Experiences constituted by concepts
Abstract
This article intends to demonstrate how judgments in Husserl's phenomenology constitute themselves. For a better understanding, we will perform an analysis from the perceptual bases to the position-taken by the Ego. Although judgments characterized themselves by a position-taking, such a position-taking based itself on the constitutive foundation. The constitutive foundation involves a noetic (thematising, the constituting) and a noematic (thematised, the constituted) structure. Therefore, while judgments can be representative of a natural attitude, an objective attitude, they can constitute an open attitude as well. Such a constitutive structure reveals that our judgments, although they assume a permanent style, does not mean that they are determinative of the character, for the Ego can always decide otherwise. Notwithstanding as long as they remain a habit, they do portray the person in her personal character.
Keywords: cognitive phenomenology; explanatory gap; phenomenal concepts; inverted spectra; mental constitution
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