Cognitivism and Motivation Internalism

Abstract

As a central thesis in metaethics, motivation internalism promises to explain the connection between moral judgement and motivation. Generally, it is defended both by non-cognitivists and cognitivists. While not accepting non-cognitivism, I ultimately reject any form of cognitivist position, which claims that cognitivism is not compatible with Hume’s psychology of motivation. Precisely, I argue that the connection between moral judgement and motivation is neither necessary nor internal. Based on the possibility of moral indifference, I counter the claim, namely that moral judgement is essentially motivational. Although, my goal is not to offer any positive explanation of the connection in question, but the result of my argument has implications on why we are better off accepting Hume’s psychology as cognitivists.

Keywords: motivation, internalism, metaethics, moral judgement, cognitivism