystallization of a method that follows the model of the language. It is the expressive power of language that offers a way out: rather than purify language through logic and mathematics or introduce neologisms, concepts should be brought in constellations that mirror the expressive power language has in the first place. Language itself, in its expressive dimension, opposed to the limitedness of the individual concept, is what reveals the object: "Language thus serves the intention of the concept to express completely what it means" (Adorno 1992, 162). For Adorno, it is also language that has the ability to store the real history and

social embeddedness of the investigated object and thus carry further a certain experiential load.

It would be useful to draw here a parallel between Adorno's idea of awakening the congealed life in terms and Husserl's regressive inquiry into the origins of geometry. Husserl's leading question was if the historical tradition of eidetic unities, in particular, of knowledge of geometric laws, entails a loss of meaning that is in turn the source of the crisis of sciences. Adorno however doesn't seem to imply that this awakening has a retrieving function, which would bring us back the initial, lost meaning of concepts. The premise here seems to be that the history stored by language can only show itself in a new configuration. In other words, the awakening of the congealed life implies placing concepts in new constellations in which, in virtue of their embeddedness in language, their functions will be reawakened by acquiring new meaning. The way Adorno re-uses the term "eidetic intuition" in his own conceptual configuration is a case in point.

Now, it has been pointed out that Adorno's works themselves are structured configuratively (Müller-Doohm 2008, 48), perhaps even in a somewhat systematic fashion (Rӧmer 2012, 85). His criticism of central philosophical concepts eventually amounts to a reconfiguration in which some of their previous layers of meaning are preserved, while new significations emerge according to the context in which the concepts are placed. Thus, coming back to eidetic intuition, as we have seen, this concept also undergoes this re-configurative procedure by taking a new place in Adorno's negative dialectics. So, if as Adorno affirms: "today the philosopher confronts disintegrated language. The ruins of words are his material, to which history binds him; his freedom is solely the possibility of their configuration according to the force of truth in them" (Adorno 2007, 37), we could say that the historical bind and truth that comes to expression in Husserl's eidetic intuition is its relation to singular phenomena and concrete experience. It takes the form of a ruin in its claim to warrant the in-itself of concepts. What is then the new force of its truth?

In *Against Epistemology* Adorno pointed out that "only language, which denotes both the singular red moment and the

species red, entices one to the hypostasis of the latter" (Adorno 2019a, 98). The possibility to work "eidetically" pertains to language, but, once again, and as he had already pointed out in *Theses on the Language of the Philosopher*, language should not be seen as a system of signs but as the basis of the performative, creative work that is the mark of spiritual experience. Doesn't this view of language eliminate the need for talking about an eidetic intuition? Eidetic intuition, in spite of its initial claim of reaching essences instantaneously, which is most likely what motivated Adorno in his intention to destroy it, is attributed a positive function, similar to that of the phenomenological moment as such. Adorno notes that Husserl has the final word because: "what belongs together in a judgement reveals itself in an exemplary rather than a merely comparative fashion. There is a sense in which you should regard a judgement not merely as something abstracted in comparison with other states of affairs but as something with an immediacy of its own where a specific state of affairs is 'evident' in this individual determinate judgement" (Adorno 2019a, 201). We can assume that the reason why Adorno gives priority to eidetic intuition rather than the irreducible given is because it allows him to bring together the two steps or moments we have already underlined and to emphasize the conceptual and in the same time immersive nature of the second moment. There is an experience in which concepts impose themselves to us in the attempt of expressing that which transcends them. Even though the classic notion of essence, as a general concept, has been stricken out, eidetic intuition is equated with spiritual experience because a) it serves to underline the notion of essence beyond the primary givenness with its ideological pitfalls and, I would argue, because b) it also carries the meaning of an evident, non-reducible given. So, even though both subjectively and historically mediated, Adorno's essences are out of the hands of the subject and retain an irreducible quality themselves. These new essences have a truth value that speaks for itself and doesn't require any scientific or exterior validation. Adorno even seems to imply that they accomplish this essential function through the linguistic work alone, sometimes in

contradiction with the ideas expressed in it. It is telling what Adorno says in this respect about Nietzsche, who defended an extreme nominalism – which is obviously in contradiction with Adorno's view of language as the medium of historical truth – thus "doing injustice to the spirit of language and its objectivity, to which his own work brings, nevertheless, great testimony" (Adorno 2016, 25; my translation). The emergence of philosophical thought in its linguistic configuration is its own phenomenological, irreducible moment.

In spite of the shortcomings of eidetic intuition and of the reification of language that Husserl was set to operate, Adorno believes that this type of productive theoretical work is nevertheless to be found in Husserl too, noting that: "even Husserl frequently found in a unique concrete thing – insistently contemplated and elucidated – deeper and more binding insight into far-reaching relations than would a procedure which tolerates in the individual only what can be subsumed under general concepts" (Adorno 1982, 96). Beyond the somewhat ironic move of relating his own interpretation of the eidetic intuition to exemplify its authentic use in the work of its initial proponent, this observation seems to imply that the far-reaching relations that Adorno is hinting at here relate to phenomenological figures of totality, such as horizon, world and eventually the life-world, that could all prove very fruitful in a discussion about the mediation of experiences through their relation to all-compassing wholes but that Adorno has never explicitly addressed.

Given that, as Adorno had declared in the *Actuality of Philosophy*, philosophy does not dispose of any ultimate principle of the legitimation of knowledge, we can ask ourselves if the hope of configuring non-identity is a sufficient criterium for the truth value of any newly crystallized configuration. As much as we should strive towards theoretical insight and a transcending of primary observation, can linguistic essences themselves completely avert the spell of ideology? On this note, we can perhaps reproach Adorno a surreptitious import of a layer of meaning that eidetic intuition had in Husserl and in the philosophical tradition in general and that makes its use in the new Adornian configuration seem somewhat illegitimate,

which is that of the reassuring function of having reached a definitive truth. This objection can be easily countered by taking into consideration the fact Adorno never shied away from highlighting the risks of a philosophy of non-identity. So, to conclude, even though Adorno is known for his critical, deconstructive analyses, he is always looking to bring out that moment of truth in each philosopher, which is not limited to a correct versus incorrect evaluation but is focused on the ethical imperative of deconstructing the dominance built into concepts and of bringing forth constellations that do justice to life "in its extreme agitation."

NOTES

[1] Susan Buck-Morss even names one of the chapters of *The Origins of Negative Dialectics* "The method in action: liquidating idealism," convincingly stressing the fact that we can identify a certain "idea" that is at the basis of all of Adorno's essays. (Buck-Morss 1977, 96)

[2] I take this term from Steel's *Adornos Philosophie der Kontemplation*. According to Steel, the emphasis on the negative that is present in most of Adorno's book titles gives only a partial and even skewed perspective on his thought, which includes however an undeniable "positive core". (Steel 2004, 21)

[3] The relationship between Husserl and Adorno has been in recent years the object of different studies which focus either on Adorno's work on Husserl (see Wolff 2006, Ferencz-Flatz 2019a), on his critique of both Husserl and Heidegger (Tengelyi 2012) or on establishing a dialogue between critical theory and phenomenology starting from their intersection points, the most prominent of which is undoubtedly the concept of experience. Thus, the recent *Husserl Handbuch* (2017) includes a chapter on critical theory, in which Bedorf underlines the fact that actually critical theory and phenomenology do share a certain skepticism against the ideas of origins, immediacy or the immanence of consciousness. Römer (2012) investigates the possibility of identifying spiritual experience in the works of Husserl and Heidegger, and Ferencz-Flatz (2019b) draws a parallel between the handling of pre-theoretical experience in Adorno and in phenomenology. Monographies dedicated to Adorno such as Roger Foster's *Adorno. The Recovery of Experience* (2007) or Peter Gordon's *Adorno and Existence* (2016) also underline the presence of a phenomenological component in Adorno.

[4] Here I agree with Roger Foster, who believes "spiritual experience" to be a better choice than "intellectual experience" for translating "*geistige Erfahrung*" due to the fact that the term "intellectual" places too much emphasis on the role of the subject. The term "spiritual," on the other hand, has the advantage of maintaining "the perceptible link with the Hegelian

notion of *Geist* and *geistig*, as well as the Proustian understanding of expérience spirituelle" (Foster 2007, 4), as well as that, I would add, of hinting at the immersive nature of this experience.

[5] Even though Adorno doesn't reference Saussure, there seems to be an implicit reference at the latter's then emerging semiotics. Philip Hogh has provided an illuminating parallel between the critique of the modern subject in Adorno and the critique of the idea of language as a system. Hogh (2010).

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A Critique of Metaphysical Logical Realism

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Abstract

This paper disagrees with Michaela McSweeney over metaphysical logical realism. Using the method of critical analysis, it compares the metaphysical ideas in McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism with the standard ideas of metaphysical realism in metaphysics to underscore the extent to which McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism deviates from metaphysical realism. The paper argues that making an imaginary mind-and-language-independent world the truthmaker of a supposed one-true-logic is a categorical mistake that gives rise to what is called the Independent-Dependent paradox. The paper submits that the independent-dependent paradox is avoidable by a recourse to logical pluralism, which better handles the description of reality as a system of complex multiples rather than a single whole. Hence, logical relativity rather than the absolutism of logic appears more tenable for logic as a descriptive tool.

Keywords: One-true-logic · Logical monism · Metaphysical logical realism · Mind-and-language-independence · Logical pluralism

1. Introduction

Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic (Tahko 2019). In this regard logical realism can be rightly regarded as a school of thought in metaphysics of logic. Logical realists are divided over what the metaphysical status of logic is. One of the most debated topic in logical realism is whether logic is one or many, single or plural. While some have argued for logical monism, that is, that there is one true logic;

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others have argued for logical pluralism, that is, that there are many systems of logic. Michaela McSweeney argues in support of logical monism and introduces metaphysical logical realism (MLR) as the conjunction of three theses, namely:

(i) That there is 'One True Logic' (OTL from now on).
(ii) That the OTL is true on account of a mind-and-language-independent world.
(iii) That the OTL is metaphysically privileged because it is better than any other logic at capturing the true nature of reality (McSweeney 2018).

This paper expresses disagreement about McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism, which is presented as the conjunction of the three theses (i), (ii) and (iii). Using the method of comparative analysis, attempt is made in the second section of the paper to establish that McSweeney's use of the concept of mind-and-language-independence, discords with the standard understanding of the concept in metaphysics. The third section of the paper argues that making an imaginary mind-and-language-independent world the truthmaker of a supposed OTL, generates what is in this paper called the Independent-Dependent (ID) paradox. The fourth section discusses some of the implications of the ID paradox to *metaphysicalism* and the final section concludes the paper.

2. Comparing the idea of mind-and-language-independence in metaphysics and metaphysical logical realism

In this section, an attempt is made to show that there is a standard meaning for 'mind-and-language-independence' in metaphysics, which McSweeney does not seem to preserve in her theory of metaphysical logical realism. The comparison between how the concept is used in metaphysics and how the concept is used in metaphysical logical realism is plausible because metaphysical logical realism can be rightly seen as a school of thought in the metaphysics of logic; and the metaphysics of logic is an aspect of metaphysics.

The idea of 'mind-and-language-independence' is explicitly or implicitly preserved in the works of many

philosophers. It is implied by Plato's 'world of Forms'. It is also implied by the different versions of the theory of substance that are found in the works of philosophers such as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, John Locke etc.

In metaphysics, the metaphysical category that can be described as 'mind-and-language-independent' is reserved for the unknown or unknowable holder of the properties that the mind attain through the senses and intuition. This standard meaning of mind-and-language-independence preserves the duality of the unknown or unknowable things-in-themselves and their knowable properties. Aristotle sustained this duality as the dichotomy between substance and accidents. The British empiricist John Locke[1] sustained this duality as the substance-quality dichotomy (Locke 2007, book 2, chap. 23). The German philosopher Immanuel Kant also sustained this duality as the noumena-phenomena dichotomy (Kant 1999, 190).

Western metaphysics is filled with different examples of this duality (Asouzu 2007). In Plato's metaphysics, this duality is sustained as the division of reality into two worlds, namely, the world of Forms and the world of imitations (Ikegbu 2014). Another aspect of this duality in Plato's metaphysics is the distinction of the Forms as objects of the real and perfect world from their mental epistemic representations through reminiscence on account of philosophical reflection. Some logical monists believe in a single logical structure that is mind-and-language-independent. What this means is that this structure will continue to exist even if there were no minds to perceive it (Rush 2014, 15). But this is tantamount to placing whatever is meant by 'logical facts' in the same metaphysical category with Plato's Forms, substance and noumena.

Duality in western ontology is sustained as the dichotomy between reality as 'things-in-themselves' and reality as 'objects of human knowledge'. But most often, reality as 'things-in-themselves' is in metaphysics, given a supersensible or transcendental or even supernatural connotation. On the one hand, it is presented as inaccessible by sensory epistemic standards, and on the other hand, its properties are presented as accessible. The practice has been to describe the metaphysically superior 'aspects' of the dichotomy that are

believed to be inaccessible by epistemic standards, as reality per excellence; while the metaphysically inferior 'aspects' that are thought of as being accessible by epistemic standards are regarded as somewhat pseudo-real. However, polarizing reality in this manner does not necessarily entail that reality is thus polarized. Such polarizations are done by the mind. The idea of mind-and-language-independence hangs on such mental polarizations. That the mind can radically conceive an idea as 'mind-and-language-independent' does not absolutely necessitate the existence of a mind-and-language-independent world. 'Mind-and-language-independence' is simply a logical concept invented by critical thinking to excuse the uniqueness of reality as things-in-themselves from the varying and possible contradictory perceptions and descriptions of them.

Is McSweeney right to describe the metaphysical category of mind-and-language-independence as a world; nonetheless to think of it as the truthmaker for an imaginary OTL? To say that it is the mind-and-language-independent world that makes the OTL true is to propose some form of dependence of the OTL on the mind-and-language-independent world. This looks like Platonism.

One of the thesis of Logical realism is that 'logical facts' are mind-and-language-independent (LaPointe 2014). Describing 'logical facts' in this manner implies that it belongs to the metaphysical category of mind-and-language-independence. If the mind-and-language-independent world is what makes the OTL true, then whatever is regarded as 'logical facts' should be facts of the OTL. In other words, if the OTL is true on account of a mind-and-language-independent world and the OTL is at the same time the real logical structure, which is mind-and-language-independent; then the OTL is itself mind-and-language-independent or it is in the mind-and-language-independent world. This sounds paradoxical but it is a logical implication from McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism.

Besides Platonism, the predominant view in metaphysics about things that are conceived as belonging to this category of mind-and-language-independence is that they are the unknown or unknowable holders of the properties. Since

logical realism also places logic within this category, it could be asked whether the OTL is knowable or unknowable.

It is not enough to say there is OTL, it is also necessary to say what exactly the OTL is. To say that the OTL is this or that is to claim to know the OTL. But will this amount to knowing the OTL as it really is or merely of its 'properties'? This paper does not attempt to answer this question since doing so will require an elaborate discussion for another paper.

Like many proponents of logical monism, McSweeney does not say what the OTL is but she categorically states that it is not fuzzy logic as was implied by Putnam's thesis[2]; however she mentions that some have identified the OTL as classical logic (McSweeney 2018). This can be seen in the work of Maddy who says the OTL is classical logic (Maddy 2014).

Classical logic has a vocabulary that is part of its structure and in this regard, cannot be said to be mind-and-language independent. However to say as Maddy does, that the mind-and-language-independent OTL is classical logic is to say that the mind-and-language-independent OTL is at the same time a mind-and-language-dependent logic. But this amounts to a paradox. The alternative will be to adopt the approach of Platonism to say that classical logic is an imperfect image of the OTL. But to hold the latter view is to admit some kind of correspondence between the supposed mind-and-language-independent OTL and its supposed mind-and-language-dependent representative. This will mean a further multiplication of metaphysical duality to include the dichotomy between the supposed one real logic as it is in-itself and its pseudo-representative.

In instances where classical logic fails to describe a given experience of reality, such as in quantum mechanics[3] it becomes paradoxical to reduce the OTL to classical logic. This is because another logic will be needed to do the job that classical logic is unable to do. But two conflicting logics or logical structures cannot be representing the OTL at the same time. If the instantiated OTL as classical logic cannot apply universally to all possible worlds, then its status as the representative of the OTL cannot stand either or better still, the OTL has no known real representative. This will mean that the OTL, like

substance and noumena is actually unknowable. But this will imply a movement away from Platonism, which appears to be a safe haven for logical monists and the thesis of OTL.

It should however be pointed out that the knowability of the mind-and-language-independent Forms of Plato does not communicate exactly the same meaning as the knowability of the OTL. Plato's theory of the reminiscence of the Forms does not suit the analogy of OTL because it categorically describes the reminiscing-mind as that of a soul that once pre-existed with the Forms. The place of the mind as the knowing subject is silenced both in logical realism and McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism. Moreover, a logical structure that 'belongs' to a mind-and-language-independent world cannot at the same time be described by a logic that is mind-and-language dependent, which does not belong to a mind-and-language-independent world.

Whereas, McSweeney thinks she is not inclined to reason that conceiving logic in the category of mind-and-language-independence constitutes a categorical mistake; the author of this paper is of the view that this position is unavoidable. It is the mind that creates the mind-and-language-independent world and not that the mind-and-language-independent world is what the mind has experienced. Putting logic within the category of mind-and-language-independence reflects an old philosophical tradition that supposes that the ideas of universals, universality, objectivity, and foundationalism can only be safe from the destructive lenses of skepticism by positioning them in a metaphysical category of mind-and-language-independence.

Kant used this approach extensively both in his *Critiques of Pure Reason and Practical Reason* to argue for the possibility of a scientific metaphysics as well as to establish a foundation for the metaphysics of morals that is deontological. In epistemology, the notion of 'the given' and 'objects of immediacy' are introduced to prevent hallucinations and illusions from collapsing to ontological nihilism. But this does not really mean that 'objects of immediacy' and 'the given' belong to another world where mind-and-language independent things are. This is why McSweeney's introduction of a mind-

and-language-independent world as the truthmaker of the OTL poses more problems for logical monists especially where they still have to describe the OTL as a descriptive tool for capturing the true nature of the world.

The claim that there is only one true logic is hegemonic. Questions about what truth consists in is always a dicey issue in epistemology. One does not see logical realism settling this perennial philosophical problem with the thesis of OTL. In metaphysics of logic, the emphasis should not be on the truth of logic as a mind-and-language independent entity but rather on the ontological truths in the world that different logics attempt to describe. Every true logic requires another true logic to describe it. A true logic, which describes another also needs another to describe it. If the OTL is the only true logic, it cannot be used to describe it; and the one used to describe it must as well be true. This produces a paradoxical chain. One way to avoid this seeming endless chain is cease to look at logic as a mind-and-language-independent thing in-itself, after all the job of logic is to capture reality in its plurality and complexity. But logic is the mind's tool and not something independent of the mind.

Moving away from an imaginary mind-and-language-independent world to a real mind-and-language dependent world is necessary to explain logic not only as the mind's descriptive tool but also as the product of valued ontological contexts. This direction avoids the paradoxical situation where a mind-and-language-dependent logic has to describe a mind-and-language-independent logic or where a mind-and-language-independent logic must correspond to or be instantiated by a mind-and-language-dependent logic. This independence-dependence situation is what I have chosen to call the ID paradox.

3. Explaining the ID paradox

Ontological logical realism and ideological logical realism are two versions of metaphysical logical realism (McSweeney 2017, 2018). Ontological logical realists are also metaphysical logical realists. This idea is gotten from the paragraph that reads:

> Ontological (metaphysical) logical realists-hereafter 'ontological realists' – think that the OTL is true in virtue of directly reflecting something about items in our ontology (McSweeney 2018, 4).

This means that the words 'ontological' and 'metaphysical' are used as synonyms in this context. However, the word 'metaphysical' has a broader meaning than 'ontological' in metaphysics. Coming from the tradition of general metaphysics, metaphysics is a science which investigates the ultimate ground of absolutely everything, giving a final answer to a total problem (Coreth 1968, 17). Metaphysics studies the ground basis of all reality as a whole, which comprises both the natural and the supernatural (Iroegbu 1995, 23). The standard meaning of metaphysics is about the study of reality in its entirety. One who is committed to general metaphysics, understands that the subject matter of metaphysics is not limited to the natural, the physical and the sensible, but also includes the categories of the supernatural, the immaterial, the spiritual, the supersensible, the transcendent and the transcendental. Special metaphysics limits the subject matter to exclude the supernatural and the spiritual. Both general and special metaphysics is a theory of 'what is' in so far as it is; however, ontology limits the class of 'what is' to 'what is believed to be'. That which is ontological is also metaphysical but not all that is metaphysical is ontological. Metaphysics deals with 'what is' in so far as it is; ontology deals with 'what is believed to be'.

In using the concepts 'ontological' and 'metaphysical' one should understand that metaphysical is broader. A people's ontological worldview is a totality of what they believe exists. Two cultures can be said to have different ontologies because there are many beliefs and practices that are coloured by such beliefs, which vary from culture to culture. For instance, traditional Africans believe in the world of ancestors but western ontology does not present ancestors in this light. This means traditional Africans have a different worldview from the westerners. However, both worldviews are reflective of their respective ontologies; and but ontologies are metaphysical in the general sense.

'What is' and 'what is believed to be' are two different things because 'what is believed to be' does not necessarily translate to what is. Also, 'what is believed to be' does not mean the same thing as 'what is perceived to be'. While 'what is perceived to be' can be believed to be, not all that is believed to be has been perceived to be as such. For instance, in some ontologies dragons are believed to exist even as they are not perceived to exist. Something can be believed to exist but not perceived to exist and something can be believed not to exist but could possibly exist. Therefore, ontology as a theory of 'what is believed to be' cannot preserve the same meaning as 'what is' in so far as it is.

This elaborate discussion to differentiate ontology from metaphysics is aimed at establishing that the supposed OTL thesis is better described as ontological rather than metaphysical. Apart from Platonism, the substance-noumena tradition takes the metaphysical category of 'what is' in so far as it is away from epistemic accessibility and settles for representational realism, that is, what is perceived to be. In western epistemology, the mind is denied the possibility of attaining 'what is', rather what is common among philosophers of the substance-noumena tradition is the view that the mind attains the imagery representations of 'what is' via the senses.

Describing the supposed OTL as a mind-and-language-independent structure places it in the metaphysical category of 'what is'. However, the proponents of the supposed OTL do not observe it and cannot point to it. All we hear is that it is a mind-and-language-independent structure. But it is factual that the supposed OTL thesis is just what is 'believed to be' and not necessarily 'what is'. The supposed OTL is a speculated idea and not a thing-in-itself in the way McSweeney's metaphysical logical realism tends to portray it. Even if the supposed OTL is taken to mean a real mind-and-language-independent structure, it cannot at the same time be a descriptive tool for capturing the true nature of reality.

That one believes that there is a supposed OTL does not necessarily mean that there really is OTL. That one thinks or believes that there is a mind-and-language-independent world does not necessarily mean that there is a mind-and-language-

independent world in actual existence because neither the former nor the latter has been perceived to exist. The OTL thesis is simply an unverifiable belief propagated by logical monists. This is why I think that McSweeney's believe in a mind-and-language-independent-world makes the conjunction of the three thesis[4] ontological logical realism rather than metaphysical logical realism. Going by the standard tradition in metaphysics and epistemology, the true nature of reality is beyond the mind's epistemic reach. How can the supposed OTL capture the world's real nature when the world's real nature is actually *uncapturable*? Even if the supposed OTL were to be seen as absolutely real, it would not be capturing the true nature of the world but only a representation of it.

Many philosophers avoid naïve realism when discussing about the true nature of the world or the true nature of reality; but rather hold unto a representational realism. Why do proponents of the supposed OTL think that a naïve realist approach is possible for the OTL? This is off tradition because even if the supposed OTL is approached from a naïve realist perspective, it cannot do the job of describing its own true nature even if it were to be conceived as a thing-in-itself; some other logic will have to do the job. Therefore, the proponents of the supposed OTL cannot avoid the problem that if there is a supposed OTL that better describes the true nature of reality, there should also be another OTL that should describe the true nature of the given OTL.

4. Disagreement about metaphysicalism

In adapting Rayo's *metaphysicalism,* it appears that McSweeney was only interested in showing that Rayo is a metaphysical logical realist. However, she failed to see that Rayo's views are detrimental to the OTL thesis. Rayo mentions that:

a) Reality has a metaphysical structure that can be divided into its constituent parts in a particular metaphysically privileged way (Rayo 2013, 6).
b) The truth of an atomic proposition stands plausible on its correspondence between the logical form of a

sentence and the metaphysical structure of reality (Rayo 2013, 6).

c) The true things we say about reality does not necessarily mean that we have perfectly captured the metaphysical structure of reality (Rayo 2013, 9).

The first two views *(a)* and *(b)* is what McSweeney calls *metaphysicalism*. But the third view *(c)* is the primary concern here since it summarizes what the author of this paper has to say about *(a)* and *(b)*.This is the view that the true things we say about reality does not mean that we have perfectly captured the structure of reality. This is a modified version of the standard view in metaphysical realism about the *unknowability* of reality but rather of the properties mentally represented. So neither 'the metaphysically privileged way of dividing reality into constituent parts' nor 'the correspondence between atomic logical sentences and atomic facts' is tantamount to capturing the true nature of reality perfectly. However, Rayo's view that reality is a complex multiple is acceptable. Logical pluralism best fits the idea of reality as a complex multiple than as a single whole as presented by OTL.

Rayo's view in (b) places truthmakers within the world but the view in (c) suggests that the metaphysical nature of reality cannot be perfectly captured. Therefore, the nature of truth that arises from this context must also be imperfect. If the truthmaker of the OTL is a metaphysical structure that cannot be perfectly captured then its truth-making-role makes the truth status of the OTL less probable. If the truthmaker of the OTL is the metaphysical structure in the world that cannot even be perfectly captured; how will the truthmaker of a mind-and-language independent world fare better in the job of truth-making for a supposed OTL?

Sider thinks that logical notions are the most fundamental language that perfectly captures the structure of reality' (Sider 2011). But if the metaphysical structure in the world is the truthmaker for atomic sentences by way of the latter corresponding to it; Sider's view stands paradoxical to Rayo's view labelled (c).

Suffice it to express disagreements about the fundamental-minima-theories of being that are mentioned by

McSweeney. Given that the true nature of reality is actually inaccessible according to standard epistemology, or that the true nature of reality cannot be perfectly captured, one can only say that each theory of reality is not a complete theory. On that note, the view that the world is just about states of affairs (Armstrong 1997) is an incomplete description of the world because states of affairs are perceived states of different physical and biological systems. States of affairs are the perceptible properties of complex multiple cosmic systems that can here be described as ontological frames of references. There is also the view that the world is all about a single structured object (Schaffer 2010). This view stands contrary to our understanding of the world as a constituent part of a larger system, which we call the universe.

Where the metaphysical nature of the world cannot be perfectly captured, then in a state of imperfect attempts to capture same, there is bound to be variances of descriptions or of perceptions or of perspectives. Placing the truthmaker of the supposed OTL in an imaginary abstract world does not nullify the imperfect subjective attempts to describe the true nature of the OTL itself.

5. Conclusion

Metaphysical logical realism presents the OTL as a knowable mind-and-language-independent structure, yet it does not answer the question of what system of logic explicates this structure or whether it is a mental structure or a plain physical structure. McSweeney's creates more problem by hanging the veridicality of this speculated single logic on an imaginary, unverified and unverifiable mind-and-language-independent world.

That the true nature of reality cannot be perfectly captured means that even the best of logics cannot perfectly describe the true nature of reality, not even the supposed OTL. Paradigm-shift in science and the replacement of old theories by new ones is an indication that human knowledge is hardly certain. Logic is better defined from its functional dimension rather than from an absolutist ontological dimension because the job of describing the true nature of reality presupposes both

epistemic and linguistic 'tools'. The descriptive function of logic stands plausible on mind-and-language-dependence; this is why conceiving logic without this functional perspective should be avoided. Defining logic from its functional perspective allows one to appreciate the relativity of logic and logical pluralism. Logical pluralism makes logic a product of ontological contexts. This underscores the relativity of logic. In this regard, relativity of logic presupposes ontological frames of reference (Shapiro 2014). Ontological frames of reference points to reality as multiple complexities rather than a unity of essence.

The world is made up of objects that enjoy various interrelations and dependencies between them (Ijiomah 1995, 5 and Maddy 2002, 501). Yet it is the mind that perceive these objects as related and not that *relatedness* and *dependence* are in themselves things of the sort that can be described as mind-and-language-independent. That a logic is said to correctly describe a real state of affairs does not necessarily imply that one should think of the logic as true or correct. Descriptions have a lot to do with the internal relations between individual perceptions, cultural belief-systems and value-systems. Until one is ready to accept that description is plausible within the direction of correspondence between world and mental states, searching for truthmakers outside this context of relations may be a fruitless venture.

The attempt to describe the absolute is common in philosophy-literature. It is not surprising that in the metaphysics of logic, there are scholars who think that there is an absolute logic. McSweeney's OTL thesis is a version of logical monism explicating her belief in the existence of an absolute logic. Absolutism has failed in philosophy because of the realization that the finite mind cannot attain knowledge of the infinite absolute. Absolutism in logic may be a school of thought, but as far as realism about logic is concerned, relativity and logical pluralism cannot just be dismissed with a wave of the hand. After all the richness of logic comes when we stop looking for some preconceived essence (Klima 2014).

NOTES

[1] See (Peter Macmillan 2015), (John Dunn 2003) for more on Locke's view on substance.
[2] Putnam once thought that since classical logic fails to explain the observations in the system of quantum mechanics, then quantum logic rather than classical logic is the true logic of the world (Putnam 1968 and 1979). This can be rightly described as an attempt to validate the thesis of OTL.
[3] As elaborately discussed by Hilary Putnam and Guido Bacciagaluppi.
[4] That there is OTL; that it is the mind-and-language-independent world that makes the OTL true; and that the OTL is metaphysically privileged because it is better than any other logic at capturing the nature of reality.

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The 'Self' is the Source of Human Beings' Decision-Making Process: A Critical Examination on Theories of Free Will

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Abstract

The concept of 'free will' states that when more than one alternative is available to an individual, he/she chooses freely and voluntarily to render an action in a given context. A question arises, how do human beings choose to perform an action in a given context? What happens to an individual to choose an action out of many alternatives? The free will theorists claim that free will guides individuals to choose an action voluntarily. Therefore, he/she is morally responsible for his/her voluntary actions. This paper attempts to answer whether a person's action is an outcome of his/her free will or brain processes? While answering this question, it examines the relation between free will and the principle of causality. It analyses participation of free will for human beings' decision-making process(es) for voluntary actions and therefore acceptance of moral responsibility for that action. This paper submits that human beings use their 'free will' to decide the course of an action and therefore they 'own' their actions. This paper also tries to trace the source of human voluntary actions to 'free will' and submits that the experience of 'free will' is an outcome of the experience of 'self'.

Keywords: free will, moral responsibility, self, decision-making process, principle of causality

1. Introduction

Are human beings free? What does it mean when we say that human beings are free to make their decisions and thereby they are morally responsible for their action? Free will theories certainly negate the deterministic theories in some sense.

Determinism as a theory presupposes that things are quantifiable and occupy space and time. Free will theories in some sense presuppose that material things are determined and that which has immaterial/spiritualistic character only can be free. When free will theorists claim that free will is the source of our actions and due to which we are morally responsible, a genuine doubt arises; from where does free will arise? This paper attempts to trace the source(s) of free will, and submits that 'self' is the source of free will.

Ancient philosophers used self, spirit, psyche, or soul in equivalent sense. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle defined self in terms of the soul having immaterial and spiritual characters. During the medieval and modern period, 'self' having these spiritual characteristics separate from physicalist or materialistic characteristics gave rise to body and mind dualism. William James proclaimed 'self' as being partly subject and partly object. Freud considered 'self' as the epicenter of one's personality and behaviour. Searle (2004) claimed that such an entity that has consciousness, perception, rationality, the capacity to engage in action, and the capacity to organize perceptions and reasons, which operates on the supposition of freedom when we do voluntary actions, could be said to be the source of agents, especially moral agents. Being a moral agent is not an easy task. An agent before performing an action needs to weigh the pros and cons of making a choice of any action and after performing an action need to own that action. In the process of decision-making, what really guides an agent to make the choice of an action? There are complex situations wherein an agent has to struggle to make a choice of an action. Still an agent chooses a course of action. This paper is an attempt to study critically the theories of free will and finding out what really causes an agent to decide in situations of contrasting choices.

Let us suppose a situation wherein a student who wishes to apply for a scholarship which is very essential for him/her in continuing further studies. The student is working on a research fellowship application on a desktop computer while sitting near to the window of his/her hostel room. It is the last day and there are hardly fifteen minutes left to submit the

fellowship application on the online portal. There are lots of details to be filled in the online application. Certainly, the student is tensed and anxious as there are hardly a few minutes left to submit the application. At that very moment, he/she hears someone screaming and crying for help. It could be a prank, very well. But then he/she hears the screaming recursively in a frantic tone. The student is really in a dilemma whether to go out of the room and attend to the person crying for help or complete the application and beat the deadline of submitting the application. It is difficult for someone to make a choice between these two alternatives. The student could be trapped in a plethora of thoughts such as; if he/she goes out of the room and finds that it is a prank by a hostel mate then the student would miss submitting the fellowship application on time. Further, if he/she does not submit the application that year, he/she will not be eligible to apply for the same research fellowship in the coming years. Another thought that could perturb the student is, if he/she submits the research fellowship application on time, and then attend to the person who was crying for help, it might be too late to save the life if the person is really injured. Would it not make the student feel guilty about this decision later? Would he/she not think had he/she attended to the injured person a few minutes earlier, the hostel mate could have been probably saved from the danger? Certainly, it is a complex situation wherein the student has to make a choice.

In this backdrop, this paper discusses the relationship between human beings' free will, their decision-making ability followed by voluntary actions and moral responsibility for the action. Let us begin with the notion of free will,

The expression, free will[1] has no ontological existence but can be comprehended through linguistic expressions. For example, an agent(S) chooses to do action (A) at time (T) and place (P). The agent's free will guides him/her to do A when other alternatives are available to him/her such as B, C, D, etc. Choosing to do A affirms the existence of the agent's free will. Dennett (1991), Tooby & Cosmides (1992), Campbell (1974), Keil (1979), and Bargh (2008) state that free will is a *design* in the processes of natural selection of an action or an object. It is

a *feeling* that has evolved in due course of time due to human beings' adaptive behavior towards worldly affairs. It is an essential element of human being's normal cognitive functions (Tranel, Bechara, and Damasio 2000). The *feeling* of having free will gives rise to the feeling of being in control (Taylor 1989; Wegner 2002). A question arises, if free will exists then what causes its existence? Is it an outcome of an individual's conscious state of mind or something else? Spinoza (1677/1951) holds that human beings believe themselves to be free merely because they are conscious of their actions, even though actions are determined by unconscious causes. In fact, it is true in the narration. The student did not know what happened to him/her when he/she is faced with two alternatives; whether to go out of the hostel room and help the person in need or fill the fellowship application and submit it on time. The student could be conscious of his/her thoughts, but he/she was unaware of what caused his/her thoughts and what guided him/her to act in a particular manner in that situation. Libet (1999) provides his experimental research findings in this regard. He claims that *readiness potential* (RP) appears 550 milliseconds before a person acts. Free will appears 200 milliseconds prior to his/her action. He conveys that RP is initiated in a person that is not known to him/her, but an intention to perform an action is generated through an unknown mechanism, that is free will. He further expresses that free will has a power that guides a person to choose an action from many alternatives. His experimental findings are depicted in the following figure.



Fig. 1: Timeline chart of a person's action, free will and readiness potential
RP: Readiness Potential, SR: Stimulus Response, A: Action, T1: Time one, T2: Time two, and T3: Time three.

Libet argues RP is the urge that comes in spontaneously almost 1000 milliseconds before the actual action takes place. The time line between T_1 and T_3 is about 550 milliseconds where T_1 is the starting point of non-conscious action known as SR. The timeline between T_2 and T_3 is about 200 milliseconds, which is a conscious process, where T_2 is the actual awareness of free will and T_3 is the time of actual action (A). According to Libet, free will precedes the actual action (A), which signifies that free will determines whether to go ahead with an action or *veto* the action.

Wegner and Wheatley (1999) express that human being's feeling of having free will is nothing but an attribution or inference of an event. According to them, the experience of having free will, which guides us, to act in a certain manner arises from contextual/situational interpretations only. They claim that the timing of a person's thought about performing an action could be manipulated without his/her awareness of it. The right combination of certain variables such as time (T), language (L), situation (S), etc. produced feelings of having free will in human beings' mind. Thus, free will is not under human being's control. Baumeister et al. (1998) argue that making a conscious choice or decision in a given situation asserts a person's ability to engage in self-control. It shows that human beings are conscious about their self-regulatory capacity/ ability.

From the above analyses, we may assert that free will is not the source of an action as something else caused free will. Free will only determines whether an action is to be performed or not. This is endorsed by Bargh (2008) in his work *Free will is unnatural*. If free will is not the source of a human action then what causes an action? This paper discusses the mechanism(s) that resulted in an action in the following passages. It also examines the causes that are causally connected to each other to guide human beings to render actions in their mundane life.

1. The Principle of Causality and Free Will

Human beings render a variety of actions in their mundane life for different purposes. The fact of the matter is that they perform actions in every moment of their life. A question arises, what process in humans leads them to choose

to perform an action out of the many alternatives presented to them in a given situation? In this regard, the authors propose the principle of causality as an underlying philosophy that operates behind a human action. The principle of causality states that every event has a cause. Nothing on the earth happens without a cause. To put it in other words, actions are necessarily caused by *something*. This *something* is nothing other than the free will as Duns Scotus (1986) affirms as the cause of any action.

The notion of free will may be put under two categories, Compatibilists' and Incompatibilists' views on free will. For Compatibilists, free will is the power or ability to do what a person wants or desires to do even though he/she might be causally determined or logically determined.[2] Here, causal determinism expresses that every event or action is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature (Hoefer 2016). Logical determinism expresses that proposition about future event or action would be treated as true if the present propositions referring to the worldly affairs were true. Further, there should be a necessary connection between present propositions and future propositions. Compatibilists bring a distinction between *constraint* and *causation*. The former refers to the condition, which prevents us from doing what we want to do, whereas the latter does not impede our will to do what we wish to do. For compatibilists, free will and determinism can be compatible with each other because determinism is understood as a mere causation. As Kane (2005) observes that compatibilists claim that voluntary actions cannot be uncaused; such actions must have the right kinds of causes- causes that come from within and express our characters and motives. No external causes prompt our will to do an action. Determinism states that an action is necessarily determined by something. Hence, it is not compatible with free will. But if determinism is used in the sense of causal connection between motive and action and one's character and motive then it cannot be opposed to free will, and it thus becomes an absolute condition for free will. So, for compatibilists, free actions are unconstrained and not uncaused. We must also note that when compatibilists claim

that determinism and free will can be compatible, determinism is not to be confused with fatalism.[3] Fatalists are of the view that human beings freely willing to do an action are ineffective. For fatalists, free will or freedom to do an action is only an illusion and therefore cannot be compatible with determinism. Fatalism holds that human beings do not have the power to change the cause of events: whatever happens, it happens. If we take this argument, then there is no such thing as moral responsibility.

Incompatibilists like Pereboom (2001), van Inwagen (1983), Robert Kane (2005), Robert Nozick (1995), Chisholm (1982), and a few philosophers argue that free will and determinism both cannot be true. If one is true, the other must be false and vice-versa. That is, if free will is true then determinism is not true. And, if determinism is true then free will is not true. Incompatibilists who support determinism and deny free will are called determinists and those who affirm *free will* and deny determinism are called libertarians. Why do the Incompatibilists take either of these positions? Ayer (1954) suggests that Incompatibilists perhaps could not comprehend the notion of natural causes or laws of nature. Whereas compatibilists claim that free will can be compatible with determinism. What it implies, is that the agent is free to act even though the time, environment, the agent's nature can be caused by various other factors in accordance with natural laws. The existence of natural laws indicates that certain events follow some events in a regular and rigid manner. Dennett (1984) evokes that one should be aware of the notion of 'control' while discussing the relation between determinism and free will. Dennett argues that only an agent can purposefully exercise control over another. It is really a categorical mistake to think that nature can control us. Dennett (1984) says, "Nature may determine us but it cannot control us" (p. 61). Pereboom (2001) proposes a third category in incompatibilism what he calls as hard incompatibilism. It is the view that designates that both determinism and indeterminism are incompatible with having free will and moral responsibility. This view denies the existence of free will in case of human actions.

Peter van Inwagen (1983) defends incompatibilism by holding consequentalist arguments. He argues:

> If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of the nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our own acts) are not up to us. (1983, 16)

Our free will is not the cause of our actions. This argument conveys that determinism conflicts with human beings' free will. It shows that determinism conflicts with human beings' ability to do otherwise in a given situation.

Libertarians are, in fact soft deterministsm who hold the view that human beings have free will and determinism is a false phenomenon in a rigid sense. They believe that one can have control over his/her volition or choice (Ginet 1990; Goetz 2002). Chisholm (1982) states that libertarians do not accept the fact that human actions are caused by some other events. For them, the agent is not totally determined but he/she has certain freedom to choose an action according to his/her will. But they cannot claim that an act 'is not caused' at all. Hobbes (1837) also confirms, "voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and therefore are necessitated" (p. 133). For Hobbes, talking of free agents was non-sense, if free means uncaused and random. Chisholm (1982) claims that libertarians agree to a fact that free acts are caused, not by any other events or natural laws, but by agents themselves (agent-causation[4]). Taylor (1974), O'Connor (1996), and Clarke (1996), endorse the 'agent-causation theory' in support of Libertarians views' on free will.

2. Human Actions and Moral Responsibility

Aristotle argues that human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain (Aristotle 1985). He confers that voluntary actions lead to pleasure while involuntary actions lead to pain. A question arises, which actions are to be judged as voluntary? In other words, when can an action be called as voluntary? According to Aristotle, involuntary actions are the results of force and ignorance. Voluntary actions are supported by reason and rationality (Aristotle 1985). The issue of moral

responsibility arises with reference to voluntary actions alone. Human beings are morally responsible for their actions because they are expected to perform actions complying with their rational choice and reasoning. Further, to become morally responsible, it necessarily implies one must be self-conscious about his/her actions. Again, one must have the freedom to choose an action out of many alternatives. This choice of rendering an action makes one responsible for the action and gives satisfaction and contentment. Why do human beings search for satisfaction and contentment for their actions? The reason is that they feel happy and satisfied when they do something good (praiseworthy) and they feel ashamed and guilty when they do something wrong or inappropriate (blameworthy). Kane (1998) writes that owning up the responsibility for an action (or omission of an action) is related to the fact that we are distinguishable from other creatures in the world *as selves*. Mele (1992) asserts that an act out of a rational decision-making ability, which comes under the purview of moral responsibility. The rational decision of an agent implies that an agent is self-controlled when he/she acts. Bramhall (1844) conveys that free will requires not only to decide the course of an action but also 'the ability to act otherwise'. Reid (1983) says that the ability to render an action implies the ability to have control over the action. Kant (1960) writes "the act, as well as its opposite, must be within the power of the subject at the moment of its taking place" (p. 45). To sum up, the ability to do the opposite of an act is a necessary condition for free will and subsequently supports the arguments of moral responsibility. Only if the ability to do the opposite is exercised consciously, an action is treated as voluntary action and the agent is held responsible for that action. Frankfurt (1969) and Dennett (1984) have challenged this proposal. When a person with Tourette's syndrome[5] does certain actions as a result of brain functions, that do not involve conscious processes, do we not hold that person morally responsible for the actions? Intentions are also intimately connected to a conscious act.[6] Every action begins with an intention, in a sense that intentions must be the immediate cause of an action for which we attribute moral responsibility. Bratman (1987)

explains that we execute our motivations by plans consisting of a hierarchically ordered set of intentions. The intentions are free in some sense.[7] Intentions are partly responsible for decision-making process(es). There could also be unconscious intentions but only conscious intentions are taken into consideration for moral responsibility.

Moral responsibility is linked to a person's voluntary actions. Wallace (1978) while explaining the normative function of moral responsibility asserts that an agent is morally responsible in so far as it is fair to hold him morally responsible. Oshana (1997) agrees that when we say a person is morally responsible, we are essentially saying that the person did or caused an act voluntarily. Pereboom (2001) asserts that an agent is morally responsible for an action if and only if the action belongs to the agent. If each and every action belongs to an agent how do we account for omissions? Is an agent morally responsible for omitting an action that he/she is supposed to carry out at a given context? Wallace (1994) states that it is unfair to blame an agent if he/she has not done anything wrong in the given context. Clarke (2018) observes that our conduct is caused not by reasons alone do but by absences of reasons as well. For example, natural causes and external forces also compel us to act in certain manner in a given situation. The causal influence for an action and absence of reasons constitute our sensitivity to act in a certain manner in a given situation (Clarke 2018). From these explanations, we may submit that causation and absences of reasons are the grounds for holding someone morally responsible for his/her actions. Does it really solve the dilemma as to the origin of decision-making process is?

3. Source(s) of Free Will, Voluntary Actions, and Moral Responsibility

To become morally responsible for an act, an agent must exercise his/her free will. It means that the agent could have acted differently if situation demanded for it. With reference to the narration, if the student had a choice to act otherwise, we could say that she/she was free and that he/she could be held responsible for the action. The student had these options at

hand; either he/she could continue to work on the application without bothering about the hostel mate's cry for help, or, he/she could have come out of the room to help the injured hostel mate promptly. Further, the student could have called up the security office and informed them about the situation. Again, he/she could have informed the hostel officials to do the needful. The student had these options before him/her to choose one among these. Here a question may be raised, what led the student to choose one particular action over the other options- that is, going out of the hostel room and saving the person from a spinal cord injury?

Compatibilists would argue that these choices were available to the student because of his/her biological, theological, psychological and physical (causal) determinants (Myers 2008). These determinants played a role in shaping the choices available to the student in the narration at the time of an action and subsequently compelled him/her to make the choice among the available options. At the end, the student made a choice. Compatibilists thus subscribe to the theory of agent-centered causation,[8] not a mechanistic-centered causation for choosing an action out of many alternatives in a given situation. For Compatibilists, an agent has an intention to have a reason to make a choice. To avail of the reason, there is a top-down controlling feature that an agent experiences at any given situation while deciding to perform or not to perform an action. This controlling feature is treated as an ontologically 'deep' entity known as *the feeling of self-hood.*

Incompatibilists argue that due to a multi-choice model an agent takes a decision for an action out of many alternatives available to him/her in a given context. The multi-choice model is not free from lacunas.[9] As Kane (2008) points out, the Incompatibilists necessarily must be in a position to explain the (logically) sufficient conditions, sufficient causes and sufficient motives due to which the agent chooses to do a particular action. With reference to the narration, the student made a choice rationally and voluntarily. A question arises, what made him/her to make that choice out of the many alternatives? Libertarians invoked factors that are responsible for one's decision to render an action in that situation such as noumenal

selves, trans-empirical power centers, Cartesian egos, special acts of will, and acts of attention or volitions. These factors can neither be determined in principle nor explained through physicochemical processes (Kane 1998). Kane (2008) argues that Incompatibilits are not in a position to explain logically the sufficient conditions and motives of a person due to which he/she chooses to render a particular action in a given situation.

The cause for free will cannot be causally determined by the laws of chemistry, physics, quantum mechanics, or any other physical or material thing. Kane (2005) points out that free will has an origin and that *origin* helps the free will to take a decision for an action when many alternatives are available in a given situation. The origin of free will lies in an agent and not anywhere else. The source of free will *in an agent* cannot be located in his/her heart, liver, and brain or in any parts of the body, as these are mutable and replaceable. Thus, we argue that the source of free will is the *feeling of one-self*, the experience of 'one-self' would be 'free' from the cause and effect determinism of the natural universe. This experience guides our thoughts and beliefs in our mundane life and it does not occur in an agent due to external forces.

4. Free Will, Self, and Agency

When we make choices of action, the voluntary actions, they don't happen to us simply but we feel that 'we' make those choices of actions and feel completely 'in charge'. The sense of agency refers to this feeling complete control of our voluntary actions. Thomas Reid (2002) puts it, "the foundation of all rights and obligations, and of all accountableness" (p. 112) comes from personal identity. Personal identity gives one the feel of one 'self' that guides towards moral agency. Bandura (2004) and Rorty (1993) propose that the exercise of moral agency has dual aspects: inhibitive and proactive. The inhibitive form of moral agency manifests in the exercise of power to refrain from engaging in inhumane acts. The proactive form is expressed in the power to actively engage in some humane acts. This dual nature of moral agency guides an individual to refrain from harmful activities and to do actively morally praiseworthy acts even at times sacrificing self-

interests. Haggard and Tsakiris (2009) have shown that sense of agency plays a key role in guiding attributions of responsibility. Responsibility is closely related to the concept of free will. For most of the people it only makes sense to hold someone responsible for their actions if they are freely in control of them. For Frith (2014) this bearing of responsibility for one's own actions has a greater significance as a social function, for the smooth functioning of the society.

Nichols (2011) highlights an interesting observation regarding the interrelation of free will, agency and self. The free will problem arises because on the one hand we feel like we are conscious and that we are really rational agents. The feeling of sense of agency gives rise to this feeling of free and rational agency. But on other hand, we also know that we are not totally free. According to Nichols, understanding the neurocognitive origins of free will beliefs will not tell us if they are true or not, but will help us evaluate whether or not those beliefs are justified. And therefore, study on the interrelation of free will and agency that is connected to self is to be carried further because of two reasons (there could be more). One, study on this interrelation of agency and free will has a bearing on the well-being and health of individuals. Langer and Rodin (1976) and Rodin and Langer (1977) have pointed out that reduction in the sense of agency is associated with poor health and a reduction in quality of life. Second, Berberian et al. (2012) have pointed out that study of the interrelation of agency and free will has a lot to reveal in the study of human-computer interface. When we study human-computer interface, it becomes evident that agency and free will belongs to 'self' that is conscious, not to unconscious entity such as machines. So ultimately, 'consciousness' is the thread that supports the subsistence of the notion of agency.

5. Conclusion

This paper agrees with Swinburne's (2013) suggestion that our belief in the reality of free will is epistemically basic. It is reasonable to accept its functions in human beings' decision-making process(es) without requiring independent evidential support for its existence. This paper explained the source of

decision-making process in human minds. It submitted that free will is an 'instinctive' character of human beings' decision-making process(es) that guides human beings to decide course of an action in a given situation and thereby hold them morally responsible for the consequence(s) of their action. This paper also submitted that 'free will' is experienced in an individual due to the experience of 'self' of that individual.

NOTES

[1] Bargh (2008) notes freedom at the political level does not have the same concerns as the freedom of the individual will. Free will as a psychological concept concerns the individual actions and actions that are under the individual's power to perform. However, freedom or free will as a political or societal concept concerns the plurality and actions that depend on or are restricted by the consent and cooperation of others. Secondly, free will is to be distinguished from a free action (Kane 1998). To act freely is to be unhindered in the pursuit of one's purposes. 'To will' freely is outlined as the power or ability of an agent to choose a course of action from the various alternatives and must be absent of both internal and external constraints.

[2] Determinism is a metaphysical thesis that proposes that whatever facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature entail the truth about the future. Determinism is to be distinguished from fatalism and predictability where the source of fatalism is located in the will of the gods, or some teleological powers and the source of determinism in natural causes or laws. (Mckenna, M., and Coates, D. J. 2015. "Compatibilism", in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

[3] Fatalism is the view that whatever is going to happen, is going to happen no matter what we do. As J. S. Mill (1874) points out that a fatalist believes that whatever is about to happen will be the result of infallible result of causes that precede it and there is no use in struggling against it. It will happen however we may strive to prevent it. The source of the guarantee that those events will happen is located in the will of the gods, or their divine foreknowledge or some intrinsic teleological aspect of the universe. A fatalist believes that a man's character is formed for him, and not by him. His character is formed by his circumstances.

[4] It is a philosophical position, which prescribes that an agent, can start a new causal chain, which is not preceded by any other prior events.

[5] Tourette syndrome (TS or simply Tourette's) is a common neuropsychiatric disorder with onset in childhood, characterized by multiple motor tics and at least one vocal (phonic) tic. These tics are typically preceded by an unwanted urge or sensation in the affected muscles. Some common tics are eye blinking, coughing, throat clearing, sniffing, and facial movements.

[6] Searle (1983), in his book, *Mind, Brain, and Science*, explains that one of the main features of consciousness is intentionality.

[7] For a detailed explanation about intentions and how they affect agent's actions and their role in moral responsibility, one can refer to Sinnott-Armstrong (2011, 242-43).

[8] In the mechanistic case, objects have specific causal powers or dispositional tendencies, associated with their fundamental intrinsic properties. The powers might concern a unique outcome or a range of possible effects that is structured by a specific probability measure. As O'connor (2000) observes the cause here is the event of the object's having these power- conferring properties in those circumstances, whereas in agent-causation the agent having the relevant internal properties will have it directly within his/her power to cause any range of states of intention delimited by internal and external circumstances. One might say that agent-causation is essentially purposive whereas mechanic causality is not. Mechanic causality is dyadic whereas agent causality is triadic. Taking the agency theory seriously within an emergentistic framework raises several theoretical problems. The most fundamental of these is determining the precise underlying properties on which an agent-causal capacity depends.

[9] Kane (1998) points out the problems like how to explain satisfactorily why only one choice occurs rather the other and insists that libertarians must come up with more radical properties for reconciling indeterminism and free will.

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Desorden y orden, revolución y dictadura: La reacción de Donoso Cortés frente a la modernidad

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Abstract

Disorder and Order, Revolution and Dictatorship: The Reaction of Donoso Cortés to the Modernity

The present contribution investigates the work of the 19th-century Spanish philosopher Juan Donoso Cortés, one of the main proponents of European counter-revolutionary thought. Referring to the genealogy of modern politics traced by Carlo Galli, Donoso's thought is interpreted through the order/disorder dyad, understood as the basis of his entire conception. It is in fact possible to see how the question of immanent disorder and the need for a transcendent order define, through theological and anthropological formulations, Donoso's philosophy of history, politics and right. As a consequence, he theorizes the necessity of a dictatorship as a response to the fundamental event at the origin of the rupture of the divine cosmic order: the revolution. Donoso's philosophy is therefore configured, in the path of counter-revolutionary philosophy, as the transition to a secularized theory of reaction to the emergence of political and social conflict in the modern world.

Keywords: Donoso Cortés, order/disorder, counter-revolutionary philosophy, political philosophy, modernity

1. Introducción: los contrarrevolucionarios frente a las revoluciones

Si se quiere recorrer la historia de la contrarrevolución resulta obvio centrarnos en las fechas de las revoluciones más importantes que han marcado la modernidad.[1] Este tipo de pensamiento es, por definición, un pensamiento negativo – es decir que nace como oposición o negación de un proceso de

cambio filosófico, social y político. Encontramos la Revolución Francesa (1789) como primer acto de este proceso de transformación y el pensamiento reaccionario de de Bonald y de Maistre; los hechos revolucionarios europeos del 1848– y la reacción de Donoso Cortés; y, finalmente, la revolución bolchevique del 1917 y el decisionismo de Carl Schmitt. Obviamente esta relación entre revolución y reacción debe a menudo ser matizada con otros acontecimientos. Por ejemplo, es bastante clara la repercusión del '48 – en particular francés – sobre el pensamiento de Donoso y sobre su definitiva conversión en un reaccionario católico, sin embargo la situación interna de España caracterizada por una perpetua crisis, a lo largo de casi todos los años de actividad política e intelectual de Donoso, ha influido en su filosofía.[2] La misma cosa se puede decir sobre Schmitt: la crisis de la república weimariana es sin duda un evento que experimenta personalmente, por lo que influye más directamente en su producción teórica que la revolución del '17. Sin embargo las revoluciones como eventos que producen la ruptura de un orden establecido marcan la experiencia fundamental de todos los pensadores reaccionarios; son, por así decir, acontecimientos paradigmáticos. Como veremos esta experiencia fundamental de desorden – y todos sus corolarios teológicos, filosóficos, antropológicos – es el origen de la modernidad, frente a la cual, la respuesta de los reaccionarios es la negación total de esta inmanencia anómica y la necesidad de restablecer una trascendencia que asegure un orden. Sin embargo – como el mismo Schmitt ha notado – entre la oposición a la Revolución del 1789 y a la del 1848 hay un cambio teórico que es el espejo de un proceso de radicalización del conflicto social y de una profundización de la secularización. Si en de Bonald y de Maistre todavía el corte del vínculo entre poder y legitimidad es pensado en una perspectiva de legitimidad – restablecer la legitimidad es la única manera de dar al *cosmos* inmanente un orden semejante al orden del *cosmos* divino – con Donoso, aunque permaneciendo en una perspectiva teológicamente parecida, vemos aparecer la posibilidad – provisional y limitada por toda una construcción teológico histórica – de una dictadura fundada en el momento de la decisión. Como nota Schmitt, «del mismo modo que el radicalismo revolucionario es mucho más

profundo y consecuente en la revolución proletaria de 1848 que en la revolución del tercer estado, de 1789, así también, en el pensamiento filosófico de la contrarrevolución, la intensidad de la decisión fue en aumento. Solo así se comprende la evolución desde De Maistre hasta Donoso» (Schmitt 1963, 77). Veremos que Donoso permanece en una constante ambigüedad ente los dos niveles – orden transcendente y (des)orden inmanente –, con la consecuencia de que el dictador, que en realidad es un tirano ilegitimo, asume la imagen de un Dios secularizado.

En el presente trabajo, dedicado al pensamiento de Donoso Cortés, seguiremos este itinerario, desde la emergencia de un desorden como experiencia fundamente de lo moderno, veremos cómo nuestro autor rechaza la hipótesis del establecimiento de un orden inmanente y, sobre este asunto, veremos su antropología pesimista y la impotencia radical de la razón humana. Al final la única posibilidad para evitar el caos, en una sociedad secularizada y en permanente crisis, será una dictadura como solución provisional al peligro representado por la revolución.

2. Orden y desorden: las categorías genéticas de la modernidad

Para entender bien la estructura esencial que define el pensamiento reaccionario –aun cuando todos los autores presentan diferencias, pero también un fundamento unitario – nos apoyaremos en el trabajo de Carlo Galli. Se puede decir que una parte considerable de su obra de filósofo de la política está marcada por la finalidad de entender la génesis de la política moderna y en particular de sus conceptos fundamentales. En este asunto la obra de Carl Schmitt asume un papel central, pues, en tanto que se ocupa con los problemas centrales de la modernidad política, permite descubrir los elementos genéticos de esa. Uno de los conceptos fundamentales en su exegesis de la obra schmittiana es el de «coacción al orden»,[3] que quiere representar una dialéctica constante de la política moderna entre una situación de desorden como elemento primario y la necesidad de establecer un orden como fin de la acción política. Aquí, para explicar cómo esta díada orden/desorden constituye la estructura fundamental del pensamiento reaccionario – por lo que respecta, sobre todo, a la obra de Donoso Cortés –

haremos referencia al planteamiento de este problema en un libro de Carlo Galli (2013) dedicado a la génesis de las categorías de izquierda y derecha. Escribe Galli:

> L'impianto categoriale del pensiero che innerva la politica moderna – in quanto essa *deve* rinunciare alla tradizionale idea di Giustizia, ossia di Ordine dell'essere che orienta, se non fosse per la peccaminosità umana, anche l'ordine politico – consiste infatti nella centralità del nesso fra disordine come dato e ordine come esigenza: da una parte esiste una realtà minacciosa e instabile, lo stato di natura, dall'altra è indispensabile costruire un artificio che dia forma e stabilità alla politica. Sono questi i due lati, inscindibili, del modo moderno di guardare alla politica. (Galli 2013, 22-23)

La génesis de la modernidad política se caracteriza por la necesidad de renunciar a una idea tradicional de orden objetivo transcendente y por lo tanto por la experiencia del desorden, de la crisis como un hecho, y del orden, de la forma, como algo que se puede y se debe construir – o guiar en su auto-construcción inmanente. Es a partir de esta indeterminación que según dos modalidades de pensar historia, sociedad y ser humano, se separan dos tradiciones políticas. La que Galli define como "izquierda" es aquella tradición filosófico-política moderna que piensa la posibilidad de una norma inmanente inscrita en la naturaleza humana que en su exteriorización puede producir orden político. Un orden que no es fundado en ninguna trascendencia; lo que no significa, sin embargo, que responda a una plena espontaneidad o a ninguna forma de construcción política. Es decir: lo que caracteriza esta filosofía es la idea de un fundamento del todo inmanente (y serán diferentes las fuentes de esta legitimidad: razón colectiva de un pueblo o de la historia del espíritu, libertad individual, etc… pero siempre inmanentes) que puede producir una transcendencia, una verticalidad, pensada, sin embargo, como una construcción artificial que tiene como fin el libre desarrollo del mismo principio inmanente. Entonces la idea fundamental de todas estas tradiciones políticas (desde el liberalismo, hasta el anarquismo, el socialismo el republicanismo etc…) es de una norma humana que puede construir un orden inmanente, o dicho de otra manera, que el ser humano puede encontrar en su racionalidad (individual o colectiva) el instrumento para auto-gobernarse.

La derecha (en particular en su versión reaccionaria representada aquí sobre todo por Donoso Cortés) se enfrenta a este estado de desorden asumiendo una postura opuesta:

> La destra […] mette sullo sfondo i semi naturali di razionalità soggettiva, ed è definita primariamente dalla percezione dell'instabilità del reale, della sua anomia, della sua mai piena ordinabilità […]. Il dato che la destra accetta come insuperabile non è un sistema di valori ma è l'inconsistenza ontologica della realtà […] (Galli 2013, 31-32)

Esta prospectiva nos permite invertir la mirada de sentido común sobre estas categorías. La derecha se presenta como el partido del orden, porque – nos dice Galli – piensa el orden siempre como amenazado, porque percibe la realidad como caos – al menos desde el momento de la derrota del orden tradicional (que sin embargo es el momento genético de esta tradición política, un "antes" existe solo como mito). El secreto inconfesable de la derecha es que lo que atribuye a la izquierda, el relativismo, es el fundamento de su manera de pensar la realidad (Galli 2013, 36). La izquierda, en cambio, el partido del orden posible, de la estabilidad inmanentemente fundada y por eso no piensa la necesidad de restaurar o instaurar un orden objetivo trascendente.

Hemos dibujado de manera rápida este esquema que en Donoso Cortés se revela como muy adecuado para la comprensión de su filosofía y de sus decisiones políticas. En particular en el pensamiento contrarrevolucionario del que forma parte esta contraposición se presenta en la forma de la contraposición entre un orden transcendente perdido (que sin embargo en perspectiva teológico-histórica debe volver) y un desorden inmanente – que es explicado de manera muy completa a través de todo un sistema teológico. En los próximos párrafos vamos a ver todos estos elementos que caracterizan esta contraposición entre *Civitas Dei* y *Civitas Terrena*, entre mundo inmanente y mundo trascendente, es decir entre orden transcendente (perdido) y desorden inmanente.

3. Orden trascendente y desorden inmanente

«En el origen de la fanática voluntad de orden se halla la catástrofe» (Beneyto 1993, 144) escribe de manera muy eficaz Beneyto hablando de Donoso Cortés. La contraposición entre

orden y desorden así como la necesidad de establecer un orden, es un tema tan recurrente en el marqués de Valdegamas que hablar de «fanática voluntad» o de obsesión no es de ninguna forma exagerado. En la ya citada monografía, Beneyto, dedica un párrafo a «las fuentes del axioma del orden» (Beneyto 1993, 162 sq) recorriendo unas interpretaciones que ven su origen en aspectos de su educación burguesa y rural o en la proyección filosófica de la contraposición entre la paz de su tierra, Extremadura, y el tumulto de las ciudades donde ha vivido después (Beneyto 1993, 162). A pesar de estas interpretaciones psicológicas, lo que nos parece más relevante es la pertenencia de Donoso a una clase social y a una corriente de pensamiento (como liberal conservador, primero, o como reaccionario católico después) que veía en las crisis activadas por las contradicciones de la modernidad política y social una amenaza a la conservación del orden y de una paz social fundada en una sólida jerarquía. En el *Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo* construye todo un sistema de explicación teológica de esta dialéctica entre orden y desorden. El axioma fundamental es expresado muy claramente en diversos pasajes, citamos uno como ejemplo:

> No habiendo ninguna especie de bien fuera del orden, no hay nada fuera del orden que no sea un mal, ni mal ninguno que no consista en ponerse fuera del orden; por esta razón, así como el orden es el bien supremo, el desorden es el mal por excelencia; fuera del desorden no hay ningún mal, como fuera del orden no hay bien ninguno. (Cortés 1970 d, 580)

En particular este orden es pensado como *cosmos* ordenado por la acción soberana de Dios, un sistema jerárquico donde cada criatura encuentra su lugar en una armonía total, descrita por Donoso con muchas imagines de perfección, paz, luz,[4] contrapuestas a las imágenes de decadencia del mundo que ha abandonado a Dios. La historia sagrada y la historia humana se encuentran en un nexo analógico: es la rebelión angélica el modelo de todas las rebeliones humanas. El pecado es siempre ruptura de este orden divino, es decir, rebelión contra Dios, tanto en cielo, como en el orden humano establecido bajo el modelo del orden divino. Este orden es el de la Iglesia y del poder político legítimo, que imitan el orden divino y desde su soberanía absoluta toman su soberanía relativa. La ruptura, en cambio, es

la misma negación de la soberanía de Dios que no puede llevar más que al desorden terreno, político. Aquí el modelo teológico de la primera rebelión impone a la historia humana un curso definido y signado por una dialéctica de ruptura y reconstitución del orden por intervención divina. Para nuestro asunto más que el esquema teológico de recomposición del orden es interesante, por sus consecuencias filosóficas-políticas, entender como Donoso piensa esta ruptura, explicada – de acuerdo con su teología – con una metáfora de "física teológica":

> El desorden causado por la rebelión angélica consistió en el apartamiento, por parte del ángel rebelde, de su Dios, que era su centro, por medio de un cambio en su manera de ser, que consistió en convertir su movimiento de gravitación hacia su Dios en un movimiento de rotación sobre sí mismo.
>
> El desorden causado por la prevaricación del hombre fue parecido al causado por la rebelión del ángel, no siendo posible ser rebelde y prevaricador de dos maneras esencialmente diferentes. Habiendo dejado el hombre de gravitar hacia su Dios con su entendimiento, con su voluntad y con sus obras, se constituyó en centro de sí propio, y fue el último fin de sus obras, de su voluntad, de su entendimiento. (Cortés 1970 d, 569)

Como la condición de armonía se constituye en una analogía entre orden divino y orden terreno, la rebelión de los ángeles es el modelo de la rebelión del hombre hacia Dios y, en consecuencia, hacia toda autoridad. Esta ruptura del orden es, dicho de manera sinóptica, la inmanentización del mismo: la idea que el hombre pueda auto-gobernarse según principios racionales. Entonces vemos que la imposibilidad de un orden inmanente es radical, desde el momento que se ha producido la ruptura entre Dios y hombre, y el hombre quiere gobernarse a sí mismo según una racionalidad secularizada. En estrecha relación con esta desconfianza en las facultades humanas encontramos en Donoso una teología, una teoría del conocimiento y una antropología radicalmente pesimistas e irracionalistas; en el próximo párrafo vamos a comentar estos aspectos.

4. La antropología pesimista y la impotencia de la razón

Como hemos visto para Carlo Galli los reaccionarios, entendiéndolos bien, tienen como fundamento una metafísica

relativista, la misma que critican, atribuyéndola a los progresistas. En Donoso Cortés eso se puede ver muy bien: su afirmación de la necesidad de un dogmatismo fideista (certeza de la verdad y del orden en Dios) es la pura negación de su experiencia de la realidad como imposibilidad de conocimiento y de orden. En este sentido si situamos la filosofía de Donoso sobre el terreno de la inmanencia se revela como la más escéptica, relativista y nihilista. Con la consecuencia de que solo una negación total de esta inmanencia, una proyección trascendente, puede restablecer la posibilidad de una verdad, de un orden, de un conocimiento.

La racionalidad autónoma del hombre es el supremo acto de rebelión contra de Dios, y lleva al hombre al caos y la incertidumbre, dada la imposibilidad de elegir el bien. En las obras de Donoso encontramos numerosos pasos donde habla de la racionalidad autónoma como la debilidad del hombre que no le permite ver la verdad, incluso usando los términos de la psiquiatría, cuando refiriéndose al racionalismo lo define como «demencia monomaníaca». (Cortés 1970 e, 417)[5] Para Donoso la imposibilidad de llegar a la comprensión de una verdad por vía racional es radical, y esto vale, en consecuencia, para la posibilidad de auto-gobierno racional. Dice Donoso que «entre la razón humana y lo absurdo hay una afinidad secreta, un parentesco estrictísimo» (Cortés 1970 d, 531), que «el hombre prevaricador y caído no ha sido hecho para la verdad» (Cortés 1970 d, 530), y por eso «la intolerancia doctrinal de la Iglesia ha salvado el mundo del caos» (Cortés 1970 d, 519). Partiendo de esta idea de «impotencia radical de las potestades humanas para designar los errores» (Cortés 1970 d, 595), es decir de un radical pesimismo antropológico, Donoso concluye que el hombre se puede salvar, y la sociedad puede salir del peligro del caos, solo con un acto de adhesión fideista al orden establecido por la iglesia – o como veremos con una decisión política desde arriba. Ya aquí podemos ver que el esquema que hemos dibujado se confirma: la adhesión al dogma es deducida por una negación del puro desorden, de la anomia de lo real y relativismo del conocimiento, negación que se parece demasiado a una decisión nihilista. Esta antropología radicalmente pesimista es según Schmitt lo que caracteriza la filosofía contrarrevolucionaria que

Donoso intensifica respeto a sus inspiradores (Schmitt 1963, 77). La necesidad del orden trascendente es justificada con la naturaleza caída del hombre: si cada forma de teoría política rebelde partía del axioma de la natural bondad humana – no siempre radicalmente desarrollada, pero que en todo caso es el fundamento lógico de estas teorías – al contrario «el cristiano católico parte del dogma del pecado original» que Donoso «radicalizó polémicamente, convirtiéndolo en una doctrina de la pecaminosidad y abyección absolutas de la naturaleza humana» (Schmitt 1963, 78-79), llegando incluso más allá de la ortodoxia católica. Schmitt describe así la concepción de la naturaleza humana en Donoso:

> Su desprecio de los hombres ya no conoce límites; la ciega razón del hombre, su frágil voluntad, el ridículo brío de sus concupiscencias carnales, se le antojan tan miserables que las palabras de todos los idiomas humanos resultan, a su juicio, insuficientes para expresar cabalmente la bajeza de semejante criatura. Si Dios no se hubiese hecho hombre, el «reptil que piso con mis pies sería a mis ojos menos despreciable que el hombre». La estupidez de las masas le asombra tanto como la necia vanidad de sus dirigentes. Su conciencia del pecado es universal, más terrible que la de un puritano. (Schmitt 1963, 80)

El dogma del pecado original – que es la justificación teológica del pesimismo antropológico – es desarrollado por Donoso en una manera muy sofisticada. Empieza con la pregunta fundamental relativa a este asunto: « ¿Cómo puedo ser pecador cuando no peco? ¿Cómo peco siendo niño? » (Cortés 1970 d, 626). En principio fue Adán, el primero pecador y padre de todos los hombres, el cual sin embargo «fue a un tiempo mismo un individuo y una especie, un hombre y la especie humana, la variedad y la unidad juntas en uno» (Cortés 1970 d, 626). Luego, individuo y especie se separaron, pero Adán pecó antes de la separación, siendo conjuntamente individuo y especie, es decir, pecó «con su naturaleza individual y con su naturaleza colectiva» (Cortés 1970 d, 626). La consecuencia respeto a la teoría antropológica es que:

> Como Adán colectivo y la naturaleza humana son una cosa misma, la naturaleza humana es perpetuamente culpable, porque es perpetuamente pecadora. […] estando la naturaleza humana en cada individuo, Adán que es la misma naturaleza, vive perpetuamente en cada hombre, y vive en él con lo que constituye su vida, es decir con su pecado. (Cortés 1970 d, 626)

Si eso no fuera suficiente Donoso recurre a una explicación de carácter pseudocientífico para explicar la transmisión de la culpa que hace referencia a una especie de evolucionismo. Como ya había explicado en el Capítulo V del Libro Segundo (Cortés 1970 d, 573 sq.) existe una relación entre las perturbaciones morales y las físicas. «El pecado puede producir en el que lo comete tales estragos y tan grandes mudanzas, que sean poderosas para alterar física y moralmente su constitución primitiva», y este mal – bajo la forma de enfermedad física – «es cosa sencilla y natural que transmita a sus hijos» (Cortés 1970 d, 623). Entonces el pecado cambia la constitución orgánica del hombre y como todos los cambios ocurridos en esta, se trasmite por generaciones. El pecado de Adán, que ha sido, como ya hemos visto, el pecado por excelencia, no cabe duda de que alteró radicalmente la naturaleza humana transmitiendo «con la sangre es estrago de la culpa y la predisposición a cometerla actualmente» (Cortés 1970 d, 623).

Entonces si el hombre es llevado estructuralmente a pecar por su naturaleza, y si su racionalidad es incapaz de acercarse a la verdad (si no sometiéndose a la fe), todos los proyectos para construir una sociedad sobre el modelo de la naturaleza humana y de su racionalidad deben fracasar. Dicho de otra manera, no es posible la exteriorización de una norma universal e igualitariamente humana (Galli 2013, 39). Esta concepción "socialista" de la relación entre inmanencia y trascendencia (que definirá también como panteísta, lo que es lo filosóficamente muy relevante) es fundada en una nueva forma de maniqueísmo, representado por Proudhon: «que consiste en afirmar que Dios es el mal, que el hombre es el bien, que el poder humano y el divino son dos poderes rivales y que el único deber del hombre es vencer a Dios, enemigo del hombre» (Cortés 1970 d, 563). A partir de esta idea de hombre como bien, se funda la idea de construir la sociedad sobre la imagen del hombre, eliminando los aspectos coercitivos y jerárquicos que impiden su libre desarrollo. Escribe Donoso:

> Supuesta la bondad ingénita y absoluta del hombre, el hombre es a un mismo tiempo reformador universal e irreformable, con lo cual viene a ser transformado de hombre en Dios; su esencia deja de ser humana para ser divina; él es en sí absolutamente bueno y produce fuera de sí,

> por sus trastornos, el bien absoluto; bien sumo y causa de todo su bien, su excelentísimo, sapientísimo y potentísimo. (Cortés 1970 d, 611)

Para los socialistas, siendo el hombre perfecto, lo que viene desde Dios, y en particular su orden jerárquico, es el mal, y se debe construir una sociedad a imagen y semejanza de la naturaleza humana. Esta es una forma de panteísmo[6] según Donoso: la unidad es el resultado no del orden de Dios, no de una trascendencia, sino de la naturaleza humana pacificada entre sus dualismos. Entonces, para los socialistas, la sociedad puede ser redimida por la acción del hombre, al contrario para los católicos esto no es posible, porque siendo el hombre caído, incapaz de edificar sobre su razón, puede solo ser redimido por Dios y gobernado desde fuera.[7] El hombre entonces produce solo desorden, y la idea de fundar una sociedad sobre su naturaleza y su racionalidad es para Donoso un absurdo, porque lo que se produce con esta política panteísta (que elimina la trascendencia del poder por un auto-gobierno inmanente del hombre bueno) es la pura anomia.

Pasando por la lectura teológica y antropológica volvemos al principio de nuestro discurso, en el mundo producido por la rebelión satánica, es decir en el mundo anómico al que él se enfrentaba, no hay un orden racional inmanente, sino la negación de todo orden: la revolución. Donoso después del 1848 parece haber aceptado la idea que la situación social y política necesita de una reacción, porque el mundo anterior está destruido y solo la acción milagrosa de Dios podría restaurar un orden verdaderamente católico. Lo que puede hacer en este momento el poder político es imitar la acción milagrosa del Dios soberano a través de una decisión: es decir instaurar una dictadura.

5. Revolución y dictadura: la reacción inmanente

> Todas las cosas humanas caminan hoy a su final desenlace con una rapidez milagrosa. El mundo vuela; Dios ha querido darle alas en su vejez […]. Dios le ha puesto las alas con que vuela, y él no sabe adónde va. ¿Adónde iba el pueblo cuando levantó en Paris sus barricadas de febrero? Iba a la reforma, y se encontró en la república. ¿Adónde iba cuando levantó sus barricadas de junio? Iba al socialismo y se encontró en la dictadura (Cortés 1970 b, 302).

No cabe duda de que para Donoso los hechos del '48 habían llevado al mundo a su fase terminal y de que esto había producido una nueva temporalidad acelerada [8] y nuevos principios de acción, o dicho en términos más secularizados, Europa estaba entrando en un estado de crisis. En frente a la última etapa de decadencia y de rebelión, de acuerdo con el esquema teológico-histórico cíclico del *Ensayo*, nos deberíamos esperar la acción milagrosa de Dios. Sin embargo la separación entre inmanencia y trascendencia no es definida así. Hay, como hemos visto, una relación analógica que no siempre es definida de manera muy clara y al mismo tiempo una acción directa de Dios en el mundo. Esta «imprecisa diferenciación entre lo sobrenatural y lo natural, en Dios y mundo, historia humana e historia divina» (Beneyto 1993, 150) permite a Donoso pensar en una perspectiva de «optimismo teológico» (Rivera Garcia 2007, 262) la actuación sobrenatural de Dios y al mismo tiempo justificar – de manera analógica con la misma intervención milagrosa de Dios – la decisión del dictador. Esto le permite desarrollar al mismo tiempo una teoría política de la dictadura secularizada que se enfrente a la revolución sobre su terreno y una teología de la historia que garantice la restauración del orden divino.

Las revoluciones que atraviesan toda Europa han producido para Donoso una diferencia cualitativa en la estructura temporal de la historia, en el orden cósmico, y eso significa también un cambio en la forma de legitimación política. En la lucha final, producida por la rebelión radical, la idea de legitimidad tradicional, como la liberal-constitucional, ya no tienen validez. Schmitt reconoce claramente este pasaje de la legitimidad a la dictadura como un gesto decisionista contra la ley:

> Tan pronto como Donoso Cortes advierte que la época de la monarquía ha terminado porque ya no hay reyes y ninguno de ellos tendría valor de serlo sino por voluntad popular, lleva su decisionismo a una conclusión; es decir, pide una dictadura política. […] Más esencialmente, esto es dictadura, no legitimidad dinástica. Donoso Cortés estaba convencido de que había llegado el instante de la lucha final; frente a lo radicalmente malo sólo cabe una dictadura, y la idea legitimista de sucesión dinástica se convierte en tal coyuntura en vacío legismo. (Schmitt 1963, 91)

Como comprende muy bien Beneyto (1993, 95 sq.) a través de un análisis de la temporalidad de la filosofía donosiana, para Donoso la revolución produce una nueva temporalización de la historia que poniendo razón y acción en la inmanencia del hecho histórico, produce una salida del cosmos ordenado por Dios. Es decir, origina una temporalidad histórica acelerada donde reacción y revolución tienen que enfrentarse sobre el mismo terreno de la decisión histórica. Esto significa en primer lugar la imposibilidad de un gobierno legítimo en esta fase histórica, el gobierno bajo la forma de la ley en el estado de excepción no vale – y esto es verdadero tanto por lo que concierne la teología como a la política, otra vez en relación analógica. El decisionismo de Donoso en esta fase se radicaliza por medio de esta teología de la historia, aunque ya estaba presente en comentario al *Proyecto de ley sobre estados excepcionales*, escrito en el 1839. Aquí Donoso expresa la paradoja de construir una ley que tenga validez en un estado de excepción, donde el problema que se plantea es precisamente que la ley deja de garantizar un orden. En este momento Donoso, aunque vea bien el problema del gesto ilegitimo que está a la base de la legitimidad («ningún principio produce una legislación en el día de su combate, sino en el día de su victoria») (Cortés 1970 a, 711)[9] todavía se pronuncia en favor de una ley que es imposible pero necesaria (Cortés 1970 a, 711); es decir piensa la necesidad de una legitimidad legal también en el estado de excepción. Los acontecimientos revolucionarios del '48 producirán en el marqués otra consciencia, y en el *Discurso sobre la dictadura* hablará del mismo asunto – planteándolo desde una perspectiva similar, no estrictamente jurídica, sino más política, aspecto que sin embargo tampoco faltaba en el comentario de '39 y que se puede resumir así: la ley gobierna el momento de normalidad, pero hay situaciones que requieren una intervención que salga de la ley. Sin embargo, lo que produce la posibilidad de la intervención extraordinaria no es el soberano (Dios o el dictador), sino el rebelde: el hombre que rompe con la legalidad (divina o constitucional), con el orden, y así produce una nueva forma de legitimación. Esta analogía entre Dios y dictador, es decir entre milagro como intervención extraordinaria de Dios y decisión del dictador en un estado de

excepción que suspende las leyes ordinarias, es expresada explícitamente por Donoso en el *Discurso sobre la dictadura*, en un pasaje que merece la pena citar enteramente:

> Pues bien, señores: si, con respecto al mundo físico, Dios es legislador, como respecto a las sociedades humanas lo son los legisladores, si bien de manera diferente, ¿gobierna Dios siempre con esas mismas leyes que El a si mismo se impuso en su eterna sabiduría y a las que nos sujetó a todos? No, señores; pues algunas veces, directa, clara y explícitamente manifiesta su voluntad soberana quebrantando esas leyes que El mismo se impuso y torciendo el curso natural de las cosas. Y bien, señores: cuando obra así, ¿no podría decirse, si el lenguaje humano pudiera aplicarse a las cosas divinas que obra dictatorialmente? (Cortés 1970 c, 309)

Este uso de la analogía parece por un lado problemático, porque pone en las manos del dictador una soberanía absoluta que pertenece solo a Dios, pero al mismo tiempo perfectamente coherente con el proyecto de la teología política, que en estas metáforas encuentra su lógica esencial, y que por lo tanto, evidencia la presuposición de un proceso de secularización. Es decir: el dictador puede actuar como Dios porque reacciona a una situación de rebeldía contra el mismo Dios operada por los revolucionarios.

Antonio Rivera lee esta díada orden legal/acción milagrosa según las tradicionales categorías de *potentia dei ordinata* y *potentia dei absoluta* (Rivera Garcia 2007, Cap. V-VI). El Dios del decisionismo es el Dios de la *potentia absoluta*, que significa forma de gobierno tiránica según la teología contrarreformista, la cual opone el poder del soberano como inspirado por el Dios de la *potentia ordinata*. Esto significa que como Dios gobierna de manera mediata por sus mismas leyes, el soberano hace lo mismo a través de la mediación de los cuerpos intermedios, de los poderes sociales de la Iglesia y de la nobleza. Este esquema vale para la teología política de la soberanía tradicional católica. Sin embargo hemos visto ya que, para Donoso, en la fase de la lucha final no es posible restaurar la legitimad tradicional, y esto es sobre todo debido a la imposibilidad de una reacción católica. Como dice Antonio Rivera «para los contrarrevolucionarios, sólo una verdadera

reacción católica podía ejercer la función de *Kat-echon* contra el apocalipsis moderno, contra las revoluciones iniciadas por liberales y socialistas» (Rivera Garcia 2007, 265). Sin embargo cuando Donoso pronuncia el *Discurso sobre la dictadura* está convencido de que no es posible una reacción católica en ese momento, dice: «Una sola cosa puede evitar la catástrofe: […] provocar una reacción saludable, religiosa. Ahora bien, señores: ¿es posible esta reacción? Posible lo es; pero ¿es probable? Señores, aquí hablo con la más profunda tristeza; no la creo probable». (Cortés 1970 c, 320)

La sociedad no tiene en sí misma las «fuerzas resistentes […] para rechazar las fuerzas invasoras» (Cortés 1970 c, 307), y eso justifica la reacción de soberano que, en el mismo terreno secularizado de la revolución, imita el Dios de la *potentia absoluta* y se convierte en un tirano. Como dice Donoso «¡la libertad acabó!» (Cortés 1970 c, 315) y no por manos del dictador sino por manos de los revolucionarios: la respuesta no puede ser liberal. Comenta Beneyto: «solo cuando la "regeneración" de la sociedad (en el sentido de desecularización) ya no sea una posibilidad no sólo para el futuro próximo sino también para el futuro remoto, el arquitecto pragmático de la historia (que es lo que le gustaría ser a todo teólogo político), trazará agonísticamente la imagen histórico-escatológica de una aniquilación apocalíptica del mal social e histórico por obra de intervención en la historia del soberano divino» (Beneyto 1993, 122).

La relación, que en términos políticos se puede definir como relación entre sociedad y estado o consenso religioso-moral y coacción política, es definida de manera muy clara por Donoso según la *ley del termómetro*:

> Señores, no hay más que dos represiones posibles: una interior y otra exterior, la religiosa y la política. Estas son de tal naturaleza, que cuando el termómetro religioso está subido, el termómetro de la represión bajo, y cuando el termómetro religioso está bajo, el termómetro político, la represión política, la tiranía, está alta. Es una ley de la humanidad, una ley de la historia. (Cortés 1970 c, 316)

En la fase actual en la cual el conflicto social, la rebelión a la autoridad (divina y terrena, dado que, de hecho, la segunda se funda en la primera), sube, es necesaria una represión

política que suspenda las leyes y el papel político de los actores sociales, es decir, «la fuerzas resistentes por sí mismas se reconcentran en una mano [:] esta es la teoría clara, luminosa, indestructible, de la dictadura» (Cortés 1970 c, 307-8). Frente al peligro de una forma de dictadura de abajo – que Donoso está convencido ser el futuro producido por las revoluciones – es necesaria una reacción de arriba, escribe: «se trata de escoger entre la dictadura que viene de abajo y la dictadura que viene de arriba: yo escojo la que viene de arriba, porque viene de regiones más limpias y serenas; se trata de escoger, por último, entre la dictadura del puñal y la dictadura del sable: yo escojo la dictadura del sable, porque es más noble». (Cortés 1970 c, 323)

Podemos aquí volver a lo que se ha planteado antes con Carlo Galli: se cierra el círculo. Una teoría que no sale de la percepción de la realidad como puro desorden, en el contexto de un proceso de secularización que se está desarrollando – cuyo retroceso por admisión del mismo Donoso es improbable – no puede llevar más que a una imposición provisional de una trascendencia imposible, es decir un gobierno perpetuamente excepcional del estado de crisis permanente que produce la modernidad. Negada la posibilidad de un orden nuevo inmanente (la inmanencia es desorden) y de la restauración del orden pre-moderno, la dictadura es la única forma de gobierno posible.

6. Conclusión: la modernidad político-social como estado de excepción permanente y su gobierno

Esta concepción de la modernidad como crisis permanente será central en Carl Schmitt, que ve en su neutralización el rol fundamental del estado y pone en relación esta teoría de la dictadura con la forma del estado absoluto. Según Antonio Rivera, para los contrarrevolucionarios, al contrario que en el absolutismo hobbesiano, el estado no neutraliza la conflictividad social a través de una separación entre los deberes exteriores del ciudadano (que están sometidos al Estado) y un foro interior de libertad (la dimensión privada, que es la sociedad). Es la unidad entre Iglesia y monarquía, es decir entre sociedad y Estado, foro interior y espacio público, la que garantiza el orden social. La jerarquía social por el poder disciplinante de la iglesia y el poder indiviso estatal actúan

conjuntamente. En este sentido la conflictividad no es simplemente el producto de la sociedad, sino de una sociedad donde la iglesia no juega más su papel histórico. Por lo tanto – escribe Rivera – "la unidad del poder, representada por el monarca tradicional, no resulta incompatible con la *potentia ordinata*, con el poder moderado, limitado […]" (Rivera Garcia 2007, 272), es decir, hay una teología política de la legitimidad divina por la cual el soberano no sustituye a Dios porque no inspira una teología de la *potentia absoluta*; y una teoría política de los cuerpos intermedios y de la mediación del poder estatal por la Iglesia. La teoría del termómetro de Donoso explica esta dinámica. Sin embargo si centramos nuestra atención sobre la condición de la sociedad donde el pensamiento contrarrevolucionario se desarrolla, y al que esta estructuralmente vinculado, es decir la sociedad moderna atravesada por todos los conflictos sociales y siempre más secularizada, nos parece inevitable que el esquema de "paz social católica" deje paso a la permanencia del estado de excepción. Y esta consecuencia – que los contrarrevolucionarios habían tenido implícita, persiguiendo «infructuosamente el mito de la constitución tradicional, monárquica y católica» (Rivera Garcia 2007, 277) – es tomada en serio por Carl Schmitt. Donoso en esta historia se coloca en el punto de pasaje, tiene la perspectiva de la restauración católica como posibilidad, pero acepta la dictadura como necesidad en la coyuntura – delegando al optimismo teológico la respuesta definitiva a la crisis empezada con la rebelión satánica. Escribe el mismo Rivera:

> El antiliberalismo reaccionario más importante del siglo XX, la teología política de Schmitt, tiende, en cambio, a hacer de lo excepcional la norma de la modernidad. Suele concebir este largo período, medido en siglos, como una época marcada por una constante guerra civil y por toda una serie de fórmulas políticas como las absolutistas o las contrarrevolucionarias, que, con mayor o menor fortuna, tienen la misión de detener el apocalipsis moderno. (Rivera Garcia 2007, 276-7)

En este sentido la respuesta contrarrevolucionaria donosiana a los conflictos sociales de la modernidad es reinterpretada por Schmitt – bajo la forma estatal – en el esquema teológico-político de la reacción moderna. Si no hay la posibilidad de una *potentia ordinata*, porque hablando en

términos secularizados, hay una sociedad conflictiva – y este conflicto lo lee como puro caos que no puede asumir forma por un desarrollo inmanente sino hay que darle forma con una acción trascendente – la *potentia absoluta* del dictador en el estado de excepción es la forma de gobierno reaccionario, la respuesta desde arriba, en todas las situaciones en las cuales el termómetro social registra temperaturas demasiado altas.

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NOTES

[1] Aquí hablando de modernidad nos referimos a la época post-1789, es decir la *Neuzeit* (modernidad como tiempo nuevo) inaugurada – principalmente – por la irrupción de la revolución francesa. Cfr. Koselleck (2000, 225-239) y Koselleck (1979).

[2] José María Beneyto, en su monografía sobre Donoso habla también de la importancia de la muerte de Pedro, su hermano menor, para entender la "conversión" del marqués de Valdegamas (Beneyto 1993, 55).

[3] Es imposible citar todos los pasajes donde aparece este concepto, siendo uno de los conceptos fundamentales de su interpretación de Schmitt y de la política moderna. Véase Galli (1996) y Galli (2006).

[4] Como ejemplo de la retórica donosiana en la descripción de la unidad se puede citar la imagen de los ángeles que precede el momento de la ruptura del orden por la rebelión satánica: «[…] todas las criaturas angélicas estaban obedientes a la voz de su Hacedor, mirándose en su rostro, anegándose en su resplandores y moviéndose si tropiezo y con una concertada armonía al compás de su palabra» (Cortés 1970 d, 581).

[5] Interesante ver como Donoso en algunos pasos, de acuerdo con las tendencias teóricas positivistas de su tiempo – que en teoría serian para él, enemigos – use teorías pseudocientíficas para demostrar la naturaleza caída del hombre, como veremos en referencia a la transmisión de la culpa.

[6] Sobre el mismo tema, Schmitt: «La linea principale dello sviluppo consiste senza dubbio nel fatto che, nella massa degli uomini colti, vengono meno tutte le concezioni della trascendenza e acquistano evidenza un più o meno chiaro panteismo immanentistico oppure un'indifferenza positivistica nei confronti di ogni metafisica. Nella misura in cui la filosofia dell'immanenza, che ha trovato la sua architettura più compiuta in nella filosofia di Hegel, mantiene

il concetto di Dio, essa introduce Dio nel mondo e fa derivare il diritto e lo stato dall'immanenza dell'obbiettivo» (Schmitt 1972, 72).

[7] «Entre socialistas y católicos no hay más que esta diferencia: los segundos afirman el mal del hombre y la redención por Dios; los primeros afirman el mal de la sociedad y la redención por el hombre» (Cortés 1970 d, 614).

[8] Sobre el nexo entre aceleración, crisis y temporalidad apocalíptica se vea Koselleck (1989).

[9] Suena muy parecido a lo que escribirá Schmitt en *Teología política*: «Prima deve essere stabilito l'ordine: solo allora ha senso l'ordinamento giuridico» (Schmitt 1972, 39).

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Croyance et politique : du privilège de la politique sur le droit (Deleuze-Guattari) au fondement mystique de l'autorité (Derrida)

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Abstract

Belief and Politics: From the Privilege of Politics on Law to the Mystical Foundation of Authority

This article analyses the legal and political extensions of Deleuze-Guattari and Derrida's approaches to law. If the former delegitimizes the law in favour of an immanent abstract machine, the latter formalizes the law in the form of aporia. We approach the question of jurisprudence and law from Deleuze's interpretation of Foucault's strategy to which he applies the logic of disjunctive synthesis. We point out that its elaborations do not take into account the rupture that lies at the heart of the law related to the mystical foundation of authority. This brings us to the question of belief as addressed by schizoanalysis, which opposes the desire to interest, the belief of a processual unconscious to the unbelief of capital with its images. We then stress the need to substitute a strategy that takes into account the double bind that plays in the impossible relationship between belief and unbelief, pointing out that denial is the fundamental political problem that Derrida has problematized.

Keywords: Power drive, Derrida, deconstruction, Deleuze, psychoanalysis, law, politics.

Dans un entretien tardif donné à Toni Négri en 1990, Gilles Deleuze relate son passage du droit à la politique, et d'une logique du contrat et de l'institution à la jurisprudence qu'il lie à une activité juridique créatrice.

> Au début je m'intéressais plus au Droit qu'à la politique. Ce qui me plaisait même chez Masoch et Sade, c'était leur conception tout à fait tordue du contrat selon Masoch, de l'institution selon Sade, rapportés à

> la sexualité. […] Ce qui m'intéresse, ce n'est pas la loi ni les lois (l'une est une notion vide, les autres, des notions complaisantes), ni même le Droit ou les droits, c'est la jurisprudence. C'est la jurisprudence qui est vraiment créatrice de droit : il faudrait qu'elle ne reste pas confiée aux juges. On songe déjà à établir le droit de la biologie moderne : mais tout, dans la biologie moderne et les nouvelles situations qu'elle crée, les nouveaux événements qu'elle rend possibles, est affaire de jurisprudence. Ce n'est pas un comité des sages, moral et pseudo-compétent, dont on a besoin, mais de groupes d'usagers. C'est là qu'on passe du droit à la politique. (Deleuze 1990).

Au-delà de la figure de l'écrivain à travers laquelle il conceptualise avec Félix Guattari une justice immanente dans *Kafka, pour une littérature mineure* (1975), Deleuze évoque cette fois des groupes d'usagers qui produisent de la jurisprudence par une activité qui transforme un milieu selon la logique de la machine abstraite immanente. Cette pratique crée le droit plutôt que le droit ne s'applique dans la généralité d'une loi abstraite tombée du ciel. Nous pouvons la raccorder à la notion de groupes sujets (*vs* assujettis) dans *L'anti-Œdipe* (1972), ces groupes qui suivent, d'après Deleuze-Guattari, les usages *légitimes* des synthèses de l'inconscient (130) en produisant des agencements collectifs d'énonciation. La schizo-analyse consiste alors à rejouer le rapport entre théorie et pratique en ce que ces groupes expérimentent des situations politiques qu'ils analysent collectivement et y entraînent de façon processuelle des créations jurisprudentielles, quand la loi interprétée par le juge pétrifie l'avenir dans les usages transcendants de synthèses qui assujettissent l'inconscient à la représentation (405). Pourtant, la jurisprudence qui prétend se substituer à la loi reste prise, d'après nous, dans la même problématique.

1. Le Foucault de Deleuze : les rapports de pouvoir priment sur la loi

Avant d'ébranler la position de Deleuze-Guattari, il nous faut déplier quelques étapes. Pour commencer, repartons de la lecture que Deleuze donne de la pensée de Michel Foucault dans un cours à Vincennes en 1986 (concomitant à la sortie de son *Foucault*) dans lequel il mentionne la jurisprudence. Deleuze reprend la problématique de la loi qu'il avait exposé avec Guattari dans *Kafka* (1975). Au lieu d'une loi absurde et

son fondement, il s'agit de repartir d'une justice immanente ouvrant à une pratique micro-politique. Or, plutôt que la littérature, c'est la jurisprudence qui vient cette fois tenir ce rôle, faisant déchoir une loi vide qui n'est rien de par son point de vue macro-physique :

> […] une loi n'est rien sans la jurisprudence, c'est-à-dire la détermination des cas d'application, elle n'est rien sans les décrets d'application. […] la jurisprudence, c'est la détermination des cas dans lesquels elle [la loi] s'applique, les décrets, c'est la détermination des conditions sous lesquelles elle s'applique. (Deleuze 1986-b)

Décrivant les concepts foucaldiens, Deleuze établit un branchement avec sa propre pensée jusqu'à les tordre pour se les approprier. Il affirme que la même différence de nature qu'il élabore avec Guattari dans *L'anti-Œdipe* entre les ordres molaire et moléculaire régit la distinction entre une macro-physique du pouvoir qui suit une logique d'interdiction associée au couple loi-illégalité, et une micro-physique du pouvoir qui part du couple loi-illégalisme en vue d'aménager un espace où la loi n'est produite que pour être contournée :

> si je dis « la loi, c'est la résultante des illégalismes dans une formation sociale », on a tout de suite envie […] de m'objecter : « mais, ça ne veut rien dire ! L'illégalisme […] plutôt qu'illégalité […] suppose déjà la loi. Comment la loi serait-elle la résultante de quelque chose qui la suppose ? ». Et ben non. C'est vrai que l'illégalité suppose déjà la loi au niveau macrophysique.
>
> Au niveau microphysique, pas du tout. Pourquoi ? […] il [Foucault] veut dire que l'illégalisme n'est pas un accident par rapport à la loi. […] Si la loi était faite pour interdire, ce serait […] curieux qu'elle échoue à ce point-là. […] Et pourtant, macrophysiquement, elle est bien faite pour interdire, mais, dans le micro […] ce n'est pas tout à fait la même loi. […] Supposons qu'elle ne soit pas faite pour empêcher, elle serait faite pour quoi ? Pour différencier les manières de la tourner. […] Et les manières de tourner la loi, elles ne sont pas hors-la-loi, elles sont dans la loi. (Deleuze 1986-a)

D'après sa lecture de Foucault, l'illégalisme produit une loi qui, paradoxalement, semble première en tant qu'elle pose cet illégalisme, et donc le présuppose, alors que celui-ci est issu d'un rapport de forces qui prime, en réalité, sur la forme qu'il produit. Le pouvoir est un rapport de force, ou plutôt, tout rapport de force est un « rapport de pouvoir ». Ce que Foucault,

lu encore une fois par Deleuze, distingue de la violence située dans les strates ou les formes telles que la forme-État. La violence porte « sur des corps, des objets ou des êtres déterminées dont elle détruit ou change la forme », étant « *un concomittant ou un conséquent de la force, non un constituant* » (Deleuze 1986-c, 77). Aussi, le rapport de pouvoir n'est pas entre deux formes comme le savoir, mais un rapport de l'action sur l'action qui donne lieu à des catégories comme *inciter*, *induire*, *détourner*, etc. On retrouve la logique deleuzo-guattarienne de la synthèse disjonctive[1] par laquelle la puissance du virtuel porte le mouvement de l'actuel à travers cette différence de nature entre pouvoir et savoir (ou forme) avec présupposition réciproque entre le micro-physique et la macro-physique (Deleuze 1986-c, 80) : le primat du rapport de force sur la forme renvoie au primat du virtuel sur l'actuel, ou du moléculaire sur le molaire. Foucault montrerait ainsi que le rapport de force ne se localise pas dans des instances souveraines qui tiennent d'une logique de stratification (l'État), et que par conséquent, une stratégie politique doit s'élaborer à partir de ce qui s'agite en-dessous, ce lieu qu'on pourrait traduire avec l'inconscient moléculaire deleuzo-guattarien.

> Le « modèle juridique » est venu recouvrir la carte stratégique. La carte des illégalismes […] continue à travailler sous le modèle de la légalité. (Deleuze 1986-c, 38)

Et Deleuze précise en note que Foucault évacue la conception légaliste et répressive, n'ayant jamais participé au culte de l'« État de droit ». Il insiste alors sur la différence de nature que Foucault établirait entre toute pratique de savoir (archive) et une pratique de pouvoir qui lui serait irréductible (diagramme).

> Le complexe pouvoir-savoir noue le diagramme et l'archive et les articule à partir de leur différence de nature. (Deleuze 1986-c, 82)

Cette formalisation explique que la loi au niveau microphysique, Deleuze y incluant la création jurisprudentielle, n'est que la résultante d'un diagramme traçant des rapports de forces plutôt que le principe supérieur d'une loi conçue au niveau macrophysique. Au lieu de partir de la loi pour la contester, à l'instar de Kafka qui ne s'intéresse pas à la

critique[2], la stratégie politique relève d'une pragmatique qui établit des jeux de répartitions suivant un processus par lequel le rapport de force virtuel s'actualise en intégrations progressives, locales et globales, jusqu'à produire « la loi comme intégration des illégalismes » (Deleuze 1986-c, 45).

> Chacun sait que ce qui est interdit par la loi est […] toléré dans telles, telles, telles conditions et à l'ombre d'une autre loi. Si bien que c'est en fonction des illégalismes qui caractérisent un champ social que la loi pourra être définie. A savoir ce qui change radicalement d'un champ social à un autre, c'est les illégalismes et la répartition des illégalismes. La loi, ce n'est que cette répartition même. (Deleuze 1986-a)

Pourtant, à suivre Jacques Derrida, cette micro-politique n'est que la loi à l'œuvre sans qu'on ne puisse opposer une activité productrice et légitime qui règle des répartitions à l'illégitimité d'une loi abstraite, ni qu'on ne puisse distinguer la force du diagramme de la violence des archives. Cette aporie de la loi que Derrida formalise en lisant lui aussi Kafka dans *Préjugés devant la loi* (1985), il la reformule dans *Force de loi* (1994) pour entremêler la violence fondatrice et la violence conservatrice du droit, transformant la notion même de justice comme celle de légitimité. Il offre de penser comment une justice inconditionnelle fait irruption en trouvant sa condition dans un droit toujours déconstructible. Or, cette formalisation, au plus *juste* de la loi, appelle à reformuler le droit à partir d'une procédure tenant compte de ce que la loi se fonde par une décision qui inscrit par un coup de force la violence interprétative d'une écriture.

> La justice – au sens du droit […] ne serait pas simplement mise au service d'une force ou d'un pouvoir social, […] économique, politique […] qui existerait hors d'elle ou avant elle et auquel elle devrait se plier ou s'accorder selon l'utilité [comme par exemple se plier à ce que Deleuze-Foucault nommeraient la loi au niveau macro-physique]. Son moment […] d'institution même n'est d'ailleurs jamais un moment inscrit dans le tissu homogène d'une histoire puisqu'il le déchire d'une décision. Or l'opération qui revient à fonder, […] à justifier le droit, à *faire la loi*, consisterait en un coup de force, en une violence performative et donc interprétative qui en elle-même n'est ni juste ni injuste et qu'aucune justice, aucun droit préalable et antérieurement fondateur, aucune fondation préexistante […] ne pourrait ni garantir ni contredire ou invalider. (Derrida 1994, 32-33)

Cette violence interprétative, ni juste, ni injuste, ne permet pas de distinguer la force du rapport de pouvoir de la violence des strates, le coup de force faisant intervenir un facteur que Deleuze-Guattari et Foucault ne prennent pas en considération : le saut de la décision qui re-vient, à chaque fois, déchirer l'ordre institué. Car, faute d'assurance quant à son fond *propre*, tout ordre ne s'institue qu'à faire appel à la croyance et au fondement mystique de l'autorité.

2. Le fondement mystique de l'autorité

Le fondement mystique de l'autorité trace ainsi la ligne de démarcation entre la position de Deleuze dans sa lecture de Foucault, et celle de Derrida pour lequel la force s'inscrit dans la violence d'une écriture. Violence et écriture s'entremêlent à chaque décision dans la *discontinuité*[3] du rapport à l'autre qui engage chacun en sa finitude par une dette infinie.

Dette finie, dette infinie

Or, dans son texte *Pour en finir avec le jugement* (Deleuze 1993), Deleuze situe la dette infinie du côté du mal.

> Ce que Nietzsche a su dégager, c'est la condition du jugement : « la conscience d'avoir une dette envers la divinité », l'aventure de la dette en tant qu'elle devient elle-même infinie, donc impayable. (Deleuze 1993, 158)

Derrida partagerait cette lecture sans qu'il ne désigne la dette infinie comme source du mal, déconstruisant plutôt l'économie dans laquelle la dette se configure suivant des programmes théologico-politiques propres à une histoire occidentale du sujet qu'elle déborde pour autant. Deleuze, lui, veut rétablir les droits de l'immanence dans la finitude de la dette en instaurant contre le jugement une justice par laquelle

> Les existants s'affrontent et se font réparation selon des rapports finis qui ne constituent que le cours du temps. […] on commence par promettre, et la dette ne se fait pas à l'égard d'un dieu, mais à l'égard d'un partenaire suivant des forces qui passent entre les parties […] Le droit n'a pas l'immobilité des choses éternelles, mais se déplace sans cesse entre familles qui ont à reprendre ou à rendre le sang. (Deleuze 1993, 159)

Deleuze-Guattari entretiennent la nostalgie d'une *machine territoriale primitive* avec ses investissements collectifs d'organes et ses marquages des corps qui établissaient les règles de circulation de blocs finis de dettes[4] sur un territoire dont nous aurions été expulsés (Deleuze 1993, 160). Cette interprétation motive la pragmatique qu'ils élaborent en stratégie politique pour défaire et retourner le socius capitaliste dans *L'anti-Œdipe*. Et comme nous l'avons analysé (Jabre 2021-a), leur lecture de Kafka propose la même opération lorsqu'ils substituent à l'*infini limité discontinu* d'une loi transcendante, le *fini illimité continu* de la justice, rapportant la dette à la finitude pour que la promesse se limite à un engagement immanent.

De même, dans le texte de Deleuze *Pour en finir avec le jugement*, nous retrouvons d'un côté la loi, ou Dieu, qui organise les corps selon des valeurs supérieures en neutralisant *violemment* les *forces* de l'inconscient par le système du jugement avec ses critères préexistants ; de l'autre côté, la justice, ou le Corps sans organe (Cso), corps affectif et anarchique, qui oppose les *forces* de l'inconscient à cette *violence* pétrifiante. Dans ce combat contre le jugement, le combattant *est* le combat lui-même entre ses propres parties, combat que nous associons dans *L'anti-Œdipe* à la tendance moléculaire produite par le conflit des machines désirantes avec le Cso. Deleuze distingue aussi le *combat contre l'Autre*, qui vise à détruire ou repousser cet Autre rapporté au système du jugement, au *combat entre Soi* par lequel il s'agit de capturer des forces dans un devenir (Deleuze 1993, 165). Or, d'après Deleuze, le système du jugement est lui-même un *combat contre* sans être pour autant un *combat entre* : le jugement vise à détruire entièrement l'adversaire en éradiquant par sa violence le combat lui-même et son rapport de force[5], quand les auteurs que Deleuze convoque – Nietzsche, Lawrence, Kafka, Artaud – mêlent l'intensité du *combat entre Soi* au *combat contre l'Autre*. En thématisant l'engagement dans ce double combat, Deleuze veut en finir avec la théologie du jugement liée au calcul de la conscience. Contre la violence d'une loi (in)fondée sur une dette infinie, il veut rétablir la justice d'un combat en intensité qui implique les forces de l'inconscient.

Tout autrement, Derrida invoque une dette originaire et infinie qui se rapporte à l'incommensurable don de l'autre. Cette loi inscrit chacun en sa finitude selon des déterminations qu'elle déborde pour autant, et par laquelle l'écriture précède et excède tout rapport en ce qu'elle le constitue par le jeu de la différance. Si Derrida souligne que la loi travaille de façon aporétique, elle n'attend pas d'être formalisée en aporie, quand bien même ce tour de plus qu'il opère, à la lire au plus juste, transforme le rapport même à celle-ci. Aussi, malgré ce que Deleuze-Guattari affirment, le calcul des réparations par circulation de blocs finis de dettes tient aussi de la loi et du jeu de l'aporie qui rompt avec une pure immanence. Le système de la cruauté comme celui du jugement renvoient à des positions qui s'opposent, mais quel que soit leur régime d'écriture, l'écriture précède tout vivant qui se voit accorder par un don infini une place singulière selon des conventions, alors même que la légitimité des conventions que l'écriture porte, aussi profondément gravées soient-elles dans la chair, ne pourra jamais trouver d'appui. Ces conventions, en manque de fondement, ne relèvent que du fondement mystique de l'autorité. Cette rupture renvoie chacun au don infini de l'autre qui l'endette, alors même que le don renvoie aussi chacun à sa propre finitude en l'inscrivant dans un contexte avec ses normes, quand bien même celui-ci se réécrit. L'aporie brouille la frontière entre le système de la cruauté et celui du jugement. A ne pas lire la notion de fondement et de légitimité à travers cette perspective, on risque de retomber dans un messianisme au nom d'un *droit naturel*[6] qui aurait été usurpé sous la violence de l'État en nourrissant le fantasme de lui rendre sa juste place. Or, Derrida rappelle dans *Force de loi* qu'un questionnement déconstructif

> commence […] par déstabiliser ou compliquer l'opposition de *nomos* et *phusis*, de *thesis* et de *phusis* – c'est-à-dire l'opposition entre la loi, la convention, l'institution d'une part, et la nature d'autre part, avec toutes celles qu'elles conditionnent, par exemple, et ce n'est qu'un exemple, celle du droit positif et du droit naturel (la différance est le déplacement de cette logique oppositionnelle) […] est un questionnement sur le droit et la justice […] sur les fondements du droit de la morale et de la politique. (Derrida 1994, 22)

Qu'il s'agisse de codes réglant un socius primitif par investissement collectif d'organes ou de lois intériorisées renvoyant à un sujet coupable, ces règles n'échappent pas au fondement mystique de l'autorité sur lequel repose toute croyance. Croyance qu'il est nécessaire de relire à travers l'aporie de la loi et la loi de l'aporie, sauf à fétichiser une écriture, qu'elle porte des codes collectifs inscrits à même les corps ou le poids d'une dette morale gravée dans le cœur.

De même, quant à savoir si la loi précède l'illégalité en posant l'interdit, ou si la loi est produite par une pragmatique des rapports de pouvoir dans la visée d'être contournée suivant une répartition des illégalismes, nous retrouvons la problématique du meurtre du père. Comme le rappelle Derrida dans son séminaire sur *La peine de mort*, on ne peut savoir si la culpabilité est l'effet ou la cause du crime comme l'illustre ce mythe freudien, contrairement à la thèse qui ne fait surgir la culpabilité avec la morale qu'après coup.

> Il fallait bien que la morale fût déjà là pour les que les fils ressentent, après le meurtre du père, cette honte dont Freud dit pourtant qu'elle engendra la morale. (Derrida 2001, 161)[7]

Venue avant et après, la loi se diffère toujours selon un jeu de double bande[8]. De la sorte, la loi se rejoue sans cesse, même quand une forme universelle la réduit à un programme qui violente « l'expression singulière, idiomatique, de celui qui subit le tort » en durcissant ses effets assujettissants, comme Jérôme Lèbre le souligne dans *La justice sans condition* (2013, 47). A ne pas tenir compte de l'aporie et en destituant la loi au nom d'une stratégie des rapports de pouvoirs, on essentialise en réalité la loi sous une autre forme en reconduisant l'opposition qui risque de fermer l'espace politique. On invoque des rapports de forces par une pragmatique du pouvoir qui justifie paradoxalement la violence structurelle des partages qui en résultent. Par cette récusation de la loi qui croise une lecture marxiste de l'idéologie juridique (Lèbre 2013, 60), Deleuze-Guattari condamnent le fétichisme, alors qu'ils ne font que retourner une croyance contre une autre. Ils manquent la problématique du déni par laquelle l'aporie travaille entre croyance et incroyance.

Pour autant, Derrida ne renverrait pas dos-à-dos une justice qui applique des lois de façon programmatique et la schizo-analyse qui propose une activité créatrice et jurisprudentielle dans la façon de réécrire la règle conformément à la logique de l'après coup. Si ce n'est que Derrida ne rejette pas l'État avec son appareil institutionnel et judiciaire pour la raison qu'il relève de la représentation. C'est encore affaire de justice.

> L'adresse, comme la direction, comme la rectitude, dit quelque chose du droit et ce qu'il ne faut pas manquer quand on veut la justice, quand on veut être juste, c'est la rectitude de l'adresse. (Derrida 1994, 39)

Il faut être juste en se souciant d'une adresse à chaque fois singulière. Aussi, faut-il tenir compte du contexte dans lequel on adresse son réquisitoire, ou élabore sa stratégie, en ce qu'il impose des déterminations avec des règles, alors même qu'il s'agit de trouver la meilleure manière de les interrompre afin de faire entendre la voix de celui qui se présente devant la loi. Aussi, à récuser l'ordre juridico-politique au nom d'une justice immanente, on risque de priver de justice celui qui a la nécessité de s'inscrire dans un contexte avec ses institutions.

Avec et contre L'anti-Œdipe

Piochons quelques illustrations de la conception deleuzo-guattarienne du désir pour montrer la nécessité d'une autre formalisation de la loi et de l'économie libidinale. Tout d'abord, le cours sur Foucault déjà cité dans lequel Deleuze prend l'exemple de la Vendée :

> Qu'est-ce qui explique, par exemple, l'opposition radicale de la Vendée à la révolution française ? Ce n'est pas simplement que la Vendée est beaucoup plus, est plus réactionnaire, plus pieuse que d'autres régions de la France, ce n'est pas simplement ça, c'est que le droit monarchique faisait bénéficier les paysans, et notamment les paysans de l'ouest, d'un certain nombre de privilèges, d'un certain nombre d'exceptions à la loi que la révolution ne peut plus leur consentir. (Deleuze 1986-a)

Or, nous pouvons nous demander en quoi le partage des illégalismes qu'il décrit suivant une lecture des rapports de pouvoir et par lequel des privilèges sont accordés à certains, ne

reconduit pas une loi qui creuse un écart *injustement* avec tous ceux qui s'en trouvent exclus.

A l'inverse, dans un autre exemple tiré de *L'anti-Œdipe*, nous constatons que la loi s'applique aux sociétés codées par des investissements collectifs d'organe suivant une formalisation aporétique similaire à celle de Derrida, comme le montrent Deleuze-Guattari en exposant une pratique chamanique autour d'un membre d'une tribu en pleine crise existentielle. La crise sera résolue par la décision des *juges*-chamans. Or, leur *jugement* se négocie entre l'idiome du plaignant et le collectif, entre clinique et politique. Nous retrouvons le fondement mystique de l'autorité par le « caractère vague de la croyance mystique » qui engage à rejouer la loi pour tenir compte de la singularité de celui qui se présente devant elle.

> La divination devient une forme d'analyse sociale au cours de laquelle des luttes cachées entre individus et factions sont mises à jour, de telle manière qu'on puisse les traiter par des procédés rituels traditionnels... le caractère vague des croyances mystiques leur permettant d'être manipulées en rapport avec un grand nombre de situations sociales. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 197)

Que l'interprétation *schizo-analytique* des chamans ne tienne pas de la loi transcendante d'œdipe, n'enlève en rien que le *plaignant* est préjugé devant la loi à partir de son idiome, une combinaison singulière qui le conduit à contester un ordre auquel il appartient, entraînant une négociation où se mêlent l'écoute de ses torts et la prise en compte de sa position dans une lignée, à une analyse politico-sociale des rapports collectifs de la tribu. Mais il n'y a pas lieu de regretter cette pragmatique dans une nostalgie ethnographique. Toute loi est prise dans un double bind qui l'excède et l'ouvre à ce *souci* de l'autre. Et si Deleuze-Guattari comme Derrida dénoncent la violence d'une loi universelle s'appliquant de façon machinale, Derrida ne s'y oppose pas en la destituant au nom de la justice, mais engage à transformer l'appareil institutionnel et juridique.

Chacun est préjugé devant la loi, et « la justice consiste à se mettre à l'écoute du différend » qui « traverse tout contexte linguistique » (Lèbre 2013, 47) avec la violence qu'il impose pour y opérer une traduction. L'absence de fondement de la loi – ou l'origine mystique de l'autorité – doit conduire le juge à

l'interrompre au nom de la justice pour la refonder et l'appliquer suivant « les apories de la décision » (Lèbre 2013, 76). Pour que cette écoute de l'autre puisse advenir, une traduction doit également s'élaborer entre le droit et la psychanalyse.

Enfin, à l'opposé de l'exemple chamanique qui tient compte de l'idiome, Deleuze-Guattari évoquent également le cas édifiant de l'excision (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 223), décrivant cette fois avec provocation la manière dont le socius primitif marque le désir collectivement dans les corps. D'après eux, il inscrirait des codes à même la chair suivant le régime de la cruauté, quand le socius capitaliste entretiendrait un désir malade par son décodage généralisé des flux. De même que nous questionnons leur virulente critique des droits de l'homme[9], nous nous interrogeons sur la responsabilité des co-auteurs à choisir le cas de l'excision, si ce n'est qu'il pointe de façon symptomatique leur difficulté à soutenir une logique qu'ils doivent affirmer plus fort, alors même qu'elle paraît plus *injuste*. Ce codage qui inscrit le désir (*sic*) n'est autre que la loi arbitraire d'un collectif qui impose une castration réelle que Derrida aura, pour sa part, dénoncée sans opposer ces rites et leurs effets de violence machinale au droit positif (Derrida 2000, 267-268). Cet exemple interroge l'autonomie de tout groupe qui applique *souverainement ses* règles sans être inquiété par la rupture qui gît au cœur du droit. Au nom de la justice, l'aporie de la loi engage à rompre avec son application machinale, qu'elle soit universelle ou qu'elle se pratique à travers des rites cruels.

3. Re-fonder le politique à partir de la problématique du déni

La schizoanalyse n'aura pas modifié le champ social, ni le champ analytique, alors qu'elle aurait dû produire un changement de fond en mettant au jour la *facticité* du socius capitaliste, d'après Deleuze-Guattari, qui vont jusqu'à mentionner des conditions objectives laissant supposer la réussite *programmée* de son processus performatif.

> Nous croyons au contraire à la possibilité d'une réversion interne, qui fait de la machine analytique une pièce indispensable de l'appareil révolutionnaire. Bien plus, les conditions objectives en semblent actuellement données. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 97)

Or, Deleuze-Guattari n'auront tenu compte ni de la résistance, ni d'une archi-performativité qui déborde tout calcul. Quelques années plus tard, Guattari reconnaît l'absence d'effets de *L'anti-Œdipe* sur les psychanalystes[10], interprétant que leur inscription sociale les fait résister, bien entendu, à la dénonciation de leur *propre* position. Autrement dit, il relève la résistance d'une écriture institutionnelle avec ses enjeux de pouvoir et de légitimation que le calcul de *L'anti-Œdipe* n'aura pas su calculer. Deleuze y revient lui aussi en 1980, lors de la parution de *Mille Plateaux*, second tome de *Capitalisme et Schizophrénie*, considérant que d'un certain point de vue, « *L'anti-Œdipe* a été un échec complet »[11], et il évoque la difficulté du contexte. Or, plus qu'un contexte *impropre*, nous y associons ce que Deleuze relatera au sujet de Foucault et de l'échec de ses expériences politiques (comme le mouvement des prisons), soulignant que celui-ci découvre l'impasse dans laquelle le pouvoir lui-même met, le problème des rapports de résistance étant pris dans les mêmes stratifications que le pouvoir (Deleuze 1986, 101-103). De même, la stratégie deleuzo-guattarienne, à affirmer que les *dispositifs de pouvoir* sont *seconds* sur les *agencements de désir*, n'aura pas modifié le socius capitaliste. L'échec de la schizo-analyse vient-il de l'impensé que nous avons mis au jour ? Peut-on privilégier les forces de déliaison et de créativité du virtuel – autrement dit la logique de la synthèse disjonctive – en affirmant qu'une tendance porte le jeu de la *différence* ? Nous pourrions nous demander si la stratégie derridienne n'a pas connu le même sort, à ceci près qu'elle tient compte des résistances, comme nous l'analysons ailleurs à travers le legs de Freud (Jabre 2019, 250, s.). Et elle ne se mesure pas en termes de performativité puisque son calcul tient d'une archi-performativité[12] qui déborde tout calcul. Mais revenons d'abord à nos doutes quant à la stratégie de Deleuze-Guattari avant de reformuler leur problématique.

Croire ou ne pas croire : l'échec d'une schizo-analyse enferrée dans ses contradictions

Rappelons que la schizo-analyse a pour objectif de faire passer les investissements réactionnaires du côté de la

production désirante, ouvrant à des agencements qui suivent les mouvements de déterritorialisation du désir. Sa puissance *déconstructrice* tiendrait à sa capacité de révéler que les investissements soutenant l'ordre social n'ont aucun sens, ce qui aurait pour effet de faire décrocher la libido d'un modèle transcendant. Ne pouvant plus s'agripper au sens, la libido basculerait du côté d'un pôle schizo-révolutionnaire.

> Loin d'être l'audace de la psychanalyse, l'idée de représentation inconsciente marque dès le début sa faillite […] : un inconscient qui ne produit plus, mais qui se contente de croire... L'inconscient croit à Œdipe, il croit à la castration, à la loi... Sans doute le psychanalyste est-il le premier à dire que la croyance, en toute rigueur, n'est pas un acte de l'inconscient ; c'est toujours le préconscient qui croit. Ne faut-il pas dire même que c'est le psychanalyste qui croit, le psychanalyste en nous ? La croyance serait-elle un effet sur le matériel conscient, que la représentation inconsciente exerce à distance ? Mais, inversement, qu'est-ce qui a réduit l'inconscient à cet état de représentation, sinon d'abord un système de croyances mis à la place des productions ? (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 352)

La schizo-analyse détruirait la croyance aux images de la représentation par son rapport immédiat au processus schizo, jouant les usages légitime des synthèses de l'inconscient contre des usages illégitimes tenant d'un sens transcendant. Opposant le non-sens au sens, elle biffe la représentation pour puiser en-deçà d'une conscience liée à des images dans laquelle la psychanalyse s'empêtre. Son projet révolutionnaire et messianique tiendrait à sa capacité à révéler que ces images forment le nouvel avatar d'une croyance religieuse et que le but de la structure n'est que l'idéologie d'une classe dominante.

Or, pourquoi ne *croyons*-nous pas que les agencements de désir éviteraient de se durcir en dispositifs de pouvoir par la révélation de leur non-sens ? Parce que le non-sens tel que Deleuze-Guattari l'entendent, reste encore le sens en tant qu'il prend pour valeur sa propre perte. Pointons la contradiction qui mine leur proposition : si le désir de répression ne tient pas compte du sens, pourquoi y aurait-il réversion de la libido et bascule d'un socius à le révéler dans son absurdité ? D'après l'hypothèse d'une effusion d'amour pour une structure où le désir joue au-delà du sens, nous pouvons déduire que, de même qu'une conscience de classe ne conduit pas machinalement à la

révolution, de même, la révélation de l'absence de but du socius n'y parviendrait pas mieux. Ce qui hypothèque la résolution de leur problème, ou plutôt du « problème fondamental de la philosophie politique » initié par Spinoza et redécouvert par Reich, à savoir la raison pour laquelle les hommes combattent pour leur servitude comme s'il s'agissait de leur salut (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 36-37). C'est-à-dire à l'affirmation d'un désir disjoint de l'intérêt (124)[13]. La schizo-analyse, à s'appuyer sur les usages légitimes de l'inconscient, aurait dû détruire ce désir absurde pour la structure, l'emportant par l'intensité du processus schizo.

Or, nul ne peut estimer quel désir l'emportera, surtout à tenir compte de l'angoisse de faire tomber des positions qui assurent la consistance, aussi illusoire soit-elle, d'une structure ou de sujets. Deleuze-Guattari, en faisant le procès de la représentation, manquent la logique aporétique de la pulsion de pouvoir (Jabre 2019) : suivant un double bind, tout ensemble se lie à lui-même par un nœud qu'on ne peut défaire d'un côté sans le resserrer de l'autre, et sans qu'on ne puisse le résoudre en prenant le parti de l'inconscient, qu'il soit structural ou moléculaire. La logique de l'inconscient relève d'une compulsion de répétition qui ne se règle ni sur la machine langagière de la conscience, et n'attend pas plus qu'on mette au premier plan une force problématisante qui opère sous la conscience. Cette impossible loi n'attend pas qu'on choisisse une tendance pour produire des effets qui débordent la conscience, et en tenir compte nécessite une stratégie qui laisse jouer la compulsion de répétition suivant un processus par lequel la décision revient à une altérité qui rend toute position à l'avance indécidable.

Poursuivons. A détacher l'intérêt (lié à la conscience) du désir (lié à l'inconscient)[14], Deleuze-Guattari distinguent la révolution préconsciente qui « renvoie à un nouveau régime de production sociale qui crée, distribue et satisfait de nouveaux buts et intérêts », d'une révolution inconsciente qui suit le régime de la production désirante :

> dans un cas la coupure est entre deux socius, dont le second se mesure à sa capacité d'introduire les flux de désir dans un nouveau code ou une nouvelle axiomatique d'intérêt ; dans l'autre cas, la coupure est dans le socius lui-même, pour autant qu'il a la capacité de faire passer les flux de désir suivant leurs lignes de fuite positives,

> et de les recouper suivant des coupures de coupures productrices. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 416)
> La schizo-analyse doit permettre alors d'atteindre aux investissements de désir inconscient du champ social, en tant qu'ils se distinguent des investissements préconscients d'intérêt, et qu'ils peuvent non seulement les contrarier, mais coexister avec eux sur des modes opposés. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 419)

Pourtant, tout mouvement révolutionnaire, à l'instar du marxisme ancré dans une conscience de classe, se lie à une poussée de désir qui repose sur une croyance en l'*à venir* qui s'oppose aux buts actuels d'une société, sans distinguer le désir de l'intérêt, bande contre bande, désir contre désir, croyance contre croyance. Et la schizo-analyse, elle-même, s'appuie sur un sens qu'elle récuse pour mettre en place sa *propre* performativité par la *croyance* qu'elle ouvre un processus machinique qui ne fait pas appel à la croyance. Ne faut-il pas croire à la schizo-analyse pour s'engager à l'expérimenter sans croyance ? Alors, si la croyance joue un rôle dans toute stratégie politique, dans un contexte ou une *époque* où la notion de *vérité* est *en déconstruction*, il faut, à l'aune de cet enjeu, intégrer ce tremblement de la vérité en formalisant dans le politique le double bind qui joue entre croyance et incroyance plutôt que de croire en avoir fini avec la croyance.

Ce double bind ouvre à la problématique du déni qui rend compte de ce que des pouvoirs résistent à la révélation de leur absence de sens. Peut-on échapper aux effets de souveraineté des dispositifs de pouvoir par une stratégie qui révèle leur absurdité, ou l'absurdité d'un *socius capitaliste*, en *croyant* que cette révélation produira un autre socius ? Ne faut-il pas plutôt reformuler toute stratégie politique à partir de l'aporie qui engage à penser une force hétérogène (la pulsion de pouvoir) précédant et fondant tout pouvoir dans un rapport impossible entre le sens et le non-sens ? La problématique du déni engage à une ré-écriture du politique selon d'autres négociations des conventions. Il évite, d'une part, d'essentialiser un sens qui n'est qu'un effet de la représentation sous le jeu de la conscience langagière par laquelle on *croit* retrouver *sa* place dans la chaîne signifiante dans un monde désordonné en se laissant transir par la loi (Lacan), d'autre part, d'essentialiser un (non-)sens producteur et non-représentatif afin de suivre les

chemins tortueux d'un désir par lequel on *croit* se passer de la loi et du langage (Deleuze-Guattari), quand ce désir nécessite encore de *croire* à sa propre *incroyance* pour opérer.

La problématique du déni, entre croyance et incroyance

Les révélations des années soixante-dix sur la répression des régimes communistes ont-elles porté un coup fatal à la croyance envers le messianisme révolutionnaire ?[15] A défaut de *croire* à ce constat, on peut retourner l'argument et appliquer le même scepticisme à un *capitalisme nihiliste* en suivant la lecture deleuzo-guattarienne. Sauf qu'il s'agirait pour les auteurs d'un tout autre mode d'incroyance, car le socius du capital serait intimement lié au cynisme qui se caractérise par le rapport même entre croyance et incroyance, au bord de la problématique du déni que nous pointons pour reformuler le politique. Rappelons que le déni concerne toute formation sociale et constitue la loi d'un fétichisme revisité que nous avons décrit dans d'autres travaux (Jabre 2020)[16]. Or, plutôt que cette lecture, Deleuze-Guattari considèrent que les formations sociales antérieures disposaient de *vraies* croyances, quand le capitalisme entretiendrait la mauvaise conscience et l'incroyance.

> Surtout, il n'y a plus besoin de croyance, et c'est seulement du bout des lèvres que le capitaliste s'afflige de ce qu'on ne croit plus à rien, aujourd'hui. « Car c'est ainsi que vous parlez : nous sommes entiers, réels, sans croyance ni superstition ; c'est ainsi que vous vous rengorgez sans même avoir de gorge ! » Le langage ne signifie plus quelque chose qui doit être cru, mais indique ce qui va être fait, et que les malins ou les compétents savent décoder, comprendre à mi-mot. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 298)[17]

Pour Deleuze-Guattari, la représentation impose ses images en assujettissant le désir en complicité avec la psychanalyse, de sorte que la croyance se révèle une incroyance.

> La psychanalyse, et le complexe d'Œdipe, ramassent toutes les croyances, tout ce qui a été cru de tout temps par l'humanité, mais pour le porter à l'état d'une dénégation qui conserve la croyance sans y croire. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 362)

Pour lutter contre ce monde pétrifié, la schizo-analyse doit rendre le désir à lui-même et rouvrir à la possibilité de « croire au monde » selon une expression que Deleuze emploiera dans *L'image-temps*[18] et que *L'anti-Œdipe* prépare.

> La terre est morte, le désert croit : le vieux père est mort, le père territorial, le fils aussi, l'Œdipe despote. Nous sommes seuls avec notre mauvaise conscience et notre ennui, notre vie où rien n'arrive ; plus rien que des images qui tournent dans la représentation subjective infinie. Mais ces images, nous retrouvons la force d'y croire, du fond d'une structure qui règle nos rapports avec elles et nos identifications comme autant d'effets d'un signifiant symbolique. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 367)

De même que le non-sens fait sens dans *L'anti-Œdipe*, « croire au monde » signifie s'ouvrir à un processus schizo entravé par des croyances auxquelles on ne croit plus, des images mortes produites par les usages transcendants et illégitimes des synthèses de l'inconscient, ces « clichés » que le capitalisme ferait circuler. La croyance se reformule alors en machinisme, quand le cynisme lié au fétichisme de la marchandise consiste à ne pas croire à des images auxquelles on prétend croire[19]. Or, Deleuze-Guattari suivent ici une veine marxiste en dénonçant un fétichisme au nom de la chose même qui aurait été supplantée, la chose (ou le sens) étant la production sociale dans son rapport immédiat au désir. La chose s'est fétichisée cette fois du côté d'un inconscient créateur. Or, on ne peut porter de condamnation contre un fétichisme au nom d'un autre (Jabre 2020), d'autant que le procès de cynisme renverrait à la responsabilité d'une (mauvaise) conscience souveraine. Si Deleuze-Guattari pressentent que le problème est plus profond[20], ils reproduisent un mode d'accusation qui rappelle la mauvaise foi sartrienne (Jabre 2019, 274 et s.) et manquent le double bind entre le sens et le non-sens.

Nous pouvons aussi objecter à leur lecture que les notions de liberté, de propriété, de souveraineté, la légitimité, les droits de l'homme etc, assurent un *socle* de croyances liées au socius des démocraties dite libérales. Même à suivre leur analyse d'une reterritorialisation sur le code Œdipe qui s'accompagnerait d'une axiomatique des flux décodés, on ne peut simplement interpréter la *production* de pseudo-codes et de reterritorialisations artificielles par le capitalisme (Deleuze

et Guattari 1972, 448) comme de fausses images dans un *monde* où l'on ne croit plus en rien, quand bien même le fétichisme du capital se doit d'être déconstruit. Toute loi fonctionne sur le déni propre à toute structure sociale, entre croyance et incroyance. Plutôt que de tenir d'une structure cynique liée au capitalisme, le déni offre de penser une fondation sans fondement qui diffère de l'*effondement* deleuzien (1968, 92). Au lieu de croire à des principes qui gouvernent un socius, ou de ne pas y croire en croyant au désir qui opère sous la représentation, il s'agit de penser l'impossibilité de croire et de ne pas croire en même temps. Cette logique aporétique propre au déni engage à discuter des raisons in(com)possibles qui fondent un ordre qui ne pourra jamais trouver de fondement et à produire du sens sur ce qui n'en a pas. Elle a l'effet performatif de transformer et diviser des pouvoirs en les ré-instituant, à *plus d'une loi* (Jabre 2020), comme Derrida le thématise dans *Voyous* en vue de déconstruire la souveraineté.

> Or, si la force souveraine est silencieuse, ce n'est pas faute de parler – elle peut être intarissable – c'est faute de sens. […] Conférer du sens à la souveraineté, la justifier, lui trouver une raison, c'est déjà entamer son exceptionnalité décisoire, la soumettre à des règles, à un droit, à une loi générale, à du concept. C'est donc la diviser, la soumettre à la partition, à la participation, au partage. C'est en faire la part. Et faire la part de la souveraineté, c'est entamer son immunité, la retourner contre elle-même. Cela arrive dès qu'on parle pour lui donner ou trouver du sens, et comme cela arrive toujours, la souveraineté pure n'existe pas, elle est toujours en train de se poser en se démentant, en se déniant ou en se désavouant, de s'auto-immuniser, de se trahir en trahissant la démocratie qui pourtant ne va jamais sans elle. (Derrida 2003, 144)

Notons que c'est par le même argument que Deleuze-Guattari justifient la puissance d'un désir révolutionnaire qui partirait de la révélation de l'absence de sens de tout socius qui ne le supporterait pas, si ce n'est que l'argument se retourne contre eux, et qu'il s'agit de penser la problématique du déni à la place de leur problématisation du désir.

> Nous avons vu que l'investissement paranoïaque inconscient portait sur le socius lui-même en tant que corps plein sans organes, par-delà les buts et les intérêts préconscients qu'il assigne et distribue. Reste qu'un tel investissement ne supporte pas d'être mis à jour : il faut toujours qu'il se cache sous des buts ou des intérêts assignables

> présentés comme généraux, quand bien même ils ne représentent que ceux de la classe dominante ou de sa fraction. Comment une formation de souveraineté, un ensemble grégaire fixe et déterminé supporteraient-ils d'être investis pour leur puissance brute, leur violence et leur absurdité ? Ils n'y survivraient pas. (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 440)

L'aporie de loi, qui institue et déconstruit en même temps la souveraineté[21], constitue alors le problème politique *fondamental*. Ce problème ne concerne non pas tant un désir qui se pétrifie en désir de répression, qu'il révèle la problématique du déni : il faut *se tenir* entre le sens et le non-sens, la croyance et l'incroyance, sur une *fondation* qui n'a pas de *fond*. L'angoisse travaille toute formation souveraine (ou Moi) qui se cache qu'elle est construite, s'appuyant sur une position impossible, puisqu'elle se fonde sans fondement. Ce double bind explique mieux que Reich et Deleuze-Guattari que l'on puisse conserver une position de jouissance dans une structure en mêlant le scepticisme à la croyance. Ce qui renvoie à la trace à laquelle *s'agripper*, autrement dit, au supplément d'origine. Et donc, à la nécessité de problématiser l'inscription en lien à la souveraineté, là où se jouent des positions de pouvoir, leurs négociations, et leurs légitimités. Nous pointons alors l'impensé de la schizo-analyse. En distinguant deux tendances en nature selon la logique de la synthèse disjonctive, Deleuze-Guattari contestent une légitimité au nom d'une autre. Ils auront attendu alors que désir reformule le champ politique dans le fantasme de le sauver en choisissant le parti d'une force créatrice contre cette même force lorsqu'elle produit certains effets d'inscription. Or, il s'agit de penser une force qui s'inverse et produit ses *propres* contradictions tout en les débordant. Deleuze-Guattari manquent cette impossible logique qui mêle croyance et incroyance à travers la problématique du *déni*. Et leur stratégie aura peiné à s'inscrire, faute de trouver le moyen de se greffer à un contexte juridico-politique où sont inscrits des jeux de pouvoirs qui résistent, aussi contestables soient-ils. Car tel est bien l'enjeu d'une analyse qui tient compte du déni : repenser la légitimité[22] selon un double bind en déconstruisant toute position souveraine, sans tomber pour autant dans la contestation d'un socius, par exemple, au nom des usages légitimes des synthèses de l'inconscient. Si la psychanalyse œdipienne peut être taxée

d'offrir une vision fataliste du désir en dénonçant une pulsion de mort qui menace l'ordre social, et si *le devenir-révolutionnaire* deleuzo-guattarien suit une tendance schizo au nom de la pureté du désir, Derrida fait un pas au-delà de ces deux positions. Il ne déplore pas l'incroyance et le désenchantement de l'époque, mais engage à la *révolution* incessante d'une *messianicité sans messianisme* qu'il élabore dans *Spectres de Marx* (1993) et qui ne relève ni d'un pessimisme, ni d'un optimisme[23]. Celle-ci devrait conduire l'ordre juridico-politique à tenir compte de la psychanalyse, une autre psychanalyse, à venir, pour se mettre à l'écoute de ce qui vient.

NOTES

[1] « Si les effets actualisent, c'est parce que les rapports de force ou de pouvoir ne sont que virtuels […] et définissent seulement […] des probabilités d'interaction, tant qu'ils n'entrent pas dans un ensemble macroscopique capable de donner forme à leur matière fluente et à leur fonction diffuse. » (Deleuze 1986-c, 45). Pour une lecture du virtuel et de la synthèse disjonctive chez Deleuze-Guattari, on pourra se reporter à notre article à paraître « Plus d'une loi: Reading repetition compulsion and generalized fetishism with Deleuze-Guattari and Derrida » (Jabre 2020).

[2] Sur la question de la critique qui en reste à la représentation, on peut se reporter à leur ouvrage sur Kafka qui invente, d'après eux, une machine d'une toute autre efficacité, « procédé beaucoup plus intense que toute critique. » (Deleuze et Guattari 1975, 91)

[3] Nous traitons de cette discontinuité qui prépare le thème du fondement mystique de l'autorité dans « Différend *Kafka* : entre les lignes de Deleuze-Guattari et Derrida. Penser la normativité au-delà de la représentation » (Jabre 2021-a).

[4] Dans ce socius, les flux de production sont détachables sous forme de stocks qui circulent et se connectent comme des blocs mobiles de dettes à travers l'activité des groupes locaux qui machinent les mariages en fonction des liens d'alliance. La parenté est croisée à des facteurs économiques et politiques qui dépendent d'une stratégie collective qui défait les accumulations de capital filiatives. (Deleuze et Guattari 1975, 172-173)

[5] Voir dans *L'anti-Œdipe*, « […] la ravageuse figure nietzschéenne des fondateurs d'empire, fondant "comme le destin, sans fondement, sans raison […]", et imposant leur nouvelle configuration telle "une fatalité inéluctable excluant le combat". » (Sibertin-Blanc 2011, 44)

[6] Par exemple, dans la lecture de Deleuze par Laurent de Sutter : « Tout ce que vous pouvez est permis, c'est le droit naturel » où « personne n'est compétent pour moi » formalise l'interprétation de Deleuze du droit dans une opposition à la loi, position que nous mettons en cause, comme le répètent nos

développements. Et par exemple cet extrait : « Le naturalisme est un plan de transformation : ses lois ne sont plus distinctes du droit, mais lui sont identiques. […] A la pensée de la loi visant toujours à ramener le droit à une fondation par ailleurs impossible, le droit naturel oppose la définition d'un mode de subvention de la pratique du droit, qui permettrait au contraire d'aller toujours plus loin dans ses transformations. » (De Sutter 1989, 80-81)

[7] « La possibilité du crime et la possibilité de l'interdit sont indissociables et co-originaires. » (Derrida 2000, 173)

[8] Sur le jeu de double bande, on pourra se reporter à notre article à paraître « Plus d'une loi: Reading repetition compulsion and generalized fetishism with Deleuze-Guattari and Derrida » (Jabre 2020).

[9] La lecture par Deleuze-Guattari des droits de l'homme illustre la différence d'approche avec Derrida qui affirme qu'il ne s'opposera jamais à quiconque se battra au nom de ces droits, aussi instrumentalisés soient-ils. (Jabre 2019, 229)

[10] « Pure illusion ! Les psychanalystes y sont restés imperméables. Tout à fait normal : allez donc demander à des bouchers de cesser, pour des raisons théoriques, de vendre de la viande. Ou de devenir végétariens ! Et du côté des consommateurs, il ne faut pas croire que la psychanalyse est inefficace ! Cela marche admirablement ! Les gens en demandent et en redemandent. Et ils ont raison de payer cher pour ça, puisque ça marche. […] L'Anti-Œdipe a à peine fait un petit courant d'air. Ce qui est drôle, c'est le mot d'ordre d'une société psychanalytique, à la sortie du livre : "Surtout n'en parlez pas, ça se passera tout seul." C'est ce qui est arrivé ! » (Guattari 2012, 270)

[11] « L'anti-Œdipe est après 68 : c'était une époque de bouillonnement, de recherche. Aujourd'hui il y a une très forte réaction. C'est toute une économie du livre, une nouvelle politique, qui impose le conformisme actuel. […] Et puis, une masse de romans redécouvrent le thème familial le plus plat, et développent à l'infini tout un papa-maman […]. C'est vraiment l'année du patrimoine, à cet égard *L'Anti-Œdipe* a été un échec complet. » (Deleuze 1980)

[12] Sur l'archi-performativité de la stratégie derridienne, voici un extrait de l'entretien *Entre crochets* donné en 1976 : « Supposez que s'introduisent alors dans le texte (une fois que le temps de la pertinence, de la confiance et de la crédibilité a opéré, il faut ce temps et voilà pourquoi ça ne se fait pas dans un *hic et nunc* abstrait), avec une violence plus ou moins subreptice (ce plus ou moins fait toute la difficulté du calcul économique), des forces hétérogènes (presque irrecevables), auxquelles on ne peut pas résister, auxquelles on résiste mais de telle sorte que la résistance fasse symptôme et travaille au corps, transforme, déforme le corps et le corpus, de pied en cap, et en nom, le forçage aura peut-être eu lieu. Ce n'est jamais sûr, ni acquis, ni joué, et ça peut toujours se laisser réapproprier. Ce que je viens de nommer forçage désigne, au-delà des effets de scènes, l'effraction et une opération de force, de différence de force. Bien sûr, cela suppose un "maximum" de risques (limité, donc, comme maximum possible) pour qui engage ses forces. Mais l'incalculable doit être de la partie. L'irrecevable — ce qui prend à un moment déterminé la forme informe de l'irrecevable — peut, devrait même, à un moment déterminé, ne pas être reçu du tout, échapper aux critères de recevabilité, être totalement exclu, ce qui peut avoir lieu au grand jour, alors que le produit irrecevable circule de main en main, […]. Et ça peut même

n'être jamais reçu. Il faut ce risque pour qu'apparaisse une chance de toucher ou d'altérer quoi que ce soit. L'irrecevable […], c'est aussi ce qui peut toujours ne pas être pris, qu'on peut laisser tomber, qu'on ne peut, même, que laisser tomber. Comme le reste. » (Derrida 1992, 24)

[13] « Il y a investissement libidinal inconscient du champ social, qui coexiste mais ne coincide pas nécessairement avec les investissements préconscients […]. C'est pourquoi, lorsque des sujets, individus ou groupes, vont […] à l'encontre de leurs intérêts de classe […], il ne suffit pas dire : ils ont été trompés […]. Ce n'est pas un problème idéologique, de méconnaissance et d'illusion, c'est un problème de désir, et *le désir fait partie de l'infrastructure*. Les investissements préconscients se font ou devraient se faire suivant les *intérêts* de classes opposées. Mais les investissements inconscients se font d'après des positions de *désir* et des usages de synthèse très différents des intérêts du sujet qui désire, individuel ou collectif. Ils peuvent assurer la soumission générale à une classe dominante, en faisant passer des coupures et des ségrégations dans un champ social en tant qu'investi précisément par le désir, et non plus par les intérêts. » (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 124)

[14] « C'est que l'intérêt de classe reste de l'ordre des grands ensembles molaires ; il définit seulement un préconscient collectif, nécessairement représenté dans une conscience distincte dont il n'y a même pas lieu de se demander à ce niveau si elle trahit ou non, aliène ou non […]. Le véritable inconscient, au contraire, est dans le désir de groupe, qui met en jeu l'ordre moléculaire des machines désirantes. C'est là qu'est le problème, entre les désirs inconscients de groupe et les intérêts préconscients de classe. » (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 305)

[15] Voir l'étude réalisée en 2017 pour la Fondation Gabriel Péri *Les idées communistes et marxistes dans la France aujourd'hui* : « Il n'est pas surprenant que l'idée sans cesse martelée depuis des décennies d'un communisme appartenant au passé soit largement partagée (62 % des personnes interrogées). Plus profondément la chute de l'Union soviétique et la disparition de la quasi-totalité des pays se réclamant du communisme ne sont évidemment pas étrangères à cette perception. » (Chau et Preud'homme 2017)

[16] Voir aussi cet extrait d'un texte à venir de René Major qu'il m'a généreusement confié lors de nos échanges : « La lecture derridienne du texte de Freud sur le fétichisme (dans *Glas*) autorise le concept de fétichisme généralisé - par rapport au fétichisme strict qui prend l'ersatz pour la chose même. C'est en d'autres termes la généralisation de l'opération de déni (démenti, désaveu) qui devient aussi importante que celle du refoulement : une opération qui permet de faire co-exister des intérêts opposés (vœu / désaveu , croyance/ non-croyance , reconnaissance / méconnaissance) dans une économie psychique tout comme dans une économie politique en général. » (10 août 2017).

[17] Voir aussi : « Le socius capitaliste donne au désir son nouveau nom, naissant de la rencontre de flux décodés : "flux de propriétés qui se vendent, flux d'argent qui coule, flux de production et de moyens de production qui se préparent dans l'ombre, flux de travailleurs qui se déterritorialisent" (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 265). Libre et nu, le travailleur n'est plus lié aux codes d'une terre, ni au surcodage du despote, mais vend sa force de travail, une quantité abstraite applicable à des tâches interchangeables. En parallèle, l'argent décodé devient un capital en mesure d'acheter cette force, s'accompagnant de

la privatisation du sol et de l'appropriation des moyens de production. La marchandise et la monnaie décodent les flux qualifiés par un équivalent général permettant "d'obtenir toutes sortes de valeurs particulières" (268). Le capital cesse d'être un capital d'alliance pour devenir filiatif, où l'argent engendre de l'argent. Alors que les anciens codes tombent en faillite, le capitalisme organise les flux décodés par l'application de règles abstraites qui s'y substituent, élargissant sans cesse ses limites par l'ajout d'axiomes qui évitent la saturation de ces flux porteurs de chaos. Par exemple, lorsqu'une revendication sociale devient trop menaçante, se crée un axiome pour les salariés, la classe ouvrière et les syndicats, ce qui maintient le système en colmatant les brèches. L'Etat a perdu toute puissance et s'est rangé au service de cette économie. La privatisation porte également sur les organes de "l'homme privé" qui dérive de quantités abstraites, divisé "entre son capital ou sa force de travail, et le reste n'a pas d'importance" (298). La famille a été exclue du champ social, "condition paradoxale sous laquelle tout le champ social va pouvoir s'appliquer désormais à la famille" (314). En effet, les coordonnées familiales sont devenues des images de second ordre, où la famille n'est plus liée à une pratique collective et devient un néo-code vidé de substance, servant à rabattre toute manifestation de désir sur sa structure figée. Aucune croyance ne tient dans ce monde des flux décodés, où la psychanalyse se fait la complice sournoise du capitalisme, culpabilisant toute révolte ramenée sans arrêt à un conflit œdipien. Sauf à fuir encore plus vite, c'est l'âge du cynisme et de la schizophrénie, où les codes qui impliquaient un couplage entre flux qualifiés, un système d'évaluation collective (295) et de croyance ne subsistent que sous une forme archaïque. » (Jabre 2021-b)

[18] « Le fait moderne, c'est que nous ne croyons plus en ce monde. Nous ne croyons même pas aux événements qui nous arrivent, l'amour, la mort, comme s'ils ne nous concernaient qu'à moitié. Ce n'est pas nous qui faisons du cinéma, c'est le monde qui nous apparaît comme un mauvais film. […] C'est le lien de l'homme et du monde qui se trouve rompu. Dès lors, c'est ce lien qui doit devenir objet de croyance : il est l'impossible qui ne peut être redonné que dans une foi. » (Deleuze, 1985, 223)

[19] On peut s'intéresser aussi à l'analyse de René Major sous un tout autre angle dans *Au cœur de l'économie, l'inconscient* (2014) qui associe le capitalisme à une économie psychique du déni à partir du mécanisme du marché. Major reprend la formule du déni « Je sais bien, mais quand même » de Mannoni (Major 2014, 76) pour montrer qu'elle s'applique au raisonnement de l'investisseur sur le marché (111 et s.), mais l'argent garde ici la position du fétiche au sens strict, portant le désir d'accumulation.

[20] « Et certes ce n'est pas la psychanalyse qui nous fait croire : Œdipe et la castration, on en demande, on en redemande, et ces demandes viennent d'ailleurs et de plus profond. Mais la psychanalyse a trouvé le moyen suivant, et remplit la fonction suivante : faire survivre les croyances même après répudiation ! faire croire encore à ceux qui ne croient plus à rien… » (Deleuze et Guattari 1972, 374)

[21] Ou de la pulsion de pouvoir qui inscrit tout principe en l'excédant, comme nous en sommes partis dans notre thèse (Jabre 2019).

[22] Pour une problématisation à nouveaux frais de la légitimité chez Derrida, on pourra se reporter à l'article de Thomas Clément Mercier *Resisting legitimacy: Weber, Derrida, and the fallibility of sovereign power*. Citons notamment ce passage : ""This simple fact is enough to threaten the very concept of legitimation to the core: it has no opposite. Nonlegitimacy can appear as such, be its signs ever so discreet, only in a process of prelegitimation' (2002d, 14). The notion that legitimacy is heterogeneous in and through the performed homo-hegemony of the dominant's 'legend' goes to complexify definitions of the State as monopolising legitimate violence. It also implies that there is no 'outside' of legitimacy. Every political situation and domination, even the most centralised in appearance, dissimulates conflicts in legitimacies and interpretations thereof." (Mercier 2016)

[23] « […] la messianicité dont je parle, comme "l'expérience de l'impossible" […], c'est cette étrange alliance de "pessimisme" et d'"optimisme" qu'on trouve, me semble-t-il, au fond de toutes les approches sérieuses et révolutionnaires de la chose publique. Et comme alors on peut aussi bien dire "optimisme" que "pessimisme", je me sers peu de ces pseudo-catégories. » (Derrida 2002, 62).

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An Intercultural Reading of Patočka's Concept of Sacrifice

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Abstract

In this paper I argue Patočka's concept of sacrifice provides a phenomenological model for understanding the experience of sacrifice, as well as for criticizing its misuse for religious or political purposes. In order to appreciate Patočka's contribution to the philosophical inquiry regarding sacrifice, it is instructive to consider his thought within an intercultural context by comparing it to the perverted form of sacrifice found among Islamic terrorists and by drawing the example of Buddhist and Japanese practices of self-sacrifice. I maintain that Patočka's concept of sacrifice shows intercultural validity without being limited to the European or Christian context. His insight not only provides an unrelenting critique of the war experience in the last century but also delivers a timely critique of the unceasing terrorist attacks nowadays.

Keywords: sacrifice, mobilization, politics, community, intercultural philosophy

1. Introduction

The notion of sacrifice has been widely discussed by French phenomenologists like Levinas, Derrida and Marion in recent decades. (Levinas 1998, Derrida 1999, Marion 2011) As a contemporary of Levinas and Derrida, Patočka has often been overshadowed by the French phenomenologists, and his concept of sacrifice has only recently been given the attention it deserves. Some interpreters tend to associate Patočka's reflections on sacrifice with his religious thought (Koci 2017a, 2017b), while others tend to emphasize the political significance of his concept of sacrifice by situating it within the context of

the First World War and aligning it with other European thinkers who address the modern technical age. (Ucnik 2007, De Warren 2013, Dodd 2017, Sternard 2017 and Tava 2018) Although it is obvious that Patočka's reflections on sacrifice are connected to various strands of thought in his writings, one should not lose sight of the core experience of sacrifice, namely "man gains by a voluntary loss" in his formulation. (Patočka 1989, 336) Patočka intends to explicate such an experience in a phenomenological way without concealing its inherent paradoxes. In this paper, I attempt to reflect on the fundamental questions concerning sacrifice, namely what does it mean to sacrifice oneself? Is Patočka's concept of sacrifice still relevant in an intercultural context, such as the widespread terrorism in recent years? In what follows, I argue Patočka's reflections could be clarified more thoroughly from political, communal and spiritual perspectives with the hope of doing justice to the multifaceted implications of his thought for the twentieth century and nowadays. I argue further that my integrated approach has the merit of showing the intercultural validity of his concept of sacrifice. Indeed, Patočka does not limit his reflections to the geographical region of Europe in the twentieth century. He mentions twice the atomic bombing of Hiroshima in 1945 in his *Heretical Essays*, but it remains unclear in what way the Hiroshima experience is supposed to enrich his reflections on war and sacrifice. (Patočka 1996, 114, 132) In my paper, I argue that the Hiroshima bombing and the subsequent struggles of the Hiroshima people help illustrate Patočka's claim that the experience of sacrifice provides a new perspective to examine the political, communal and spiritual situation of our epoch. Having said that, I do not pretend to ignore Patočka's explicit reference to Christianity when he interrogates the meaning of sacrifice. (Patočka 1989, 339) I believe his attempt to "seek the fully ripened form of demythologized Christianity", which is not the primary subject of the present paper, should be duly understood within the broader context, namely his emphasis on the spiritual dimension of human existence in the technicized age. In his last study "On Masaryk's Philosophy of Religion", Patočka explicitly claims that his investigation of the problem of meaning exceeds the framework of Christianity and

this shows his intention to understand the universal human condition. (Patočka 2015)

In what follows, I attempt to employ an integrated approach to illustrate Patočka's concept of sacrifice in five steps. Firstly, I will give a sketch of Benslama's analyses of sacrifice with a special focus on Islamic terrorism. By highlighting the perverted experience of sacrifice as in terrorism, we can better appreciate Patočka's reflections as a critique of terrorist sacrifice nowadays. Secondly, I will give a sketch of Heidegger's concept of sacrifice that inspires Patočka as well as invites him to pursue a more robust concept of sacrifice in relation to human community. Thirdly, I will show that Patočka's concept of sacrifice entails a political critique that he launches against the state's appeal to sacrifice during war times, which further prompts him to argue for a sacrifice for "nothing." Fourthly, his ideas of sacrifice provide a new moral basis for rebuilding the community from within. Fifthly, his concept of sacrifice also reveals the spiritual dimension of human existence which is entirely eclipsed by the technological age. Finally, I will prolong Patočka's reflections with reference to the Hiroshima experience by drawing inspirations from Kenzaburo Oe's *Hiroshima Notes* in order to show that Patočka's concept of sacrifice not only anchors itself in the European experience of the World Wars but also finds its intercultural validity in the testimonies of the Hiroshima people. With their sacrifice and struggle, the Hiroshima people make themselves like combatant in the war confronting the age of distress.

2. Terrorist sacrifice

In order to evaluate the contemporary relevance of Patočka's reflections on sacrifice, it is instructive to pay attention to the much-debated issue of sacrifice in the midst of the terrorist attacks in Europe nowadays. The terrorist incidents have not only aroused psychic trauma of the victims, their neighbours and the general public, but also incited intellectual debates within various disciplines, such as sociology, international politics and psychoanalysis about the causes of terrorism. (Roy 2016, Kepel 2017, Benslama 2016) It

is interesting to note that Fethi Benslama, who has conducted psychoanalytical investigation of the Islamic terrorists in France, provides an illuminating account of the psychological motivations for a perverted concept of self-sacrifice inherent in the Islamic terrorism.[1] He coins the term "Super-Muslim" (*surmusulman*) to characterize the experience of self-sacrifice that motivates the Islamic terrorists and that inflames their "furious desire to sacrifice". A "Super-Muslim" is defined by a "coercion" (*contrainte*) under which one is led to adjust oneself incessantly by the representation of an ideal Muslim. The person who suffers under the pressure of "Super-Muslim" always feels that he is being interrogated and ensnared by the fantastic idol of a perfect Muslim. In other words, the "Super-Muslim" is stripped of any freedom except to act in accordance with the demands of a perfect Muslim.

To understand the way in which Benslama's concept of "Super-Muslim" operates amongst the Islamic terrorists, it is crucial to highlight three points, which will also serve to prepare our discussions of Patočka's reflections on sacrifice. First, Benslama argues that the "Super-Muslim" involves a temporality of existence that, contrary to our everyday experience, does not point to an anticipation of possibilities that lies in the future except his death. His death leads rather to the glorious past to which every perfect Muslim should return. More precisely, the subject captured by the "Super-Muslim" is not a subject in the proper sense of that term. Instead, the subject is unceasingly embroiled into the past which is not the past he has actually lived through, but a past that has already been dictated by the Islamic ancestors. The "Super-Muslim", writes Benslama,

> is requested to identify himself with an exemplary Muslim, the Prophet and the ancestor (*Salaf*), to make their past lives into a present and his own life a past life. The imperative of the 'Super-Muslim' is not 'To become!' but 'To Return to the past!' because for him the Good has already taken place, the promise has already realized, he only has to rediscover them in the past, in waiting for the end of the world, or better: to hasten it. (Benslama 2016, 93)

The "Super-Muslim" characterizes precisely the psychic mechanism of the terrorists like the Kouachi brothers who committed the terrorist attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* offices in

Paris in 2015 while shouting "Allahu akbar". (Benslama 2016, 55) In that case, the murderers of the victims seem not to be the Kouachi brothers themselves but the holy warriors who incarnate in them. The future towards which the "Super-Muslim" leads his life is no longer an open field of possibilities; it is nothing other than a repetition of the distant past.

Second, Benslama suggests that the "Super-Muslim" seeks to unify himself with God by sacrificing his own life. What the "Super-Muslim" achieves in launching the terrorist attack is not the arousal of concern for the injustice that Muslims suffer in Europe with hope of securing justice for them in the future. Rather, the "Super-Muslim" believes that his terrorist act is itself an act of justice. In other words, the death of the terrorists in kamikaze attacks already signifies the coming of justice or of God on earth. As a result, there is no separation between the terrorists and God in the terrorists' self-sacrifice. With the union of the person and God, Benslama remarks that "[t]he self-sacrifice to which the youths are driven is a real projection of their bodies in the imaginary body of the absolute Other (*l'Autre absolu*), who is the tyranny much more terrible than the human tyrant." (Benslama 2016, 131) In this regard, the indivision between human beings and God engenders nothing other than the destructive self-sacrifice, which leads merely to death.

Third, the self-sacrifice of the terrorists reflects the anxiety over the destruction of their community. According to Benslama, the radicalization of some Muslims originates in the phantasy in which the enemy intrudes into their communities and even into their bodies. In order to maintain the purity of their own bodies and their communities, the radicalized Muslims are tempted to take violent reactions to their enemies. (Benslama 2016, 144-145) The violent confrontation has to do with the idea of an organic and pure Muslim community which has long been regarded as being in opposition to the political community of a nation-state. (Benslama 2016, 146-147) The terrorist attacks aim at rebuilding a purely Muslim community on the basis of religion rather than the modern principle of laws, the idea of laicity for example. For the terrorists, the success of the kamikaze attack lies precisely in the self-sacrifice

of the terrorists and the death of the enemies, which serves to establish the ideal community.

However, one must not understand the idea of "Super-Muslim" as belonging to any serious Islamic philosophy. Instead, it is a psychic coercion that commands certain Muslims to act under phantasies. Referring to the great theoretician of woman emancipation Tahar Haddad, Benslama reminds us that freedom in the Islamic tradition does not lie in the desire of breaking the chains of life but to remove the "petrified phantasies which surround it (freedom)". (Benslama 2016, 148-149) The "Super-Muslim" perfectly represents one of these "petrified phantasies" that turn the radicalized Muslims into self-sacrificial warriors barring them from asking the meaning and prospects of their self-sacrifice. In order to evaluate the perversion of the "Super-Muslim," it is necessary to put forward a theoretical model that clarifies the experience of sacrifice without conflating it with the phantasy of death and the ideal community. From this perspective, I argue that Patočka formulates a robust concept of sacrifice in the phenomenological manner. Before I turn to Patočka, I will give a sketch of Heidegger's reflection on sacrifice which exerts a clear influence on Patočka. However, I will demonstrate in what way Heidegger's concept of sacrifice is inadequate in avoiding the trap of "Super-Muslim." Via the detour to Heidegger, we will see more clearly that Patočka's attempt can be regarded as a way to overcome Heidegger's shortcoming and shed away the illusion of the "furious desire to sacrifice" in the "Super-Muslim".

3. Heidegger on Sacrifice

Heidegger conceives of sacrifice as a self-sacrifice that, on the one hand, discloses the most authentic relation of man to his being and, on the other, reinforces his relation with other members of the community. Although Heidegger has not thematized the concept of sacrifice in the same way as Patočka, he discusses it in various texts in relation to the phenomena of death and community. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger emphasizes the importance of sacrifice in manifesting man's most authentic way of Being-in-the-world. On Heidegger's account, being authentic is not simply to choose what one

wants, but more precisely, to recognize what one chooses to be most wanted amid the imminence of death. One thus becomes individuated, as self-irreplaceable by any others, distinguished from the loss of oneself in the undifferentiated everyday existence. For this reason, Heidegger writes that "[a]nticipation (*Vorlaufen*) discloses to existence that its uttermost possibility lies in giving oneself (*Selbstaufgabe*), and thus it shatters (*zerbricht*) all one's tenaciousness to whatever existence one has reached." (Heidegger 1962, 308; Heidegger 1967, 264)[2] In anticipating to give up (*aufgabe*) his life, he breaks with his adherence to the everyday existence and finds his existence groundless, as if he was thrown into nothingness. Later Patočka evokes almost the same idea when he highlights the possibility of human existence being shaken by death in an unprecedented scale caused by the devastative weapons in the First World War and thereafter.

Heidegger further suggests that self-sacrifice is significant for building a new community with a stronger solidarity. Through a collective engagement to sacrifice, man's death is no longer a personal issue. For Heidegger, the death of a group of men will gain a new meaning as a powerful act to take charge of the destiny of their community and their people (*Volk*). Heidegger writes a cryptic paragraph in *Being and Time* to emphasize the necessity to fight for freedom by alluding to sacrifice.

> Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing (*geschehen*) of Dasein. (Heidegger 1962, 436; Heidegger 1967, 384)

In the context of post-war Germany, it is not at all unexpected for the German readers to understand immediately Heidegger's allusion to the self-sacrifice of veterans in the First World War. In using the terms *Mitteilung* (notice) and *Kampf* (combat), one might suspect that Heidegger is deliberately evoking the war experience of the Germans, including the death notification sent to the families of the soldiers and the prevalent talk of preparation for death in the frontline as well as in the home front.[3] Heidegger's remark on sacrifice in his lectures on *Germania* in 1934 and 1935 can be regarded as a further explication of the above idea. He claims that the

comradeship of the soldiers on the frontline "lies in the fact that the nearness of death as a sacrifice (*Opfer*) placed everyone in advance into the same nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*), so that the latter became the source of an unconditional belonging to one another." (Heidegger 2014, 66; Heidegger 1999, 73) It is through the confrontation with nothingness that a common destiny befalls the soldiers putting them under an anxious anticipation of the unpredictable and perilous future. In this regard, death not only individuates each soldier, but also renders them reunited to each other forming a community in struggle. In other words, the sacrifice in wars reveals a deeper and closer relation between men which is absent in the ordinary social experience. That potential comradeship appears only in the collective sacrifice and hence escapes any organization, manipulation or calculation in advance. (Heidegger 2005, 236) In this context, it seems that Heidegger's concern about comradeship is only applicable to the soldiers fighting in the name of the same nation. It remains doubtful whether Heidegger's concept of sacrifice extends to include the possibility of solidarity among the soldiers across the frontline and even human beings across the national borders.[4] One could say that Heidegger's delineation of sacrifice is so narrow that it cannot evade the problem of the "Super-Muslim" for in the latter case it is precisely the terrorists' fascination with death that makes them united together, including their predecessors and their successors. Therefore, it is necessary to inquire into the meaning of sacrifice more in detail and raise the question whether a collective anticipation of death is adequate to strengthen the solidarity among human beings without any vision on the community to come. It is my opinion that what the "Super-Muslim" and Heidegger's concept of sacrifice lack in common is precisely a robust reflection on the dynamic relations between sacrifice and community, which Patočka does not hesitate to pursue in his writings.

4. Sacrifice as a political critique

In this section, I attempt to show that Patočka elaborates his concept of sacrifice in relation to his political critique, namely a critique of the "total mobilization" that

reaches its climax in the two World Wars and continues in the post-war era.[5] He claims that under total mobilization, all human beings as well as natural life are deployed to serve the war and so manipulated by the governments' political, social and economic planning. Patočka claims that

> It was this war that demonstrated that the transformation of the world into a laboratory for releasing reserves of energy accumulated over billions of years can be achieved only by means of wars. (Patočka 1996, 124)

In consequence, men are sacrificed in return for the forces that strengthen the power of the states and this in turn eradicates the possibility of genuine sacrifice among human beings. The force that manipulates the world is like a bulldozer which flattens everything on the earth by destroying all the disparities. (Patočka 1990, 344) On the contrary, an act of self-sacrifice would counter such a flattening, for it is an act freely taken by the subject to renounce any assignment imposed to him. In this regard, Patočka's concept of sacrifice can better clarify the experience in question in distinction from its perverted form precisely because he puts into doubt the so-called act of sacrifice that serves a certain purpose, be it religious or political or both.

Almost from the beginning of his philosophical thinking, Patočka paid attention to the manifestation of human freedom in the form of negative experience. As early as in "Life in Balance and life in Amplitude" in 1939, Patočka highlighted the importance of suffering in pursuing the meaning of life. In this short text, he contrasts between two attitudes towards living, namely a life lived in balance and a life lived in amplitude. Living in balance is to arrange one's life in view of practical success and seek satisfaction from within. On the contrary, living in amplitude is to break with the hedonism inherent in the life in balance. Therein one becomes aware not only of "physical pain, misery, oppression, guilt and death" but also of his pursuit of higher value that calls him to suffer thus bringing his life out of balance. (Patočka 2007b, 39) For Patočka, the suffering is revelatory to human beings in a twofold manner. On the one hand, it reveals man's "inner boundary" and the depth of his life which cannot be touched by

hedonist successes and failures. As long as man is willing to suffer the unsurpassable finitude of his existence in longing for good and justice, his suffering outweighs his desire for security and a life in balance. On the other hand, life in amplitude means struggling to live for meaning and even to stand on the boundary of life and death without retreating to the life in balance or believing in the compensation beyond the boundary. As Patočka says, "living in amplitude means a test of oneself and a protest." (Patočka 2007b, 39) It requires man to resist seeking comfort in life and to protest against mundane gratification without resorting to any "paradise" or otherworldly consolation. In the eyes of Patočka, Socrates is the cardinal example of life in amplitude, for Socrates sacrifices his life not in exchange for anything but to manifest his freedom of practicing philosophy even against the *polis* at the risk of his life. His sacrifice is nothing but a protest against the illusion of a prosperous life enjoyed by the Athenians showing that life in amplitude is the way to freedom.[6] Patočka's description of the life in amplitude in relation to the shattering of the seemingly balanced life is worth citing.

> He, who takes such a possibility upon himself, is free in a profound sense, He frees himself of the mere seeming that nails us to deep weakness, to futile hopes. The awoken freedom revealed what seemed to be as seeming and in accepting the danger acquired only now its full safety, acquired for Man a life out of his own roots, out of his own foundation. Because in this, in the struggle for freedom, in the struggle with himself, Man took possession of himself, of the deepest that he has in himself or that he is able to reach. In this spark this new life appears to him. (Patočka 2007b, 40)

The life in amplitude constitutes a subject who cannot gain autonomy without dispossessing oneself. Such a subject is uprooted from the familiarity with the world and the dispossession lets one hang on nothing except oneself. This provides the first sketch of the experience of sacrifice before his later elaboration of the concept.

Only after the Second World War, Patočka attempts to associate the term sacrifice with the political situation of Europe in launching his political critique. In his "Ideology and Life in Idea" in 1946, Patočka writes, not without bearing the horrible memories of the war in mind, that "the resolution to

win was not less and demands on the *sacrifice* of the individual for the society were almost unlimited." (Patočka 2007b, 40)[7] In this text, he elaborates two dimensions of the phenomenon of sacrifice, denoted by the Czech term *oběť*, which were monstrously demonstrated by the two World Wars, namely human beings as sacrificial victims of the war and human beings as self-sacrificing war heroes.[8] On the one hand, the World Wars embody an ideology that summons people to sacrifice their lives for their nations and thus turns men into sacrificial victims of the powerful nations. The need to sacrifice forces innumerable men to be enlisted for the war and their deaths at the front were then glorified by the State. The war heroes in the "mass graves" are indeed nothing other than the victims of belligerent politics. Even at the home front, "shortages, hunger and epidemics" become widespread during the war and in consequence incalculable number of civilians were sacrificed. Patočka denounces the terror of war ideology as a form of dehumanization when he writes that "[w]e all experienced and are experiencing how far man is in our world a mere object of forces that extend beyond him." (Patočka 2007a, 95) For man is regarded as a disposable object by the war ideology, the so-called sacrifice or "die for their country" (*mort pour la patrie*) contributes more to the accumulation of forces than the dignity of a combatant dead or alive. In addition, the war ideology not only objectifies man but also arouses the "irrational impulses of xenophobia and racial and national origin." (Patočka 2007a, 92) The tides of racism and nationalism originate, theoretically speaking, in man's identification with a collective unity that differentiates itself from others and claims its superiority over them. Man must put aside his individuality in order to merge with the seeming unity of racial or national collectivity. However, Patočka insists that the dissolution of an individual into a whole reflects precisely a "false collectivism" (Patočka 2007a, 91) because it deprives of his freedom of individuating oneself from the collectivity and the economic, nationalistic or military forces that mobilize him for certain purposes. Patočka argues that a man cannot be said to be free if he is unable to put into question his identification with a collectivity at any moment and take the responsibility of

acting like an individual, i.e. recognizing the fact that his actions are nothing collective but his individual choice.

On the other hand, Patočka suggests that in reality human beings do not cease to experience their "resoluteness" to act amid the menace of death that comes from every aspect of life. Massive fleeing and unremitting resistance during the wars show that man is capable of individuating oneself from any collective identities to manifest his individuality. Interestingly enough, the extreme brutality of the two World Wars not only exposes the fragility of human beings but also their unrelenting resoluteness in combat as well as survival. For Patočka, this makes the wars somehow "meaningful" to man in the way that they push man to the limit of survival and reveal the "inner core" (Patočka 2007a, 95) of human existence of which neither an ideology nor a person can deprive. In standing at the limit of life, man discovers the fact that what lies in his "inner core" is never any collective identity or ideology but freedom as such. Patočka conceives of freedom less as a subjective capacity to choose than a fundamental possibility of self-comprehension that hinges on the disengagement of man's concern for any external objects. By withdrawing from his engagement in any objects, a man can no longer be influenced by any ideology or forces that intervene in his dealings with objects. In Patočka's terms, man then breaks with "such a force, controllable from without as well as from within." (Patočka 2007a, 93) The resoluteness of man reveals to him the most unshakable principle of his being, i.e. freedom, which escapes any seizure by ideology and indeed elevates his life to the height of the Idea. The Idea is not anything sensible or objectifiable but that which turns a man's regard away from his concern for satisfaction and towards that which is in principle un-accomplishable, beyond any hope of satisfaction.

Therefore, it is no coincidence that Patočka emphasizes for the first time in "Ideology and Life in Idea" that sacrifice is the very act that manifests the freedom of human beings.[9] Such kind of freedom is simultaneously a loss and a gain. Loss because his life is exposed to risks, gain because he amplifies his life by surpassing his egoism and elevating his life in pursuit of the Idea. Patočka emphasizes so much the

importance of living according to the Idea as he remarks in the following.

> [T]o the logic of the Idea belongs the consciousness of the responsible, in that they do not want privileges for themselves; to the logic of the Idea belongs the inner significance of the highest sacrifice; the fact that what is a sheer loss from an external viewpoint, can be inner fulfilment (regardless of all external purposes ……). (Patočka 2007a, 94)

It is important to note that for Patočka living up to the Idea does not lead to man's unification with it as in the case of the "Super-Muslim" in which the radicalized Muslims intend to unite with God via his sacrifice. Patočka even rejects the use of violence against others to "realize" the Idea, for it is contradictory for a man to give up his egoism and to subject the other under his will. (Patočka 2007a, 94)

In his "Seminar on the Technical Era" in 1973, Patočka arrives at a more specific definition of sacrifice which shows his novel thinking on the topic.

> A person who sacrifices himself, must go to the end. He is 'abandoned' precisely so that there is nothing (*rien*), nothing (*aucune chose*) to which he can still cling to. (Patočka 1990, 311)

For Patočka, the person who sacrifices oneself must hold on to nothing, i.e. nothing substantial like God or a certain nation. Even if the sacrifices intends for peace or justice, one must not regard this act as the means to actualize the Idea of justice itself. For that would turn the act of sacrifice into a reification of the Idea which is precisely what makes the terrorist pathological from Benslama's perspective. Yet, Patočka is not claiming that one sacrifices oneself arbitrarily. What he suggests is that one must not take one's sacrifice as a means to achieve an end, even if the end is noble enough to be proclaimed in front of others publicly. In the eyes of Patočka, the experience of sacrifice indicates that nothing other than the act of renouncing one's dependence on oneself could constitute the being of the person who sacrifices oneself. Such an idea of sacrifice cannot but be a negative experience that it does not produce or accomplish anything other than the carrying out of the act itself.

Patočka's concept of sacrifice as a political critique becomes more developed in his later texts such as *Heretical Essays*. In the Sixth Essay of his *Heretical Essays*, Patočka reiterates what he means by sacrifice must be distinguished from the sacrifice that is summoned by the State. The meaning of the sacrifice promoted by the state is merely relative, i.e. dependent upon the way the State mobilizes the sacrificial victims. For the state wants to maintain "peace" by mobilizing people to enter wars; the people who are sacrificed are then commemorated as heroes. In this way, peace is pursued by means of war and in fact becomes the reason for starting wars. Patočka criticizes the relative sacrifice as nothing other than a justification for the continuation of more wars. On the contrary, what Patočka draws our attention to is the absolute sacrifice, which he believes enables us to think about peace. Unlike the relative sacrifice which aims at acquiring certain territories, resources, power, etc., the absolute sacrifice is precisely a sacrifice that does not aim at acquiring anything. Rather, it involves a radical rupture with the logic of acquisition by confronting face to face the finitude of human beings. The man who sacrifices himself realizes fully that "something is not the means to anything else, a stepping stone to…, but rather something above and beyond which there can be nothing". (Patočka 1996, 130) The meaning of absolute sacrifice is not about the augmentation of force but the recognition of human finitude, of which no projects of the State can dispose. Such a self-understanding is important for it puts into doubt any political propaganda of the states that pretends to maintain peace by mobilizing their people to war. For the veterans, if the State continues to vaunt their contribution to peace, it could bring about a double misrecognition of the war experience. On the one hand, the state would misconstrue the frontline experience (*Fronterlebnis*) as a collective and heroic one while neglecting the individual confrontation of death that the veterans still suffer even after their demobilization. On the other hand, the state would overstate the meaning of combat among the veterans who have indeed suffered from "struggle and death" (Patočka 1996, 131), unpredictability and meaninglessness to the extreme on the frontline. The political

propaganda about war can never render justice to the war experience. As J. Glenn Gray writes in his memoir almost 15 years after his military service in the Second World War, "[t]he deepest dear of my war years, one still with me, is that these happenings had no real purpose." (Gray 1998, 24) The glorification of the war heroes would serve nothing other than covering up the meaninglessness of the war and even tend to embellish the belligerent politics. In order to break with the political propaganda about wars, Patočka emphasizes the consciousness of the night that disrupts the consciousness of the day which aims at attaining peace by planned mobilization. On the contrary, the consciousness of the night implies an understanding of "the cosmic and the universal" (Patočka 1996, 130) via the absolute sacrifice such that that the man who sacrifices himself no longer regards himself as an autonomous subject who exchanges his life for something else but rather as a passive subject who lets his life encounter the uncertainty that overwhelms his own will. This entails an awareness that the absolute sacrifice alone can put an end to "the transformation of the world into a laboratory for releasing reserves of energy". (Patočka 1996, 124) That means to say, the absolute sacrifice breaks with the logic of instrumentalization and calculation by restoring the uncontrollability and unpredictability into our understanding of the world. The consciousness of the night renounces to submit oneself under the order of power and energy that the deployment of war presupposes and strengthens. In such an experience, man confronts his finitude without evading it and even lets his finitude to expose to its limit without receding into self-preservation. In this regard, the absolute sacrifice as a sacrifice for nothing does not aim at attaining anything that the consciousness of the day would establish. On the contrary, it embodies the consciousness of the night that reminds human beings of that which remains uncontrollable and restless at the limit of human existence. As a result, the experience of sacrifice restores the proper relation between human beings and the world such that the man recognizes that his dignity lies in something beyond subsistence.

5. Sacrifice as a communal renewal

In this section, I attempt to show that Patočka's concept of sacrifice also involves the renewal of communal relations. He argues that although sacrifice aims at nothing, it embodies a new form of interhuman relations that remain curbed in the community under the total mobilization. Through this new form of solidarity, we will see more clearly in what way Patočka's thinking departs from Heidegger's concept of sacrifice and the "Super-Muslim".

In the Sixth Essay of his *Heretical Essays*, Patočka suggests that sacrifice "presents itself as the authentic transindividuality." (Patočka 1996, 131) I suggest understanding the term "authentic transindividuality" as a new form of communal relation that sacrifice aims at fostering between the person who sacrifices and his witnesses. Always under Heidegger's influence, Patočka conceives the everyday life as an anonymous existence in which man believes the world has been revealed in its fullness without any remaining mystery unknown to human beings. (Patočka 1996, 114.) Patočka is not making an anti-rationalist claim that the world is beyond the grasp of any rationality and that the scientific rationality must be rejected. What he actually suggests is that the experience of sacrifice discloses what the everyday life dominated by an instrumental rationality hides. That which remains uninstrumentalisable, proper to the being of human beings, is the act of bearing self-responsibility, i.e. not subjugating oneself to any ends. Patočka's notion of self-responsibility deserves a longer treatment which I cannot pursue in this context. It is important to emphasize that his concept of sacrifice should be understood in relation to his concept of self-responsibility. For Patočka, it is the calling of being responsible for oneself that motivates one to sacrifice and that calling remains ungraspable by the instrumental rationality. In the everyday existence in which human beings are frequently enslaved by work and everything is being regarded as a means to an end, man finds himself replaceable by others for everyone accepts the meanings that are given to him, such as socio-political organizations, values, traditions, etc. that pass through the previous generations and come down

to him. (Patočka 1996, 99) Once man puts into doubt the meanings given to him, he no longer merely accepts them without asking for their justification and he starts to find himself singularized from others through such questioning. As long as he realizes that he does not belong to the order of means and ends, it seems like he is being summoned to respond to his being, i.e. a free being. In this regard, he finds himself the unique person in being responsible for himself. That means to say, either he takes up the self-responsibility or evades it with a clear consciousness of what he denies. Patočka's self-responsibility is meant to describe giving responses to one's being, just as its German adjective form *Verantwortlich* suggests, being accountable to one's being, irreplaceable by any others. An action to self-sacrifice is a self-responsible action precisely because the actor is the only person accountable for his act. The self-sacrificial act does not obey any given orders but rather disobeys them. Therefore, it might disrupt any socio-political planning and others' expectations that affect him. The famous example that Patočka must have had in mind, though for some reason he never directly mentioned him, is Jan Palach. Palach immolated himself protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1969. At first glance, it seems he has chosen to die alone without anyone else performing the same action. Such an immolation is by no means an act-in-concert (*Zusammenhandeln*) which, as Arendt suggests, constitutes the power of a political action. It is necessary therefore to inquire into the question in what sense the act of sacrifice involves a new type of interhuman relation.

Patočka's concept of "solidarity of the shaken" is meant to describe the interhuman relation embodied by the act of sacrifice. The solidarity of the shaken is not a solidarity that is built upon any nation, people (*Volk*) or group interests but rather a solidarity that originates in the people who share the experience of being shaken to death notable in the times of war. The experience of being shaken enables man to understand that he becomes free in the most profound sense of the word as long as he breaks with the order of force and refuses to be mobilized. In the case of Jan Palach, his immolation is certainly not an act-in-concert, but his self-sacrifice expresses his refusal to live

under the Russian occupation. More importantly, his action is not instrumental at all, by which I mean he did not believe his self-sacrifice would bring about a complete reversal of the occupation given the fact that the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was the largest military action since the Second World War. In reality, one of his last letters reveals the motivation of his self-sacrifice as follows: Given the fact that our nations are on the verge of desperation and resignation, we have decided to express our protest and stir the sleeping conscience of the nation.[10]

What he does hope is to make everyone understand the urgency of the Russian occupation through his death and to prompt their actions. Nevertheless, even if his self-sacrifice did not succeed in ending the Russian occupation (in fact it did not, and it was all too naive to believe it would in 1969), the meaning of his self-immolation remains the same. In other words, success or failure, glory or shame are irrelevant criteria of evaluating the sacrifice. Rather, the meaning of sacrifice is manifest in shouldering the self-responsibility in the midst of external menace. Jan Palach's self-sacrifice makes him fully accountable to himself in rejecting to live with "desperation and resignation." He sacrifices himself not in order to overturn the Russian occupation but to remain self-responsible, for he no longer wants to deceive himself into thinking that he could tolerate the communist domination and the cynicism of silence that some of his Czech fellows had.[11] Jan Palach's funeral was attended by tens of thousands of Czech people, and his commemoration has lasted until the present day. Through his commemoration, a community is formed to mourn his death and reinforce the common will among the participants to stop military aggression. We can say that the self-sacrifice of Jan Palach, though remaining an individual act, fuels a form of the solidarity of the shaken because his death makes people gather together with the awareness of the threat of war and the utmost self-responsibility. In my opinion, Jan Palach's self-sacrifice is different from the sacrifice of the patriotic soldiers in the eyes of Heidegger or terrorists in the guise of the "Super-Muslim" insofar as Jan Palach by no means believes his self-sacrifice is the more appropriate way to overthrow the Russian

occupation. The dissidents of the Charter 77, though with different aims, form a community similar to the one that mourned for Jan Palach in 1969. They rejected the self-deception that the Czech Communist government promoted and protested against the violation of human rights in 1977. The dissidents take the responsibility in requesting that the government protects civil rights by risking the security of their livelihood and the prospects of their families. Although the causes of action for Jan Palach and the dissidents are different, what they share in common is the sense of self-responsibility at the risk of dispossession. No matter how high the price they must pay, every risk of loss puts their conviction to the test and makes them aware that they are irreplaceable in shouldering their self-responsibility.

> The responsible human as such, writes Patočka, is *I*; it is an individual that is not identical with any role it could possibly assume…… it is a responsible I because in the confrontation with death and in coming to terms with nothingness it takes upon itself what we all must carry out in ourselves, where no one can take our place. (Patočka 1996, 107)

Here, I take Patočka to mean that self-responsibility lies at the very heart of sacrifice. So-called self-responsibility does not foreclose its invitation for others to respond to their own voices. The solidarity of the shaken precisely refers to the voluntary association of the responsible individuals. It does not lead to a formation of any states or political parties but rather a community in which individuals voluntarily come together to protest against the order of forces, the national, the political or the religious etc. As Patočka remarks, "[t]he solidarity of the shaken can say 'no' to the measures of mobilization which make the state of war permanent." (Patočka 1996, 135) That is a community that refrains from acting in favour of any particular interests shared by a group of people, a race, a class, or a nation. In this way, that is also a community that can extend its boundaries across national, racial and class antagonisms to include everyone. However, one should note that such a solidarity is fragile. The solidarity of such a community can be undermined as long as its members become less and less devoted to sacrificing themselves amid the risks. In order to

evade the risks, a withdrawal into the egoistic life could take place, which weakens the intention to associate with each other. In the post-war years, the glorification of war heroes seems to build up a form of solidarity among patriotic nationals but, from Patočka's point of view, it actually covers up the human finitude by mythologizing the national solidarity. Patočka's novel concept of solidarity of the shaken launches a critique of these patriotisms by putting self-responsibility at the basis of social solidarity.

In his "Supplement" to the early work *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem* published in 1970, Patočka further elaborates the importance of devotion as an effort to renew a community, which seems to me essential to understanding the solidarity of the shaken. (Patočka 2016, 115-180) Although Patočka never uses the term sacrifice in his "Supplement", what he describes as the life in devotion is nothing other than sacrifice. From his perspective, life in devotion is a "life in self-surrender, life outside oneself, not a mere solidarity of interests but a total reversal of interest." (Patočka 2016, 178) Having his theory of the movement of existence in mind, he claims that the experience of devotion belongs to the third movement of existence, i.e. the movement of breakthrough. It suffices here to give a brief sketch of his theory of movement of existence that shows the existential-ontological foundation of the experience of sacrifice. With the first movement of existence known as anchoring, man anchors himself in the world by being accepted by the society since his birth, especially by his family, neighbours, friends, etc. The movement of anchoring is characterized by a lack of self-consciousness that man inevitably has conflicts with others in the world and can individualize himself from the society. With the second movement of existence known as self-extension, man finds himself situated in the world of instruments fabricated by human beings. He is absorbed by the world with the production in which struggles and conflicts are unavoidable. On the contrary, the movement of breakthrough radically breaks with the other two movements of existence in the way that for the first time man puts into doubt the "peace" that he enjoys with the community that accepts him and becomes aware of the

"night" of his existence, i.e. the unpredictability of his future and the groundlessness of his existence. (Patočka 1996, 74) In the life in devotion, man becomes aware of the fact that he cannot survive without the society that accepts him and he cannot avoid all those instrumental relations and conflicts of interests in a society. The movement of breakthrough motivates him to rise above the bondage to life in the movement of anchoring and the social antagonisms in the movement of self-extension by giving up himself and living outside himself, not obeying the divine command but listening to his determination to devote himself to a new form of community different from acceptance and antagonisms. Such a community with the devoted individuals would foster a new kind of solidarity surpassing the natural happiness resulted from the movement of anchoring and the endless conflict of private interests resulted from the movement of self-extension. That points to a community to come which does not enclose itself in the satisfaction of life and the expansion of production, but rather remains open to building stronger communal relations among its members. Patočka's describes the new form of community as one without domination and unification by a transcendent unity, be it a religious or national identity.

> It (devotion) thus begets a community of those who understand each other in surrender and devotion, and, through the negation of separate centers, cement a fellowship of dedication, a fellowship in devoted service, which transcends every individual. (Patočka 2016, 179)

Although Patočka mentions God a few times in this context, he by no means confines the community of devoted individuals to the fellowship of Christians. Regarding the character of such a community, he says that "there is nothing 'mystical' about it." (Patočka 2016, 180) It is not an unquestioned existing society but a community to establish through the devotion of its members in the future.

In short, Patočka's use of the expression "authentic transinividuality", which I mentioned above indicates a community of individuals with their dedication to others. Sacrifice is not an individual engagement cut off from the community but an act that invites others to take up the self-

responsibility and dedicate oneself to building a new community, a community to come. Seen in this way, Jan Palach represents what Patočka suggests "[l]ife given in dedication is, in a certain sense, everlasting." (Patočka 2016, 179) What makes a communal life everlasting is nothing other than the endless devotion of its members.

6. Sacrifice as spiritual authority

In this section, I will elaborate Patočka's concept of sacrifice as a spiritual dimension of human existence. He claims in his *Heretical Essays* that the solidarity of the shaken "can and must create a spiritual authority, become a spiritual power that could drive the warring world to some restraint, rendering some acts and measures impossible." (Patočka 1996, 135) One might ask why it is necessary to have certain spiritual authority or power in contemporary society. Does the term "spiritual" indicate any religious dimension of human existence? Some scholars like Jean-Luc Marion and Martin Koci try to give an affirmative answer to the above question. In what follows, I argue Patočka's use of sacrifice expresses a more general concern for the "spiritual foundation" of contemporary humanity.

First, Patočka recognizes the religious origin of sacrifice, but he does not agree to confine the concept of sacrifice to its religious (or Christian) meaning. This point can be seen in his Varna Lecture in 1973. (Patočka 2015a, 20) He suggests that the concept of sacrifice can be demonstrated in a new way, different from the traditional theological way, in order to remedy the "spiritual crisis" of contemporary humanity. Neither naturalism nor socialism has provided satisfactory solutions to the spiritual crisis, for both currents of thought have never confronted the meaning of technology and human existence as radically as phenomenology. For Patočka, the "spiritual crisis" refers to the domination of technological thinking that results in a "draining away of meaning" in Husserl's diagnosis and the "enframing" (*Gestell*) in Heidegger's analysis. What is crucial is to give a new spiritual foundation to technological thinking via the experience of sacrifice without simply returning to the religious origin of sacrifice. Patočka gives so much importance to sacrifice because "sacrifices represent a

persistent presence of something that does not appear in the calculations of the technological world". (Patočka 2015a, 20) Sacrifice is nothing but a break with the ordering of beings (*Seiendes*) making us aware of the singularity of human beings and the truth of being (*Sein*). One can say that Patočka employs the idea of sacrifice to give an alternative answer to Heidegger's persistent questioning of the meaning of being (*Sein*).

Second, although Patočka claims that sacrifice marks the singularity of Christianity, he does refer to other exemplary figures of sacrifice such as Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his "Seminar on the Technical Era" in 1973. (Patočka 1990, 321) Sakharov publicly opposed the Soviet Union's (and the United States') "antiballistic missile defence" and called for a halt to the arms race in 1960s. Solzhenitsyn revealed Lenin's and Stalin's oppression of prisoners in *Gulags* (known as internal exile) in his novels such as *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and *The Gulag Archipelago* in the 1960s, which earned him international fame as well as expulsion from Russia. Both dissidents decide to break with the technological thinking that takes everything as a means to an end by being truthful to themselves. Being self-responsible does not prevent them from being persecuted by the Soviet regime. Despite the fact that Sakharov is not religious and Solzhenitsyn is religious, Patočka believes that the scientist and the writer manifest the same "freedom of the undaunted" (Patočka 1996, 39) in sacrificing their comfort and protesting against the regime's manipulation of human beings.

Third, Patočka argues that what motivates the dissidents' actions is their "spiritual" personality rather than their religious faith. In his "The Spiritual Person and the Intellectual" in 1975, Patočka characterizes the "spiritual person" as a person who understands the meaning of sacrifice and is capable of sacrificing oneself.

> The spiritual person who is capable of sacrifice, who is capable of seeing its significance and meaning… The spiritual person is not of course a politician and is not political in the usual sense of this word… but he is political in yet a different way, obviously, and he cannot be apolitical because this *non-self-evident nature of reality* is precisely what he throws into the face of this society and of everything that he finds around himself. (Patočka 2007c, 63)

The spiritual person constantly problematizes the self-evidence of reality, just as Sakharov puts into doubt the technical progress of military armament that threatens the survival of humanity and Solzhenitsyn exposes the inhuman acts that the Russian communist government has committed in the name of emancipation of human beings. One might also think of the self-immolation of Buddhist monks in protest to the Vietnam War in the 1960s. When the Buddhist nun Nhat Chi Mai set herself on fire in Saigon in 1967, she put two statues in front of her, those of the Virgin Mary and Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva, with the intention to call for solidarity of different believers to fight for peace. (Chân Không 2007, 103) The meaning of her sacrifice is not to plead for an immediate unification of the Buddhists and the Christians, or North and South Vietnam but to show her rectitude in refusing to live under hate and violence. (Chân Không 2007, 106) From Patočka's perspective, she is certainly a spiritual person, though she is trained to be a Buddhist nun, for she understands the meaning of sacrifice and is capable of doing it. Patočka further suggests that a spiritual person is inherently political without the need of holding any particular stance in politics, like being a communist or liberal, republican or democrat. This is because he would always call into question what we have taken for granted in politics by refusing to regard politics as the servant of economy, security, and State power. We can see Patočka's concept of the political entails a critique of technological thinking in politics and a critique of politicians as technocrats, which later inspires Vaclav Havel's famous formulation of "anti-political politics." (Havel 1984).

7. Intercultural validity

In the last section, I attempt to extend Patočka's thinking of sacrifice to the experiences of non-European cultures, and I hope to demonstrate Patočka's concept of sacrifice retains its intercultural validity beyond the Christian context. Patočka mentions Hiroshima two times in his *Heretical Essays* highlighting it as a kind of frontline experience but he has not given an illustration of how the Hiroshima experience

can shed light on the solidarity of the shaken. (Patočka 1996, 114, 132) I suggest understanding the Hiroshima experience with the help of Oe Kenzaburo (大江健三郎) 's investigation conducted in Hiroshima and published in his *Hiroshima Notes* in 1965 in order to appreciate the intercultural validity of Patočka's thought.

Both Patočka and Oe emphasize the war experience of Hiroshima from the perspective of the sacrificial victims. As Patočka remarks, the Second World War represents a limitless enlargement of the frontline experience in the First World War such that the aerial and atomic bombing widely deployed in the Second World War "eliminated the distinction between the front line and the home front." (Patočka 1996, 132) Although the Hiroshima people did not choose to enlist in the War, they were sacrificed in the America's bombing which had been provoked by the Japanese attack. As a result, all the Hiroshima people become the sacrificial victims of the War. According to Oe's report, the spectre of death still haunts the inhabitants of Hiroshima even 18 years (in 1963) after the atomic bomb explosion. The deadly destruction caused by the atomic bomb not only resulted in more than 100,000 immediate deaths, but also numerous disfigured bodies, incurable diseases and enormous pollution of water and land. The continuous confrontation with suffering, physical and mental illness and death leaves the frontline experience to the Japanese long after the war stopped in 1945. Oe remarks that numerous women in Hiroshima have suffered from anxiety and shame after the bombing because the pregnant women worried about the health condition of their babies and the young women having atomic bomb disease were regarded as bringing bad luck to their future husbands. For these reasons, suicide among women in Hiroshima is not rare. Yet, the people of Hiroshima did not cease to resist the temptation to suicide brought by the frontline experience in Hiroshima. They acquired a specific attitude towards death which, absent in other regions of Japan, represents a moral struggle against the imminence of misfortune and death. As Oe notes, "I regain courage when I encounter the thoroughly and fundamentally human sense of morality in the Hiroshima people 'who do not kill themselves in

spite of their misery.'" (Oe 1995, 84) Their survival involves a constant confrontation of death, which pushes their existence beyond the movement of anchoring and self-extension.

The frontline experience in Hiroshima renders the Hiroshima people "unsurrendered" rejecting the destiny of sacrificial victims. The spectre of death pushes them to sacrifice themselves in order to defend human dignity. Without any previous experience in curing the atomic bomb disease, the Hiroshima doctors worked days and nights trying many different methods to help alleviate the pain of the victims. The sacrifice of the doctors in Hiroshima is not celebrated by their success but their tireless struggle against the "enemies" (i.e. the diseases caused by the atomic bomb) and their "dedication" to the sacrificial victims of the war. Oe's appraisal of the "undaunted" doctors demonstrates precisely that it is not the inherent goodness in the human nature that can save humanity from evil but the undaunted struggle itself that motivates man's self-sacrifice and leaves the future open to drastic unpredictability. In Patočka's terms, it is the movement of breakthrough that prompts human beings to confront the limit of their existence and calls them to take up their self-responsibility. Oe's observation of the Japanese doctors in the following looks alike the frontline experience of the soldiers in the First World War that make them aware of their finitude.

> Even now, writes Oe, there is no evidence that the human goodness which served the hapless victims has gained the upper hand over the human evil which produced the atomic bombs. People who believe, however, that in this world human order and harmony eventually recover from extremity, will perhaps take courage from the twenty-year struggle of the Hiroshima doctors – even though it cannot yet be said that they have won the battle. (Oe 1995, 132)

The strong anti-nuclear mobilization in the period of Oe's visit to Hiroshima in the 1960s embodies a community built upon the solidarity of the shaken. From a global point of view, the frontline produced by the atomic bombing not only divides the world between the Japanese and the Americans during the Second World War but also between those who take seriously the nuclear threat to humanity and those who employ the nuclear technology to strengthen the force of the State. Oe remarks that the people of Hiroshima dare to speak out about

the atomic bomb to other parts of the world in spite of the miseries and the shame of their defeat in the Second World War. Their witness to the history of the war from the perspective of the sacrificial victims puts into question the glorification of the veterans by the State.

> People who continue to live in Hiroshima, instead of keeping silent or forgetting about the extreme tragedy of human history, are trying to speak about it, study it, and record it. (…) The people who stick by the city are the only ones with a right to forget it and keep silent about it; but they are the very ones who choose to discuss, study and record it energetically. (Oe 1995, 112)

Anti-nuclear mobilization is built upon the solidarity of the people who truly understand the risk of nuclear energy and are willing to "say no" to the planning of more nuclear power plants by the Japanese state. Although the anti-nuclear community exerts certain political pressure in Japan in raising concerns for the use of nuclear power, the underlying solidarity points to something more than the aggregation of interests, namely anti-nuclear power. That is a solidarity inseparable from the lived-through experience of the atomic bombing in the memories as well as in the bodies of the survivors in Hiroshima. More precisely, it is the traumatic experience that interrogates the subjects making them aware of the imminence of total destruction and thereby propelling them to request a suspension of power that has already been exerted upon them by economic and political decisions. Such a solidarity in its nature does not aim at conquering more and more power and even competing with the State, but rather aims at expressing their non-integration with the State and their refusal to the technological and political manipulation of life. Oe believes that the Hiroshima experience should be made known to the whole world as it shows the Hiroshima people confront with death in an "undaunted" manner. In my opinion, this long struggle of the Hiroshima people reflects precisely their interruption with the ordinary life, i.e. the movement of breakthrough in Patočka's terms. Through this interruption, they rework the solidarity of the community from within without being integrated into the any political parties or the State.

8. Conclusion

I conclude by recapitulating my main arguments. I hope to have shown Patočka's concept of sacrifice provides a critique of the pseudo-sacrifice manifest in the "Super-Muslim" because his formulation "sacrifice for nothing" avoids objectifying the goal of sacrifice. In passing from Benslama's discussions of the "Super-Muslim" to Heidegger, I do not pretend to claim that the Heidegger's concept of sacrifice has the same problem as the "Super-Muslim". What I want to point out is that Heidegger, as an innovative thinker who formulates the idea of sacrifice in the phenomenological manner, cannot provide a theoretical model in rethinking the relation between the person who sacrifices and others who witness. The common destiny of a people resulted from their collective act of sacrifice in Heidegger's view becomes precisely what is problematic in Patočka's view. One can suspect that Patočka is well aware of the insufficiency in Heidegger's thinking of sacrifice due to the fact that Patočka is much more critical of the problem of nationalism and racism than Heidegger in the times of war. Patočka agrees with Heidegger that sacrifice reflects a form of freedom to get rid of the bondage of life thus turning the subject into a self-abandoning subject. However, what Heidegger has not thought through is precisely the question in what way the experience of sacrifice can fundamentally refashion the communal relations of a given society. For this reason, Patočka looks for an alternative theory that enables us to critique the State's mobilization of the sacrificial victims and that contributes to thinking about new communal relations and spiritual dimension of contemporary humanity.

Drawing on Oe's studies of the aftereffect of the Hiroshima bombing, I argue that Patočka's concept of sacrifice is not confined to the European or Christian context. In Oe's view, the dignity of human beings cannot be manifest without the determination to combat under the shadow of death and this is essential to the experience of sacrifice in the frontline experience of the Hiroshima people. My view is that Patočka's formulation "sacrifice for nothing" is apt in capturing the experience of sacrifice in a non-religious manner that is present in different cultures. In sacrificing oneself for nothing, the

subject is able to initiate a break with the order of means and ends, resulting in his life exposed to risks without the promise of redemption. In consequence, a community composed of devoted individuals is a community that remains open to the reconstruction of its solidarity that is less based upon the national, religious or cultural ties than every individual's dedication to others.

NOTES

[1] Neither Benslama nor the author of this paper has the intention to identify terrorists with Muslims.
[2] See also Marx Crépon's discussions on this point. Crépon 2013, 11-25.
[3] I refer to the following studies on the relation between Heidegger and the war experience. Altman 2012, 169-194. Losurdo 2001, 55-61.
[4] Sallis's commentary has not addressed this problem. Sallis 1990, 139-167.
[5] Patočka adopts the term *totale Mobilmachung* from Ernst Jünger. Patočka 1996, 114. Ernst Jünger 1993.
[6] Patočka prolongs his meditation on Socrates in his *Socrates* in 1946 where he writes that "[t]he awakening of the soul is an unending struggle, a struggle in which the awaken struggle for his proper person and which, nothing more than other moral struggle, is never definitely won, as long as he remains a breath of life." Patočka 2017, 187.
[7] My emphasis.
[8] I take the term "sacrificial victims" from Ucnik 2007.
[9] Heidegger also affirms that sacrifice reflects human freedom though he formulates the idea in a way very different from Patočka. Heidegger 2005: 236.
[10] From Palach's letter to the Union of Czechoslovak Writers on 16 January 1969. Access date 6 Sep 2018. http://www.janpalach.eu/en/default/jan-palach/priprava
[11] I refer to Speech of Pastor Jakub S. Trojan at Jan Palach's grave on 25 January 1969. "In this cynical century in which we are often scared by others and others are scared by us, in a century in which we are often startled at our own small-mindedness, he made us ask a question that can make great people of us: What did I do for others, what is my heart like, what is my aim, and what is the highest priority in my life?" Access date 6 Sep 2018. http://www.janpalach.eu/en/default/jan-palach/pohreb

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